Responsa

CARR 170-171

CCAR RESPONSA

Contemporary American Reform Responsa

109. Burial of a Sefer Torah

QUESTION: The congregation has a Torah that can no longer be repaired. Must it be buried in the congregation’s cemetery, or may it be buried on the grounds of the synagogue itself? (Rabbi E. L. Sapinsley, Bluefield, WV)ANSWER: A Torah is buried out of respect. Traditionally it is placed in an earthen urn and buried in the cemetery near a scholar (Meg. 26b; Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 282.10; Shulhan Arukh Orah Hayim 154.5). A Torah could, of course, also be placed in an absolutely safe spot; that was done in the Cairo Geniza into which not only Torah scrolls but all kinds of documents which mention the name of God were placed in order to assure that the name of God and holy writings would not be desecrated. A pasul Sefer Torah in which eighty-five consecutive letters remain continues to be holy (Sab. 115b), and so must be treated in a reverent manner. According to one strand of the tradition, such a defective Torah could be retained in the Ark, but not used. This was generally not followed, because it was easy to forget which was the defective Torah and to embarrass the congregation through its use (Jacob Ettlinger, Binyan Zion, 1.97; Magen Avraham to Shulhan Arukh Orah Hayim 154.8; Gedaliah Felder, Yesodeh Yeshurun, 2.142). Burial of a Torah on the grounds of a synagogue has not been discussed. It would certainly be possible, but would represent a second best choice, primarily because the ground in which the Torah is buried may also be put to another use later, for example, as a playground, picnic site or parking space, etc. In other words, it is easy for the next generation to forget that a Torah has been buried there, and so, not treat it reverently. That is unlikely to occur in a cemetery. I would, therefore, suggest that if the burial is to take place on the grounds of the synagogue, that the site be appropriately marked. Otherwise, it would be preferable to bury the Torah in the cemetery in keeping with tradition.May 1985

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

TFN no.5755.15 177-183

CCAR RESPONSA

A Woman as a Scribe

5755.15

She’elah 

Almost two years ago, our synagogue hired a Torah scribe to clean and repair a sefer torah which had been rescued from the Nazis. Several of us had the opportunity to help clean the Torah and “letter” it by placing our hand over the scribe’s as he wrote, thus fulfilling the commandment for every Jew to write a Torah. I became fascinated and deeply moved by this work. The feeling of standing in front of the open Torah, of sensing the spirit of the original scribe, of the generations before me who rejoiced and wept in its presence, is a powerful one. I so love this feeling of being connected to God and to my people through the Torah that I would like to learn how to be a scribe in my own right if that is possible. I already have art and calligraphy backgrounds, and I am deeply committed to this. 

Could you please reply to me in the form of a responsum on the subject of women participating in the scribal arts? If you have particular advice as to a course of study, I would appreciate hearing that, too. (Julietta Ackerman, Goldens Bridge, NY) 

Teshuvah 

Many of us, upon reading this question, can readily identify with your experience. We too can remember how we felt when we stood before the open sefer torah and sensed for the first time the power and significance of this scroll in our lives, in the way in which we define who we are. And for good reason. Jewish tradition regards the study of Torah as the means by which we discover God’s will, how we are to live so as to sanctify the divine name. The world, we are taught, exists for the sake of three things, one of which is Torah.[1] And the study of Torah is equivalent to the performance of all the other commandments.[2] The Torah and the study of Torah are, therefore, the quintessential Jewish religious acts. Little wonder, then, that a child marks the occasion of reaching religious majority by being called to the Torah, for it is through participation in the life of Torah that one learns most truly just what it means to grow as a Jewish adult, to be a Jew. 

The Traditional Prohibition. 

Yet the fact remains that Torah as an intellectual and spiritual discipline has traditionally been reserved to males. Let us take, for example, your own experience of “fulfilling the commandment for every Jew to write a Torah”, a commandment derived from Deuteronomy 31:19, “therefore, write down this poem and teach it to Israel.”[3] The author of the Sefer Hachinukh, an important medieval work, uses exalted language to describe the purpose of this mitzvah: “God instructed that each Jew should have a sefer torah readily available to study…in order to learn to revere God and to understand God’s commandments, which are more precious to us than gold…”.[4] But the phrase “each Jew” is severely qualified: “This commandment is practiced in every community and in every age[5] by males, who are obligated to study the Torah and therefore to write it, and not by females.” 

Women, in other words, are exempt from the commandment to write a Torah scroll because they are also exempt from talmud torah, the requirement to study Torah. The source of this exemption is a midrash, a rabbinic legal interpretation of Deuteronomy 11:19: “you shall teach (My words) to b’neikhem.” This Hebrew word is the second person inflection of banim, which means either “children” or “sons”, and according to the rules of Hebrew grammar it can be rendered correctly as either “your children” or “your sons”. The midrash seizes upon the latter alternative: b’neikhem means your sons and excludes your daughters. Hence, a father need not teach Torah to his daughter, nor is she required to study it on her own.[6] Since a woman is exempt from the commandment to study Torah, the rabbis deduce through the interpretive principle of simukhin, which draws comparisons between adjacent Torah verses or subjects, that she is also exempt from the mitzvah of t’fillin.[7] And–once again through the principle of simukhin–if she is exempt from the requirement to wear t’fillin, she is not qualified to write them, or to write m’zuzot or Torah scrolls.[8] As Maimonides puts it: “Torah scrolls, t’fillin, or m’zuzah parchments that are written by a woman are unfit for use (p’sulin) and should be stored away.”[9] Thus does the tradition disqualify women from serving as scribes. 

Critique of the Traditional View. 

The position we have just described, which is the consensus view of the halakhah, is not immune to critique. We would argue that the traditional prohibition, though strictly observed in the Orthodox community, is flawed as a matter of Jewish law. We note, first of all, that the rule which disqualifies women from serving as scribes rests upon a thoroughly arbitrary reading of the Torah. The midrash on Deuteronomy 11:19 which interprets b’neikhem as “your sons” rather than as “your children” could just as easily and correctly have chosen the alternate translation. Indeed, the halakhah often does read banim and its various inflections as “children”, undistinguished by gender.[10] This more inclusive reading is even adopted when the subject under discussion is a matter of ritual observance, where we would expect the rabbis to draw a distinction between men and women. A case in point is Numbers 15:38, which states: “speak to b’nei yisrael (sons/children of Israel) and tell them to make fringes (tzitzit) on the corners of their garments”. The Talmud cites this wording to prove that only Jews (b’nei yisrael) and not Gentiles are permitted to make the ritual fringes.[11] Note that the text reads the phrase b’nei yisrael as “children”, rather than “sons” of Israel; accordingly, most halakhists rule that Jewish women, no less than Jewish men, are qualified to make tzitzit.[12] In other words, nothing prevents the rabbis from reading the Hebrew banim as “children” rather than “sons”, including males and females alike within the terms of a mitzvah. They are not compelled, therefore, to interpret Deuteronomy 11:19 so as to exempt women from the mitzvah of Torah study and, by extension, from t’fillin and from serving as scribes. 

Why then did the rabbis of the Talmud adopt that restrictive interpretation? Clearly, the sages of late antiquity did not possess what we would call an “enlightened” view of the female mind and character. They believed it inappropriate and even dangerous for women to occupy themselves with the study of Torah. Thus, although women were not absolutely forbidden to study and even received a certain merit for doing so, “the Sages command that a father not teach Torah to his daughter, for most women are not intellectually suited to learn. Rather, due to their lack of intelligence, they are liable to interpret the words of Torah in vain and foolish ways. As the Sages teach us: `if one teaches his daughter Torah, it is as though he teaches her obscenity.’”[13] This attitude, though not the only one represented in Talmudic literature, is of a piece with other rabbinic statements concerning women[14] and, as the codes indicate, it is the accepted halakhah regarding women and Torah study. Given this intellectual and cultural reality, it is no surprise that the rabbis chose to read Deuteronomy 11:19 in the way that they do. 

In our age, it is hardly necessary to state that the rabbinic view of women’s mental capacity does not correspond with the facts. We reject that view, therefore, not because it is politically incorrect but because it is false. And since it is demonstrably false, since it contradicts our own intellectual and cultural reality, one need not be a Reform Jew to recognize its falsehood. Indeed, leading traditional scholars have acknowledged that women are no less capable of learning than are men and that the rabbinic conception of female intelligence does not fit the “woman of today”.[15] This is important, because the exclusion of women from the mitzvah of Torah study was justified largely on the basis of their supposed intellectual inadequacies. In the absence of this conception, the rabbis would not have ruled Torah study off-limits to women. And in a time when the evidence of our eyes so clearly demonstrates the collapse of that conception, no justification exists for rabbis, Orthodox or otherwise, to maintain the restrictive interpretation of Deuteronomy 11:19 which denies to women the opportunity to participate as equals in this mitzvah.[16] 

The View of Reform Judaism. 

Reform Judaism dissents sharply from this prohibition. Our movement rejects any attempt to draw distinctions in ritual practice on the basis of gender. Over the years, we have worked to remove the barriers that deny women equal access to all avenues of Jewish religious expression, learning, and leadership. Women serve our communities as rabbis, cantors, and mohalot (performers of ritual circumcision); there is no reason to deny them, should they possess the requisite education and skills, the opportunity to function as soferot s’tam, writers of Torah scrolls, t’fillin, and m’zuzot. 

Since this is a matter of religious principle for us, we would maintain our dissent even if it were impossible to argue cogently on textual grounds against the traditional prohibition. Why then do we make such an argument? Obviously, we do not expect that Orthodox authorities will change their position because of anything we say. We rather seek to demonstrate that, according to halakhah no less than on grounds of ethical principle, women ought to be obligated to study Torah and thus permitted to write sacred texts. Such to our mind is the most persuasive reading of the sources of Jewish law, one which Orthodox halakhists could adopt with halakhic integrity. 

You, Ms. Ackerman, ought therefore to be able to serve the entire Jewish community, and not just its liberal segment, as a scribe. That some deny you this opportunity is the result of a prohibition which, as we have seen, flows from arbitrary textual interpretation and long-outdated psychology. This is a regrettable state of affairs which, we hope, will one day change. In the meantime, you should not let it hinder you from working toward your goal. 

Your goal is, in fact, our goal as well. The Reform movement is deeply interested in training and producing soferim/ot, just as it produces rabbis, cantors, and other religious leaders.[17] We also urge you to remember that as a scribe you will serve the community as a teacher of Torah as well as an inscriber of texts. A scribe, like a rabbi, embodies for other Jews the value of the study of Torah, the commandment that is equivalent to all the others combined. It is therefore incumbent upon the scribe, no less than upon the rabbi or other communal servants, to continue to study Torah with the greatest intensity of which he or she is capable. This study should include, at a minimum, a careful reading of the Torah itself, the weekly portions along with their haftarot, in the original Hebrew. In addition, you should learn the traditional halakhot, the laws concerning the writing of Torah scrolls, t’fillin, and m’zuzot. A good source for these is Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah, which contains a section devoted to this subject. 

You say that it is your dream to become a scribe. We say that you have every right to pursue that dream and to serve your people thereby. We pray that God grant you the energy, perseverance, and insight to make your dream come true.  

NOTES 

  1. M. Avot 1:2. And see B. Pesachim 68b: “were it not for the Torah, even heaven and the earth could not exist”.
  1. B. Shabbat 127a.
  1. B. Sanhedrin 21b. See Yad, Hilkhot Sefer torah 7:1: “that is to say, write for yourselves the Torah which contains this poem [in parashat Ha’azinu], for we write the Torah whole and not section by section.”
  1. Sefer Hachinukh, mitzvah 613.
  1. I.e., it is not restricted to the land of Israel or to the days when the Temple was standing. 
  1. B. Kiddushin 29b; Yad, Hilkhot Talmud Torah 1:1; Shulchan Arukh YD 246:6. 
  1. B. Kiddushin 34a. Since these two commandments are mentioned side by side (Deuteronomy 6:7-8 and 11:18-19), the rabbis learn that what is true of the one (women are exempt from Torah study) is true of the other (women are exempt from t’fillin). 
  1. Since the commandment of m’zuzah (“you shall write them on the doorposts of your house… Deuteronomy 6:9) is adjacent to the commandment of t’fillin (“you shall bind them… Deuteronomy 6:8), what is true of “binding” (women are exempt) is true of “writing” as well; B. M’nachot 42b and B. Gitin 45b. In the version of this baraita which appears in the printed version of M. Sof’rim 1:13, “woman” is not mentioned among the list of those who are unfit to write a sefer torah. However, the Gaon of Vilna reads “woman” in his text of Sof’rim; moreover, the exclusion of women seems demanded by the very logic behind this rule (“whoever does not wear t’fillin may not write them”). 
  1. Yad, Hilkhot T’fillin 1:13; SA, OC 39:1; SA, YD 281:3. The Tur, YD 281, does not mention “woman” among those who are disqualified to write a Torah scroll. From this, some would learn that while a woman may not write t’fillin she is permitted to write a sefer torah (D’rishah ad loc.). But this is not the majority halakhic position (Siftey Kohen, SA, YD 281, # 6). 
  1. The Torah speaks of the Israelite community as b’nei yisrael, the “children” of Israel, a designation which almost always includes women as well as men. For example: according to all opinions the well-known statement in Leviticus 19:2 (“speak to b’nei yisrael and tell them: `you shall be holy…’”) is addressed to the entire community and not merely to its sons. 
  1. B. Menachot 42a. 
  1. Yad, Hilkhot Tzitzit 1:12. On the basis of B. Menachot 42a, Rambam prohibits Gentiles from making the fringes, and he does not include women within this prohibition. Tosafot, Menachot 42a, s.v. minayin and Tosafot, Gittin 45b, s.v. kol; R. Asher, Hilkhot Tzitzit, # 13; SA, OC 14:1; Hagahot Maimoniot, Tzitzit 1, # 9. Some medieval authorities want to read b’nei yisrael in this verse as “sons of Israel”, thereby disqualifying women as well as Gentiles from making tzitzit; see Hagahot Maimoniot ad loc. But theirs is definitely a minority opinion. Isserles, SA, OC 14:1, urges that tzitzit not be made by women, but his words are couched in the form of a prudent stringency and not as a statement that, according to the law, women are forbidden to make them. 
  1. Yad, Hilkhot Talmud Torah 1:13; see also SA, YD 246:6. The quotation is the dictum of R. Eliezer in M. Sotah 3:4. See also Y. Sotah 3:4: “let the Torah’s words be burned rather than given over to women.” 
  1. E.g., “women are of unstable temperament” (B. Shabbat 33b and B. Kiddushin 80b) and “women’s sole wisdom lies in the spinning of yarn” (B. Yoma 66b). 
  1. See Arukh Hashulchan, YD 246, par. 19, and Torah T’mimah, Deut. 11:19, # 48, end. And see, especially, R. Ben Zion Ouziel’s description of “today’s woman” in his Resp. Mishpetey Ouziel, v. 3, # 6, where counter to the Orthodox rabbinic majority he rules in favor of female suffrage. Moreover, despite women’s supposed mental inferiority, halakhists have long required them to study those aspects of Jewish law which apply directly to them. See Isserles, YD 246:6, and Tosafot, B. Sotah 22b, s.v. ben azai
  1. One cannot defend a refusal to remove the prohibition on the basis of “hallowed tradition.” The halakhah allows contemporary rabbis to depart from the rulings of their predecessors when those rulings were based upon an observable reality that has changed since their day. See R. Eliezer Berkovits, Hahalakhah: kochah vetafkidah (Jerusalem, 1981), 48ff. 
  2. Ms. Ackerman was informed of the efforts by the Union of American Hebrew Congregations to hold an institute for the teaching of scribal skills during the summer of 1996.

TFN no.5751.2 37-38

CCAR RESPONSA

Applause in the Sanctuary

5751.2

She’elah

During Friday night services in the Sanctuary we have had an Israeli dance performance or a jazz pianist who played contemporary interpretations of traditional Jewish melodies. Congregants were unsure whether applause on such occasions was appropriate.What about a guest speaker? Is it allowable to applaud at the conclusion of the address?

 

Teshuvah

The Sanctuary — that is, the place where communal worship usually takes place and where the Torah scrolls are kept in has served a variety of purposes at different times. At one time wayfarers would spend the night there, and today large communal meetings are often held in the Sanctuary. Some congregations, when they accommodate events which appear to be “secular” in nature, shield the Ark with a screen and thereby signal that the “holy space” has now been converted to ordinary usage. But others do not engage in this practice.

 

The matter of applause generally arises only at events that are clearly performances of one kind or another (which should, of course, be suitable to a synagogue), and applause would be the normal reaction of the audience. In fact, the rule of thumb that might be applied is to ask whether the people assembled are a congregation or an audience. In the latter instance, applause would be expected and unobjectionable.

 

But what if the applause takes place during a Shabbat service? Rabbi Solomon B. Freehof permitted it in the case of a couple who were blessed on their Golden Wedding anniversary. He considered the applause as a warm and friendly gesture on the part of the congregation, and deemed it halakhicly permissible.1

 

You inquire about applauding a dance group or pianist or guest speaker during the service. While the Halakhah is permissive on the subject, we feel it imperative to ask whether such reaction enhances the worship service. Quite evidently your congregation feels somewhat uncomfortable about applauding guest artists or speakers, and we are sure they would consider it totally inappropriate to applaud the rabbi or cantor for their contributions to the service.2

 

The current discomfort of your congregation in this matter suggests that they have a sense that applause is predominantly an every-day expression which somehow runs counter to the sense of apartness ascribed to the religious service, the Shabbat atmosphere and the Sanctuary. That sense ought to be fostered and reinforced. While applauding the golden jubilars might express a sense of family among the congregants, we would counsel against extending such a custom to other occasions. It would be better to discourage all applause for guest artists and speakers during the worship service itself, for once we open the door to it there will be a constant problem of distinguishing between the appropriate and the inappropriate.

 

We would therefore advise that any event which is likely to elicit applause be held after the conclusion of the prayers; and then having now become may express itself in the usual manner.3 A religious service, wherever held, should be an occasion apart, and how much more so a service held in the synagogue.

 

Notes

His responsum on this matter, which he published not long before his death, set forth the way in which Jewish tradition dealt with the specific halakhah regarding the clapping of hands on the Sabbath; see “Applause in the Sabbath Service,” Today’s Reform Responsa (1990), pp. 31-34, where rabbinic sources are given. Since tradition forbade music making on the Sabbath, the question arose whether clapping one’s hands was a form of rhythmic music; if it was not, it was allowed. During the 1930s the writer of this responsum was present at an Orthodox Rosh Hashanah service in Chicago, during which the congregation repeatedly applauded the chazan. As, for instance, applauding a couple and wishing them mazal tov after the conclusion of the wedding service.

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

CARR 193

CCAR RESPONSA

Contemporary American Reform Responsa

130. Pulpit Robes

QUESTION: Some

members of the congregation feel that it would be more appropriate for the rabbi and cantor to

appear on the pulpit in robes. At the present time it is the minhag of the congregation to

have them conduct services wearing a dark suit. Is there some Jewish tradition which favors

robes? (L. Brody, Pittsburgh, PA)ANSWER: In recent centuries, Hassidic Orthodox

authorities have opposed any change in the garb worn by their followers; for that reason, their

members continue to wear garments commonly used in Eastern Europe during the eighteenth

and nineteenth centuries (Sofer, Mahaneh Hayim, Vol. II, #2; Joseph Schwartz,

Vayitzbor Yosef, 12.7, etc.). These authorities have also opposed the innovation of rabbi

and cantor wearing robes, which was introduced into the liberal congregations of Hungary. They

felt that this followed the customs of the Gentile community around us, and that has always been

prohibited (Zeph 1.8; Yad Hil. Akum 11.1; Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 178.1).

This, however, was a later interpretation of these citations, for both Caro and Isserles refer to

garments which were overly decorative or ostentatious (Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah

178.1). It is, therefore, clear that although in a large number of congregations rabbis

and cantors wear robes, there is nothing in tradition which would encourage it. In fact, the

democratic tradition of Judaism which gives no special liturgical role to rabbi or cantor would

indicate robes as inappropriate garb of distinction. The minhag of the congregation

should, therefore, be followed.September 1983

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

TFN no.5754.1 143-146

CCAR RESPONSA

Selling Ritual Objects to Jews for Jesus

5754.1

She’elah

Should a synagogue gift shop knowingly sell Jewish ritual objects to anyone, Jews or Christians, involved with Jews for Jesus, and how far should we go in ascertaining a person’s identity for purposes of selling any of these items? Should the gift shop knowingly sell Jewish ritual objects to Christians who say they wish to make use of them in order to “recover the Jewish roots” of their Christianity? (Rabbi Joan S. Friedman, Bloomington, IN)

Teshuvah

  1. This Committee has repeatedly taken the position that Jews who affiliate with Jews for Jesus or with the various “Messianic Jewish” movements are apostates and should be treated as such. These individuals “should not be accorded membership in the congregation or treated in any way which makes them appear as if they were affiliated with the Jewish community, for that poses a clear danger to the Jewish community and also to its relationships with the general community.”1 If so, then it is arguable that we ought not to sell them objects which they will use to perform their pseudo-Jewish rituals. This conclusion would be based upon the verse (Leviticus 19:14) “do not place a stumbling-block before the blind,” which our tradition reads as a prohibition against leading others unwittingly into transgression.2 On the strength of this rule, one is forbidden to hand a cup of wine to a nazir, lest he be enticed to break the vow he has taken against drinking intoxicants.3 Similarly, one may not hand forbidden food to an apostate Jew; despite his apostasy he remains a Jew, and the food is still prohibited to him.4 To sell ritual objects to Jews for Jesus would aid them in the performance of religious services which amount to a renunciation of their Judaism. They are forbidden to do that, and we are forbidden to help them do that. In addition, the use of Jewish ritualia helps them create a false impression in the minds of those Jews who visit their churches. By presenting their evangelical Christian theology in Jewish garb, these movements attempt to persuade Jews in search of religious identity and spiritual fulfillment that one can be a perfectly good Jew–indeed, a “completed Jew”–by “accepting Jesus.” We have every reason not to cooperate with the efforts of any Christian denomination, no matter how “Jewish” they appear, to missionize our people and to encourage them to abandon the faith of Israel.

Against this, one might argue that by selling ritual objects to Jews for Jesus we do not in fact place a “stumbling-block” before them. The sources cited above suggest that the prohibition applies only when the nazir or the apostate could not have committed the sin without the Jew’s assistance. If he could have gotten hold of the forbidden substance on his own, he would in any event have violated the commandment. Thus, the Jew who helps him obtain it is not the exclusive agent or cause of the transgression.5 In our case, since the ritual objects are widely available and could be purchased elsewhere, the fact that we sell them does not cause the Jews for Jesus to do anything they would not otherwise have done.

This argument, however, does not succeed. Even if our action does not technically violate the Toraitic commandment in Leviticus 19:14, rabbinic ordinance forbids us to assist other persons in committing a sin. The fact that “they would have done it anyway” is hardly a justification for our helping them do it. Moreover, Jewish tradition holds that we have a positive duty to try to prevent them from committing the transgression.6 If we cannot dissuade them, we must at the very least refuse to involve ourselves in their act.

Still, there are other and valid arguments in favor of selling these items. The first has to do with the difficulty of determining just which unfamiliar customers are indeed Jews for Jesus. Should we push our inquiry too far,7 we risk insulting persons with legitimate reasons for purchasing ritual objects. Should we refuse to sell ritualia to any and all persons who are unknown to us, we may appear to have something to hide. Such behavior on our part may well threaten the good relations we seek to establish with the non-Jewish community, in itself an important traditional value; the Talmud teaches that some legal requirements with respect to the Gentile world are to be relaxed “for the sake of peaceable relations” (mipnei darkhei shalom).8 Second, there is the factor of dina demalkhuta, dina, the law of the land. Civil rights laws may prohibit us from refusing to sell to customers on religious grounds. Third, these purchasers, even if they are Jews for Jesus, might learn something. It is arguably better, for example, that they read a Jewish haggadah rather than a messianized version that turns the three matzot into the Christian Trinity, the Pesach sacrifice into Jesus, the seder into the Last Supper and the wine and matzah into the Eucharist. It may be that a positive and open response to these people will encourage them to keep an open mind about Judaism, perhaps some day even to return to it. If our goal is that these people might one day pursue the path of teshuvah, we might think twice before pushing them away.

  1. The second part of the question deals with Christians who wish to use Jewish ritual objects as part of their own liturgical observance. Here, the prohibition of Leviticus 19:14 does not apply. Christianity is not a form of idolatry;9 thus, by selling Jewish ritual objects to Christians, we do not aid them in performing rites which are traditionally forbidden to the “children of Noah.” We can imagine a number of legitimate purposes for which the Christian customer might want these objects: as gifts for Jewish friends and relatives, for example, or as part of an educational display. Moreover, if Christians desire to use these objects as a means of “recovering their Jewish roots,” that is their business and not ours. On the other hand, we must be concerned that a Christian church which “Judaizes” its appearance may, like Jews for Jesus, give the mistaken impression that its worship service is somehow a “Jewish” one.

 

Conclusion.

Bearing all this in mind, our advice is as follows:

  1. It is appropriate to ask a customer who is unfamiliar to us why he or she wishes to purchase a ritual item. This “inquiry” should be limited to normal conversation and “small talk.”
  2. If we ascertain that customers are Jews for Jesus or Christians who want to use the ritual items for purposes we deem Jewishly inappropriate, we may discourage them from making the purchase. For example, we can inform them that the gift shop exists to serve Jewish needs. We can let them know our deep feelings about the sanctity of these items, our belief that they ought to be used solely within a properly Jewish context. We can direct them to books and educational items which may serve their purposes just as well.

After this degree of discouragement and suggestion, we probably have no choice but to sell to customers who insist on buying. As long as we make the gift shop open to the community, it must be open to the entire community.

Our conclusion assumes this elemental fact: synagogue gift shops, no less than Sisterhoods, Brotherhoods, and schools, are agencies of the synagogue. They exist not simply to sell merchandise and to raise funds, but to help the synagogue fulfill its religious and educational goals. As much as is possible and practicable, the gift shop should refrain from conducting its business in ways that are inimical to basic values of Jewish life and faith as we understand them. It is therefore appropriate for the gift shop staff to take reasonable steps to discourage what we would consider the improper use of our religious objects.10

 

Notes

  1. Contemporary American Reform Responsa, # 68, pp. 109-112. See also CARR, # 66, pp. 107-108 and 67, pp. 108-109; American Reform Responsa, # 150, pp. 471-474; and R. Walter Jacob, Questions and Reform Jewish Answers, # 110, p.175 and 242, pp. 395-396.
  2. Sifra to Lev. 19:14; see Sefer Hachinukh, mitzvah 232.
  3. Avodah Zarah 6b.
  4. Tosafot, Avodah Zarah 6b, s.v. minyan; Hil. Harosh, BT. Avodah Zarah 1:2. Lev. 19:14 applies as well to non-Jews; thus, a Jew must not assist a Gentile in worshipping idolatry, which is prohibited to all people as one of the seven Noahide laws.
  5. Avodah Zarah 6b; Tosafot and Hil. Harosh loc. cit.; see also Alfasi, Avodah Zarah, fol. 1b, s.v. minayin.
  6. See the commentary of R. Nisim Gerondi to Alfasi, loc. cit.; Tosafot, Shabbat 3a, s.v. bava; R. Menachem Hame’iri, Beit Habechirah, Avodah Zarah 6b; Chidushei Haritva, Avodah Zarah 6b. The latter cites the mishnah in BT. Gitin 61a, which declares that we do not aid and abet transgressors, and the rule that “all Jews are guarantors for each other (kol yisra’el areivim zeh bazeh; BT. Sanhedrin 27b and Shevu`ot 39a), which implies a positive duty to prevent other Jews from violating the Torah. He might have cited Lev. 19:17, “you shall surely rebuke your fellow,” as well.
  7. There is some question as to whether we need to inquire at all. Since most of those who come to our gift shops are not apostates, we might rely upon the majority principle (rov) and regard those whom we do not know as members of that category. See Tosafot, Pesachim 3b, s.v. ve’ana, and Tosafot, Yevamot 47a, s.v. bemuchzak.
  8. Gitin 61a; Yad, Matanot Aniyim 7:7 and Melakhim 10:12.
  9. This conclusion is the result of a long debate within Jewish legal literature, one which continues within in Orthodox circles. While Maimonides (Yad, Avodat Kokhavim 9:4 in the uncensored texts) declares Christians to be idolaters, R. Menachem Hame’iri (Beit Habechirah, Avodah Zarah, pp. 46, 59, and elsewhere) excludes both Christians and Muslims from this designation. Many Ashkenazic authorities rule similarly, though without noticeable enthusiasm (see Hil. Harosh Avodah Zarah 1:1; Isserles, SA, YD 156). Our Reform tradition follows Hame’iri, without any hesitation. Our understanding of the nature of idolatry, of Christian teaching, and of our ethical duties toward our fellow human beings demands that we strip from Christianity any hint of the label avodah zarah. See ARR, # 6, pp. 21-24, and the sources cited there.
  10. See also R. Walter Jacob, Questions and Reform Jewish Answers, # 242, pp. 395-396.

.

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

ARR 208-209

CCAR RESPONSA

American Reform Responsa

64. Status of an Uncircumcised Retarded Adult

(1976)QUESTION: What is the status of an uncircumcised Jewish adult? In this case the individual is retarded and living in an institution. Would rights of burial, etc., be denied? (M.L., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania)ANSWER: Jewish law is very clear in its statements about circumcision. It is the father’s responsibility to assure the circumcision of a male child. We would say, father or mother. If, for some reason, this has not been done, then it becomes the court’s responsibility–and later, that of the child–to see to it that he is circumcised (Kiddushin 29a; Yoreh De-a 261.1). For anyone converting to Orthodox Judaism, circumcision is also required. In early Reform Judaism there was considerable controversy about circumcision. Some of the more radical reformers wished to abolish this custom. Their stand was, however, not widely adopted, and the only element of this which remains is that we would not absolutely require circumcision of a convert (CCAR, 1892). This kind of objection had previously been raised in Hellenistic times, and led to bitter controversy. Of course, in modern America this issue has become moot, as virtually all children are circumcised at birth. A retarded individual remains a minor and therefore he would continue to be the father’s or court’s responsibility all his life. If the father is no longer alive, the responsibility does not fall upon the mother, as she cannot be held directly responsible for this positive commandment, according to tradition (Yoreh De-a 261.1). But as we have stressed equality between men and women, the mother would be responsible. In any case, it would be cruel to circumcise an adult male who would suffer pain while being unaware of the reasons for this ritual. In this case, it should not be done. An uncircumcised adult male Jew is, however, to be considered a Jew for every ritual in his life. With a normal individual this would mean Bar Mitzvah, marriage, and burial. He might, at various stages, be encouraged to become circumcised, but if–for reason of health or other reasons–he refuses, the normal privileges given to other Jews would not be withheld from him. If he is a Kohen, he may even bless the people (Hoffman, Melamed Leho-il, Yoreh De-a 79). He has sinned, but remains a Jew (Sanhedrin 44a). The individual must consciously refuse circumcision to be considered a Mumar La-aralot; this would not be true of a retarded adult (Tur, Yoreh De-a 2; Beit Yosef, quoting Rabbenu Yerucham). All of this is certainly true of burial. In fact, Jewish law goes considerably further than this. It clearly states in Yoreh De-a 345.5 that Israelites who are absolute sinners and cast off the “yoke of the Commandments” entirely, or even become idolaters, are still to be buried as Israelites. We are not obligated to mourn for them, but we are obligated to bury them (see also Chatam Sofer to Yoreh De-a 341). He only stipulated that we should bury that individual at some distance from those who are law-abiding Jews. A Chevra Kadisha may make more stringent rules as a “fence around the law” (as was done from time to time at various times in the past). So Simon Raphael Hirsch in the last century excluded such Jews from membership in his congregation; Joseph Saul Nathanson refused them burial (Sho-el Umeshiv III, 2.4). Others in this time of pressure stated that, although they should not be buried directly next to a normative Jew, it would be proper to bury them eight feet away (see Vayelaket Yosef IV, 4-118). We can see that there would be no restriction whatsoever about the burial of an uncircumcised retarded adult in present-day America, where the few strictures of the last century are not applicable. Furthermore, nowadays almost all cemeteries are divided into family plots, so families are separated from each other, and varying degrees of observance can be marked in this fashion without harming anyone in the community.Walter Jacob

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

NARR 381-382

CCAR RESPONSA

New American Reform Responsa

236. Contradictory Responsa

QUESTION: Several of the responsa in Contemporary Reform Responsa seem to be contradictory. For example, #67 has decided that a Messianic Jew should be refused burial, while #122 and #138 have indicated that apostates along with criminals are buried in a Jewish cemetery, although normally at a distance from other graves. As these answers were written at different times, does this reflect a growing strictness among us or are there other reasons for the disparity? (Rabbi Benno M. Wallach, Crosby IX)

ANSWER:We should note that all responsa address very specific questions and are not intended to provide broad general answers. An entire collection of responsa or several such collections may begin to provide a broader view of Jewish life and may set a pattern for generalizations. However, individual responsa address specific issues as will become apparent in the subsequent discussion.

Tradition has indicated that Jewish criminals were to be buried (Deut 21.23; M San 4.5; 47a; Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 362.52 and 334.3 and Tur Yoreh Deah 334 and commentaries). Furthermore, apostates were similarly buried. We did so not to honor the apostates, but to help the surviving family. For that reason all matters connected with the “honor of the dead” were avoided while normal other burial procedures were followed (Moses Sofer Responsa Yoreh Deah 341; Tur and Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 344, 345 and Commentaries). When an apostate died suddenly it was assumed that he had repented and returned to Judaism before his death (Isserles to Shulhan ArukhYoreh Deah 340.5; Hoshen Mishpat 266.2). However, in #122 the Messianic Jew did not die suddenly nor had he in any way indicated a return to Judaism. Furthermore, his family remain apostates. These grounds are sufficient to refuse the burial of a Messianic Jew or a Jew for Jesus.

We may also refuse burial as these individuals masquerade as Jews and mislead others and they therefore pose a danger to the unsuspecting members of our community. Anyone who endangers the Jewish community in a serious fashion may be refused burial by that community (Nahmanides Responsa #224; Jacob Levi Responsa#49)

These responsa, therefore, may seem inconsistent on initial reading, however, they answer different questions and the circumstances are sufficiently distinctive to demand different answers.

April 1988

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

ARR 68-69

CCAR RESPONSA

American Reform Responsa

23. Walking Across Religious Symbols

(Vol. LXIII, 1953, pp. 153-154)

QUESTION: The entrance to the foyer of our new Temple is embellished with a mosaic outlining the seven-branched Menora and the Tablets of the Law. As one enters the Temple, he unavoidably walks across these two important symbols of Judaism. Is it proper to do so? To tear up the floor at this time would, of course, involve considerable expense.

ANSWER: In a religion such as Judaism, which has always stressed the disciplinary value of symbols and symbolic acts, reverence for the consecrated objects must of necessity play an important role.

Accordingly, when sacrifices prevailed as modes of worship, the Altar assumed a holy character and had to be kept from any form of profanation. Even the ashes on the Altar, partaking of the sanctity of the Altar itself, had to be removed “without the camp unto a clean place” (Lev. 6:4).

When the book displaced the Altar, and prayer and study became the delights of the worshiper, the written word, as embodied in the Bible and Prayerbook, rose to the place of the sacred and received reverential treatment. Scrolls and religious books, worn with use, were stored temporarily in special hiding places to await ultimate burial with due ceremony.

This reverence for religious objects, long fostered in the synagogue, has taken root in our Western civilization. Modern nations cherish their national emblems and treat them with a reverence bordering on religious piety. Shall we, who have come to view the Decalogue as the symbol of our faith, allow men to trample on it?

The expense involved in rectifying the error is as nothing compared with the sure impairment of the sense of reverence in a not-too-reverent generation.

See also:

S.B. Freehof, “Menorah Decoration in Floor,” Reform Responsa, pp. 68ff.

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

CARR 46-47

CCAR RESPONSA

Contemporary American Reform Responsa

27. Dress Code for Religious

School

QUESTION: Our religious school has insisted on a dress code for

young people both in school and especially for the attendance at synagogue services. Is there

anything in Jewish tradition that points to “proper attire” for attendance at synagogue services?

(Kenneth G. Jacob, Pittsburgh, PA)ANSWER: This question leads us to look at the

sumptuary legislation in the past. The question may be restated as follows: Does the Jewish

tradition give the synagogue community or the rabbinate the right to legislate on the question of

dress? We will find that such legislation began in Mishnaic times (M. Sotah 9.14) when the rabbis

prohibited the use of “crowns of the bridegroom” during the war of Vespasian and “diadems of

the bride” during the war of Titus. Restrictions applicable to synagogue services

became frequent in the Middle Ages. Many decrees may be found beginning with the early

fifteenth century. These represented reactions to the danger of envy by Gentiles. The decrees

passed at Forli, Italy, in 1416, dealt with extravagant dress worn in public. Some idea of the

detailed nature of such sumptuary legislation may be given through a short quotation from acts

passed in Metz in 1690: “On Saturdays and festive occasions women are allowed to wear only

ordinary veils. God-mothers are allowed to wear others only on the evening before circumcision

or the Saturday following the birth of a boy. Veils of gold or silver are expressly forbidden, except

on the Saturday preceding a wedding, to the mother of the bride, her mother-in-law, sisters-in-

law, sisters, grandmothers and aunts. This privilege lasts for the two days before the wedding

and extends to women who conduct the bride to the synagogue on the morning of the wedding

and those who accompany her under the hupah” (Alfred Rubens, A History of Jewish

Costume, p. 196). Similar details curbing extravagant clothing of men may be found in a

wide variety of medieval sources (Louis Finkelstein, Jewish Self-Government in the Middles

Ages and Cecil Roth, Gleanings). A discussion of special garments to be

worn on the Sabbath appeared in the Talmud (Shab. 113a), and declared that those who

possessed a change of clothing should wear the new clothing on the Sabbath, and those who do

not simply should make the old clothing look a little better in order to honor the Sabbath. The

passage sought to assure that the Sabbath was distinguished from other days in every possible

way, “dress, speech, manner of walking, etc.” Even here one rabbi opposed this on the grounds

of ostentation, but that opinion was rejected. David ibn Zimri (16th century) mentioned special

clothing worn by men and women on the Sabbath; in Egypt these were white (Responsa

II, 693; IV, 62), while Lampronti cited a number of sources which indicated that a woman’s

special Sabbath garb might only be sold if one needed money for sustenance (Pahad

Yitzhaq). None of this, however, was concerned specifically with dress in the

synagogue. There were also strong prohibitions against wearing clothing akin to the

costume of non-Jews. A taqanah was mentioned by Güdemann against wearing

clothing of monks and nuns in the synagogue (Geschichte, Vol. I, pp. 260 ff; Meir of

Rothenburg, Responsa #18). We know from other sources that medieval Jewish travelers

often found safety in dressing themselves like monks and nuns (Sefer Hassidim, ed.

Margolis, #702). This prohibition was codified by Maimonides (Yad Hil. Avodah Kokhavim

11.1) and in the Shulhan Arukh (Yoreh Deah 1.78). Isserles, however, stated that the

prohibition applied only to religious vestments used in actual services, not to clothing which

happens to be similar to that of Gentiles. Both Caro and Isserles agreed that such garments may

be worn if required for attendance at court or government functions (for a recent brief discussion

of this, see Moses on, “Hukat Akum,” Hadarom, #40, pp. 47 f). Another

medieval taqanah dealt with the problem of dirt caused by wooden shoes worn in the

synagogue and prohibited them inside the building (Güdemann, Geschichte, Vol.

III, pp. 267 ff, quoting Moses Cohen, Book of the Pious). This regulation was akin to

contemporary church rules which were concerned with the ostentation of wearing such shoes as

well as the noise caused by them; it forbade the worshiper to bring a second clean pair for wear

in the church. We can see from this and other sources which might be cited that

rabbinic authorities had the authority to regulate dress within and outside the synagogue.

Certainly, this would have been used to assure the proper attire had such legislation been

necessary. A modern rabbi must also insist that dress in the synagogue be appropriate, but not

ostentatious.March 1976

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

CARR 173-174

CCAR RESPONSA

Contemporary American Reform Responsa

112. Prayers at Reinterment

QUESTION:

The parents of a member of our congregation are buried in a cemetery in New York City much

plagued by vandalism. He would like to transfer these caskets to our cemetery. When the

caskets are reinterred, need any kind of service be conducted? (Rabbi M. Silverman, Albany,

NY)ANSWER: Although Judaism generally frowns upon disinterment and reburial in

a new site, it permits it for several reasons, including the one cited in this question. In fact, under

some circumstances disinterment and the movement of a body to another grave is obligatory

(Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 363; Haham Z’vi Ashkenazi, Responsa #50).

When such reinterment occurs, no ritual of any kind is required, although some pious

commentators suggest that mourning rites (qeriah, qaddish, etc.) be carried out for one

hour (Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 403). This might be done either at the site of the

reinterment itself or just as appropriately in another setting, i.e. at home or in the synagogue.

When Moses Sofer, in the last century, was faced with the government’s confiscation of a large

cemetery, he prohibited anyone from informing close relatives when the disinterment and

reinterment would take place, so that they would feel no obligation to mourn even for one hour

(Responsa Yoreh Deah #184). We, of course, are concerned both with

tradition and with the feelings of respect and honor of the individuals involved. Obviously, if the

children wish to have the bodies of their parents transferred to a safer site, there is a strong

feeling about the memory of these parents. It would be appropriate to recite a few psalms and

qaddish at the synagogue, at home or at the cemetery. This should be done at some time

on the day of the reinterment, or a few days after it has taken place. While this is not obligatory,

it reflects the respect of children for their parents.October 1985

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.