Responsa

RRR 59-62

Father Transfers Children to Christian Sunday School

A physician in your congregation removed his chil dren from your religious school and entered them into the Sunday School of the local Presbyterian Church. You ask whether this action affects his right to he a member of your congregation. (To Rabbi Max Selinger, Cumberland, Maryland)

There is no doubt that by taking the children out of the Jewish school this man has violated the positive commandment, namely, that it is a duty incumbent upon the father to teach, or to provide for the teaching of, the Torah to his children. There is also no doubt that by enrolling them in a Christian Sunday School he is putting them on the road to apostasy from Judaism. That he has committed a sin thereby is certain, but the specific question that you ask concerning him is a difficult one. Does he, because of this sin, forfeit the right to be a member of the congregation?

You know, of course, that as far as worshiping with the congregation is concerned, the Talmud states (b. Keritot 6b) that no fast day service is a proper one unless sinners are included among the worshipers. That is why, in the preliminary statement to the Kol Nidre, we say that God has commanded us to worship with sinners. In other words, if he should want to worship with the congregation, one would not forbid him that duty or privilege. But you ask whether he has the right to be a member, which means the potential right to be an officer and even to be honored by the congregation, as being called up to the Torah, and so on. In other words, just what has he forfeited by his sin?

The legal literature does not specifically mention a man’s status in the community in relation to this particular sin. But there is sufficient discussion of analogous matters to give us some guide as to the spirit of the tradition in such matters. There is a great deal of discussion in the law concerning “one who separates himself from the ways of the congregation” {Hapores m’darche zibbur). The statement is used specifically, at first, with regard to the question as to whether one should mourn for such a man if he dies or whether to engage in his funeral. For the sake of completeness, it would be well to go through this discussion from the beginning.

The Sifra to Emor, end of first section, and the Talmud in b. Sanhedrin 47a, speak of a priest being forbidden to “defile himself” by participating in funerals. He may do so, however, for his close relatives. The text, Leviticus 21 : 4, says, “He shall not defile himself, being a chief man among his people. . . .” To which the Talmud says, “If the relative acts truly as one of the people of Israel, the priest may defile himself for that funeral, but not if the person ‘hias separated from the ways of the congregation’.” It is from this passage in the Talmud that the phrase is carried over in all the later law. There is one other even sterner passage in the Jerusalem Talmud, Terumoth 8 : 3, in which it is said that if a shochet or a butcher feeds people trefa meat, we must not even bury him at all. The next important source is in the post-Talmudic treatise, “Semachot” 2 : 8, in which the law is applied not only as to priests, but as to all sinners and all relatives. Sefer Ha Eshcol, in the laws of the uncleanness of priests (p. 179, end of chapter 53) explains “he who separates . . .” as follows: “As for example apostates and sectaries.” A limitation is given by Solomon ben Aderet (0responsum 763) who says that a person who refuses to support the congregation financially belongs to this group, but that does not mean that we should not bury him and provide shrouds for him. It means that we do not do him the usual honors of standing in a row of mourners, and so forth. The fullest discussion of this sort of a person is given in the “Mordecai,” at the end of “Moed Katan,” chapter 3. There the Mordecai quotes his teacher, Meir of Rothenburg, who gives a careful limitation to the phrase “he who separates himself. . . .” He says, “It must be a person who commits these sins provocatively (l’hachis) and steadily, not merely occasionally.” The law is codified in the Shulchan Aruch (345 : 5). It is worth noting the text in the law as it is here definitely given. The phrasing comes from Maimonides (“Hilchos Avel” I : 10): “All who separate themselves from the ways of the congregation, these are the men who break the yoke of the commandments from their neck, and are not included with the rest of Israel in their actions, and in the honor given the festivals, and in attending synagogues and schools, but consider themselves free without the law, and also apostates to idolatry. For all these we do not mourn at all.” To which Isserles adds that if one does not bear the financial load of the congregation, his relatives may mourn for him but not the rest of the community.

While the law specifically speaks of burial, we may take it to be expressive of our general attitude to that person who separates himself. Now from the law as given we may- draw certain conclusions: First, much depends upon the motive of the person in his action. If, as Meir of Rothenburg said, the action was provocative (i.e., meant to affront the Jewish community) then the community is justified in the strictest reaction; but if the motive is not provocative, but due to some fancied advantage for his children, and if there is a possibility that the man can be persuaded to repent of his action, then the community would be justified in being patient and in trying to use persuasion.

However, there is another principle in the law not directly concerned with the motivation of the man, but concerned with the security of the Jewish community. Suppose, for example, that the action of this man, who may be a prominent citizen, should have a baleful influence upon other members of the community who may be led to follow his example, and that therefore the community may be endangered, then our legal tradition justifies any special strictness which may be necessary to protect the community, i.e., “to build a fence” (le migdar milsa). The right to stern action for communal defense is recorded in the Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpot II, and Isserles, at the beginning of Choshen Mishpot 425. This special right of drastic action for communal defense has been used by Jewish community leadership all through the ages.

I cannot, therefore, give you a specific and clear-cut answer as to this man’s right to continue in the congregation, since the tradition gives us some leeway for practical and common-sense judgment. If the action is merely a chance notion on his part, he can just be permitted to belong as he wishes, or not; if, however, it is a studied affront to the community (l’hachis), he should be excluded. If the community reaction against him is one of scorn, he can be ignored. But if his example may be followed by others and the community thus endangered, then strict action should be taken. This, basically, is the spirit of our religious tradition on the matter.

RRR 94-97

Naming a Child When Circumcision Is Delayed

If owing to the child’s illness the circumcision is de layed, when should the child be named? The question raises a problem in the State of Louisiana, which re quires “an immediate registration of the name for the Office of Vital Statistics.” If it were not for this re quirement, the child could be named at the Brith, no matter how many days or weeks it was delayed.

Recently I formally named a child, with the bless ing, at the temple services, after immediately register ing the name as required by state law. Is this proper procedure? (From Rabbi Jerome Mark, Lake Charles,Louisiana)

The question of when and how to name a child when circumcision is delayed depends somewhat on the general laws involved in the naming of a child. In Biblical times, all the instances which we have of the naming of a child indicate that the child was named at birth, as one can see, for example, with the children of the matriarchs: “And Leah . . . bore a son and she called his name Reuben” (Genesis 29 : 32). This does not say expressly that it was at his birth that he was given his name, though it seems to imply it. Curiously enough, the first clear examples of naming a child at circumcision come, not from classic Jewish literature but from the New Testament. One is Luke 1: 59: “On the eighth day they came to circumcise the child; and they called him Zacharias after the name of his father.” The other is from Luke 2 : 21: “And when the eight days were accomplished for the circumcising of the child, his name was called Jesus.”

But nowhere in the Mishnah or in the Talmud is there the slightest mention of any requirement, or custom, to name a child at the circumcision. The first mention of it is in the Midrashic literature of the Middle Ages in Pirkey d’Rabbi Eliezer, chapter 48, where it is said, speaking of Moses, that his parents at his circumcision named him Jekuthiel. In fact, the only attempt that I have seen to explain the reason for naming a child at the time of his circumcision is a homiletic explanation quoted from Chamudey Daniel in the book “Brith Olom” (Blum, p. 227). He suggests since Abram was not called Abraham until after his circumcision (which occurred in his adult years) therefore children should not be named until their circumcision. Clearly this is hardly a sound analogy.

In the Halachic literature the first reference is in the Tur, Even Hoezer 265, in which it is stated that the author of the “Ittur” (Isaac Abbe Mari in Provence, twelfth century) speaks of the blessing which we now use in concluding the naming of the child. This seems to be the very first reference in the Halachic literature; and from then on it was apparently taken for granted that the child was named at the circumcision, because the Shulchan Aruch mentions the naming formula incompletely, as something well known. It is important to note that the fixed custom of naming the child at circumcision begins only in the Middle Ages; unless, of course, the two references in the Gospel of Luke indicate that the custom originated earlier among Greek-speaking Jews, but if so, it is strange that there are no other references to it in the entire Talmudic literature. From which we can conclude that at least it is no violation of any law but merely a divergence from custom if the child is named at another time than at the circumcision.

What, then, is the best occasion for naming a child whose circumcision is delayed on account of illness? In some of our Reform congregations, in cities where the children are circumcised by obstetricians on the third or fourth day, the family will either have a naming party on the eighth day (a sort of a Brith Mila without the operation) or the boy is named when the father is called up to the Torah in the synagogue, just as girls are named. Similarly, if circumcision is delayed, as in this case, the boy can well be named in the temple.

There is no real objection to naming the child before the circumcision. In fact, there is a partial analogy. If, for example, the child belongs to a family which is excused from circumcision altogether (because it is a family of bleeders in which previous children have died because of circumcision) then this child must, of course, be named without circumcision. In such a case the custom is that the child is named when the father is called to the Torah before the eighth day (see “Brith Olom,” loc. cit.). If, when the child is circumcised at a later time, the family wishes to have a Brith Mila party, there is no objection to having the child named again, making reference to the fact that the name is already consecrated.

As for sending in the name to the Bureau of Vital Statistics immediately, this can always be done, and it is not relevant to the circumcision ceremony. After all, while the name is religiously given or announced at the circumcision, the name can well be chosen as soon as the child is born, as was done in Biblical times (when a child was apparently named at birth). Therefore, in Louisiana the child’s name can be registered on the first or second day, and the formal naming delayed either until the child is named in the temple or at the Brith Mila.

RRR 145-148

Jewish Section in a General Cemetery

Is it permissible to use a Jewish section in a general cemetery where the Jews have only the right of burial and not outright ownership of the land? (From Rabbi Max Nussbaum, Temple Israel, Hollywood, California)

The question is one which has been discussed for over a hundred and fifty years, since the time when municipal cemeteries were established in Hungary and Jewish sections were provided in them.

Before going into the question itself, it is necessary to say this preliminary word: There is almost sufficient argument on both sides in Orthodox legal tradition to permit a decision either way. The basis of decision, therefore, is often a matter of mood and temperament. I need not tell you that the mood of Orthodox rabbinical leadership nowadays is almost entirely negative. They are always eager to prohibit because they consider these days to be dangerously undisciplined. On the other hand, our temperament is to be permissive because we consider that the Law should be adjusted to life. Hence I warn you that my answer is open to question as a liberal interpretation of the Law; but I must call your attention to the fact that the Orthodox opinions in the photostats which you enclosed are unjustifiably strict in their prohibition.

The first opinion is from the organization of the Spinka Chasidim in Brooklyn. The argument here is that Moses Sofer (cited in the “Pis-che Teshuva” to Yore Deah 363) was asked whether bodies may be disinterred from a temporary cemetery not owned by Jews to be reburied in a cemetery owned by Jews. Moses Sofer permits the disinterment in this case. From this answer the organization of the Spinka Chasidim wants to draw the conclusion that all burial in a cemetery not owned outright is forbidden by Jewish law. What they failed to state is that the cemetery from which Moses Sofer permitted disinterment was a temporary cemetery, opened in the time of the plague, which was now going to be turned back to agricultural purposes. It was for this reason that Moses Sofer permitted disinterment. But can it be logically argued that the Jewish section in a modern cemetery would be as impermanent and insecure as that plague cemetery to which Moses Sofer referred? Furthermore, the responsum of the Spinka Chasidim failed to cite the fact that in the same section of the “Pis-che Teshuva,” Ezekiel Landau was asked a similar question and forbade disinterment. In other words, Ezekiel Landau thus declared that a cemetery not owned outright was usable.

Second, with regard to the opinion of the Union of Orthodox Congregations, the argument prohibiting the use of such a section is that the owners can at any time disinter the bodies. Is that true? Does the law not protect the repose of those who have bought the right of sepulcher against willful disinterment?

Basically, the problem in Jewish law is the security of the bodies. Will their repose be undisturbed? Even if a cemetery is owned outright there is no guarantee that a road will not be built, requiring the removal of the bodies. Other than in case of such public works, surely the bodies are safe in their graves from willful disinterment, or can be made so. I will now cite a part of a responsum which I wrote to my brother Louis on the matter. I indicate in it that it is possible to obtain exclusive use of a certain section for Jewish burial without the need of buying the land outright; and certainly we can add that the bodies can be protected against willful disinterment.

There is a halachic problem with regard to a Jewish section in a nondenominational cemetery. About a hundred years ago, certain municipalities in the Austro Hungarian Empire insisted upon a municipal cemetery with a Jewish section. The rabbis insisted that the community make an effort to get outright ownership of the Jewish section. Without that the rabbis were very doubtful about such a combination of cemeteries, but they made some concessions about hedges and space between the sections. In other words, they reluctantly consented, but would have completely consented if the Jewish community could have gotten outright ownership of their section.

Now we come to the problem in America. I was asked just yesterday by a rabbi in the South whether their community should consent to having a Jewish cemetery as part of the nondenominational cemetery. I presume it is, as usual in America, a private corporation that is organizing the cemetery. Now, there was justification for the rabbis a hundred years ago to strive for complete Jewish ownership. They felt, in the long run, a greater sense of security for the dead; and as far as the immediate present was concerned, they also had a good reason for wanting complete ownership; that is, they wanted to be sure that the cemetery owners or company would not bury non-Jews in the Jewish section, in which case it would cease to be a Jewish cemetery.

I therefore told this rabbi in South Carolina that he should strive for outright ownership, but he told me that that is impossible because, at present, the company wants merely to sell individual graves in a section set aside as Jewish. I said to him that he must find some legal way in which the Jewish community will at least have absolute control over who will be buried in that section.

I do not want to complicate the matter in this regard, but if, for example, Reform, Orthodox, and Conservative Jews are going to use that Jewish section, there may have to be a division into three parts, because we permit certain practices in burial which the Orthodox do not permit. For example, we will permit a man to bury his unconverted Christian wife in his lot. Also, we will permit disinterment to a new family plot, whereas Orthodox law will permit it only if the parents are already buried in the plot to which the body is to be moved. If that is the case, and we need a Reform, Orthodox, and Conservative section, then there will have to be a city-wide committee in charge.

I asked a well-known lawyer (E. B. S.) to write me a letter making the legal suggestions whereby, short of actual ownership (which would be the best, of course), the Jewish community or the Jewish congregation can exercise complete control over who is to be buried in their section and how it is to be divided. Could, for example, the cemetery committee make a Jewish committee an agent, so that sales of land are made through it, and so forth?

What I want from you is this: The lawyer will give me suggestions from the legal point of view. You may have records in actual practice from some of these joint cemeteries, and you may know exactly what the Jewish group does to exercise religious control, while lacking outright ownership of the cemetery. Give me what information you have, and also what suggestions you may wish to make.

Of course, outright possession is preferable. Yet in our growing and changing cities, even outright possession is not a guarantee against the need of someday distinterring bodies. If outright possession is not possible, and if a reasonable legal guarantee can be obtained for exclusive Jewish burial in the section, along with legal protection against willful disinterment, then it is virtually impossible, in my judgment, to prohibit the use of such a Jewish section on the basis of Jewish law.

RRR 91-93

Circumcision and Naming of Orphan

A father died before the circumcision of his boy. The question was asked: How should the child be named in Hebrew, as the son of his father or the son of his mother? Also, who takes the father’s part in the Brith Mila ceremony? (From Rabbi Nathan Kaber, Altoona, Pennsylvania)

Why should there be any question that the child is named as the son of his father rather than the son of his mother? All the rabbis in the Mishnah and the Talmud carry their father’s name, even though the fathers of many of them, for most of the time that they are quoted, have been dead. It is true that there must be a custom to name a child after his mother, as, for example, Samuel Edels, after a woman, Edel, or Moses Rivkes, or Joel Sirkes. But this was, perhaps, merely the popular identification of the child when the father had died early, and Moses Rivkes is also known as Moses ben Naftali, and Joel Sirkes as Joel ben Samuel Sirkes.

There was of course a custom, not necessarily widespread, to name a person in certain prayers after his mother. Especially in cases where a man was sick and they prayed for him in the synagogue, they would pray for him, let us say, as “Ya’akov ben Rifke.” The reason given for this special use of the mother’s name is the verse in Psalm 116: 16: “I am thy servant, the son of Thy handmaid.” The implication is that in case of special emergency prayer, the mother’s name is used. But nowhere do we find that a person’s father’s name is omitted from that of any legitimate child.

Now, how can the Brith Milah service be conducted, since the father has an indispensable role in it? The mohel, originally the father, circumcised the child himself, as the Talmud states in b. Pesachim lb top. The mohel is the father’s agent and, therefore, the father is to stand by bis side. When the mohel has circumcised and pronounced the blessing, the father is required to pronounce the bless-ing to enter him into the covenant, and so forth. With the father having such an indispensable role, how can the ceremony be conducted if he is not present, or dead?

There is an analogy in the case of the redemption of the first-born, which takes place on the thirtieth day (see Yore Deah 305 : 10). While Isserles says that if the father is dead or absent the child cannot be redeemed, the bulk of the authorities agree with Sabbetai Cohen (the Schach) that if the father is dead, the court has the right to redeem the child and, in fact, the duty to do so. The same is the case with circumcision. The court has the duty, in case the father neglects it, to circumcise the child. Here Isserles, who was dubious in the case of redemption going on in the absence of the father, has no doubt that the circumcision must go on though the father is dead (see Isserles to Yore Deah265:l).

Who, then, shall speak the father’s blessing to bring the child into the covenant, and so forth? Some say that anybody present may do so. Others say that the man who holds the child may do so. Perhaps, by analogy with what is the practice in redemption of the first-born, the grandfather is considered a parent and he may say it. I would suggest that the grandfather be appointed to say it or the one who is the Sandek or, perhaps, the rabbi himself who is the Beth Din.

RRR 99-104

Circumcising Son of Gentile Wife

A Jew married a Christian woman who was not con verted to Judaism. The woman is pregnant. If she gives birth to a son, the father wants the child circum cised, and the mother consents to it. Should the rabbi arrange for this circumcision and participate in the ceremony? (From Rabbi Max Selinger, Cumberland, Maryland)

The above question has been discussed at considerable length in the Jewish legal literature of the last century, inasmuch as quite a number of Jewish men have married Christian women who remained unconverted to Judaism. In a mixed marriage the child follows the status of the mother. Hence, the boy that may be born will be a Gentile boy. Of course, nowadays almost all boys of whatever affiliation are likely to be circumcised by an obstetrician. This would not be a ritual circumcision, but merely a medical circumcision. There is some question, for example, in this regard, whether an Orthodox physician may perform a purely medical circumcision for a Gentile (see Isserles, Yore Deah 263 : 5, and Schach, ad loc). But this question does not concern us. You are asking whether the child may receive Jewish religious circumcision (for the sake of performing the commandment of circumcision, m’shum mitzvas mila) which, of course, involves reciting the blessings provided for the performance of this mitzvah. In other words, this is to be a religious circumcision, not merely a medical one. If it were merely a medical one, the father would not need to ask the rabbi about it. Furthermore, the implications go further than the desire to perform the mitzvah of circumcision, i.e., Jewish religious circumcision. The implication is that this religious circumcision will make the child a Jew; in other words, it is intended, in effect, to be a ceremony of conversion. This is the full meaning of the question.

Let us first consider the question aside from conversion, namely, may we perform the mitzvah of mila (with the blessing) for such a child? It is quite clear that we may do so. The Tur, in Yore Deah 266, states clearly (near the end of the section) as follows: If a Jew marries a non-Jewess and she bears him a son, the child may not be circumcised on the Sabbath. This clearly indicates that he may be circumcised on the weekday. So, also, the Shulchan Aruch, Yore Deah 266 : 13, says that the child may not be circumcised on the Sabbath. The implication, here too, is clear that he may be circumcised any other day of the week. So, too, David Hoffman, in “Melamed L’ho-il,” Yore Deah 82, says that even if the parents do not intend to have the child take the ritual baths for conversion, nevertheless, the child may be circumcised with the mitzvah of circumcision. Hoffman’s discussion is based upon a related question. He is asked whether, if in later years this circumcised child of a Gentile mother wants to be fully converted to Judaism and will take the ritual bath required, we need also take a drop of the blood of the covenant. To which, as mentioned above, he said that it is not necessary since the original circumcision (of this Gentile child) was for the mitzvah of mila. In other words, it was Jewish religious circumcision. Similarly, Moses Shick, in his responsa Yore Deah 248, says that if both parents consent, it is certainly a fulfillment of the Jewish ritual of circumcision (mitzvas mila).

Some modern authorities, however, doubt whether we should perform this mitzvah for such a Gentile child even though it is permitted. There is a full discussion of this question in the responsa of Marcus Horowitz, who was Rabbi in Frankfurt two generations ago (see his responsa, “Matteh Levy,” vol. II, nos. 54 and 55). He mentions the future problem which may be involved in circumcising such a child. The child, of course, is not yet fully Jewish until he completes the ritual of conversion, namely, the ritual bath. If we do perform this circumcision, the child may grow up believing he is Jewish and may marry a Jewess. Therefore Marcus Horowitz wrote to Isaac Elchanan Spektor, of Kovno, asking his opinion. The reply is embodied in responsum 55. Spektor says that of course the statement of the Shulchan Aruch (that he may not be circumcised on Shabbas) makes it clear that he may be circumcised on other days of the week; but this applies, he explains, only if the father is pious and in all likelihood will raise the child as a Jew; but he adds that since this father is not at all religious, the child will not be raised as a Jew, and therefore we should not circumcise. In other words, Spektor, while admitting that the law permits us to circumcise this child, is making a strict decision because of the present mood of such parents. He thus follows the rabbinic right of “making a fence” (l’migdar milsa). Horowitz considers Spektor’s cautionary answer and concludes that since the law does allow such circumcision, he will try as much as possible to persuade the father to lead a religious life and, therefore, will permit the child to be circumcised. A whole booklet was written on this subject by Shalom Kutno (“U’ch’Torah Yeosey”). He says that each case must be judged individually; and that if the mother will be converted first, then of course there would be no question about permitting the circumcision. Judah Leb. Zirelsohn, the martyred Rabbi of Kishenev, permitted circumcision of children of Jewish fathers and Gentile mothers (“Atze Levanon” 64). He defends this decision in his later book, “Ma’arche Leb,” 55.

From all of the above, it is clear that the law permits Jewish religious circumcision for this child of a Jewish father and a Gentile mother, but that some of the later rabbis feel that there is a danger in permitting this nowadays.

Now, as to the second question: whether such circumcision permitted by the law can be deemed equivalent to conversion. In general, may we convert a Gentile infant? On the face of it, one might say no, since the law requires us to be very careful in explaining to every candidate for conversion exactly what is implied in taking upon oneself “the yoke of the Torah.” It is only if the court is convinced of the candidate’s sincerity that he is accepted and circumcised and bathed. Obviously this whole process of explaining and judging sincerity cannot apply to an infant. Nevertheless, the Talmud (in b. Ketuboth 11a) says that if a mother brings her infant for conversion, the Beth Din converts it. The reason given there is that we are doing a favor to the child and one may do a favor without a person’s direct consent. Besides, the child is pure and, unlike an adult, has not yet tasted the immorality of pagan life and, therefore, need not be so carefully investigated, even if we could do so. Thus it is clear that we may circumcise this infant with the implication or intention of conversion.

But it is here that we diverge from the full requirements of Orthodox law: conversion also requires the ritual bath. If, therefore, the father is not a pious Orthodox Jew, he will never care to complete the process of the conversion of the child. That is why Moses Schick (loc. cit.) says that if both parents agree, then we may convert the child completely; and therefore, also, Shalom Kutno (loc. cit., 3b) says that the mother must herself be converted first before we begin the whole process. However, we in the Reform movement have insisted, even with adult conversion, that the ceremonies involved are secondary, and that the investigation of the candidate’s sincerity and then the careful instruction of the candidate are the essential prerequisites for conversion. Hence, whether the child is later bathed in a mikveh or not, is not, from our point of view, a requisite for his complete conversion. The Central Conference of American Rabbis in its report on Marriage and Mixed Marriage (re cently reprinted) has definitely and formally decided that if a child is entered into our religious school and goes through the school and is confirmed, the education and the influence and the ceremony of Confirmation are to be considered as full conversion.

We, of course, appreciate the spirit which motivates the hesitation of some of the Orthodox rabbis. They fear that full Orthodox conversion will be neglected if the parents are not themselves fully Orthodox. We, too, are concerned with the attitude of the parents. We would ask the parents to promise that the child will receive a Jewish religious education and be raised as a Jew. If both parents agree to that, we should consider this sufficient, since, at all events, the ritual circumcision of such a child is permitted by the law, and the conversion of such a child is permitted by the Talmud.

RRR 226-230

Breast-Feeding or Bottle-Feeding

In the government hospitals which do obstetrical work for the wives of service men, it often happens that mothers refuse to breast-feed their babies. In ac cordance with their wish, a suppression of lactation is made and the baby is fed by formula from a bottle. Is there any objection to this process from the point of view of Jewish legal tradition? Further, the physician making the inquiry wants to know some of the tradi tions or folklore concerning breast-feeding, mother’s milk, and so forth. (From Rabbi Aryeh Lev, New York

City, asked unofficially on behalf of the physician)

In Biblical times the only known way of feeding an infant was by breast-feeding. Hence, a mother who would refuse to breast-feed her baby would, in effect, be willfully starving the infant. Therefore, the author of Lamentations uses such a cruel mother in a metaphor, as follows:

Even the jackals draw out the breast,
They give suck to their young ones;
But the daughter of my people is become cruel,
The tongue of the sucking child cleaveth to the roof of his mouth for thirst . . . (4 : 3-4).

However, this poetic statement does not necessarily indicate that only the mother herself must breast-feed her child. They did use wet nurses in Biblical times. These wet nurses were greatly beloved and honored. Thus we read that when Rebecca left home to be married to Isaac, her wet nurse (Maynekes) went with her (Genesis 24 : 59). When this wet nurse died (Genesis 35 : 8) the place of her burial was affectionately called “the oak of tears.”

But the question asked is whether it is a mother’s duty to breast-feed her baby herself as long as it is possible for her to do so. There is a great deal of legal material on the general question of breast-feeding. Most of it is found in the Talmud in b. Ketuboth 59-60, and then, based on the Talmud, the law finds its way into the various Codes, particularly in the Shulchan Aruch, Even Hoezer 80 and 82.

It must be realized at the outset that there are a number of circumstances under which a mother can actually refuse to breast-feed her baby. Of course, such a refusal would not mean that the baby would not be nourished. A wet nurse would be engaged. In fact, even if a wet nurse were not available, they had a sort of a formula involving milk and eggs (see b. Yevamoth 42b). There are a number of circumstances, mentioned in the Talmud and embodied in the later law, under which a woman can simply refuse to breast-feed her baby herself. If, for example, it was the custom in a parental home to employ wet nurses and if she brought two maidservants into the marriage, she could refuse to nurse the baby herself (see b. Ketuboth 59 b ; also b. Ketuboth 61c). If the husband can afford wet nurses, she can refuse to nurse the baby herself.

But how can a mother be allowed to refuse to nurse her baby herself when the Mishnah says clearly, in Ketuboth 5 : 5, that it is the duty of a mother to nurse her baby? It is to be observed that the duty is mentioned as follows— and the exact wording is significant: “These are the tasks which a woman must do for her husband; she must grind the corn and bake and wash and give suck to her son.” It is noteworthy that these are the duties which she owes to her husband; in other words, basically, the obligation to nourish a child up to the age of six, or to provide for his nourishment, is incumbent upon the father. He can be compelled to nourish or to provide for the nourishment of his child if he refuses to do so of his own free will (see Even Hoezer 71 : 1). So, in effect, nursing the infant is one of the duties which the wife owes her husband. But the basic duty of feeding the infant in some way or other is incumbent upon the father. Thus the law is clear that if the wife can afford to hire a wet nurse, she may do so. The child is fed and her duty to her husband is thus fulfilled. Hence, if she is divorced, she no longer has these various duties toward her husband mentioned in the Mishnah, grinding corn, weaving, and so forth, and therefore is no longer obligated to nurse his baby and her baby. Now he must pay her for it or hire a wet nurse (b. Ketuboth 59b). In this regard, there is a very interesting responsum by Samuel D. Medina, of Turkey, sixteenth century (“Rashdam,” Even Hoezer 193). A widowed woman bore a posthumous child and she demanded pay from her husband’s brother (who shared in the estate) for nursing the child, and the rabbi allowed her claim. Of course, if the husband does not want her to nurse the baby and she does want to nurse the baby, her will must prevail because of the pain caused her by the undischarged milk (b. Ketuboth 61a). But if he wants her to nurse his child and she refuses, her will prevails if it is the custom to have wet nurses in her father’s house.

Of course, while a divorced woman can refuse to nurse the child, there is, nevertheless, an interesting and important limitation to this right of refusal. If she has already nursed the child long enough (usually forty days) so that the child recognizes her and might refuse to take nourish ment from someone else, then she may not refuse to nurse him (Shulchan Aruch, Even Hoezer 8 : 50).

As far as I know, there is no law concerning techniques of suppression of lactation. The authorities do not speak of it directly; but they do have considerable discussion about which foods hinder the production of the milk or increase it, what foods the mother may not eat, lest they affect the child through the milk, and so on (see, in general, b. Ketuboth 60 b , and a special discussion of it in W. M. Feldman, The Jewish Child, p. 183).

As to the latter part of the question, asking for some of the folklore regarding lactation, Feldman refers to much of it. For example, people believed that the mother’s milk is derived from the mother’s blood. They evidently connected the cessation of menstruation during pregnancy with a transformation of the blood into milk for the child. Then they speak of various foods and vegetables which might do harm to the child through the mother’s milk.

The various laws which prohibit a woman remarrying while she is nursing her first husband’s child, are of no direct concern to the question except, perhaps, that the questioner might be interested in the related matter of weaning the child. If a child has been kept off its mother’s milk for four or five days, it may return to the breast if this abstention occurred within twenty-four months of birth; but if it has been kept off mother’s milk after twenty-four months from birth, it is forbidden to return to the breast. However, a mother may continuously breast-feed a child for four to five years. If a mother gives birth to twins, she may refuse to breast-feed both and has the right to demand that a wet nurse be provided for one of them.

There is no need to mention more of these folkloristic customs and some of the laws which may have folkloristic motivations. The answer to the essential question asked is clear: The duty to suckle the child is one of the duties which a wife owes to her husband. If she can afford a wet nurse, or he can afford a wet nurse, she need no longer feed the child, since the essential law is that the father is in duty bound to arrange for the child to be fed. If she is divorced, therefore, she can refuse to nurse the child. If, therefore, a modern woman does not wish to nurse the child, she is justified in refusing. Certainly with her husband’s consent, she may do so. Even without his consent, she may refuse if she can afford to make other provisions (in the ancient times this meant a wet nurse). Therefore it is clear that the law is permissive in this regard.

RRR 148-149

DATES OF DEATH AND BIRTH

Does a man die on the same date and time as that on which he was born? (One of the questions asked by the Jews of India through Rabbi Morris N. Kertzer, New York City)

In commenting on the verse in Ecclesiastes 3 : 2, “A time to be born and a time to die,” the Yalkut Shimoni (I : 938) says: “Happy is the man whose hour of death is as the hour of birth.” This seems to be the source of the idea that a man dies at the same hour that he was born. However, the Yalkut Shimoni quotes this from “D’vorim Rabba” VIII: 5, which explains its true meaning. It means: Happy is the man who at the time of his death is as pure as at the time of his birth. But the notion is evidently based upon the first statement in the Midrash.

However, in this question and in the following one (about the exact hour of death and marriages) we recognize the influence of the Orient, especially of China, where the astrologers pick the auspicious moment for every important occasion. This is absolutely contrary to Judaism, for the Talmud says there are no horoscopes for Jews (b. Shabbas 146c): “Eyn Mazel I’Isroel. ”

RRR 19-23

Bar Mitzvah on Saturday Afternoon

Granted that it is valid (as it is) to have Bar Mitzvah on Saturday afternoon or on Monday or Thursday, or whenever there is a regular Torah reading, should we encourage Bar Mitzvahs to take place on these un usual times, Saturday afternoon and during the week? (From Rabbi Morton M. Kanter, Bay Shore, Long Island, New York)

The form of the question indicates at the outset that this is not a problem primarily of law as it is a matter of congregational policy or organization in face of a social situation. Clearly there has arisen in relation to Bar Mitzvah a problem of congregational organization or management which is becoming more and more difficult. Up to about twenty five years ago, very few Reform congregations had Bar Mitzvahs. All of them had Confirmation for an entire class at one service. In most of the Reform congregations, until recently, Confirmation was considered to have supplanted Bar Mitzvah. The few Reform congregations which retained the ceremony had only an occasional Bar Mitzvah. But in recent years, perhaps the majority of our congregations have Bar Mitzvah, and in those congregations almost every boy who reaches the age of thirteen goes through the ceremony. In fact, many of the congregations have added a similar ceremony for girls, Bas Mitzvah. Since each boy who is Bar Mitzvah (and each girl who is Bas Mitzvah) must go through the ceremony individually, this new situation has created suddenly a congestion of the congregational schedule. Even if there are two Bar Mitzvahs a Sabbath, there simply are not enough Sabbaths in the year to accommodate all the Bar Mitzvahs.

One wonders what happened in Europe in the Orthodox communities when, also, every single boy became Bar Mitzvah. In the first place, in the one community there were many little synagogues, and thus there was plenty of room to scatter the Bar Mitzvahs over the community. But with our large congregational institutions, this is more difficult. A middle-sized city, which in Europe would have perhaps twenty little places of worship, has in America only three or four.

There is an additional problem besides this one of the reduced availability of separate synagogues in modern times. Nowadays, in America and in England too, the Bar Mitzvahs have become huge social affairs. Hundreds of people come to almost every Bar Mitzvah. As a result, the regular congregation is “swamped.” The Sabbath service seems to be a private religious affair for this particular family and its friends, and gradually the sense of regular worship on the Sabbath by the regular loyal worshipers is destroyed or at least greatly weakened. In Europe, where Bar Mitzvahs were modest affairs and perhaps ten or fifteen extra people might have come, the worshiping congregation did not lose its sense of identity from Sabbath to Sabbath because of these occasions. Nowadays it is possible to have a different congregation every Sabbath, one that rarely returns to the synagogue.

All this has greatly concerned the rabbinate, which would wish to retain the manifest benefits of Bar Mitzvah (the motive for a deeper study of Hebrew, the sense of personal responsibility, and so forth) while avoiding these unexpected congregational problems which the great social excitement of Bar Mitzvah and the small number of separate congregations has brought about.

This explains the number of new questions which have been received in the last decade similar to the one which we are now discussing. These questions all reflect a search for other days in the week on which to put Bar Mitzvahs besides the regular Sabbath service. There have been questions as to whether it is proper to have Bar Mitzvah on Sunday morning, one even on Yom Kippur day. Friday evening has by now been fairly well established as a time for Bar or Bas Mitzvahs. The present question concerns the propriety or at least the advisability of having Bar Mitzvah on Saturday afternoon.

It should be clear that the ritual of the Bar Mitzvah, as it developed over the centuries, was always bound up closely with the reading of the Torah. It is at the reading of the Torah that the father recites the familiar blessing, transferring religious responsibility from himself to his son. This connection of Bar Mitzvah with the Sefer Torah has become so intimate that the right of the Bar Mitzvah to be called to the Torah is a right superior to almost all others; for example, to the right of a father whose child will be circumcised during the week, or to the right of a husband whose wife has come to the synagogue for the first time after childbirth. The only right to be called to the Torah which is superior to that of the Bar Mitzvah is the right of a bridegroom in the week of his wedding. All these laws of relative rights to be called to the Torah are given by Mordecai Jaffe in the “Levushim” and are quoted by Abraham Abele Gombiner (Magen Avraham to Orah Hayyim 282).

So there is one general answer to possible dates for Bar Mitzvah. If there is a Torah reading on that day, then the Bar Mitzvah may properly take place. Thus, for example, there can be no Sunday morning Bar Mitzvah unless it happens to be the Sunday of the New Moon, or other occasion when the Torah is read. Bar Mitzvahs on Friday night are not justified by Orthodox law because there is no Torah reading for Friday night, but by our Reform custom they are amply justified. When the Union Prayerbook was newly revised, the Committee was confronted with a widespread demand for a Torah-reading service on Friday night. The majority of our people come to services on Friday night and they should hear the Torah read. Therefore, we went beyond Orthodox custom and, because we felt that the times needed it, ordained the reading of the Torah on Friday night. Since we read the Torah now on Friday night, we can have Bar Mitzvahs on Friday night.

The suggestion made in the present question that Bar Mitzvah be held on Saturday afternoon has much to commend it. In the first place, the Torah reading on Saturday afternoon, as that on Monday and Thursday morning, is traditional. Although there is no prophetical reading, there is the regular reading of the first part of next week’s portion. Besides the advantage that this is a traditional time for Torah reading, there is another practical religious advantage if some Bar Mitzvahs are held on Saturday afternoon. No matter how many Bar Mitzvahs were held on Sabbath afternoon (which, by the way, in most of our American business and professional fife is a day off from work, and many people can come), such ceremonies would not be destroying the regular Sabbath service attendance. On the contrary, we would be adding a service, or at least reviving one which had fallen into complete neglect. This certainly would be good. I wish it were possible that many Bar Mitzvahs could be thus placed. It is decidedly more justified by the older tradition to have a Bar Mitzvah on Saturday afternoon than on Friday night; and, at least in the larger congregations, we would spare ourselves the overcrowding of our regular services by transient spectators and, in addition, ease the congestion of the year’s schedule.

RRR 23-27

Mentally Retarded Child and Bar Mitzvah

A child who is mentally retarded, but to some small degree educable, is approaching his thirteenth birth day. His father would like the child to be Bar Mitz vah. It will be possible to teach the child to recite the two blessings over the Torah, but not more than that. Therefore the father himself will read the Haftorah. Is it justified, according to the spirit of Jewish law, that such a retarded child engage in the ceremony of

Bar Mitzvah? (Asked by L.S.F. for T.K.S.)

There are, alas, many mentally retarded—feeble-mindedchildren; and undoubtedly their parents have wanted them to have whatever joy they could and perhaps bring joy to themselves by celebrating his Bar Mitzvah. Yet, since Bar Mitzvah means the formal acceptance of responsibility for the commandments and since, clearly, such a child can hardly be responsible, then whether Bar Mitzvah is permissible is surely a question which must have often been asked before. Yet I do not recall a single responsum on this sad but important subject. Let us, therefore, see what deci sion can be arrived at through a general consideration of the basic laws involved.

There are many laws in the Mishnah, Talmud, and Codes dealing with the feeble-minded. Of course, mental ailments are so varied that one can hardly expect the Talmud to have a precise definition, if indeed precise definition is at all possible, covering a wide spectrum of mental deficiency. The Talmud gives a rough-and-ready way in which to judge whether a person is insane (b. Chagiga 3b)— an insane person goes out alone at night, sleeps in the cemetery, tears his clothes, and so forth. From the legal point of view, the mentally retarded person (shota) is grouped with two other classes, namely, the deaf-mute and the minor. While many laws apply to all three equally, they are nevertheless not entirely of equal religious status. For example, the marriage of a mute would be recognized as valid (see Shulchan Aruch, Even Hoezer 67 : 8) whereas the marriage of a shota is not valid (Even Hoezer 67 : 7). This is based upon the Talmud (b. Yevamoth 112b) where we are told that the rabbis did not provide for marriage for a shota because it cannot be a happy marriage. Among the other special legal disabilities of the shota is that he cannot engage in buying or selling either movable property or real estate. No sales made by him or made to him are valid (see Maimonides, Yad, “Mechira” 29 : 4, and Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpot 235 : 20). He cannot even transfer property to another (without sale) or have property transferred to him (Choshen Mishpot 243 : 16). A general description of the legal status of the shota is summed up in the commentary of Rashi to the passage quoted from Chagiga 3b. Rashi says a shota is free from all the commandments and from all punishment (for the violation of them). Therefore it is quite understandable why a shota cannot be included in the quorum of ten (minyan) necessary for public worship. (See Orah Hayyim 55 : 8.)

Now a Bar Mitzvah is one who becomes in duty bound to fulfill the mitzvos (see Abot 5 : 21). The father recites the blessing—generally interpreted to mean that from now on this boy will bear the responsibility for his own sin and be in duty bound to obey all the commandments. Clearly, then, a shota who is free from the duty of obeying the commandments and is free from punishment if he violates them cannot possibly be Bar Mitzvah. The normal boy through Bar Mitzvah, or at least through becoming of age, which the Bar Mitzvah symbolizes, changes from the status of irresponsibility to that of responsibility. The shota cannot change at all. He was irresponsible as a minor and, according to the law as cited above, remains irresponsible as an adult. Therefore it is clear that the Bar Mitzvah has no meaning in his case and should not be carried out.

All this is according to the strict letter of the law. Nevertheless, even acknowledging that he cannot be made responsible for the mitzvos, there is some justification for permitting this child to participate in the ceremony. Actually, the whole Bar Mitzvah ceremony is only a custom, a minhag. It is hardly mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch. According to the law, it is the boy’s maturity which makes him responsible. The ceremony grew up later, and is in no sense equivalent to an ordained ceremony like the Seder or the Suceah or putting on the tefillin. Therefore, even though the law says that this feeble-minded lad (if he remains feeble-minded) cannot be responsible for the commandments, still, is it really objectionable if he goes through this ceremony? In other words, may not such a boy be called up to the Torah since the Bar Mitzvah ceremony is not really “sacramental” or mandatory as such?

Nowhere in the literature is there any direct statement as to whether a shota who knows the blessings may be called up to the Torah. Nevertheless, since the shota is irresponsible and regularly grouped with the minor (who is also irresponsible) we may, perhaps, decide from the rights of the minor in this matter, whether a shota could be called to the Torah. The Talmud says clearly (in Megilla 23a) that all may be counted among the seven who are called up Saturday to the Torah, even a minor. The Shulchan Aruch, in Orah Hayyim 282 : 3, repeats it as a law that a minor may be one of the seven called up to the Torah on the Sabbath. But it adds: Provided he knows to Whom the benedictions are addressed. This additional test, namely, that a minor should be aware of God, to Whom the benedictions are addressed, is derived by the Shulchan Aruch by analogy from the Talmud in b. Berachos 48a, where we are told that if a minor knows to Whom the benedictions are addressed, he may be included in the public grace after meals (M’zuman). If, then, this unfortunate child has enough intelligence, not merely to learn the blessings, but to understand that the blessings are addressed to God, then he may be called up to the Torah at any time. If that is the case, why not also on the Sabbath after his thirteenth birthday?

In Reform congregations, the Bar Mitzvah ceremony is not taken to have a strict formal and legal meaning as it might have in an Orthodox congregation. The six hundred and thirteen commandments do not become more a part of the life of a child after this Sabbath than they were before. The Bar Mitzvah is taken to be a symbol much like the general spiritual symbol associated with Confirmation, namely, that it is a taking on of a new and stronger sense of ethical and spiritual responsibility, of becoming adult in mind, heart, and conscience. If that is the case, it would not be of too much importance to us that technically this child, being a shota, is, according to Rashi, freed from all responsibility for the mitzvos. We would rather judge the ceremony on its spiritual and ethical side. If it does the child good, if it will stir the child to a little extra effort which he may need, if it will bring joy to his parents who have had so much sorrow, then certainly the child should be allowed to recite the blessings and the father to read the prophetical reading.

To sum up, then, we must make a distinction between Bar Mitzvah (“the coming of legal age”) and the later ceremony of Bar Mitzvah which is primarily calling the boy to the Torah as a symbol of his religious majority. As far as the actual coming of legal age, this is beyond the reach of this child. The law declares him to be permanently irresponsible, therefore permanently a minor. But the ceremony of Bar Mitzvah is not a firmly rooted part of the law. It is only a formal participation in the public Torah reading. This any minor may do who knows to Whom the blessings are addressed. Especially in liberal congregations where the conferring of technical responsibility does not count as much as our helping the child toward, a happier and more useful life, the ceremony, while necessarily pathetic, may be of encouragement and benefit.

RRR 67-72

Jewish Nurse Baptizing Dying Catholic Infant

A Jewish nurse asks for guidance in the following sit uation: If a Catholic infant is dying and a Jewish nurse is the only nurse with the child at the time, the Catholic Church would want the child baptized by the nurse, who utters the following formula: “I bap tize you in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.” May a Jewish nurse, from the point of view of Jewish tradition, perform this baptism? (From Rabbi Joshua O. Haberman, Trenton, New Jersey)

It is, of course, obvious that there is not and could not be any direct opinion on this question in Jewish traditional law. If, in earlier centuries, a Jewish physician were attending a Catholic mother giving birth to an infant, or if a Jewish midwife were helping at the birth, these situations occurred in homes and not in hospitals. So there were always members of the Catholic family present to perform the emergency baptism. But nowadays, with modern hospital practice, where it generally happens that a nurse (particularly a night nurse) will be alone in the room with an infant or in charge of the room in which the various newborn infants are kept, she may very well observe that a certain Catholic infant is dying and that there is no time to get a Catholic nurse to perform the baptism. Should she, a Jewess, feel that Jewish tradition permits her to perform this Catholic religious act?

First of all, it is necessary to clarify the attitude of Jewish legal tradition toward Christianity, especially toward Roman Catholic Christianity which was the only form of Christianity which most of the Jewish scholars found in their environment. A large section of the law in Yore Deah deals with the laws of idolatry. Many details of the relationship between Jews and Catholic Christianity are found there as developments of the Shulchan Aruch laws on idolatry. This fact may lead to a profound misunderstanding, namely, that Judaism, especially its legal tradition, looks upon Christianity with its Trinity as a polytheism or an idolatry. If that were the case, which it is not, then the old laws of complete avoidance of any contact with idolatry would apply also to Christianity.

But this is not so at all. Jewish legal tradition, which one would expect to be strict in its prohibitory mood, looks upon Christianity as a valid worship of God. As for Christian trinitarianism, the Christians are not prohibited in the eyes of Jewish law from adding divine persons to God in their worship. To add other divine or adored persons (e.g., the two other members of the Trinity and the saints, whether or not the adoration of the saints is “worship”) is called in Jewish law “shittuf (association or partnership). The Jews by their special covenant at Sinai are forbidden any shittuf and must worship God alone. The Christians, children of Noah, are not forbidden shiftuf, provided they worship God.

That this is so can be made clear by three different citations from the law, each centuries apart from the other. The first is a statement of Rabbenu Tarn, the great French authority of the twelfth century (in b. Bechorot 2 b and Sanhedrin 63b), in which he says that though Christians take oaths by their holy personages, their basic intent is that these oaths are taken in the name of God. Therefore, there is no sin in our exacting an oath from them in business transactions.

The second citation is from the seventeenth century. Moses Rivkes, of Vilna, in his commentary “Be’er Hagolah” to Choshen Mishpot 425, says that the sentence in the Passover Haggadah, “Pour forth Thy wrath upon the nations who knew Thee not,” refers only to those nations which do not believe in God the Creator, the miracles which God has done, and the giving of the Law. But these nations in whose presence we live, and where we are protected, believe in all these scriptural ideas, and we are firm in praying for the peace and prosperity of all of them.

The third citation is from the eighteenth-nineteenth century. The commentator, Israel Lipschutz, in his commentary “Tifereth Isroel” to Baba Kama, at the beginning of chapter 4, speaks of the duty of dealing fairly with non Jews in business relationships: “How much the more [he says] is the obligation upon us to deal fairly with these, our brothers, of the nations who recognize the One God and honor His Law and call Scripture ‘Holy Writ’ and observe that which is incumbent upon them of our Torah, namely, the seven commandments (of the sons of Noah).”

So it is clear that Christianity is, in the eyes of Jewish law, a valid worship of God, and the trinitarianism of its faith, which would be prohibited to Jews, does not invalidate their faith because they never were forbidden shittuf, adding of forms of deity.

Then why are the laws of the relationship between Jews and Christianity dealt with as a development of the laws of idolatry? Because these older laws on idolatry are the only systematic statement in the tradition of the relationship between Jews and non-Jews. Therefore such relationship, interpreted and modified, can help us in understanding the relationship between Judaism and other religions, provided we keep in mind the basic principle that Christianity, in spite of its trinitarianism and its saints, is not idolatrous, although forbidden to Jews, who are under the Covenant of Sinai.

Now, coming closer to our problem: Since Jews are forbidden any amplification of the personality of God (shittuf) then is not a Jewish nurse prohibited from baptizing this Catholic baby ” … in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost”? Yes, if thereby she proclaims her belief in the Trinity, or even pretends hypocritically to a belief in the Trinity. But does her recitation of those words really mean a belief or even mean a pretended belief?

I directed an inquiry to the Catholic Chancellery and was informed of the meaning of the Catholic law that the Catholic Church accepts the validity of a baptism made by a non-Catholic in times of emergency. I was told that this law means much more than the acceptance of a baptism by a non-Catholic Christian (who believes in the Trinity). It means that even a nonbeliever in the Trinity, or even an atheist who baptizes the child using the formula, has validly baptized the child, and the Church will not rebaptize provided the baptism was intended to be what the Church wants it to be.

Therefore, the Jewish nurse is not required to be hypocritical, to pretend to a belief she does not have, for the baptism to be a valid one. She says, in effect: “I myself do not believe in the Trinity. I do not even believe in baptism as a sacrament. But the Catholic parents do, and for the sake of their belief, I perform this ceremony which is of meaning to them.” In other words, she does not represent her own belief; she is only an agent of theirs. The principle in the Jewish law that one may not be an agent for a sin (‘Ayn Sheliach Lidvar Averah, ” b. Kiddushin 42b) can hardly apply here, because for the persons for whom she is the agent, namely, the parents or the Church, this action is not a sin, even in the eyes of Jewish law.

There is a parallel in the law to a situation like this one in which a person of one religion performs an act that is to be carried out according to the intention of the other religion. It is not exactly parallel, namely, that a Jew performs an act which Christians shall deem valid according to Christianity, as in the case of the nurse and the Christian baptism; but it is rather that a Christian performs an act that shall be valid according to Judaism. If, for example, a Christian makes a contribution to the synagogue, could that contribution be used, Iet us say, to make a curtain for the ark or for a Menorah? The law is that a Christian may make any contribution to the synagogue, provided he does not specify its use, but says, “Use it in the way that is most meaningful to you.” In other words, he gives the gift al da’as Yisroel. (See full discussion in Reform Jewish Practice, Vol. II, p. 45, and Shulchan Aruch, Yore Deah 259 : 4 Incidentally, Isserles says, 254 : 2, that even if the Christian does not say, “Use it in your Jewish way,” we accept the gift anyway.) In any event, this parallel indicates that Jewish law accepts the principle that one can give a gift or do a deed in which he says, “I am not doing it in accordance with my belief, but according to yours.”

So far it seems clear that there is no sound objection to the nurse performing the ceremony and her uttering the trinitarian words. But now we must consider whether she should do it or perhaps try to avoid doing it. In other words, what is duty in this matter?

In this regard it is important to bear in mind the two parallel ethical motivations in Jewish law: m’shum ayva— to avoid creating hatred; and mipne darche shalom— f orthe sake of the paths of peace. These principles are fre-quently invoked in the relationship between Jews and non Jews. For example, a Jew moving from a house must re move the mezuzah if a Christian will now occupy the house. Nevertheless, the law reads that if removing the mezuzah will create hurt or ill will between Jew and Christian, it should not be removed (see Yore Deah 291: 2). Or, for example, in pagan days, it was forbidden to have any contact with Gentiles even three days before their festivals, but the law is that with Christians we may have contact with them, not only on their festivals but even give them gifts on their festivals (see Yore Deah 128 : 12). All this “for the sake of avoiding hatred and creating peace.”

Perhaps of closest relevance to our theme is one of the laws which is also motivated by “the paths of peace,” namely, the admonition in b. Gittin 61a et seq. that we sustain the poor Gentiles, heal their sick, bury their dead, and console their mourners for the sake of the paths of peace.

Now, this emergency baptism involved in our question concerns a dying child whose Catholic parents would be greatly consoled if they felt that the child had been baptized with a baptism which the Church accepts as valid. Certainly this (anticipating by a few minutes or an hour) is a consolation to mourning parents, which is required by Jewish law of all Jews.

To sum up: Belief in the Trinity as involved in the formula of baptism is not a sin for Christians, according to Jewish law. Therefore the Jewish nurse, who is an agent in this case, is not an agent for a sinful act. The Church does not require her even to pretend belief in the Trinity. She is not a hypocrite. Jewish law requires her to comfort the mourners. The virtuous act, uttering this formal sentence in their name, is done “for the sake of the paths of peace.”