Responsa

CARR 104-105

CCAR RESPONSA

Contemporary American Reform Responsa

64. Return to Judaism of an

Apostate

QUESTION: An elderly man, both of whose parents were

Jewish and who had no Jewish education, married a non-Jew early in life and was baptized.

Later in his life he became a member of the Congregational Church, and eventually he was even

ordained as a minister of the United Church of Christ. He served in several pulpits. Eventually he

became disillusioned with Christianity and dropped his ministerial status. He is now actively

studying Judaism. Is anything required aside from haverut for readmission to Judaism?

What ceremony and what words should actually be used? (Rabbi N. Hirsch, Seattle,

WA).ANSWER: The question of someone returning to Judaism after leaving it goes

back to Talmudic times where there is a discussion of this matter (Bekh. 31a; A. Z. 7a). The

entire matter, however, became crucial in the Middle Ages. There we deal with two kinds of

apostates who have returned to Judaism. The first are those who are forced to convert

individually or as a community. This occurred from time to time in virtually all the countries of

Europe, especially in Spain which led to the problems of the Marranos. The second instance

included those who converted under little duress or who remained Marranos for a longer period

of time when it was quite possible to escape that status. In the first instances, it is

clear that such individuals were readmitted to the Jewish community (and we must remember

that this was a corporate community not merely a congregation) without any action on their part

except their desire to become formally part of the Jewish community once more. No ritual bath

or anything else was considered necessary. This was the law as finally stated in the Shulhan

Arukh (Moses Isserles to Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 268.12; Abraham Gombiner,

Magen Avraham to Shulhan Aruch Orah Hayim 326), based upon a verse in

Jeremiah (3.22) – “Return you recalcitrant children.” This Biblical statement, as well as various

Talmudic statements similar to it, were cited by Elijah Gaon of Vilna in his discussion of the

above mentioned passages of the Shulhan Aruch. There was a general feeling

that one should embarrass such people as little as possible and make it easy for them to return

to the Jewish community. So Rabenu Gershom, who lived in the Rhineland in the eleventh

century, felt that one should simply admit such individuals and not in any way remind them of

their previous apostasy (Mahzor Vitry, pp. 96 ff). Solomon ben Simon Duran

(Responsa #89) also felt that no ritual bath or any other act was required. These thoughts

have also been followed by Joseph Caro in his Bet Josef (to Tur Yoreh Deah

268). However, in instances where the apostasy was not under duress, and where the

apostate may have caused considerable trouble to the community, then it was considered

advisory to demand a ritual bath (Moses Isserles to Shulhan Aruch Yoreh Deah 268.12).

This entire ceremony, as well as a promise to become an observant Jew, had to be made before

three witnesses (Joseph Ibn Habib to Alfasi Yeb., Chap. 4). Examples of this more

demanding point of view may be found in Zimmel’s Die Marranen in der rabbinischen

Literatur. In this instance we are dealing with an individual who has been a leader

in another religious group and, therefore, may be looked upon by some in the community in a

different fashion than an ordinary apostate. We should require more of him. Certainly a rather

specifically worded statement of haverut made before three witnesses would be in order.

The statement should be worded in a manner appropriate for this individual.March 1983

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

RR21 no. 5758.11

CCAR RESPONSA

On Patrilineal Descent, Apostasy, and Synagogue Honors

5758.11

She’elah

This query concerns a young man whose Jewish father and fundamentalist Baptist mother are members of my congregation. The young man, who is now college age, grew up attending our religious school on Saturday mornings and his mother’s church on Sundays. He observed his bar mitzvah in our synagogue, on condition that he not be baptized for a minimum of two years following the ceremony. He continued to attend religious school classes, exceeding our synagogue’s “post-Bar Mitzvah” requirement, and he and his family continue to attend Shabbat services every week. However, the young man eventually chose to be baptized as a Christian some time after his seventeenth birthday. He is now attending a seminary with the intention of becoming a Christian minister.

The father of this young man, who is an active worker for and major donor to our congregation, customarily reads the haftarah at our Yom Kippur minchah service (“maftir Yonah”). This is an honor which we bestow upon the person judged the synagogue’s “star supporter or worker;” hence, the father has read this haftarah for some years. And since the father has no knowledge of Hebrew, his son has for several years recited the benedictions preceding and following the reading. Now that the son has chosen to become a Christian, a congregant has objected to his continued participation in the service. On the other hand, our ritual policy which deals with the participation of non-Jews in our public services does not seem to apply here. The policy states that non-Jews are not permitted publicly to recite benedictions containing the formulae asher kideshanu bemitzvotav (“Who has sanctified us through the mitzvot”) or asher bachar banu (“Who has chosen us”). Since the haftarah benedictions do not contain these formulae, it is not clear to me that we can deny the son the right to participate in this honor without making it clear to his father that this decision is aimed specifically at him.

Should we permit the son, who at any rate is very respectful of his Jewish heritage, to recite the haftarah benedictions?

Teshuvah

Under no circumstances should this young man be permitted to recite the haftarah benedictions. He is not a Jew, and as such he is precluded from participating in the ritual reading of the Torah, of which the haftarah is an inseparable element.

This she’elah raises the issue of how a synagogue determines its rules governing the participation of non-Jews in its worship services. The present congregation has such a policy, and our sho’el suggests that this policy does not clearly apply to the haftarah benedictions. We disagree with this suggestion, for two reasons. First, we would point out that the benediction recited prior to the haftarah reading does contain the words asher bachar…uveyisrael amo, “God, who has chosen…Israel His people,” thereby expressing the very same theological doctrine which according to the policy ought to disqualify a Gentile from participating in this element of the service. Second, even if this doctrine were missing from the text of the benediction, the she’elah proposes that we read the congregation’s rule in such a literal and formalistic way as to render it meaningless.[1] The point of the policy, it seems to us, is not that Gentiles are prohibited from reciting certain “magic words” and combinations of syllables but that it is inappropriate for Gentiles to lead rituals and to read prayers which express the concept of the peoplehood of Israel, the idea that we Jews are a particular community, distinct from all other communities in its unique understanding of how to worship God and to realize the ideal of holiness in our lives. “Chosenness” and “commandment/sanctification” are, to be sure, prominent verbal embodiments of this concept, but a great deal of our liturgy is devoted to the rehearsal of our identity as a particular people “chosen” for the task of sanctifying ourselves and the world through the performance of mitzvot. By that token, there are many parts of the service which a Gentile, who by definition is not a member of this particular people, should not lead for us, even though they do not contain the precise formulae designated explicitly by the congregation’s ritual policy.

In several recent responsa, we identify the concept of community as the proper standard by which to distinguish those elements of our service that Gentiles may not lead or perform from those which they may.[2] Non-Jews may not recite those rubrics of the liturgy, such as the Shema its benedictions and the tefilah, which our tradition defines as chiyuv (obligations), for it is in the recitation of these elements that we constitute ourselves as a particular community and identify ourselves as participants in the ongoing historical experience of the people of Israel. Another way to put this is that a Gentile may not serve as a sheliach tzibur, a leader of congregational prayer, for that person must, as a representative of the people, be of the people, a member of the community. Similarly, a Gentile should not recite on behalf of the community benedictions whose wording expresses the idea that “we, the people of Israel, do this in response to God’s mitzvot.” And a Gentile may not participate in any of the rituals surrounding the reading of the Torah, since this act, which requires a minyan of Jews, is one of the central liturgical means by which the community affirms its existence as a covenant people. Since the haftarah, the “supplement” to the Torah reading, is an integral part of that reading,[3] it is clear that this young man, who is a non-Jew and not a member of the religious community of Israel, may not recite it or its accompanying benedictions.

Patrilineal Descent and Jewish Status.

We have described this young man as a “Gentile” and on that basis find him ineligible to recite the haftarah benedictions. By this, we do not mean that he is a Jew who has converted to another religion; such a person is regarded as an “apostate Jew,” a subject we shall take up later in this responsum.[4] We mean rather that this young man never was a Jew in the first place. To say this is to declare that he never qualified for Jewish status under the terms of the CCAR’s Resolution on Patrilineal Descent, adopted in 1983. The text of that resolution states:[5]

The Central Conference of American Rabbis declares that the child of one Jewish parent is under the presumption of Jewish descent.

This presumption of Jewish status of the offspring of any mixed marriage is to be established through appropriate and timely public and formal acts of identification with the Jewish faith and people. The performance of these mitzvot serves to commit those who participate in them, both parent and child, to Jewish life.

The resolution goes on to enumerate some of those public and formal acts which might serve to confirm what it terms the child’s “positive and exclusive Jewish identity.” Among these are religious study and participation in a ceremony of Bar or Bat Mitzvah.

One might possibly assume that this young man qualifies as a Jew under the resolution, since he has attended religious school and observed his Bar Mitzvah in the synagogue. This assumption, however, is erroneous. The point of the Resolution on Patrilineal Descent, as it has been interpreted by this Committee and through the accumulated practice of Reform congregations, is that Jewish status is not automatically conferred upon the child of one Jewish and one non-Jewish parent. The child’s Jewishness is a “presumption” which must be established through a pattern of behavior which testifies to the desire of the parent(s) to raise the child exclusively as a Jew. Therefore, the “public and formal acts” of which the resolution speaks can confirm a child’s Jewishness only to the extent that they offer proof that such is indeed the intention of the parent(s).These actions must serve as “meaningful acts of identification” with the Jewish faith and people.[6] As we have written:[7]

These acts of Jewish identification, though “public” and “formal,” are more than mere public formalities. To be “meaningful,” they must offer evidence that the child in fact identifies as a Jew and that the parents are willing and able to transmit a sense of Jewishness to their son or daughter. If they offer no such evidence, then they become meaningless, mere words and empty ceremony that tell us nothing of the depth of a child’s identification or of the parents’ capacity or sincerity in fulfilling their promise to raise the child as a Jew.

In that responsum, we found that a child raised in a “dual-religion” household, one in which Judaism and another religion are actively practiced, does not qualify for Jewish status under the Resolution on Patrilineal Descent, because regardless of the “public and formal acts” they may perform, such a family is incapable of transmitting an “exclusive Jewish identity” to the child. A household in which two religions have a legitimate claim to equal status is not a Jewish household. In such a household, it is as easy to say that the child enjoys a presumption to Gentile status as to a Jewish one. And in such a case, the child’s Jewishness can be established only through conversion.

The case before us is markedly similar. This young man, whose father is an active member of the synagogue and whose mother is a committed Christian, grew up in a dual-religion household. He was intentionally raised in both Judaism and Christianity. The “timely and formal” acts of Jewish identification, such as religious school and Bar Mitzvah, are nullified by his attendance at church, and his choice of Christianity is proof that he never developed an “exclusive Jewish identity.” We would conclude that, although under our 1983 resolution this young man enjoyed a presumption of Jewish status, this presumption was never established. He is, in our eyes, a non-Jew, and he can become a Jew only through the process of conversion.[8]

Judaism as an Exclusive Commitment and a Public Matter

. This conclusion proceeds from Reform Judaism’s categorical rejection of the notion that a child can be raised simultaneously as a Jew and as a member of another religious community. In this regard, we would point out that there is no such thing as a “half-Jew”; one is either a Jew or one is not. That a child receives a Jewish education along with a Christian one does not change this reality. That he “is very respectful of his Jewish heritage,” while admirable, is irrelevant for the purposes of this she’elah. For our community to consider him a Jew, a member of the religious community of Israel, he or his parents must make an exclusive commitment to Judaism, a commitment requiring that he renounce his attachment to any other faith. And as a means of avoiding the confusions and difficulties of which this she’elah is a remarkable example, a mixed-religion family ought to make such a decision for their child as soon as possible in that child’s life.

With this in mind, we find it puzzling in the extreme that the congregation permitted this young man to observe his becoming a bar mitzvah in the synagogue. Our Committee has held that such ceremonies of religious identification as berit milah and bar/bat mitzvah are inappropriate for children who are being raised in two religious traditions.[9] The latter ceremony symbolizes a young person’s acceptance of the mitzvot, the religious responsibilities incumbent upon an adult member of the Jewish community. One of these, obviously, is the responsibility to be a Jew, to identify with this people and with its religious experience and expression. This young man, who was simultaneously attending church services and considering whether to “be” a Jew or a Christian, was most assuredly unready to declare his acceptance of those responsibilities. We are confused, as well, at the “condition” imposed upon him at the time of his Bar Mitzvah ceremony. A promise not to be baptized for two years hardly inspires confidence that we are dealing here with an identified Jew. On the contrary: the fact that such a promise had to be made indicates that he was at the time actively exploring the possibility that he would commit himself to Christianity. This sense of doubt, this lack of exclusive commitment to a Jewish religious identification renders the bar mitzvah ceremony an empty ritual, a contradiction in terms. As we have written elsewhere, “the (bar mitzvah) celebration is a confirmatory act, not a trial run…its observance under present circumstances would be a denial of its essence.”[10]

We take this opportunity to stress a point of critical importance concerning these issues: the definition of Jewishness and the setting of criteria by which an individual’s Jewish status is determined is an emphatically public matter. It is for the community, and not for the individual or the individual’s family, to answer the question “who is a Jew?”, for we are the Jewish people, a collective which bears a common historical identity. In order to maintain its common existence, this people must possess and exercise the right to draw its own parameters and to declare its standards for membership. An individual may regard himself or herself to be a Jew; his or her family may concur. And this sense of identification may be significant for that person and family. But for our purposes, in deciding how we shall set the rules and ritual policies that govern our communal religious life, this person is not a Jew unless and until we, the community of Israel, can accept him or her as one of us.[11]

The Apostate and the Synagogue.

Even were this young man considered a Jew under the doctrine of patrilineal descent, his decision to become a Christian would define him as an apostate. While it is true that mainstream halakhah holds that one cannot successfully convert “out” of the Jewish people,[12] an apostate is nonetheless regarded as having separated him- or herself from the community and therefore ineligible to participate actively in its ritual and public life. On that basis, while we would encourage this young man to attend synagogue, we would certainly not permit him to ascend the bimah or to perform any of the public rituals of our worship services. In a previous teshuvah dealing with a Jew who converted to Episcopalianism and graduated from a Christian theological seminary, we wrote:[13] “we would be sending the most confusing signals to our community if we permitted apostates to assume prominent roles in our synagogues and thereby blur the distinction between those who proudly declare their Jewishness and those who abandon our faith.” That conclusion applies without question to the present case.

Conclusion.

Because he was raised simultaneously in two faiths and because he has declared his attachment to Christianity, the young man who is the subject of this she’elah does not qualify for Jewish status under the CCAR Resolution on Patrilineal Descent. He is therefore not a Jew, and he should not be permitted to recite the haftarah benedictions or to lead any of the elements rubrics of our liturgy whose recitation and performance are restricted to Jews.[14]

One final note. We have approached this question as a matter of standards of religious practice. At the same time, we surely recognize its personal and emotional side. We do not know the father of this young man, yet we know that his must surely have been a most difficult experience. We are unable to agree with his desire that his son continue to recite the haftarah benedictions, for we do not believe that we obtain lasting religious benefit when we abandon the most basic standards of practice and observance that distinguish us as a people. Yet we are also forbidden to ignore the sense of pain and anger, of rejection and loss which quite likely lie behind that request. This is, therefore, a situation that calls not only for judgment but for compassion, for the exercise of midat harachamim alongside midat hadin. It is a situation that clearly demands the utmost in pastoral skill and sensitivity. We are confident that the rabbi of the congregation possesses these in sufficient measure to respond fully to the human needs of its members. We can but offer the rabbi our encouragement and our wishes for success.

NOTES

We doubt whether even this congregation applies its policy so literally. For example, the benediction following the Torah reading does not contain the word bachar in any of its forms, yet no suggestion is made by the congregation that a Gentile for this reason is permitted to recite the blessing after the reading but not the one before it. We think this is because the congregation does not really interpret its rule in such a formalistic sense as implied by the she’elah, especially when such an interpretation would lead to an obviously absurd result.

See Teshuvot for the Nineties (TFN), no. 5754.5, and the other responsa cited therein, especially American Reform Responsa (ARR), no. 6. See as well our teshuvah 5758.2.

See M. Megilah 4:1 and Yad, Tefilah 12:2. The haftarah is never read when the Torah is not read; hence, it, too, requires a minyan (M. Megilah 4:3; Yad, Tefilah 8:4) and is like the Torah reading an essentially communal ritual.

The Jew who renounces Judaism for another religion is regarded as yisrael mumar, an apostate Jew; see below in the text.

The text can be found in American Reform Responsa (ARR), 550.

Ma`agele Tzedek: Rabbi’s Manual

(CCAR, 1988), 227.

Teshuvot for the Nineties (TFN)

, no. 5755.17, at 254-255.

Our Reform responsa tradition has consistently ruled that the presumption of Jewish status under the doctrine of patrilineal descent does not apply in cases where the parents have chosen to raise their child in more than one religious tradition. See Contemporary American Reform Responsa (CARR), no. 61; Questions and Reform Jewish Answers (QRJA), nos. 88, 109, and 110.

On berit milah, see QRJA, nos. 108 and 109; on bar mitzvah, see CARR, no. 61 and TFN, no. 5754.3, 263-264.

, no. 5754.3, at 264.

This point is not altered in any way by the disagreements between Reform Judaism and other Jews over such matters as patrilineal (better: “one-parent”) descent. We may dispute the details of the definition of Jewishness, but we have never disputed that this definition is a public matter, to be set by the community. The Resolution on Patrilineal Descent is just such a communal standard: adopted by the Conference and interpreted by the Conference and its constituent bodies. Reform Judaism has never suggested that an individual is Jewish merely on the grounds that he or she “feels” Jewish or regards him- or herself as such.

“A Jew, even though he sins, remains a Jew”; BT Sanhedrin 44a, according to the interpretation advanced in Teshuvot Rashi, no. 173.

, no.5753.13; the citation is at p. 83. We add there that “were we to honor an apostate who, to boot, is a scholar of theology, the community would be confronted with a man who was born and raised a Jew, but determined after much study that Judaism is inferior to another religion. We must be careful to avoid conveying any message which may weaken the Jewish community.” See that responsum for texts and sources on the status of the apostate in Jewish law and tradition.

We should add, parenthetically, that although the she’elah takes note of this young man’s ability to pronounce the blessings in Hebrew, the haftarah benedictions may be recited in the vernacular: M. Sotah 7:1; BT Sotah 32a, and Tosafot ad loc., s.v. keri’at shema utefilah; BT Berakhot 40b; Yad, Berakhot 1:6 and Kesef Mishnah ad loc.; SA OC 185:1. To be sure, the tradition prefers that the berakhot be recited in Hebrew; see both the Mishnah Berurah and the Arukh Hashulchan to OC 185:1. And while the words of both of these late-19th and early-20th century authorities are influenced by their anti-Reform zealotry, we Reform Jews for good reasons of our own have come to encourage the use of the Hebrew language in our synagogue and home rituals. Still, in the absence of any absolute requirement that the haftarah benedictions be recited in Hebrew, there can be no practical justification (let alone a religious one) for permitting this young man to recite them.

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

TFN no.5753.13 81-85

CCAR RESPONSA

Apostate in the Synagogue

5753.13

She’elah

A man, born and raised a Jew, has converted to Christianity and joined the Episcopal Church. Having earned a theological degree, he now teaches Comparative Religion at a local private school and has been “very helpful in the ecumenical dialogue between Christians and Jews.” Should he be allowed to speak in a Reform synagogue? If permitted to speak, may he do so from the bimah? If he is permitted to speak from the bimah, should he be permitted to deliver a homily during Sabbath or Holiday worship? May he lead the congregation in prayer or be offered an aliyah? (Rabbi Harry Rothstein, Amenia, NY)

Teshuvah

It must be made clear that regardless of how genial this man is, regardless of his academic credentials or how honest his intentions, because he has forsaken Judaism and converted to another religion we must consider him an apostate. The issue of how we are to interact with apostates has been thoroughly covered in traditional halakhic literature, as well as in our Reform responsa.¹

Central to our she’elah is the question: Why would we even consider permitting an apostate to enter our synagogues, let alone teach or lead us in worship?

Jewish tradition has always been sensitive to the different circumstances under which a person would abandon his or her affiliation with the Jewish community. Not all apostates are lumped together. There are essential differences between one who is forced to convert during a period of religious persecution (anoos)² and one whose apostasy is a matter of religious conviction and public rejection of Judaism (mumar l’hakh’is or meshummad).³

Nonetheless, we always hope that even those who are apostates of their own volition will at some time return to the fold. For ours is not simply a religion, we Jews are also a family. We can change our name, looks and religion, but we cannot erase the familial link with the Jewish people. An oft cited passage in the Talmud reads:

Rabbi Abba the son of Zavda said, Even though [an Israelite] has sinned, he is still called `Israel.’ Rabbi Abba said, there is a popular saying: A myrtle, though it stands among reeds, is still a myrtle, and so it is called.⁴

Indeed, our insistence that an apostate is still Jewish often led to grave consequences.⁵ To solve some of those problems, there was an attempt by Gaonic authorities to rule that the apostate had forsaken the Jewish people and, therefore, had forfeited his or her claim for certain benefits and rights within the Jewish community.⁶ But their attempts were rejected by Rashi and other leading halakhic authorities.⁷ Rashi takes the above-quoted statement from the Talmud and extends it to include apostates:

The meshummad is a Jew in every way, as it is said: “even though an Israelite has sinned …”, meaning that even though he has sinned [or in this case, apostatized], he is a Jew.”⁸

If then a meshummad, the willful and even provocative apostate, is still considered Jewish, are there any restrictions to his or her participation in the Jewish community? The question is an ancient one, and the answer is: yes, there are restrictions.⁹

Far from welcoming the apostate to participate in the service, the early Jewish liturgy included a Birkat haMinim, which explicitly cursed those Jews who abandoned their people.¹⁰ Some authorities have even rejected or restricted commmunal contributions by apostates.¹¹ The Rabbinic decrees and ordinances against the willful apostates are founded on the Torah, which established the severest of punishments against those who left the faith and people of Israel.¹²

Thus we have, on the one hand, the classic teaching that a Jew is always a Jew. On the other hand, tradition effectively shunned complete apostates, denying them an active role in the Jewish community. Israel of Bruna, a 15th century German Rabbi, made an attempt to resolve the conflict by teaching that even though the apostate is an Israelite, he is not a Jew, meaning that “Israelite” is the designation of one’s lineage, while “Jew” refers to one’s relationship with the Jewish community.¹³ (The idea seems to parallel Reform Judaism’s recent insistence that from either mother or needs to be supported by “appropriate and timely acts of identification with the Jewish faith and people.”¹⁴)

The modern state of Israel has also ruled that an apostate, though Jewish by lineage, is not permitted to be registered as a “Jew” under the “Law of Return.”¹⁵ The Jewish community has thus been remarkably consistent in excluding apostates from active participation, all the while affirming the ancestral lineage and holding out hope for them to return. The Reform movement has similarly remained firm on the issue of the apostate Jew.¹⁶

In our case, we therefore conclude that this man, who has earned a theological degree and is an active member of the Episcopal church, has willfully converted and is thus an apostate, a meshummad. He is thereby is excluded from actively participating in Jewish worship. We would be sending the most confusing signals to our comunity if we permitted apostates to assume prominent roles in our synagogues and thereby blur the distinction between those who proudly declare their Jewishness and those who abandon our faith.

Consequently, this apostate should not be given the honor of ascending the bimah, nor should he be given the distinction of addressing the congregation before, during or after a worship service.¹⁷ Were we to honor an apostate who, to boot, is a scholar of theology, the community would be confronted with a man who was born and raised a Jew, but determined after much study that Judaism is inferior to another religion. We must be careful to avoid conveying any message which may weaken the Jewish community.

However, we would not keep him from attending the service, because we always hold out hope that he will repent and rejoin our fold.¹⁸

Notes

There are several Reform responsa that deal with apostasy: Solomon B. Freehof, “Status of Apostates and Burial of an Apostate,” Recent Reform Responsa #26, pp.120-127 and #27, pp. 127-131; “Our Attitude to Apostates,” Modern Reform Responsa #30, pp. 169-175. Also see Walter Jacob, “Status of a `Completed Jew in the Jewish Community,” Contemporary American Reform Responsa #68, pp. 109-112. Coercion is not, of course, limited to threats of violence. Coercion can also include the combined pressures of economic welfare and professional security. See, for example, Asher Siev’s article on the strange path of an apostate Jew in Sefer zikaron lish’mue’l kalman mirsky (Jerusalem, 1970). The mumar l’hakh’is, literally, the “provoking apostate,” is the most troublesome of those who forsake our faith. Rambam identifies this kind of willful apostate as one “who repudiates the Oral Law as a matter of personal conviction and through his reasoned opinion.” (Yad, Hilkhot Mamrim, 3:3). History has shown that it is the provoking or willful apostate who, all too often, acts in a way which denigrates Judaism and is most detrimental to the Jewish people. For evidence of the murders and oppression wrought by former co-religionists, see The Jewish Encyclopedia, 2:14-17; Yitzhak Baer, A History of the Jews in Christian Spain, Philadelphia, 1966, vol. 1, pp. 328-354) and vol. 2 (pp. 141-150, 341ff). BT. Sanhedrin 44a. Jacob Katz details some of the “grave consequences” (in Exclusiveness and Tolerance, pp. 70-71), such as the cases of apostates who did not grant their wives a Jewish divorce. If they would no longer be considered Jewish, their marriages could simply be annulled. But by insisting that every apostate was still Jewish, a get was necessary for a true divorce. Without it, the woman could not remarry in the traditional community. Katz (ibid, pp. 70-71) cites Otzar HaGeonim, VII, pp. 34-37, concerning their ruling that a widow did not have to submit to the ceremony of chalitzah with her apostate brother-in-law. In another case, some of the Geonim (Otzar HaGeonim, IX, pp. 28-35) and Rabbenu Gershom (Teshuvot Rabbenu Gershom # 58) ruled that an apostate was no longer eligible to inherit from his Jewish relatives’ estate. Teshuvot Rashi #173. “It was in this connexion that Rashi quoted the maxim `although he has sinned he remains a Jew,’ which has, since then, become a standard ruling in connexion with the definition of the status of the apostate. In its original talmudic context this sentence appears in an aggadic setting only, and not in relation to apostasy. By using it in this striking manner, Rashi ensured the almost uncontested adoption of his definition. Behind this clear-cut statement lies an emphasis on the unchangeable character of the Jew, an emphasis that would contest any possible justification for obliterating Judaism by baptism” (Katz, ibid, p. 71). Teshuvot Rashi # 173. See for example: BT. Chullin 4b-5b; Sifra 2.2 (Finkelstein ed., vol. II, pp. 20-21); Lev. R. 2.9; Yad, Hilkhot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot, 3.4; SA, YD, 53.4 and OC 215.2. Tosefta, Berakhot III.25; see also Gedalia Alon, The Jews in Their Land, ed. Gershon Levi (Harvard Univ. Press, 1989), pp. 288 ff. 11 Rabbi Yaakov Weil, She’elot uTeshuvot: Dinim v’halakhot #57; R. Moshe Schick, Teshuvot Maharam Schick, Yoreh De’ah, #231, cited by R. Solomon B. Freehof, The Responsa Literature (New York: Ktav, 1973), p. 134. Deuteronomy 13:13-19. She’elot uTeshuvot Mahari miBruna, #35; see R. Maurice Lamm in Jewish Tradition and the Nontraditional Jew, ed. J.J. Schachter, Northvale, NJ, 1992, pp. 169-170. Resolution of the C.C.A.R., see its Yearbook XCIII (1983), p.160, and the interpretation of the decision inRabbi’s Manual (1988), pp.225-227 (W. Gunther Plaut) and the detailed discussion in Contemporary American Reform Responsa, #38, pp. 61-68 (Walter Jacob). The ruling, which is known as the “Brother Daniel case,” was made by the Israeli Supreme Court: 72/62, PD 16:2428-55. Cf. Encyclopaedia Judaica, sub “Apostate.” See the Reform responsa on apostasy listed in the first footnote above. In the words of R. Walter Jacob, Contemporary American Reform Responsa # 68, “such individuals should not be accorded membership in the congregation or treated in any way which makes them appear as if they were affiliated with the Jewish community … We certainly do not want these individuals to speak for Judaism in any public forum.” This follows the CCAR’s Responsa Committee’s 1983 teshuvah, “Status of a `Completed Jew’ in the Jewish Community,” Contemporary American Reform Responsa #68. Thus, for the Committee, even “Messianic Jews” or the “Jews for Jesus” (who, because of their proclivity for proselytization, must certainly be classified as mumarim lehakhis (“provoking apostates”), are not to be excluded from attending services or classes “for we always hold the hope that they will return to Judaism and disassociate themselves from Christianity.”

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

CARR 105-107

CCAR RESPONSA

Contemporary American Reform Responsa

65. Drifting Apostate

QUESTION: A young

woman has moved through Christianity to Bahai and then to Judaism. After what appeared to be a sincere conversion, along with active synagogue participation, she and her twelve-year-old daughter suddenly disappeared upon reconciliation with an ex-husband. She subsequently moved into “neo-paganism” and Unitarianism. Now she has returned and once more seeks membership in the congregation. The time elapsed since her disappearance from the community is approximately nine months. The woman appears to be a spiritual “drifter.” Should she be accepted as an active haverut? How should the child be treated? (Rabbi D. Zucker, Springfield, MO)

ANSWER: It is quite clear that a proselyte who has become an

apostate remains, nevertheless, a Jew. In modern times we can not deny the right of an individual to join another religion, but for our purposes, that individual, nevertheless, remains a part of the Jewish people (see “An Apostate Proselyte,” W. Jacob, American Reform Responsa, #71). Now we must ask what should be done to readmit this individual as we are unsure of her stability.

Most of the traditional material which deals with apostates is

irrelevant for this situation as it treats apostasy under duress. Here the act was entirely voluntary and may reflect the instability of the young mother. When apostates under duress reappeared in a Jewish community (principally Marranos), they were generally welcomed and made part of the community with as little fuss as possible.

It has been felt that one should not

embarrass such unfortunate individuals and make it easy for them to return to the Jewish community. So Rabenu Gershom, who lived in the Rhineland in the eleventh century, felt that one should simply admit such individuals and not in any way remind them of their previous apostasy (Mahzor Vitry, pp. 96 ff). Solomon ben Simon Duran (Responsa #89) also felt that no ritual bath or any other act was required. These thoughts were incorporated by Joseph Caro in his Bet Josef (to TurYoreh Deah 268).

However, in

instances where the apostasy was not under duress, and where the apostate may have caused considerable trouble to the community, then a process akin to conversion was demanded (Hai Gaon in Aderet, Responsa, Vol. 4, #292; Rashi to Kid. 68b and Lev. 24.10). At the very least, a ritual immersion in the miqveh was demanded (Moses Isserles to Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 268.12) as well as a promise to become an observant Jew before three witnesses (Joseph Ibn Habib to Alfasi Yeb. Chap. 4). Examples of this more demanding point of view may be found in Zimmel’s Die Marranen in der rabbinischen Literatur.

In this instance, as the woman seems unstable, it should be impressed

upon her that conversion to Judaism is serious and that a return from the status of apostasy is not easy, so a declaration along with perhaps immersion in a miqveh are in order. As presumably the daughter followed her mother into neo-paganism and Unitarianism, the same requirements should be applied to her.

July 1986

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

CARR 161

CCAR RESPONSA

Contemporary American Reform Responsa

100. Burial of an Apostate

QUESTION: The

following tragic situation has presented itself to me. A woman was murdered by her husband who

then in turn shot himself. There is also a possibility of a suicide pact on which they had agreed.

This was a second marriage; both parties were Jewish, however the wife converted to

Christianity two years ago. The children by a former marriage have also converted. The husband

will be buried in another city; the children (who are Christian) would like a minister to officiate at

the funeral but would like the burial to take place in a Jewish cemetery with a rabbi officiating. Is

this permissible? (Rabbi S. Akselrad, Columbus, OH)

ANSWER: This tragic

situation raises a number of questions, however the main issue is whether we consider this

woman to be Jewish or not. When an apostate has died, she has always been given the benefit

of doubt as it was felt that on her deathbed she may have repented and reverted to Judaism.

Although such individuals were considered sinners while alive, they nevertheless were be

considered to be Jews (San. 44a). We bury sinners (Semahot II; San. 47a; Yad Hil. Avel

1.10; Tur Yoreh Deah 334; Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 333.3 ff), but do not

accord the honors of the dead to them. There has been some disagreement about the nature of

such honors. We would not provide shrouds, stand in line at the cemetery to console the

mourners, or have a mourning period.

In this instance as the surviving family

members are Christian the ritual at the cemetery should be very simple. The woman may,

however, be buried in a Jewish cemetery.

January 1987

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

NARR 353-354

CCAR RESPONSA

New American Reform Responsa

222. Video Taping a Wedding

QUESTION: A couple who are contemplating divorce have presented a video tape of their marriage which seems to show that the traditional words harei at… were not spoken by the groom. The rabbi’s words may be heard clearly but the groom seems to have said nothing. The groom now claims that therefore no marriage existed and it should be annulled and no divorce is necessary. (Sandra Berkowitz, Baltimore MD)

ANSWER: Let me begin by stating that there is considerable doubt whether the traditional words harei at… must be spoken. The codes and the earlier Talmud provide a variety of texts which may be recited (Shulhan Arukh Even Haezer 27. 1 f and commentaries). This question also leads us to look at what constitutes a valid Jewish marriage according to tradition. There are three ways of effecting a marriage:

(a) The most common form featured a document witnessed by two competent individuals and handed by the groom to the bride (Kid 9a; Shulhan Arukh Even Haezer 32.1-4). This has remained the essential covenant of the modern wedding. The document is the modern ketubah signed by two witnesses.

(b) In addition it was possible to effect a marriage through the transfer of an item of value (kesef) in the presence of two competent witnesses. This remains as part of the modern wedding in the form of presenting a ring with the formula “harei at mequdeshet…” (Kid 2a, b; Shulhan Arukh Even Haezer 27.1).

(c) Finally, marriage can be effected through intercourse (biah) preceded by a statement indicating the wish to take this woman as wife in the presence of two witnesses who saw the couple leave for a private place (Kid 9b; Shulhan Arukh Even Haezer 33.1). The last method was severely frowned upon by the rabbis, but, bediavad, it is valid. Marriage simple through intercourse with proper intent would be akin to “common law” marriage.

These three acts together or separately, if properly witnessed constitute, a Jewish marriage. In this instance there were many witnesses who were at the wedding, and who either saw the exchange of an object of value, or heard the traditional words, or saw the couple subsequently leave together. It should not be difficult to establish that all of this took place. In addition, of course, two witnesses signed the ketubah. That would be the first resource to be tested, but if the ketubah has been lost or willfully destroyed then the other forms of evidence would be adequate. The wedding is valid and cannot be questioned on the basis of the video-tape which may not have recorded one aspect of the ceremony.

March 1990

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

NARR 354-356

CCAR RESPONSA

New American Reform Responsa

223. An Anniversary Ceremony

QUESTION: A couple is going to celebrate their thirtieth wedding anniversary and their children have arranged appropriate festivities. As part of the celebration they would like the rabbi to conduct a ceremony which re-affirms the couples dedication to each other and proclaim their love for each other. What is the attitude of tradition toward such a ceremony? What kind of berakhot may be included? (David Weisberg, Los Angeles CA)

ANSWER: There is nothing in the tradition which bears directly on this question. Although, undoubtedly, anniversaries were appropriately celebrated in the past, the religious portion of it was carried out differently. For example, by honoring the husband through participation in the Torah reading or other synagogue honors and at that time an appropriate misheberakh would be recited. The woman would, of course, have no direct part in this, but would be equally proud and content. There is a good deal to be said for the public celebration of a special anniversary as it emphasizes marriage and the family within the setting of the broader community. In the late twentieth century with its numerous family problems this is especially desirable. Irrespective of other plans we should encourage such a couple to be honored at a synagogue service in accordance with the traditions of the congregation. For many families this will be enough. If such celebrations occur regularly, then the members of the congregation will be constantly reminded of successful happy marriages.

The children of this couple, of course, wish to go further and want to incorporate some religious feelings into the general festivities. This too should be encouraged as it brings an additional religious element into family life. We should, however, be cautious about the manner in which this is done. The general tenor of the party needs to be in good taste.

The various editions of the Rabbi’s Manual published by the Central Conference of American Rabbis contain anniversary prayers. The sheva berakahot have not been used and have been reserved for the wedding ceremony itself. However, any other prayers recited at a wedding may appropriately be used again at the anniversary. This is a good occasion for new and personal prayers. It would be appropriate for the children and grandchildren to participate in such a rededication service and to express their thoughts about the happy marriage of their parents. There are also many readings from the Bible, Midrash and the classical Jewish poets which can be utilized on this occasion.

In summary then, such a special wedding ceremony should use the prayers found in the various editions of the Rabbi’s Manual which may include a blessing over wine, as well as the thanks to God for having reached this happy day, and other appropriate prayers created especially for the occasion by the rabbi and the family.

February 1990

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

CCARJ, Fall 1992, 65-66 (TFN no.5752.11 21-22)

CCAR RESPONSA

“Amazing Grace”

5752.11

She’elah

A Jewish woman would like to have the song “Amazing Grace” sung at her funeral. She also wonders whether it would be appropriate in general Jewish worship, or whether it is so christological that it should not be used in a Jewish ritual setting.

Further, is the word “grace” so distinctly Christian that it in itself disqualifies the song? The author of the hymn in question was a certain John Newton, a slave trader who had a “born again” experience, repented of his evil, and found in religion a new way of life.

Teshuvah

Let us turn first of all to the meaning of “grace”. In Christian theology, it represents the freely offered, and often undeserving, gift of God to an individual or to a people. Two Hebrew terms are the model for this concept: chen and chesed. In the Septuagint, chen is rendered as charis (whence “charity”, this is the word most commonly translated as grace); and chesed as eleos (“mercy”). The idea that God does not forget the undeserving is usually expressed by the divine quality of chesed; for instance, in II Sam. 7:15 (God’s mercy will not depart from David’s offspring even if they commit iniquity) and in other places like Isaiah 54:8. Since Christianity adopted the Pauline emphasis on grace and considered Jesus Christ its main vehicle, the English term grace has been avoided by Jewish writers, even though its antecedents in the Hebrew Bible are firm and formidable.

Thus the English word itself has assumed a christological coloring and its liturgical use would lead us into a consideration of the biblical warning not to walk on the custom of other nations chukkat ha- goyim.¹

The avoidance of chukkat ha-goyim in all expressions of living, from ritual practices to daily dress, was enunciated by Maimonides,² as well as the Shulchan Arukh.³ These texts have been interpreted more stringently at some times and more leniently at others. However, there can be no question that whenever a custom reminded one of other religions and tempted to lessen the distinctiveness of the Jewish heritage, it was considered to fall under the prohibition of chukkat ha-goyim.⁴

Thus the so called “Lord’s Prayer” which contains traditional Jewish teachings has become firmly connected with Christian worship and therefore, though its individual components are unobjectionable, would not be acceptable in any Jewish setting.

A similar situation obtains for “Amazing Grace”. None of the individual words or concepts of the song “Amazing Grace” in and of itself contradicts Jewish teachings. But its author, John Newton, had been converted under the influence of George Whitefield and John Wesley, became an Angelican priest and a pillar of the emerging Methodist movement. His hymn is a textbook description of a conversion experience in the evangelical Protestant tradition and therefore unsuitable for us.

There are some who believe that a song like “Amazing Grace” has become an expression of contemporary folklore, and therefore the melody at least could be deemed acceptable. We disagree. By analogy, some Christmas and Easter customs have become highly secularized and denuded of specific Christian content, yet they too also fall under the prohibition of chukkat ha-goyim.

Surely there are worthy Jewish melodies fit to sanctify a funeral service, and as for the words one might recall the observation of Solomon Schechter: “A people that has produced the Psalmist, a Rabbi Judah Halevi, and other hymnologists and liturgists counted by hundreds, has no need to pass around the hat to all possible denominations begging for a prayer or a hymn”.⁵

Notes

Lev.20:23 and 18:3, Ezek. 5:7 and 11:12.

Yad, Hilkhot Akkum 11:1-3; 12:1.

Sh. A., Y.D. 178 and commentaries thereto.

See also our responsa on “Blessing the Fleet” and “Flags on the Bimah” in this volume, pp. and .

Studies in Judaism (New York, 1938), p.136f. One member of the Committee dissented, holding that

on the whole, Reform Judaism has attempted to accommodate such poetry and music, and that its strength has been its ability to incorporate secular material into its liturgy in a way that is consistent with tradition. “At a funeral, I take it, this song would express the woman’s faith that God’s presence had influenced her life and aided her in time of trouble. If the Rabbi is uncomfortable with the words “Amazing Grace”, s/he might have the tune played on a musical instrument and incorporate other more traditional Jewish texts expressing these things, thereby satisfying the woman’s intent”.

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

CARR 144-146

CCAR RESPONSA

Contemporary American Reform Responsa

86. Alzheimer’s Disease

QUESTION: A

sixty-three-year-old man has been diagnosed as suffering from Alzheimer’s Disease. In nine

months he has deteriorated drastically and now needs constant skilled nursing care. His wife, a

school teacher, has discovered that her insurance does not cover such expenses which are more

than $2,000.00 a month. The couple’s savings will be entirely exhausted in a few years. Medicaid

will not help until nothing except the house in which they live remains. The wife’s lawyer has

counseled her to seek a legal divorce, which will shield her resources so that she may have

some income when she reaches retirement in a few years. Without such a step she will become

dependent upon the charity of her children and the general community. If she takes this step she

will, of course, feel that she has abandoned her husband. His condition has degenerated to such

an extent that he is unaware of his surroundings and does not fulfill his marital responsibilities.

(Rabbi D. D. Weber, Elyria, OH)

ANSWER: These circumstances which you have

described are tragic. Unfortunately, as modern medicine progresses an ever increasing group

within our population reaches an advanced age, and frequently one member is afflicted with an

incurable debilitating disease which slowly destroys that life and drastically affects the life of the

healthy spouse.

Let us see whether a marriage may be dissolved under these

circumstances. Marriage, as the Hebrew designation qiddushin implies, is a sacred act

which brings special sanctity to the relationship established between husband and wife. The

blessings recited (sheva berakhot) indicate the sanctity of the status into which the couple

entered. Marriage and all aspects of family life have been discussed at great length in Jewish

literature since the Mishnaic period. Provisions have, of course, also been made for divorce

(Deut. 24.1 ff) and the Talmudic Tractate Gitin, as well as discussions elsewhere, deal

with causes and the subsequent implementation of divorce.

Among the reasons for

divorce is the affliction of either party with an incurable disease which makes intercourse

impossible or dangerous (Shulhan Arukh Even Haezer, 117.1 ff, 154.1 ff). A wife may

also seek a divorce if the husband is squandering the family assets so that she feels that her

maintenance is endangered (Ibid. 154.3). Although no age restrictions are mentioned in

these discussions, marriages of the young or middle-aged are implied. In other words, these

reasons were not intended to deal specifically with the problems of old age which may, naturally,

lead to illness, impotence and unusual expenses.

We may approach the entire

question from another point of view as noted by Professor Mark Washofsky, to whom I am

indebted, and turn to the duty of one spouse to pay the other’s medical obligations. Shulhan

Arukh Even Haezer (69, 79) obliges the husband as part of the ketubah to provide

medical care for his wife. In our Reform context we would, of course, extend this obligation to the

wife. Paragraph one states that this obligation holds whether the illness is of a temporary or a

chronic nature. Paragraph three deals directly with our problem. It provides an escape in the

event of a long-term and expensive illness (Yad Hil. Ishut 14.17); the husband may set a

limit for her medical bills; should she refuse this offer, the husband divorces her and she

receives the ketubah. Rambam and Caro argue against this arrangement on ethical

grounds (see also Magid Mishneh), but neither denies that the husband possesses this

right. On the other hand, some authorities do deny this right; the Rabad limits the husband’s

power of divorce to a case where the wife is not terminally ill (Ran to Alfasi, Ket. 19a); Solomon

Luria argues that in our day, when the taqanah of R. Gershom forbids divorce without the

wife’s consent, the husband can not compel her to choose between these alternatives (Joel

Sirkes to Tur Even Hazer 79). At any rate, whether a spouse possesses this right or not, it

is definitely not in keeping with the spirit of marriage and its sanctity.

Just as the wife

has the obligation to provide medical care for the husband, the husband is also obligated to

provide economic sustenance to his wife. This is a tenai bet din (Yad Hil. Ishut

12.2 ff). The wife has the right to renounce this support; if she does, her husband no longer has

any claim to her income. The wife in this instance could be encouraged to establish herself in a

state of financial independence; under Jewish law she need not be divorced in order to gain

control of her own finances (Ketubot 58b; Yad Hil. Ishut 12.4). In addition, the bet

din is empowered to seize the husband’s property in the event of his mental incapacity in

order to fulfill her requirement of mezonot (Ibid., 12.17). In this case, the

husband’s “property” would include the ketubah or its equivalent; under Jewish law the

husband’s estate is mortgaged in order to provide the required support for the wife. This also

means that his children as his heirs are obligated to support his wife; this is not charity, but a

debt which is owed her. These thoughts help us within the framework of halakhah, but not

with the current requirement of American law.

We must balance these statements with

our general view of qiddushim and see it in the light of this particular couple. There is

nothing in the question which indicates that they have become estranged from each other. Only

this debilitating illness has led to thoughts of divorce. They surely entered into marriage with the

understanding that they would help each other irrespective of what the future might

bring.

Although there might be some technical justification for a divorce from a

halakhic point of view, it would be morally wrong to follow that route in order to preserve

the estate. A divorce may affect the husband despite his current condition and would certainly

affect the wife and children.

We should seek an alternative way to help her both now

and in the future, especially as these questions arise frequently and the social security

administration is generally responsive to such efforts. Furthermore, halakhah also

encourages such practical solutions which will continue the marriage bond and avoid

poverty.

The wife is duty bound to care for her husband even though there is no hope

of recovery and although it may destroy her resources. We should seek alternative ways to help

her both now and in the future. The lawyer in question should be encouraged to look for other

ways to protect the resources of this client.

March 1986

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

NARR 35-36

CCAR RESPONSA

New American Reform Responsa

**22. Aliyah with the Hebrew or English Name**

QUESTION: In my congregation we have recently decided to invite individuals to participate in the Torah service by their Hebrew name. This has caused embarrassment among those who do not know their Hebrew name or were never given a Hebrew name. I have hesitated about assigning a name just for the occasion. Should the English name be used if the Hebrew name cannot be remembered or should English names always be used for the sake of consistency? (Norbert Katz, London, England)

ANSWER: When the tradition discussed Torah honors and the names of individuals asked to participate, it was principally concerned with the dignity of the individual. If there was a blemish connected with his father, then the shame was avoided by simply mentioning his name alone, or designating him as X, who is the grandson of Z (Shulhan Arukh Orah Hayim 139.3; Isserles and commentaries). If the father was unknown or he was a foundling, then the person was designated as the son of Abraham. These discussions inform us that Hebrew names were regularly used in the traditional service, and that the individuals invited to the Torah were not to be embarrassed in any way.

The introduction of Hebrew names for Torah honors in our Reform services represents a reemphasis on Hebrew names. It creates an additional bond with the Hebrew language. It is, therefore, good and useful. We, however, should also follow the inclination of the Shulhan Arukh and earlier sources and not shame the individuals who are going to be honored. It would probably be best to continue the use of Hebrew names for those who know their Hebrew names, and English names for those who do not. As Torah honors are often assigned some days before the service, it may be possible for individuals to rediscover their Hebrew name or if they have none to ask for a Hebrew name. Slowly over the years the use of Hebrew names will become more common and that is a direction in which we should proceed.

May 1989

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.