Woman/Women

See Synagogue
See Remarriage
See Mohel
See Sheitl
See Aliyah
includes discussion of beged ish

MRR 52-56

WOMEN WEARING A TALIT

QUESTION:

In some of our congregations it is the custom that whoever comes up to the pulpit to participate in the service puts on a talit. In young people’s services for our high schools, boys and girls participate and often the girl puts on the talit at that occasion. According to Jewish law and tradition, is it proper for a girl to wear a talit at service? (Asked by Rabbi Harry J. Stern, Montreal, Canada.)

ANSWER:

THE COMMANDMENT to wear a talit with fringes is based upon Numbers 15:37-41. Upon the basis of this commandment the anonymous baraita in Menachot 43a says that women, too, are in duty bound to wear the garment with fringes. However, Rabbi Simon there says they are free from that obligation. He bases his opinion upon the fact that Scripture, in the passage in Numbers, uses the phrase, “Ye shall see them and remember,” etc. Since Scripture says, “Ye shall see them,” that proves that the proper time for talit and tsitsit is the daytime and not the nighttime. This conclusion puts the commandment to wear fringes into the special class of positive commandments “limited by time” (sheh hazman gerama) and it is a general rule that women are free from the obligation to fulfill such positive commandments as are dependent upon time. Of course, being free from the obligation to fulfill the commandment of fringes does not mean that they are forbidden to wear them. It means only that they are not in duty bound to wear them.

When the law is discussed in the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 17:2, Joseph Caro says, following Rabbi Simon in the Talmud (quoted above) that women and slaves are free from putting on the fringes, since it is a commandment based upon time; but Isserles adds: “At all events, if they wish to put on the fringed garment and even recite the blessing over it, they are free to do so, as is the case with all time-limited positive commandments” (that is, they are not compelled to obey, but they are permitted to do so if they wish). However, he adds, if they do put them on, it would appear to be a show of extra pride of piety ( yohorah). But if they are not to put it on because it would look like a show of extra pride of piety on their part, then it becomes necessary to explain the fact that women observe the commandment of the lulav and recite blessings over it. Is not the lulav also a positive commandment limited by time? The explanation of this difference is given by the Magen David that the lulav is a stricter commandment than the fringes because if a person does not have a square garment (the fringes must be on the corners of a fourcornered garment ) he need not put fringes on at all. It is true that it is now our custom to wear always a talit katan with four corners and fringes. Nevertheless, according to law, it is only if a man has a fourcornered garment that he must put fringes on. In other words, the obligation depends on the garment. But with regard to the lulau, a man must get a lulav and say the blessings. In this case the obligation is incumbent upon the man himself (chovat gavra) not on whether he has the object or not; he must get it if he lacks it.

One of the later decisors, Jechiel Epstein, in his Aruch Hashulchan, Orach Chayim 17, says that we should not allow women to put on the fringed talit. But then Epstein has the problem of explaining why women bless the lulav and formally eat the matzah at the Seder, which are positive commandments limited by time. He explains by saying that these positive time limited commandments come only once a year, but the talit should be worn every day.

However, all the great (and earlier) authorities permit it. The only question that seems to divide the earlier authorities (none of whom doubt the right of women to put on the talit) is the question as to whether when a woman puts on the talit, she may make the regular blessing or not. There is a full discussion of this problem in the Tosfot to Rosh Hashanah 33a, s.v., “Ha.” This Tosfot is mainly the opinion of Rabbenu Tarn. The discussion is on the general principle of whether anyone (such as women and the blind) who is free from the obligation to fulfill “positive commandments limited by time” should (when he fulfills such commandments voluntarily) pronounce the blessing over them or not. The Tosfot is based mainly on the discussion in Baba Kama 87a, where Rabbi Joseph, who was blind, had voluntarily fulfilled such commandments as he was not obligated to fulfill. See, also, the Tosfot in Erubin 96a, s.v., “Michal,” where the Tosfot discusses the statement in the Talmud that Michal, the daughter of Kushi (or the daughter of King Saul) used to put on tefilin, and the wife of Jonah used to make the festival pilgrimage to Jerusalem. Both of these were “positive commandments limited by time.” Rabbenu Tarn holds the opinion that women may pronounce the blessing over the fringed talit. But Maimonides in Yad Hilchot Tsitsit, III, 9, says that women may put on the fringes if they wish, yet may not say the blessing, and he adds, “So with all the other positive commandments that women are free from, if they wish to fulfill them without reciting the blessings, we do not prevent them.” The Hagahot Maimoni at that passage in the Yad says in the name of Rashi that he, too, was opposed to their reciting the blessing.

So the law is clear enough: One authority believes that a woman is actually in duty bound to wear the fringes. All agree that she may wear them if she wishes to, except for the limitation that it might look like the pride of extra piety. This solitary objection can hardly apply to the young women if we put a talk upon them. They would simply consider it part of the ceremony. Besides, in our Reform movement where special emphasis is placed upon the religious equality of men and women, there can be no real objection in young women putting on the talit when they participate in the service.

CORR 123-126

LADY’S PANTS SUITS

QUESTION:

The historic congregation in Curacao is constantly visited by vistors from American cruise ships. Many of the ladies, as is the modern custom, wear pants suits. Some of the traditional-minded members of the congregation object to this type of clothing as a violation of the Biblical prohibition of women wearing men’s clothing. Rabbi Malcolm Stern, to whom they spoke, reminded them that in Morocco and elsewhere in North Africa, pants suits were the traditional garments of women. However, Rabbi Stern suggested that the status of the law be more fully discussed.

ANSWER:

IT IS EXTREMELY difficult to discuss the matter of modern women’s clothing on the basis of Halachic precedent. After all, the social situation and the social mood have changed so drastically since ancient times that it is difficult for a modern man to grasp the relevance of these ancient laws. Nevertheless, the laws had a most worthy intention and deserve our understanding and even our acceptance, whenever that is possible for us.

The law stems from Deuteronomy 22, verse 5, which states: “A woman shall not wear that which pertaineth unto a man, neither shall a man put on woman’s garments, for whosoever doeth these things is an abomination unto the Lord thy God.” Now, why should men’s clothing on a woman or women’s clothing on a man be, as Scripture says, an “abomination?” Rashi explains it quite clearly. He says the change of clothing was in order that a woman could mingle among men, and that could only be for the purpose of adultery. Of course when one thinks of the complete separation of men and women in the earlier centuries, certainly a woman circulating in men’s disguise among men might be justly suspect.

But can we truthfully say that today? It is true that there is a great relaxation of moral standards nowadays. But in spite of that, can we truthfully declare that a woman who wears a pants suit wears it with an immoral intent? If that were the intent, surely many of the modern mini-skirts and other such garments are much more provocative of sexual looseness.

We must therefore judge this particular garment on the basis of intent. As a matter of fact, this approach is justified by Jewish law. The oldest Halachic source, after Scripture itself, is the Sifre, and the Sifre on this passage (paragraph #226) says: “Does that mean that men may not wear colored cloth because women wear it? Certainly not. The key word is the Biblical word ‘abomination.’ If the garment is worn for the abominable purpose of secretly moving among the other sex, that is the ‘abomination,’ and that is the prohibition.” So, too, the Talmud (Nazir 59a) says there is no “abomination” in the wearing of the garments, but only if they wear them in order to mingle in each other’s groups. In other words, we must judge by the intent.

A further proof that we judge by intent was the relation of the Rabbi to the masking and hilarity of Purim. On Purim often men would dress in women’s clothes and women would dress in men’s clothes, and Rabbi Judah Mintz of Padua, in his responsum # 17 says that there is no objection to it on Purim because there is no other intention involved but rejoicing. So Moses Isserles, the great Ashkenazic authority, discussing the dressing up on Purim in Orah Hayyim 696:8 says, “As for the custom to wear masks on Purim and men wearing garments of a woman and a woman wearing garments of a man, there is no prohibition in this matter since the intention is only joy.” See also Ozar Dinim u-Minhagim, page 337, column 1. So the purpose of the type of clothing must always be taken into consideration.

There is also another way to consider the modern problem. The law forbidding a man to wear a woman’s garments was extended to forbid a man to use any of the feminine devices of beauty culture. The Shulchan Aruch in Yore Deah 182:6 says that a man may not even pluck out one white hair from his black beard and he may not use a depilatory on his arm-pits. All these are forbidden because they are cosmetic devices of women. Nevertheless, the Shulchan Aruch itself says that where it is the custom for men to remove the bodily hairs, there is no objection to it.

In other words, we must judge these matters by what has become the prevailing custom. Rabbi Stern, therefore, was quite right in calling attention to the fact that wearing pants suits was the established custom of the North African women. Similarly, might we not be justified then in saying that the pants suit is no longer an exceptional garment worn by some bold woman to attract attention, but by now has become established as a normal type of women’s garments, and therefore may be considered as no longer violative of the law in Deuteronomy?

As we said at the beginning, the whole mood of modern life is so different from the life in ancient times that it is hard to apply a law which was so deeply rooted in vanished moods and social attitudes. But this much we can say: If the garment is not for the purpose of, as Scripture says, “abomination,” and if, also, it has become established as a woman’s garment, then I believe that we can no longer object to it on Halachic grounds.

A similar decision on this question was arrived at by Obadiah Joseph, Chief Sephardic Rabbi of Tel Aviv. He says it is “better than miniskirts.” (Published in Or HaMizrach, Tishri 5733, p. 37. He cites the Schach and the Bach to Yore Deah 182.)

rrt 216-220

MARITAL RIGHTS OF A RAPED WOMAN

QUESTION:

If a married woman is raped, is the husband required to divorce her? What, in general, is the status in Jewish law of a woman who is the victim of a rapist? (Asked by S.S.)

ANSWER:

THE PROBLEMS, marital and legal, involved in the crime of rape are being discussed nowadays quite frequently and heatedly. This is true partly because of the general laxity of present-day morals and also because many social-minded people, and especially advocates of women’s rights, protest the present treatment by the civil authorities of a woman who declares that she is the victim of rape. The charge is often made that the police question the woman in such a way as to imply that she was not raped at all but had consented to, or even encouraged, the sexual encounter. For all these reasons, it becomes rather important nowadays to analyze the status in Jewish law of a woman who is raped or who says that she has been raped.

The laws on this matter go all through Jewish legal literature, beginning with the Bible, continuing in the Talmud, and finding permanent place in the Codes, such as the Shulchan Aruch and Maimonides. It becomes clear, even from a cursory reading of the material involved, that Jewish law has maintained an attitude which is precisely the opposite of that imputed to the legal authorities today. That is to say, Jewish law, from the very beginning, comes to the defense of the woman who is raped or who claims to be raped. The Bible, in Deuteronomy 22:29, says that if a man rapes an unmarried woman, he must pay a fine and then must marry her and may never divorce her. The Mishnah repeats this law in Ketubos 3:4. The Talmud, discussing the matter in Ketubos 39b, says that the rapist must pay for the pain and shame that he has caused, and must marry his victim even if she is blind or lame (or deformed). The Shulchan Aruch, in Even Hoezer 177:3, modifies this law as follows: The rapist must marry the girl provided the father and the girl both consent to the marriage. And the Shulchan Aruch continues that if he divorces her, he must be compelled to take her back again.

Of course, rabbinical courts today do not deal with such matters. They confine themselves to cases in civil law, such as contracts, debts, etc., but do not consider that they still have the right to deal with criminal law, such as murder, rape, etc. (see Choshen Mishpot # 1) . Nevertheless, it is the decision of the scholars that the rapist, while he can no longer be legally compelled to do so, should be pressured to marry her (of course, as the Shulchan Aruch says, if she consents to be married to him). (See article “Anussa” in Ozar Yisroel.)

All this applies to an unmarried girl who is the victim of rape. But what if the victim is a married woman? Is there any reason in the law for the husband to divorce her? The questioner has the impression that this is so. This impression has some logic since it is based upon a clear analogy, namely, that if a woman is voluntarily and definitely immoral, her husband must dvorce her. The question asked here is therefore the following: Does this duty to divorce her apply to a woman who is the victim of rape? Definitely not! The Talmud in Ketubos 51b, discusses the matter and clearly states that if a wife is the victim of rape, she is permitted to continue as wife to her husband. The ground for this permission is the general principle in rabbinic law that a person under compulsion is forgiven whatever sin he may have committed {onus rachmona patray). In fact the Talmud says that if she is being raped but during the process yields and participates willingly, even then she is to be forgiven because her desire has overcome her.

So the Shulchan Aruch, in Even Hoezer 6:11, states as a law that a woman who is raped is permitted to remain married to her husband. See Be’er Hetev, ibid., who says it is obvious (pashut) that she is permitted to remain his wife. The Encyclopedia Talmudis (s.v. “Anussa”) refers to some authorities who are in doubt as to whether the husband need divorce his wife. But actually their doubts concern only the question of whether the wife was really raped or not. Yet even as to such doubts, the presumption of the law is that her statement is generally to be accepted as true. Of course if it is certain that she had been raped, then all authorities agree that the husband may keep her as his wife.

The Shulchan Aruch, stating this law, adds, however, that if her husband is a priest, she is not permitted to remain married to him. This exception is due to the special laws of ritual sanctity that surround the priesthood. For example, it is not a sin for a woman to be a divorcee, yet a priest may not marry a divorcee. In other words, the priest must follow special laws of sanctity which do not necessarily reflect upon the character of a wife.

It is interesting that even with regard to a raped woman and a priestly husband, there is a variation of the law which indicates that the attitude of Jewish law is exactly opposite to that which is imputed to present day authorities. This variation is found in Even Hoezer 6:13. If it is proved definitely that the woman was raped, then, as has been stated, the priest may not retain her as wife, just as he may not marry a divorced woman. But if there is no proof, but she declared that she has been raped, the priest may continue to keep her as a wife, although after the priest dies his widow may not marry any other priest because of doubt.

Also related to the above discussion is the question of a captive woman. Here, too, the question rises of Jewish women taken into captivity and the presumption that they are raped as helpless captives. May the husband keep a captive woman after she is ransomed? These questions are discussed in the Shulchan Aruch, Even Hoezer 7, and it is clear that the slightest proof that the woman has remained pure is accepted both for Israelite and priestly husband. See especially the famous responsum of Meir of Rothenburg in Responsa Literature, pp. 99 ff.

To sum up: Contrary to the alleged attitude of present-day civil authorities, Jewish law from the very beginning has always been on the side of the woman victim. If she is unmarried, the rapist must marry her if she consents to the marriage. If she is a married woman, the husband may keep her, unless he is a priest, for priests are subject to special laws which do not reflect upon the character of the woman.

TRR 77-79

WOMEN AS PALL BEARERS

QUESTION:

According to Jewish law and tradition, may women serve as pall bearers in a funeral? (Asked by Vigdor W Kavaler.)

ANSWER:

It is difficult to give a definite answer to this question since it involves the general status of women in Jewish law, which is in itself rather complicated and often vague. But if we take up the question element by element, we may be able to come to an adequate conclusion.

1. Is pall bearing a religious duty? Definitely it is to be so considered. The law states that when a person has the duty of burying his dead (“He whose dead lies before him”) he is free from fulfilling all other religious duties such as, for example, the recital of the prayers, etc., because “when one is engaged in a mitzvah, he is free from another mitzvah.” The Mishnah (Berakhot 3:1) then discusses whether the pall bearers, too, are free from the recital or prayers during their service as pall bearers; and the answer is that those who are actual pall bearers necessary for the carrying of the coffin (i.e., not honorary pall bearers) are free from the need to recite the prayers, just as the chief mourner is. So it is clear that the actual pall bearing is a mitzvah which, at a time when it must be accomplished, is paramount.

2. Are women in duty bound to fulfill this mitzvah? The general rule is that women are free from the obligation of fulfilling such mitzvot which are determined by a fixed time as, for example, the shema that must be recited at a certain hour (Eruvin 27a). Yet participating in a funeral procession cannot be considered under the rule of “a mitzvah that is fixed by time.” The Talmud in Eruvin, discussing this principle, mentions such commandments as a redemption of a first-born as not being a commandment fixed by time, although it must occur thirty days after the birth of the first-born. What the rule “fixed by time” actually means is that it is the commandments fixed by calendar or by hours from which women are free, but not such commandments that come at a certain time through chance or accident. Of course, even with regard to those commandments that are fixed by time which are described as not being obligatory on women, if a woman wishes to fulfill them, she is not prohibited to do so.

3. Is there a general objection to women participating in a funeral procession? Certainly not in Biblical times. It was the custom to provide women mourners (singers of dirges) to weep at the funeral (II Chronicles 35:25). This custom continued in the Mishnah (Qedushin 4:4) and indeed the requirement is still mentioned in the Shulhan Arukh (Even Haezer 89:1). Moreover, the Talmud speaks of a definite custom for women to march in the funeral procession, and says that it depends upon the local custom whether they march in front of the coffin, or whether they march behind it (Sanhedrin 20a). However; the Shulhan Arukh (Yoreh Deah 359.2) giving this rule that women may either precede a coffin or follow it, adds that it would be better to keep women entirely away from the funeral procession. This negative attitude is based upon the Zohar as quoted by Caro himself to this passage in the Thr. However, we need not be too concerned with the Kabbalistic anxiety about possible immoral thoughts in seeing women march in the funeral procession. We follow the common sense statement of the Tosfot to the passage in Sanhedrin which says that since the funeral is a time of sadness, we need not be concerned that there will be immoral thoughts at the sight of women in the procession.

To sum up: Pall bearing is a definite commandment but not one fixed by calendar or by hour and therefore it cannot be said that women are not obligated to fulfill it. From earliest time, too, women participated in the funeral ceremony as chanters of dirges and by walking in the procession. We may, therefore, not hesitate in modern times to permit women to serve occasionally as pall bearers.

ARR 24-43-2

CCAR RESPONSA

American Reform Responsa

8. Ordination of Women

(Vol. XXXII, 1922, pp. 156-177)

The very raising of this question is due, no doubt, to the great changes in the general position of women, brought about during the last half century or so. Women have been admitted to other professions, formerly practiced by men only, and have proven themselves successful as regards personal achievement as well as raising the standards or furthering the interests of the professions. Hence the question suggested itself, why not admit women also to the rabbinical profession?

The question resolves itself into the following two parts: first, the attitude of traditional Judaism on this point, and second, whether Reform Judaism should follow tradition in this regard. At the outset it should be stated that from the point of view of traditional Judaism there is an important distinction between the rabbinate and the other professions in regard to the admission of women. In the case of the other professions there is nothing inherent in their teachings or principles which might limit their practice to men exclusively. In the case of the rabbinate, on the other hand, there are, as will soon be shown, definite teachings and principles in traditional Judaism, of which the rabbinate in the exponent, which demand that its official representatives and functionaries be men only. To admit women to the rabbinate is, therefore, not merely a question of liberalism; it is contrary to the very spirit of traditional Judaism which the rabbinate seeks to uphold and preserve.

It should be stated further, that these traditional principles debarring women from the rabbinate were not formulated in an illiberal spirit by the Rabbis of old or out of a lack of appreciation of women’s talents and endowments. Indeed the Rabbis of old entertained a high opinion of womanhood and frequently expressed their admiration for woman’s ability and appreciated her great usefulness in religious work. Thus, e.g., they say, “God has endowed woman with a finer appreciation and a better understanding than man” (Nida 45b); “Sarah was superior to Abraham in prophecy” (Tanchuma, Exodus, beginning); “It was due to the pious women of that generation that the Israelites were redeemed from Egypt” (Sota); and “The women were the first ones to receive and accept the Torah” (Tanchuma, Buber, Metsora, 18, p. 27a); and “They refused to participate in the making of the golden calf.” These and many other sayings could be cited from Rabbinic literature in praise of woman, her equality to man and, in some respects, superiority to him. So we may safely conclude that their excluding of women from the rabbinate does not at all imply depreciation on their part of woman’s worth.

But with all their appreciation of woman’s fine talents and noble qualities, the Rabbis of old have also recognized that man and woman have each been assigned by the Torah certain spheres of activity, involving special duties. The main sphere of woman’s activity and her duties centered in the house. Since she has her own duties to perform, and since especially in her position as wife and mother she would often be prevented from carrying on many of the regular activities imposed upon man, the law frees her from many religious obligations incumbent upon men, and especially exempts her from such positive duties the performance of which must take place at certain fixed times, like reciting the “Shema” or at prescribed seasons, like Sukkot (M. Kiddushin 1.7): “Vechol mitsvat aseh shehazeman geramah, anashim chayavim venashim peturut.”

This fact, that she was exempt from certain obligations and religious duties, necessarily excluded her from the privilege of acting as the religious leader or representative of the congregation (Sheliach Tsibur). She could not represent the congregation in the performing of certain religious functions, since, according to the Rabbinic principle, one who is not personally obliged to perform a certain duty, cannot perform that duty on behalf of others and certainly cannot represent the congregation in the performance of such duties: “Kol she-eino mechuyav badavar eino motsi et harabim yedei chovatan” (R.H. III.8; Berachot 20b).

On the same principle, she was expressly disqualified from writing Torah scrolls. Since she could not perform for the congregation the duty of reading from the Torah, the text prepared by her was also not qualified for use in connection with the performance of that duty (Gittin, 45b; Mas. Soferim 1.14). Women were also considered exempt from the obligation to study the Torah (Eruvin 27a; Kiddushin 29b-30a). Some Rabbis even went so far as to object to women studying the Torah (M. Sota III.4). This opinion, of course, did not prevail. Women were taught the Bible and given a religious education, and there were some women learned in the law even in Talmudic times. But to use the phrase of the Talmud (M.K. 18a), “Isha bei midrasha la shechicha,” women were not to be found in the Beit Hamidrash, in the academies and colleges where the rabbis assembled and where the students prepared themselves to be rabbis. Evidently, the reason that they could not aspire to be rabbis, was that the law excluded them from this religious office.

This law, that women cannot be rabbis, was always taken for granted in the Talmud. It was considered to be so generally known and unanimously agreed upon that it was not even deemed necessary to make it a special subject of discussion. The very idea of a woman becoming a rabbi never even entered the mind of the Rabbis of old. It is for this reason that we find only few direct and definite statements to the effect that women cannot be rabbis. Only occasionally, when the discussion of other questions involved the mentioning of it, reference–direct or indirect–is made to the established law that women cannot act as judges or be rabbis. Thus, in a baraita (Pal. TalmudShevu-ot 4.1, 35b, and Sanhedrin 4.10, 21c) it is stated “Harei lamedan sheha-isha einah dana,” “We have learned that a woman cannot act as judge,” i.e., cannot render decisions of law. The same principle is also indirectly expressed in the Mishna (comp. Nida 6.4 and Shevu-ot 4.1). In the Talmud (Gittin 5b), it is also indirectly stated that a woman cannot be a member of a Beit Din, i.e., a rabbi or judge. For there it is taken for granted that she could not be one of three who form a tribunal or Beit Din to pass upon the correctness of a bill of divorce or of any other document (see Rashi, ad loc.).

In the Midrash (Num. R. 10.5) it is also quoted as a well-known and established principle that women may not have the authority to render decisions in religious or ritual matters: “Shehanashim einam benot hora-a.” These Talmudic principles have been accepted by all medieval Jewish authorities. Maimonides (Yad, Sanhedrin II.7) declares that the members of every tribunal or Beit Din in Israel, which means every rabbi, dayan, or moreh hora-a in Israel must possess the same qualities which characterized the men whom Moses selected to be his associates and whom he appointed judges and leaders in Israel. These qualities, Maimonides continues, are expressly stated in theTorah, as it is said: “Get you from each one of your tribes men, wise and understanding and full of knowledge, and I will make them heads over you” (Deut. 1:13). Maimonides here has in mind the idea, entertained by the rabbis of all generations, that the rabbis of each generation continue the activity and are the recipients of the spirit of those first religious leaders of the Jewish people. For, as is well known, Mosheh Rabbenu and the Seventy Elders who formed his Council were considered the prototypes and the models of the rabbis of all subsequent generations (comp. Mishna, R.H. II.9). Likewise, R. Aaron Halevi of Barcelona (about 1300 C.E.) in his Sefer Hachinuch(nos. 74, 75, 77, 79, 81, 83), Jacob Asheri in Tur, Choshen Mishpat VII, and Joseph Caro in Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat VII.3–all expressly state the principle that a woman cannot officiate as judge or rabbi. It hardly need be stated that when some of the sources use in this connection the term “Judge” (dayan) they, of course, mean rabbi, for which dayan is but another name. In rabbinic terminology the functions of a rabbi are spoken of as being “ladin ulehorot,” to judge and decide religious and ritual questions. And even in our modern rabbinical diploma we use the formula “Yoreh yoreh, yadin yadin,” giving the candidate whom we ordain the authority to judge and decide religious questions and to give authoritative ruling in all religious matters. To be sure, the Rabbis do permit the women to be religious teachers, like Miriam, who, according to the Rabbis, taught the women while Moses and Aaron taught the men (Sifrei Zuta, quoted inYalkut Shim-oni, Behaalotecha, 741 end), and Deborah, whom the Rabbis believed to have been merely teaching the law (Seder Eliyahu R. IX-X, Friedman, p. 50; compare also Tosafot, B.K. 15a, s.v. “asher tasim” and parallels). Some authorities would put certain restrictions upon woman even in regard to her position as teacher (see Kiddushin 82a, and Maimonides, Yad, Talmud Torah II.4), but in general, the opinion of the Rabbis was that women may be teachers of religion (see Chinuch, 152, and comp. Azulai in Birkei Yosef to Choshen Mishpat VII.12); and as a matter of fact, there have always been learned women in Israel. These women-scholars were respected for their learning in the same manner as learned men were respected (see Sefer Chasidim, 978, and comp. also Sede Chemed I, letter Kaf, no. 99), and some of these women scholars would occasionally even give lectures in rabbinics; but they have never been admitted to the rabbinate, since all the rabbinic authorities agree, at least implicitly, that women cannot hold the office of a rabbi or of a Sheliach Tsibur and cannot perform any of the official functions requiring the authority of a rabbi.

This is the attitude of traditional Judaism towards the question of women rabbis, a view strictly adhered to by all Jewry all over the world throughout all generations, even unto this day.

Now we come to the second part of our question; that is, shall we adhere to this tradition, or shall we separate ourselves from Catholic Israel and introduce radical innovation which would necessarily create a distinction between the title Rabbi as held by a Reform rabbi and the title Rabbi in general? I believe that hitherto no distinction could rightly be drawn between the ordination of our modern rabbis and the ordination of all the rabbis of preceding generations. We are still carrying on the activity of the Rabbis of old who traced their authority through a chain of tradition to Moses and the Elders associated with him, even though in many points we interpret our Judaism in a manner quite different from theirs. We are justified in considering ourselves the latest link in that long chain of authoritative teachers who carry on their activity of teaching, preserving, and developing Judaism. For our time we have the same standing as they had (comp. R.H. 25a). The ordination which we give to our disciples carries with it, for our time and generation, the same authority which marked the ordination given by Judah Hanasi to Abba Areka or the ordination given by any teacher in Israel to his disciples throughout all the history of Judaism.

We should therefore not jeopardize the hitherto indisputable authoritative character of our ordination. We should not make our ordination entirely different in character from the traditional ordination, and thereby give the larger group of Jewry that follows traditional Judaism a good reason to question our authority and to doubt whether we are rabbis in the sense in which this honored title was always understood.

Nor is there, to my mind, any actual need for making such a radical departure from this established Jewish law and time-honored practice. The supposed lack of a sufficient number of rabbis will not be made up by this radical innovation. There are other and better means of meeting this emergency. This could be accomplished if our rabbis would follow the advice of the men of the Great Synagogue, to raise many disciples and thus encourage more men to enter the ministry. And the standard of the rabbinate in America, while no doubt it could be improved in many directions, is certainly not so low as to need a new and refining influence such as the influence brought by women to any profession they enter. Neither could women, with all due respect to their talents and abilities, raise the standard of the rabbinate. Nay, all things being equal, women could not even raise it to the high standard reached by men, in this particular calling. If there is any calling which requires a wholehearted devotion to the exclusion of all other things and the determination to make it one’s whole life work, it is the rabbinate. It is not to be considered merely as a profession by which one earns a livelihood. Nor is it to be entered upon as a temporary occupation. One must choose it for his life work and be prepared to give to it all his energies and to devote to it all the years of his life, constantly learning and improving and thus growing in it. It has been rightly said that the woman who enters a profession must make her choice between following her chosen profession or the calling of mother and home-maker. She cannot do both well at the same time. This certainly would hold true in the case of the rabbinical profession. The woman who naturally and rightly looks forward to the opportunity of meeting the right kind of man, of marrying him, and of having children and a home of her own, cannot give to the rabbinate that wholehearted devotion which comes from the determination to make it one’s life work. For in all likelihood she could not continue it as a married woman. For, one holding the rabbinical office must teach by precept and example, and must give an example of Jewish family and home life where all the traditional Jewish virtues are cultivated. The rabbi can do so all the better when he is married and has a home and a family of his own. The wife whom God has made as helpmate to him can be, and in most cases is, of great assistance to him in making his home a Jewish home, a model for the congregation to follow. In this important activity of the rabbi–exercising a wholesome influence upon the congregation–the woman rabbi would be deficient. The woman in the rabbinical office could not expect the man to whom she was married to be merely a helpmate to her, assisting her in her rabbinical activities. And even if she could find such a man, willing to take a subordinate position in the family, the influence upon the families in the congregation of such an arrangement in the home and in the family life of the rabbi would not be very wholesome. (Not to mention the fact that if she is to be a mother she could not go on with her regular activities in the congregation.) And there is, to my mind, no injustice done to woman by excluding her from this office. There are many avenues open to her if she chooses to do religious or educational work. I can see no reason why we should make this radical departure from traditional practice except the specious argument that we are modern men and, as such, we recognize the full equality of women to men, hence we should be thoroughly consistent. But I would not class the rabbis with those people whose main characteristic is consistency.

Jacob Z. Lauterbach

Discussion

Rabbi Levinger: I feel very strongly on this question. When we look at the various denominations in this country who are opposed to ordaining women as ministers we find that they are those who, like the Episcopalians and the Catholics, look upon their ministers as priests. To us the rabbi is merely a teacher and preacher. The question is not whether there are a great many women who want to become rabbis. Perhaps there are none at all. But we are called upon to act on a matter of principle, and if in the next thirty or forty years we produce but one Anna Howard Shaw, we want her in the rabbinate.

Rabbi Witt: I was present at the meeting of the Board of Governors when the matter came up, and it was decided to refer it to the Conference. After reading the responsa that were prepared by Rabbi Lauterbach, I feared that there would be much opposition. I trust that our action in this matter will be unanimous. It is not a matter of tradition at all. I must confess I was not in the least interested in Rabbi Lauterbach’s presentation. It seemed reactionary to me. I did not feel that it was the proper presentation of the subject.

I need not say that I honor Dr. Lauterbach for the learning contained therein, but the point he presents is not the point at issue. We have witnessed the revolution in the status of women. Five years ago I had to argue in favor of women’s rights when that question came up in the Arkansas legislature, but I did not feel that there would be need to argue that way in a liberal body of men like this.

There is a principle involved, and I hope that the stand we take will be one in line with all the progressive tendencies of our day; that we will have the vision to see what is before us. From the standpoint of today, shall we say to women that they shall not have the right to function as we are functioning?

The question is: Have they the qualifications to function as spiritual leaders?

What does it require to be a spiritual guide? It requires a great spirit and the quality of leadership. Some women have it and some women have not. Some men have it and some men have not. If we had a great leadership we would not have the questions which were so ably presented yesterday among the practical questions of the ministry. The one thing that was stressed was that if we had devoted leaders who could inspire following, all the problems would vanish.

I believe that this body of men should do nothing that would stand in the way of any forward movement in behalf of the womanhood of America. I cannot believe that a religion that is so splendidly spiritual and forward-looking as our religion will stand in the way of such a movement. I feel that this Conference can only act in one way, and that is to fall in line with what is the destiny of the women of the future.

Rabbi Weiss: In a large measure I agree with the previous speakers. I agree with all that has been said in favor of ordaining women as rabbis. I believe I am second to none in the rabbinate in the matter of idealism. But a vast measure of compromise must enter into all situations of life. I do not believe that we can have life exactly as we would like to have it. There is a vast debt due to cold austere justice, but there are fourteen million Jews in the world, and they must be considered. In the city of New York alone there are a million and a half who look upon you with a degree of respect but who have their own mode of procedure and who would look upon any radical action on your part as a line of cleavage in the House of Israel. I merely mean that we should proceed slowly. I believe that some compromise can be effected, such as allowing women to be teachers or superintendents; but I believe that it would be unwise at the present time to have them ordained as rabbis. Let me give one concrete illustration. Suppose a woman were to sign a marriage document. To many in New York today such a ceremony would hardly be recognized as binding.

Rabbi Brickner: There is much merit in what Dr. Lauterbach has said. He has not stressed the question of opinion, but the question of practicability. Modern psychologists agree that women do not differ from men so much in intellect. In fact, experiments prove that women are the peers of most men. There are women occupying positions in modern industry in which they could not be equaled by many men. It is not a question of equality. All that Dr. Lauterbach has said has already been said against women entering other professions. The question with us is one of practicability. The tendency in modern Judaism is to conserve Jewish values. We wish to be in touch with the masses of Jewish people. When I came away from Toronto the other day I clipped from the newspaper the vote of the Methodist Church in Canada. It represents the liberal traditions in Canada. And yet it voted by a small majority against permitting women into the ministry. It is not a question of principle or equality–on that we are all agreed. It is purely a question of practicability.

Rabbi Charles S. Levi: The matter before you is not a matter of the hour, but a matter of all times. It is a matter that touches upon the acknowledged leadership of our people, and reaches the lives of uncounted thousands of our American co-religionists. We are the links in the chain of time. We are the spokesmen who give expression to the great truths which bind the past to the future, and it is for us to keep alive the chain of tradition.

Rabbi Rauch: I listened with great interest to Dr. Lauterbach’s presentation and was at first inclined to agree with him, but as he proceeded it struck me that there was a great omission. He gave a fine presentation of the traditional point of view and even hinted at certain modern needs, but I regret to say that he failed to touch on what Reform Judaism has to say on the subject. And yet our whole interpretation of religious life is supposedly based on the principles of Reform Judaism. Now what has the philosophy of Reform Judaism to say in regard to woman? I know from experience because I was born in an Orthodox environment. There was a very clear line of distinction between the boy and the girl, and the education given to the boy and girl. The boy had to learn Scriptures, while the girl was not expected to learn them. Many duties were imposed upon the boy, few upon the girl. This went on for centuries. What happened when Reform came in? One by one the barriers separating the boy from the girl educationally began to be broken down. We admitted the girls into the same schools, and we tried to teach them the same things. Even in the important ceremony of Bar Mitzvah we brushed aside the traditional point of view and we said that the girl should be educated and confirmed the same as the boy. And in our congregations, which is the practical side of our religious life, we have given to women exactly the same status as to men. In my own congregation women conduct the summer services, and they conduct them just as well as–if not better than–they used to be when we got someone temporarily for the summer. In every line of endeavor in our temples we have proceeded on the theory that woman is the equal of man. What do they ask us to do? They want us to make it possible for women to work along the same lines as we men are working. We do not ask privileges for them. Let there be the same demands, the same rigorous training, and let the congregation decide whether the woman is doing the work well or not. I do not think that our course will be hurt by a liberal attitude.

Rabbi Englander: Personally, I was surprised to learn that the Board of Governors submitted this question to the Conference. I thought that after the faculty–a body composed of the teachers–had taken action, that would be sufficient guidance for action on the part of the Board of Governors. However, I wish to touch on one argument which has been raised to the effect that if we admit women as rabbis we would tend to create a schism in Israel. During all the conferences in recent years there have been many actions that we would not have taken had we feared this. We would not have set ourselves on record against Zionism. Had fear been taken into consideration, we would not have taken a stand on many subjects. Twenty years ago, this Conference put itself on record favoring absolute religious equality of women with men. Are we going back on our own action? In spite of all the arguments advanced by Dr. Lauterbach, the faculty set itself on record as favoring the ordination of women, although it stated that at the present time it believed it was impractical for women to enter the rabbinate. But I do not believe that the question of practicability is for us to decide. The only question before us is: Shall we, in the light of Reform Judaism, put ourselves in favor of admitting women to the rabbinate?

A motion is made that further discussion be discontinued.

Rabbi Morgenstern: I do not care to express any opinion upon this subject, because–you can readily understand–inasmuch as this question has been submitted by the College authorities to the Conference to get an expression of opinion, I am here rather to listen than to offer any opinion I myself may have. I realize that the time of the Conference is very precious and that you -cannot afford to give more time than is necessary to the discussion of this question, but I believe that the question is of such importance that it ought to justify the expenditure of as much time as may be necessary for a thorough discussion of the question. Several of the men lay emphasis upon the significance of the principle of not breaking with Catholic Israel. We have heard the arguments, but there are several valuable thoughts which have not yet been presented. And there is one phase of the question which has not been adequately discussed. We can all accept the opinion of Dr. Lauterbach as authoritative, namely, that from the point of view of traditional Judaism the ordination of women would not be permitted. We need not discuss that. But the practical aspect of the question has not been discussed. Namely, is it expedient, and is it worthwhile?

Rabbi Abrams: It seems to me that the question resolves itself into three parts. First, what is the principle? Second, is it consistent? Third, is it practical?

As a matter of principle, women ought to be ordained, as we now recognize that they are entitled to the same privileges and rights as men. Our ancestors never asked, is it practical? They asked, is it the will of God? And thus they settled the question for themselves. But we must ask the question, is it in keeping with the tradition of the past? In the whole paper of Rabbi Lauterbach we do not find the statement that women could not be ordained as rabbis. Indirectly we inferred that they may not be ordained because we do not find any women who were ordained. At the most, sentiment was against it; but sentiment has been against women going into many of the professions even today. But that does not mean that they should not be ordained or could not be according to traditional laws.

What is our ordination today? In spite of our claim that we are the descendants of the ancient Rabbis, we must admit that the function of the modern rabbi is entirely different from the function of the Rabbi of old. In olden times, he was the judge. That was his chief function. Preaching and teaching were secondary. If we were to lay claim to be lineal descendants of the ancient teachers, we must go to the prophets of the Bible. We are the followers of the prophets more than of the Rabbis. And if we would follow the example of the women of the Bible, we would find that many women served as prophets and that during Talmudic times many of them taught. So we are not inconsistent with the past if we put ourselves on record as favoring the ordination of women.

Rabbi Joseph L. Baron: I enjoyed thoroughly the scholarly paper of my teacher on the negative view of the question, and I shall not deny that the admission of women into the rabbinate will, like any innovation, shock some people and call forth opposition and ridicule. But I wish to point out several flaws in the negative argument. Professor Lauterbach intimates that the matter has hitherto never arisen as a practical issue because it has been taken for granted that a woman cannot, in the capacity of a rabbi, carry out, or represent the people in, a function in which she is not personally obliged to participate. How, then, can we infer from this that with the full entry of woman in all the religious functions of home and synagogue, she must still be denied the privilege of ordination? We broke with tradition long ago when we granted women an equal standing with men in all our religious functions.

I disagree entirely with the remark that by taking the proposed step, we shall create a schism. The Russian Jews, to whom reference has been made, do recognize and follow women leaders, as in the radical factions. And if women are not recognized as leaders in the Orthodox synagogue, let us not forget that neither are we recognized as such. There is a distinct difference made, even in the Yiddish terminology, between a Rav and a Rabbi. Again, we broke with tradition long ago when we declared that a rabbi need not be an authority on questions of kashrut; and I need not mention which, from the point of view of Orthodoxy, is the greater offense.

When I received the responsum of Dr. Lauterbach a week or two ago, I inquired as to the attitude of the members of a Unitarian Church in Moline, where a woman has been officiating for about half a year, and the reply was very favorable. That minister is not falling behind her male predecessors in her zeal and ability in handling all the problems of the church. So, as to the practicality of the matter, I believe that should be left entirely with the individual congregation.

Rabbi James G. Heller: I do not believe that the Conference has the right to appeal to its duty to “Catholic Israel” in order to settle this question. In the past, many decisions have been taken which evidenced no regard for mere keeping of the peace. The one question at issue, the one question that should be discussed by this Conference, is whether in principle the admission of women into the rabbinate is desirable, and whether it is in accordance with the historic teachings of Reform Judaism. The entire content of Dr. Lauterbach’s responsum can, to my mind, be summed up in that very logical inconsistency to which he refers toward the end of his paper in so laudatory a manner. He must complete the syllogism contained in his remarks. Since traditional Judaism, Orthodoxy, did not require women to perform certain duties or functions, did not permit them to share in certain duties or functions, did not permit them to share in certain religious acts, it could not allow them to become teachers of these same duties. And, per contra, since Reform Judaism requires and asks of women the performance of every religious duty in the catalogue, it cannot deny them the right to become teachers and preachers.

Rabbi Samuel S. Cohon: I wish to call your attention to the fact that in other professions there is a great deal of prejudice against women even where they administer with considerable success. You would imagine that women would welcome the services of women physicians; but in actual practice it is stated that women are more bitterly opposed to female practitioners than are men.

In the legal profession we also know that in many instances women are debarred from practice. But I believe that many of us who realize how much our wives have helped us, how they have cooperated with us, how they have borne many of the responsibilities, also realize that they should be given the opportunity to assume this work on their own accord, if they so desire. Of course, there will be prejudice against women in the rabbinate, but if one congregation is found that will welcome a woman, the opportunity should be granted.

Rabbi Frisch: We have made greater departures from tradition in Reform Judaism than the one which is before us, so we can afford to dismiss this question without further discussion. But I regard the ordination of women as the last step in the removal of restrictions in the Jewish faith. She is fitted by temperament and by all of her qualifications to the position of teacher, and she has been granted the right to participate in all our congregational activities as the equal of man. Civilization has had cause to regret every restriction which it has placed in the way of those who wanted to be free.

I have been wondering whether we are not denying ourselves a new source of strength, a new source of inspiration, by our reluctance to admit women to the rabbinate. I recognize the handicaps, but I believe that the women who surmount the obstacles will be greater spirits than the men who are in the rabbinate today. Will it be any greater reproach for a woman to give up the ministry for the sake of maternity than it is for a man to give it up to seek a livelihood in other work? I think it will be for a nobler reason. If we get women into our midst as rabbis, I believe that we will be enjoying some of the inspiration and strength which we feel we need. So I plead that we place ourselves on record as in full sympathy with a further emancipation of women by their ordination as rabbis in Israel.

Rabbi Stern: Emotionally I am conservative and I do not like to break with the past, but I cannot agree with Rabbi Lauterbach in this instance. Is it not essential for us first to decide what is the principle? I believe the practical will take care of itself. It is very interesting to note that in the city of New York a professor in the Seminary, the rabbi of an Orthodox congregation, had a Bar Mitzvah of girls. This is very interesting and shows that the other wing of Judaism is also making progress.

A motion that the opinions of members which have been sent in should be read

was introduced. The motion lost.

Rabbi Morgenstern: I think there is one possible source of information that we have not heard from and whose opinion would be very helpful to us. I mean the wives of the rabbis present. It would help us to get an expression of opinion from the women, if some of the wives would be willing to give us their ideas based on many years of experience in this work. I would ask that this opportunity be given to the ladies to express their opinions.

It was moved that the courtesy of the floor be extended to any of the ladies present who cared to take part in the discussion.

Mrs. Frisch: When I entered the hall this morning, I was opposed to the ordination of women as rabbis. I am now in favor of it. I have been much impressed with what I have heard.

The reason I was opposed to the ordination of women was what you would call the practical reason. I now feel that whatever practical reasons I may have had cannot be compared in value with the matter of principle which has been mentioned here this morning.

The practical reason that I had in mind was that I, as a wife and mother, did not understand how a woman could attend to the duties which devolve upon a rabbi and at the same time be a true home-maker. Candidly, I do not see at this moment how it can be accomplished. I cannot solve this question, but there may be some women who would prefer a life of celibacy in order to minister to a congregation.

Personally, I am selfish enough not to be willing to give up the happiness of wifehood and motherhood for this privilege, great though it may be. But I love the work of the rabbinate so much that could I have prevailed upon myself to forget the joys that come with home-making, I should have become a rabbi. I do not believe that privilege should be denied women, and it behooves us to go on record as being in favor of this development.

Miss Baron: I am connected with Jewish work in New York City and I know that since the Jewish woman has entered this work it has intensified the value of Jewish education. I believe that should the Jewish woman enter the rabbinate, she will be able to intensify the religious feeling of our people.

Mrs. Berkowitz: I am more than satisfied to be the silent member of our partnership, but I believe that it is the function of women to give spiritual value to the world, and especially the Jewish woman–imbued with the Jewish spirit–will naturally bring a certain quality to the ministry which some of our men lack. I think that might be enlarged and strengthened, and therefore should like to see our women become rabbis, if they wish to do so.

A motion that action on this resolution be postponed until next year lost.

A motion that a referendum vote of the members of be taken lost.

A motion that this resolution be referred to the Committee on resolutions lost.

Rabbi Joseph Leiser: The objections of Professor Lauterbach concerning the admission of Jewish women to the rabbinate are inadequate. His thesis, that the rabbinical profession is a career and involves the totality of life to the preclusion of even the function and offices of motherhood, is not valid and is no more applicable to the Jewish woman as rabbi than it is to the Jewish woman as lawyer, doctor, dentist, newspaper writer, musician, businesswoman, or teacher. In all these trades and professions, Jewish women are actively engaged beyond the consideration or limitations of sex and in spite of previous sex taboos. As a profession, the rabbinate ought to be open to women on a parity with that of men, provided women receive a degree for academic training carried on according to approved standards.

But my objection to the position maintained by Professor Lauterbach rests on more fundamental contentions than of sex discrimination in the rabbinate. The Professor fails to analyze the rabbinate in the light of its function and activity in the world today. He carries over into America, a modern America, the methodology and outlook of an Orthodox rabbi whose function is that of a lawyer, one who renders decisions in an ecclesiastical court from codes drawn up by established standards of behavior. Orthodox Judaism rests upon laws of conformity: one discharges his duties; one learns them and fulfills them. Whereas Reform Judaism releases the individual and enables him to realize his own nature, and therefore allows him to contribute whatever there is implanted within his soul and mind in humanity.

This difference in motivation is translated to the profession of the rabbi, as it is interpreted in Reform Judaism.

The mere repudiation of the authority of the Talmud and Shulchan Aruch is not sufficient to constitute one as a Reform rabbi; nor does the acceptance of these make one an Orthodox rabbi. To be sure, the Orthodox rabbi is learned in the law, since the very nature and constitution of his profession require it. But the Reform rabbi is not primarily a legal expert. The modern rabbinate has become an institution, just as the synagogue has developed functions other than those pertaining to worship and the discharging of ceremonial observances. In these days it serves more than one purpose, and therefore requires more than one type of professional labor.

The variety of activities that are now released in the ordinary synagogue calls for a number of workers, all of whom must be filled with the knowledge of God. The new work recently developed in the synagogue appeals particularly to the woman, who by nature and training is singularly fitted to undertake it.

It will be said in rebuttal that while the need and ability of these modern activities within the synagogue may require the professional assistance of women, these functions do not require the training and professional equipment of a rabbi. This is a mistake. Mere inclination provides access to those qualities of emotionalism and undisciplined enthusiasm which endanger the assistance of a woman. Professional training is required for the expert in the religious institution of the synagogue. In the departments of education, as our synagogues are elaborating them, a Jewish woman is particularly well qualified, providing her training in rabbinics is grounded in a thorough knowledge of the literature.

A Jewish woman is the logical adjunct to young people’s societies and organizations, and no synagogue is complete without these new features.

The social activities of a congregation are dependent on the social instincts of a woman. Her rabbinical training enables her to link up these activities with tradition and provides the background of Jewish consciousness to this work.

The pulpit, and whatever pertains to it, is–and remains–a plane wherein man is by nature and temperament best qualified, although not exclusively so. But woman, by reason of self-limitation, is not disqualified. Viewing the rabbi in the light of a prophet and the man of vision, he–more than woman–responds to this unusual endowment. Men are prone to be idealists. They are quick to see visions. They are the dreamers. To men is given the gift of prophecy, but not exclusively (as the careers of Hulda and Deborah testify). Men are called upon by God to be pathfinders, liberators, protagonists of right, brandishing the shining sword of justice before the hosts of evil-doers. In the defense of right, men will face the outrages of the world alone.

On the other hand, women are conservative, and seldom are impelled to stand forth and proclaim these eternal convictions. They are pacifists, importunists, moderators, trimming their sails to whatever winds blow on the seven seas of thought. Remember that while it was due to the merit of women that the children of Israel were redeemed from Egypt, it was only merit, not the fierce rebellion of a Moses, saying, “Let my people go free!” that wrought the miracle.

Were the woman as rabbi merely confined to pulpit discourses and the formal aspects of ceremonials, her admission to the profession would be inept and otiose. The synagogue, however, has enlarged its tent cords of service. It is an institution of which the pulpit is part, not the totality. Being only a feature of the institutional labor, there are spheres of activity in the synagogue that not only can be filled by woman, but are primarily her province.

Rabbi Neumark: I. “This fact that she was exempt from certain obligations…she could not…represent the congregation in the performance of such duties” (R.H. III.8; Berachot 20b). Against this argument the following can be said:

First, the traditional functions of the rabbi have nothing to do with representation of the congregation in the performance of certain religious duties from which women are freed. There are certain categories of men, such as are deformed and afflicted with certain bodily defects, who could not act as readers, but could be rabbis for decisions in ritual matters and questions of law.- The same holds true of people with a “foreign accent” in Hebrew.

Second, women are not free from the duties of prayer, grace after meal, and Kiddush, and they can read for others (cf. Mishna and Bab. Gemara, Berachot, 20a,b). Thus, even in our modern conception of the function of the rabbi, which includes reading, woman can act as representative according to traditional law. Of course, “Tefila” here is used in its technical meaning–“Eighteen Prayers”–while Prayer in its general meaning of Divine Service had the “Shema” in its center, and woman was freed from its obligatory reading. But no Orthodox Jew ever waited with the obligatory reading of the “Shema” for the public service; it has, at least in post-Talmudic times, always been done right in the morning, privately.

Third, the practice within Reform Judaism has decided in favor of admitting women as readers of the Divine Service. And since we are interested in the traditional law on the subject only in order to take from it a clue for Reform practice, this argument would be of no consequence even if it were valid, as it is not. If a woman is to be debarred from the rabbinate in Orthodox Judaism because she cannot serve as a reader, then the only logical consequence would be that Reform Judaism, which has decided in favor of the woman reader, should disregard the Orthodox attitude, and admit women to the rabbinate.

II. The reason why a Torah Scroll written by a woman was considered unfit is not, as Dr. Lauterbach claims, because she could not be reader of the Torah, but quite a formal one: Whosoever has not the obligation of binding (Tefilin), has not the fitness of writing (a TorahScroll) (Gittin 45b; Men. 42b). The above reason is given in Soferim I.13, but there, woman is not debarred from writing a Torah Scroll.

III. In Bavli, Mo-ed Katan 18a, it is not said that “women were not to be found in the academies and colleges where the rabbis assembled and where the students prepared themselves to be rabbis.” It is only said “Isha bei midrasha la shechicha,” “A woman is not often to be found in Beit Hamidrash. The academies and colleges of those days were not institutions for training rabbis, but institutions of learning, most of whose students were pursuing other vocations. A woman in those days was supposed to keep away from all public places, such as courts and the like, and even, as much as possible, from the streets: “Kol kevodah bat melech penima.”

IV. As to the direct question of the legal situation, I have discussed that matter in the opinion which I have submitted to the faculty of the Hebrew Union College. I want to add the following remarks: 1. The statement of Yerushalmi Sanh. 21c and Shev. 35b, that a woman cannot serve (occasionally) as judge, is not from a baraita, as Dr. Lauterbach claims, but occurs in a discussion between two Amoraim. 2.”Lamadnu” does not mean “we have learned,” but is a technical term for an inference on the virtue of an hermeneutical rule; in this case,Gezera Shava. 3. Nowhere in Talmudic but always by Tanya literature is a baraita introduced by “tanei,” “lamadnu,” and the like. 4. The emphasis on “men” in the quotation from Maimonides is not justified.

V. As to the practical question of the advisability to ordain women at the Hebrew Union College, I do not believe that the Orthodox will have any additional reason to object. They themselves employ women in their schools as teachers and readers, and our women rabbis will not do more than this. In fact, the entire question reduces itself to this: women are already doing most of the work that the ordained woman rabbi is expected to do, but they do it without preparation and without authority. I consider it rather a duty of the authorities to put an end to the prevailing anarchy by giving women a chance to acquire adequate education and an authoritative standing in all branches of religious work. The practical difficulties cannot be denied. But they will be worked out the same way as in other professions, especially in the teaching profession, from the kindergarten to post-graduate schools. Lydia Rabbinowitz raised a family of three children and kept up a full measure of family life while being a professor of bacteriology. The woman rabbi who will remain single will not be more, in fact less, of a problem than the bachelor rabbi. If she marries and chooses to remain a rabbi–God blesses her–she will retire for a few months and provide a substitute, just as rabbis generally do when they are sick or are involved in an automobile accident. When she comes back, she will be a better rabbi for the experience. The rabbinate may help the women, and the women rabbis may help the rabbinate. You cannot treat the Reform rabbinate from the Orthodox point of view. Orthodoxy is Orthodoxy and Reform is Reform. Our good relations with our Orthodox brethren may still be improved upon a clear and decided stand on this question. They want us either to be Reform or to return to the fold of real, genuine Orthodox Judaism whence we came.

See also:

“Resolution,” CCAR Yearbook, vol. 3, 1893, p. 40; vol. 32, 1922, p. 51; vol. 85, 1975, p. 70. “Resolution,” National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods, 1961, 1963.

ARR 5-8

CCAR RESPONSA

American Reform Responsa

4. Woman Wearing a Talit

(Vol. LXXX, 1970, pp. 55-56)QUESTION: In some of our congregations it is the custom that whoever comes up to the pulpit to participate in the service puts on a Talit. In young people’s services for our high schools, boys and girls participate, and often the girl puts on the Talit at that occasion. According to Jewishlaw and tradition, is it proper for a girl to wear a Talit at service? ANSWER: The commandment to wear a Talit with fringes is based upon Numbers 15:37-41. Upon the basis of this commandment, the anonymous baraita in Menachot 43a says that women, too, are in duty bound to wear the garment with fringes. However, Rabbi Simon says there that they are free from that obligation. He bases his opinion upon the fact that Scripture in the passage in Numbers uses the phrase: “Ye shall see them and remember,” etc. Since Scripture says, “Ye shall see them,” that proves that the proper time for Talit and Tsitsit is the daytime, not the nighttime. This conclusion puts the commandment to wear fringes into the special class of positive commandments “limited by time (shehazman geramo), and it is a general rule that women are free from the obligation to fulfill positive commandments that are dependent upon time. Of course, being free from the obligation to fulfill the commandment of fringes does not mean that they are forbidden to wear them. It means only that they are not in duty bound to wear them. When the law is discussed in the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 17.2, Joseph Caro says, following Rabbi Simon in the Talmud (quoted above), that women and slaves are free from putting on the fringes, since it is a commandment based upon time; but Isserles adds: “At all events, if they wish to put on the fringed garment and even recite the blessing over it, they are free to do so, as is the case with all time-limited positive commandments” (that is, they are not compelled to obey, but they are permitted to do so if they wish). However, he adds, if they do put it on, it would appear to be a show of extra pride of piety (yohara). But if they are not to put it on because it would look like a show of extra pride of piety on their part, then it becomes necessary to explain the fact that women observe the commandment of the Lulav and recite blessings over it. Is not the Lulav also a positive commandment limited by time? The explanation of this difference is given by the Magen David: that the Lulav is a stricter commandment than the one concerning fringes, because if a person does not have a square garment (the fringes must be on the corners of a four-cornered garment) he need not put fringes on at all. It is true that it is now our custom always to wear a Talit Katan with four corners and fringes. Nevertheless, according to law, it is only if a man has a four-cornered garment that he must put fringes on. In other words, the obligation depends on the garment. But with regard to the Lulav, a man must get a Lulav and say the blessings. In this case the obligation is incumbent upon the man himself (chovat gavra), not on whether he has the object or not; he must get it if he lacks it. One of the later deciders, Yechiel Epstein, in his Aruch Hashulchan, Orach Chayim 17, says that we should not allow women to put on the fringed Talit. But then Epstein has the problem of explaining why women bless the Lulav and formally eat the Matzah at the Seder, which are positive commandments limited by time. He explains by saying that these positive time-limited commandments come only once a year, but the Talit should be worn every day. However, all the great (and earlier) authorities permit it. The only question that seems to divide the earlier authorities (none of whom doubts the right of women to put on the Talit) is the question as to whether, when a woman puts on the Talit she may make the regular blessing or not. There is a full discussion of this problem in the Tosafot to Rosh Hashana 33a, s.v. “Ha.” This tosefet is mainly the opinion of Rabbenu Tam. The discussion is on the general principle of whether anyone (such as women and the blind) who is free from the obligation to fulfill “positive commandments limited by time” should (when he fulfills such commandments voluntarily) pronounce the blessing over them or not. The tosefet is based mainly on the discussion in Bava Kama 87a, where Rabbi Joseph, who was blind, had voluntarily fulfilled such commandments as he was not obligated to fulfill. See, also, the tosefet in Eruvin 96a, s.v. “Michal,” where the tosefet discusses the statement in the Talmud that Michal, the daughter of Kushi (or the daughter of King Saul) used to put on Tefilin, and the wife of Jonah used to make the festival pilgrimage to Jerusalem. Both of these were “positive commandments limited by time.” Rabbenu Tam holds the opinion that women may pronounce the blessing over the fringed Talit. But Maimonides, in Yad, Hilchot Tsitsit III.9, says that women may put on the fringes if they wish, yet may not say the blessing, and he adds: “So with all the other positive commandments that women are free from, if they wish to fulfill them without reciting the blessings, we do not prevent them.” The Hagahot Maimoniyot at that passage in the Yad says in the name of Rashi that he, too, was opposed to their reciting the blessing. So the law is clear enough: One authority believes that a woman is actually in duty bound to wear the fringes. All agree that she may wear them if she wishes to, except for the limitation that it might look like the pride of extra piety. This solitary objection can hardly apply to the young women if we put the Talit upon them. They would simply consider it part of the ceremony. Besides, in our Reform Movement, where special emphasis is placed upon the religious equality of men and women, there can be no real objection to young women putting on the Talit when they participate in the service .Solomon B. Freehof

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

ARR 24-43

CCAR RESPONSA

American Reform Responsa

7. Ordination of Women as Rabbis

(Vol. XXXII, 1922, pp. 50-51) The discussion of the responsum, “Shall Women be Ordained as Rabbis?” was led by Rabbi Jacob Z. Lauterbach. The following participated in the discussion: Rabbis Max Heller, Levinger, Witt, Weiss, Brickner, Charles S. Levi, Rauch, Englander, Abrams, Raisin, Baron, J.G. Heller, Cohon, Frisch, and Nathan Stern; Mrs. Frisch, Miss Baron, and Mrs. Berkowitz. The discussion was closed by Rabbi Lauterbach. It was moved and adopted that the courtesy of the floor be extended to the wives of rabbis, in order to ascertain their views on this subject. It was moved and adopted that the President appoint a committee to formulate a statement which shall express the sentiment that the Central Conference of American Rabbis has repeatedly made pronouncements urging the fullest measures of self-expression for woman, as well as the fullest utilization of her gifts, in the service of the Most High, and that it gratefully acknowledges the enrichment and enlargement of congregational life which has resulted therefrom. Whatever may have been the specific legal status of the Jewish woman regarding certain religious function, her general position in Jewish religious life has ever been an exalted one. She has been the priestess in the home, and our sages have always recognized her as the preserver of Israel. In view of these Jewish teachings and in keeping with the spirit of our age and the traditions of our conference, we declare that woman cannot justly be denied the privilege of ordination.Henry Cohen and Committee

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

TFN no.5755.15 177-183

CCAR RESPONSA

A Woman as a Scribe

5755.15

She’elah 

Almost two years ago, our synagogue hired a Torah scribe to clean and repair a sefer torah which had been rescued from the Nazis. Several of us had the opportunity to help clean the Torah and “letter” it by placing our hand over the scribe’s as he wrote, thus fulfilling the commandment for every Jew to write a Torah. I became fascinated and deeply moved by this work. The feeling of standing in front of the open Torah, of sensing the spirit of the original scribe, of the generations before me who rejoiced and wept in its presence, is a powerful one. I so love this feeling of being connected to God and to my people through the Torah that I would like to learn how to be a scribe in my own right if that is possible. I already have art and calligraphy backgrounds, and I am deeply committed to this. 

Could you please reply to me in the form of a responsum on the subject of women participating in the scribal arts? If you have particular advice as to a course of study, I would appreciate hearing that, too. (Julietta Ackerman, Goldens Bridge, NY) 

Teshuvah 

Many of us, upon reading this question, can readily identify with your experience. We too can remember how we felt when we stood before the open sefer torah and sensed for the first time the power and significance of this scroll in our lives, in the way in which we define who we are. And for good reason. Jewish tradition regards the study of Torah as the means by which we discover God’s will, how we are to live so as to sanctify the divine name. The world, we are taught, exists for the sake of three things, one of which is Torah.[1] And the study of Torah is equivalent to the performance of all the other commandments.[2] The Torah and the study of Torah are, therefore, the quintessential Jewish religious acts. Little wonder, then, that a child marks the occasion of reaching religious majority by being called to the Torah, for it is through participation in the life of Torah that one learns most truly just what it means to grow as a Jewish adult, to be a Jew. 

The Traditional Prohibition. 

Yet the fact remains that Torah as an intellectual and spiritual discipline has traditionally been reserved to males. Let us take, for example, your own experience of “fulfilling the commandment for every Jew to write a Torah”, a commandment derived from Deuteronomy 31:19, “therefore, write down this poem and teach it to Israel.”[3] The author of the Sefer Hachinukh, an important medieval work, uses exalted language to describe the purpose of this mitzvah: “God instructed that each Jew should have a sefer torah readily available to study…in order to learn to revere God and to understand God’s commandments, which are more precious to us than gold…”.[4] But the phrase “each Jew” is severely qualified: “This commandment is practiced in every community and in every age[5] by males, who are obligated to study the Torah and therefore to write it, and not by females.” 

Women, in other words, are exempt from the commandment to write a Torah scroll because they are also exempt from talmud torah, the requirement to study Torah. The source of this exemption is a midrash, a rabbinic legal interpretation of Deuteronomy 11:19: “you shall teach (My words) to b’neikhem.” This Hebrew word is the second person inflection of banim, which means either “children” or “sons”, and according to the rules of Hebrew grammar it can be rendered correctly as either “your children” or “your sons”. The midrash seizes upon the latter alternative: b’neikhem means your sons and excludes your daughters. Hence, a father need not teach Torah to his daughter, nor is she required to study it on her own.[6] Since a woman is exempt from the commandment to study Torah, the rabbis deduce through the interpretive principle of simukhin, which draws comparisons between adjacent Torah verses or subjects, that she is also exempt from the mitzvah of t’fillin.[7] And–once again through the principle of simukhin–if she is exempt from the requirement to wear t’fillin, she is not qualified to write them, or to write m’zuzot or Torah scrolls.[8] As Maimonides puts it: “Torah scrolls, t’fillin, or m’zuzah parchments that are written by a woman are unfit for use (p’sulin) and should be stored away.”[9] Thus does the tradition disqualify women from serving as scribes. 

Critique of the Traditional View. 

The position we have just described, which is the consensus view of the halakhah, is not immune to critique. We would argue that the traditional prohibition, though strictly observed in the Orthodox community, is flawed as a matter of Jewish law. We note, first of all, that the rule which disqualifies women from serving as scribes rests upon a thoroughly arbitrary reading of the Torah. The midrash on Deuteronomy 11:19 which interprets b’neikhem as “your sons” rather than as “your children” could just as easily and correctly have chosen the alternate translation. Indeed, the halakhah often does read banim and its various inflections as “children”, undistinguished by gender.[10] This more inclusive reading is even adopted when the subject under discussion is a matter of ritual observance, where we would expect the rabbis to draw a distinction between men and women. A case in point is Numbers 15:38, which states: “speak to b’nei yisrael (sons/children of Israel) and tell them to make fringes (tzitzit) on the corners of their garments”. The Talmud cites this wording to prove that only Jews (b’nei yisrael) and not Gentiles are permitted to make the ritual fringes.[11] Note that the text reads the phrase b’nei yisrael as “children”, rather than “sons” of Israel; accordingly, most halakhists rule that Jewish women, no less than Jewish men, are qualified to make tzitzit.[12] In other words, nothing prevents the rabbis from reading the Hebrew banim as “children” rather than “sons”, including males and females alike within the terms of a mitzvah. They are not compelled, therefore, to interpret Deuteronomy 11:19 so as to exempt women from the mitzvah of Torah study and, by extension, from t’fillin and from serving as scribes. 

Why then did the rabbis of the Talmud adopt that restrictive interpretation? Clearly, the sages of late antiquity did not possess what we would call an “enlightened” view of the female mind and character. They believed it inappropriate and even dangerous for women to occupy themselves with the study of Torah. Thus, although women were not absolutely forbidden to study and even received a certain merit for doing so, “the Sages command that a father not teach Torah to his daughter, for most women are not intellectually suited to learn. Rather, due to their lack of intelligence, they are liable to interpret the words of Torah in vain and foolish ways. As the Sages teach us: `if one teaches his daughter Torah, it is as though he teaches her obscenity.’”[13] This attitude, though not the only one represented in Talmudic literature, is of a piece with other rabbinic statements concerning women[14] and, as the codes indicate, it is the accepted halakhah regarding women and Torah study. Given this intellectual and cultural reality, it is no surprise that the rabbis chose to read Deuteronomy 11:19 in the way that they do. 

In our age, it is hardly necessary to state that the rabbinic view of women’s mental capacity does not correspond with the facts. We reject that view, therefore, not because it is politically incorrect but because it is false. And since it is demonstrably false, since it contradicts our own intellectual and cultural reality, one need not be a Reform Jew to recognize its falsehood. Indeed, leading traditional scholars have acknowledged that women are no less capable of learning than are men and that the rabbinic conception of female intelligence does not fit the “woman of today”.[15] This is important, because the exclusion of women from the mitzvah of Torah study was justified largely on the basis of their supposed intellectual inadequacies. In the absence of this conception, the rabbis would not have ruled Torah study off-limits to women. And in a time when the evidence of our eyes so clearly demonstrates the collapse of that conception, no justification exists for rabbis, Orthodox or otherwise, to maintain the restrictive interpretation of Deuteronomy 11:19 which denies to women the opportunity to participate as equals in this mitzvah.[16] 

The View of Reform Judaism. 

Reform Judaism dissents sharply from this prohibition. Our movement rejects any attempt to draw distinctions in ritual practice on the basis of gender. Over the years, we have worked to remove the barriers that deny women equal access to all avenues of Jewish religious expression, learning, and leadership. Women serve our communities as rabbis, cantors, and mohalot (performers of ritual circumcision); there is no reason to deny them, should they possess the requisite education and skills, the opportunity to function as soferot s’tam, writers of Torah scrolls, t’fillin, and m’zuzot. 

Since this is a matter of religious principle for us, we would maintain our dissent even if it were impossible to argue cogently on textual grounds against the traditional prohibition. Why then do we make such an argument? Obviously, we do not expect that Orthodox authorities will change their position because of anything we say. We rather seek to demonstrate that, according to halakhah no less than on grounds of ethical principle, women ought to be obligated to study Torah and thus permitted to write sacred texts. Such to our mind is the most persuasive reading of the sources of Jewish law, one which Orthodox halakhists could adopt with halakhic integrity. 

You, Ms. Ackerman, ought therefore to be able to serve the entire Jewish community, and not just its liberal segment, as a scribe. That some deny you this opportunity is the result of a prohibition which, as we have seen, flows from arbitrary textual interpretation and long-outdated psychology. This is a regrettable state of affairs which, we hope, will one day change. In the meantime, you should not let it hinder you from working toward your goal. 

Your goal is, in fact, our goal as well. The Reform movement is deeply interested in training and producing soferim/ot, just as it produces rabbis, cantors, and other religious leaders.[17] We also urge you to remember that as a scribe you will serve the community as a teacher of Torah as well as an inscriber of texts. A scribe, like a rabbi, embodies for other Jews the value of the study of Torah, the commandment that is equivalent to all the others combined. It is therefore incumbent upon the scribe, no less than upon the rabbi or other communal servants, to continue to study Torah with the greatest intensity of which he or she is capable. This study should include, at a minimum, a careful reading of the Torah itself, the weekly portions along with their haftarot, in the original Hebrew. In addition, you should learn the traditional halakhot, the laws concerning the writing of Torah scrolls, t’fillin, and m’zuzot. A good source for these is Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah, which contains a section devoted to this subject. 

You say that it is your dream to become a scribe. We say that you have every right to pursue that dream and to serve your people thereby. We pray that God grant you the energy, perseverance, and insight to make your dream come true.  

NOTES 

  1. M. Avot 1:2. And see B. Pesachim 68b: “were it not for the Torah, even heaven and the earth could not exist”.
  1. B. Shabbat 127a.
  1. B. Sanhedrin 21b. See Yad, Hilkhot Sefer torah 7:1: “that is to say, write for yourselves the Torah which contains this poem [in parashat Ha’azinu], for we write the Torah whole and not section by section.”
  1. Sefer Hachinukh, mitzvah 613.
  1. I.e., it is not restricted to the land of Israel or to the days when the Temple was standing. 
  1. B. Kiddushin 29b; Yad, Hilkhot Talmud Torah 1:1; Shulchan Arukh YD 246:6. 
  1. B. Kiddushin 34a. Since these two commandments are mentioned side by side (Deuteronomy 6:7-8 and 11:18-19), the rabbis learn that what is true of the one (women are exempt from Torah study) is true of the other (women are exempt from t’fillin). 
  1. Since the commandment of m’zuzah (“you shall write them on the doorposts of your house… Deuteronomy 6:9) is adjacent to the commandment of t’fillin (“you shall bind them… Deuteronomy 6:8), what is true of “binding” (women are exempt) is true of “writing” as well; B. M’nachot 42b and B. Gitin 45b. In the version of this baraita which appears in the printed version of M. Sof’rim 1:13, “woman” is not mentioned among the list of those who are unfit to write a sefer torah. However, the Gaon of Vilna reads “woman” in his text of Sof’rim; moreover, the exclusion of women seems demanded by the very logic behind this rule (“whoever does not wear t’fillin may not write them”). 
  1. Yad, Hilkhot T’fillin 1:13; SA, OC 39:1; SA, YD 281:3. The Tur, YD 281, does not mention “woman” among those who are disqualified to write a Torah scroll. From this, some would learn that while a woman may not write t’fillin she is permitted to write a sefer torah (D’rishah ad loc.). But this is not the majority halakhic position (Siftey Kohen, SA, YD 281, # 6). 
  1. The Torah speaks of the Israelite community as b’nei yisrael, the “children” of Israel, a designation which almost always includes women as well as men. For example: according to all opinions the well-known statement in Leviticus 19:2 (“speak to b’nei yisrael and tell them: `you shall be holy…’”) is addressed to the entire community and not merely to its sons. 
  1. B. Menachot 42a. 
  1. Yad, Hilkhot Tzitzit 1:12. On the basis of B. Menachot 42a, Rambam prohibits Gentiles from making the fringes, and he does not include women within this prohibition. Tosafot, Menachot 42a, s.v. minayin and Tosafot, Gittin 45b, s.v. kol; R. Asher, Hilkhot Tzitzit, # 13; SA, OC 14:1; Hagahot Maimoniot, Tzitzit 1, # 9. Some medieval authorities want to read b’nei yisrael in this verse as “sons of Israel”, thereby disqualifying women as well as Gentiles from making tzitzit; see Hagahot Maimoniot ad loc. But theirs is definitely a minority opinion. Isserles, SA, OC 14:1, urges that tzitzit not be made by women, but his words are couched in the form of a prudent stringency and not as a statement that, according to the law, women are forbidden to make them. 
  1. Yad, Hilkhot Talmud Torah 1:13; see also SA, YD 246:6. The quotation is the dictum of R. Eliezer in M. Sotah 3:4. See also Y. Sotah 3:4: “let the Torah’s words be burned rather than given over to women.” 
  1. E.g., “women are of unstable temperament” (B. Shabbat 33b and B. Kiddushin 80b) and “women’s sole wisdom lies in the spinning of yarn” (B. Yoma 66b). 
  1. See Arukh Hashulchan, YD 246, par. 19, and Torah T’mimah, Deut. 11:19, # 48, end. And see, especially, R. Ben Zion Ouziel’s description of “today’s woman” in his Resp. Mishpetey Ouziel, v. 3, # 6, where counter to the Orthodox rabbinic majority he rules in favor of female suffrage. Moreover, despite women’s supposed mental inferiority, halakhists have long required them to study those aspects of Jewish law which apply directly to them. See Isserles, YD 246:6, and Tosafot, B. Sotah 22b, s.v. ben azai
  1. One cannot defend a refusal to remove the prohibition on the basis of “hallowed tradition.” The halakhah allows contemporary rabbis to depart from the rulings of their predecessors when those rulings were based upon an observable reality that has changed since their day. See R. Eliezer Berkovits, Hahalakhah: kochah vetafkidah (Jerusalem, 1981), 48ff. 
  2. Ms. Ackerman was informed of the efforts by the Union of American Hebrew Congregations to hold an institute for the teaching of scribal skills during the summer of 1996.

NARR 23-25

CCAR RESPONSA

New American Reform Responsa

13. Women with Heads Covered in the Synagogue

QUESTION:In my synagogue, which is a little more traditional, it is customary for women to wear hats and to have their hair covered during services; is a wig sufficient? What is the traditional basis for this? Does the custom have ancient roots? (Richard Bernstein, Miami FL)

ANSWER: Various periods in history have considered different portions of the female body as sexually enticing. Hair was certainly considered so in the Talmudic period, and it was to be covered for that reason among married women (M Ket 2.1; 72a; Yeb 114b; Ber 24a; I Cor 11.5). Maimonides insisted on hair covering for married and unmarried women in public places (Yad Hil Issurei Biah 21.17). The matter has been discussed at considerable length through responsa as well as other classical sources. A full summary has been provided by Samuel Krauss “The Jewish Rite of Covering the Head” (Hebrew Union College Annual 19 pp 121 ff; and J. Z. Lauterbach (Studies in Jewish Law, Custom, and Folklore pp 225 ff and Otzar Haposqim Vol 9). We, of course, are concerned primarily with the question of whether prayer may be conducted when a woman’s head, married or unmarried, is not covered. Caro definitely felt that it was necessary for all women to cover their head during prayer (Shulhan Arukh Orah Hayim 75.2); yet unmarried virgins who customarily go bareheaded could do so in the synagogue also. In a later age when uncovered hair became the general custom of society, it was no longer considered necessary for women to cover their hair. Hair in those societies had lost its sexual overtones (Y. Hayim Sefer Huqei Hanashim 17.1; Masat Mosheh Even Haezer 21.5; Sefer Eleh Hamitzvot Mitzvah #262). Among the Orthodox this represents a minority view; the majority continue to agree with Caro (Moses Feinstein Igrot Mosheh Even Haezer 1:53; Y. Weinberg Seridei Esh 3.30; E. Waldenberg Tzitz EliezerVol 7 48:3; etc).

In modern times traditional authorities have reached a somewhat different conclusion. Women had changed their mode of dress, and so women’s hair was generally now not covered, and this, therefore, no longer constituted a barrier against prayer in a synagogue (Arukh HashulhanOrah Hayim 75.8). These and other modern authorities as well as those of the last century realized that many women who were forced to cover their hair did so with a wig, which in some instances was more beautiful than their original hair, and so made them more rather than less enticing. This was precisely what the original prohibition intended to combat.

The traditional statements therefore are clear. The hair of married women, possibly unmarried women, must be covered during public prayer. A wig is generally also considered sufficient covering outside the synagogue, but not within, mainly as a matter of marit ayin.However, some modern Orthodox authorities have given way to the widespread custom of Orthodox women not having their hair covered and have permitted this in the synagogue.

Our Reform view is different. We do not see uncovered hair as likely to distract and be sexually arousing. The question of a wig would not arise. Women may worship in our synagogue with hair covered or uncovered, as they wish.

August 1990

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.