Responsa

ARR 135-136

CCAR RESPONSA

American Reform Responsa

51. Use of Pyrex Dishes for Meat and Milk

(Vol. XXIX, 1919, pp. 78-79) Not knowing what Pyrex is, I must be guided by the information that it is glass, and on this presumption give the following information in reply to a question submitted to me. The Mosaic law (Exodus 23:19, 34:26 and Deuteronomy 14:21) says: “Thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mother’s milk.” This the Rabbinical law explains to prohibit the mixture of any milk or milk product with the meat of animals and fowls (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De-a 87.13). I am always quoting the latest standard authorities on Rabbinical law. This prohibition is extended to the use of vessels, so that a vessel used for milk must not be used for meat and vice versa (Yoreh De-a 93.1). “Glass vessels, even when used for permanent preservation of food, including hot food, require no purification (if, e.g., they were used for boiling milk and subsequently are to be used for boiling meat), for they do not absorb anything of their contents, and mere rinsing before using them again is sufficient” (Joseph Caro, Orach Chayim, 451.27). The glossarist Moses Isserles adds: “Some authorities take a rigorous view and declare that even washing the vessels in hot water does not help. This is the practice in Germany and Poland.” The filossarist David Halevi, author of Turei Zahav, adds: This rigorous view is based on the assumption that glassware is equal to earthen ware. If, however, the glass dishes [usually used for milk or meat] had been accidentally used [for the other kind], there is certainly no prohibition” (ibid., 30). “Earthen vessels used for the permanent preservation of prohibited wine are, according to some authorities, not to be used [for kosher food], but all authorities are unanimous in the opinion that this prohibition does not include glass vessels” (Yoreh De-a 135.8). The glossarists Shabbetai Kohen (Shak, ibid., 23) and David Halevi (Turei Zahav, ibid., 11) give as a reason for this exception the fact that glass vessels have a smooth surface and do not absorb anything of their contents. These quotations should suffice to prove that Pyrex, presuming that it is glassware, may be used for both milk and meat dishes and would therefore mean both a convenience and a saving in kosher households. Inspection of the article would seem necessary to convince the man who gives the decision that Pyrex is what it is represented to be. Ritualistic questions are to be submitted to an authorized rabbi. There is, however, no guarantee that a decision given by one rabbi would be recognized by others, for Judaism has no ecclesiastic authority in an hierarchical sense. New York had last year a heated controversy between two sections of Orthodox rabbis, led by R. Wolf Margolis, on the one hand, and Moses Zebulun Margolis on the other. It may be presumed, however, that if a few recognized authorities would subscribe to this opinion, it would be respected by the vast majority of observant Jews. It ought to be translated into Hebrew and Yiddish, for a Hebrew endorsement (Hechsher) put on the goods would, to most people, be a sufficient guarantee.G. Deutsch

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

NARR 120-121

CCAR RESPONSA

New American Reform Responsa

77. Drums at a a Purim Service

QUESTION: May drums and other musical instruments be used at a Purim service with a specific instrumental setting, in order to create the noise necessary to drown out the name Haman; this would add a festive touch to the service? (Walter Finegold, Bloomington IN)ANSWER: Let us begin by looking at the Orthodox rejection of instrumental in the synagogue. Generally this objection has been connected with mourning for the destruction of the Temple, and so instrumental music is permitted only at weddings (Shulhan Arukh Orah Hayim 560.3). In addition, there is the prohibition against the use of music on shabbat or festival days partly because of the work involved, and partly because this would imitate non-Jewish customs (Shulhan Arukh Orah Hayim 338.1 ff; Eleh Divrei Haberit; David Hoffmann Melamed Lehoil 1.16). The latter opinions are part of a controversy about the use of the organ as an instrument in the synagogue. This represented one of the major disputes between the Reform and Orthodox community in the last century. Nogah Hatzedeq along with other lengthy essays in German, represent the Reform point of view (Samuel Krauss Zur Orgelfrage). This controversy is behind us; we do not observe the restriction against instrumental synagogue music or continue to mourn for the destruction of the Temple, so we must ask what kind of instrumental music is appropriate in the synagogue. The music should not imitate gentile music around us (Joel Sirkes Responsa #127). Of course, we should remember that music and musicians played a major role in the ancient Temple in Jerusalem (I Chron 15.16; II Chron 5.13; 2.76; Neh 12.35, etc). In addition, we have many musical notations in the Book of Psalms, although a large number of them are no longer understood. Some psalms dealt specifically with the musical instruments, as Psalms 149 and 150. The Purim Service has always been among the most relaxed of the entire year. The festival has had a carnival like atmosphere attached to it. Costumes were permitted (Judah Mintz Responsa #16; Shulhan Arukh Orah Hayim 696.8). In addition, noise accompanied the reading of the Megillah and objections were only raised when it became excessive and made it difficult to listen to the text. Greggars have been made available to children for several centuries. Some are beautifully ornamented and others very simple (Siehe der Stein Schreit aus der Mauer – Geschichte und Kultur der Juden in Bayern p 127 ff; Isaac Shachar Jewish Tradition in Art p 158 ff). None of these examples antedated the nineteenth century but they certainly existed earlier. Our collection here in Pittsburgh displays a fine brass greggar. The inclusion of musical instruments in the service for the reading of the Megillah when Haman is mentioned is appropriate. As the instruments will play a special flourish rather than just making noise this will add to the festivities.February 1988

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

CARR 4-5

CCAR RESPONSA

Contemporary American Reform Responsa

3. Punishment of Minors

QUESTION: What is the status of the minor in Jewish law regarding punishment for serious offenses? (S. Levin, Pittsburgh, PA) ANSWER: It is clear from a wide variety ofstatements that the father is completely responsible for the acts of his minor children. So, minors would not be punished no matter what their crime, but the father would face whatever monetary penalty is appropriate (M. K. 8.4; Yeb. 99b; Hag. 2b; Git. 23a; B. M. 10b; Tur and Shulhan Arukh Hoshen Mishpat 182.1, 348.81, 235.19). In a similar vein, the father is compensated for any injury to his minor children, including the humiliation sustained by them (B. K. 86b). The value lost was figured as if they could still be sold into slavery, as was possible in an earlier period (B. K. 97b). In the case of the seduction of minor females, the fine went to the father (Deut. 22.28). If the culprit married her, he paid no fine (Ex. 20.15). In case of rape, he had to pay a fine, marry her and could never divorce her (Deut. 22.28). The Talmud increased the fine and included psychological damage (Ket. 29a). Individuals above the age of maturity (12 for girls and 13 for boys) are considered responsible and may be punished as adults, but no capital punishment is permitted until the age of twenty (Yad Hil. Genevah 1.10). If damage to property occurs due to the action of a minor, liability is incurred only if proper precautions have been taken by the owner (B. K. 29a, 55b ff; Tur and Shulhan Arukh Hoshen Mishpat 421).December 1981

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

NARR 44-45

 

CCAR RESPONSA

 

New American Reform Responsa

 

30. Prophetic Scrolls

QUESTION: A member of my congregation would like to commission some scrolls which would then be used for the reading of the Haftarah. Is there a tradition for reading the Haftarah from a scroll? Would it be appropriate to maintain such scrolls in the ark with the Torah? (Thomas Shapiro, San Francisco CA)

ANSWER: We, of course, continue to read from the scroll of Esther, the Megillah, and the writing of the Megillah is governed by rules (Shulhan Arukh Orah Hayim 691). The other minor books which may be used in scroll form (Ruth, Song of Songs, Lamentations and Ecclesiastes) are generally read from books and only rarely from a scroll. Certainly there is no mandate to do so.

As the Haftarah is chosen from different sections of the prophets for each shabbat, we do not have a continuous cycle of readings as with the Torah. Having the text available in book form rather than in a scroll makes the process of finding the text and reading it much easier although special scrolls with the Haftarah sequence have existed. Perhaps for this practical reason there is little reference in the traditional sources to prophetic readings from a scroll. Clearly at an earlier stage of our history, scrolls of the prophets were used and the most famous of these, the Isaiah scroll, is now in the Shrine of the Book in Jerusalem. Later, the codex form of the book was introduced; it was widely used by the third century but among Jews only in the eighth century.

I do not know of any synagogue that regularly uses scrolls of the prophetic books or the five megillot, although several synagogues possess them and keep them in the ark alongside the Torahs. There is nothing wrong about commissioning such scrolls to be written, but I do not find much in favor of doing so. It might be better to interest the family in another project which would be more useful to the synagogue.

November 1989

 

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

NARR 393-394

CCAR RESPONSA

New American Reform Responsa

241. Lost Property

QUESTION: A Russian Jewish Immigrant family which recently arrived in America has discovered that one of the suitcases brought along did not belong to them. It is a small suitcase which contains family mementos as well as some Hebrew books. Only Hebrew names were given in the volumes with no indication of the rightful owner. They have kept the suitcase for some time with the hope that some inquiries would locate the proper owner. Now they wish to dispose of it and do not know what to do with the contents and especially with the Hebrew books. How long need they wait for the rightful owner to appear? What action should they take? (Karen Ruttenberg, Birmingham AL)ANSWER: It is understandable that the confusion of immigration may lead to the loss of personal objects. It has always been considered a mitzvah to restore a lost object to its owner (Deut 22.1; B B 23b ff; B K 54b ff; San 73a; Yad Hil Gezelah Veavedah 11; Shulhan Arukh Hoshen Mishpat 259, 263). It was incumbent upon the individual who found a lost animal to keep it and feed it virtually indefinitely until the rightful owner appeared to claim it. He could, of course, at that time ask that proper recompense be made for the care which he provided for the animal (Deut 22:2 and commentaries), but beyond that he had no claim on the property. In this instance the family feels that the books have become a burden and they do not think that anyone will ever claim them. It would be appropriate to place them in a communal setting, preferably a synagogue. A memorandum should be circulated among the local Russian Jewish community and in other cities in order to discover the rightful owner. If that fails, the synagogue should simply add this suitcase of books and other objects to its genizah and leave them there indefinitely. If they have not been claimed within a generation, it would be possible to give them to an archive. As these objects were considered sufficiently important to be among the few possessions taken from Russia, they will surely be claimed. The items should be stored in a synagogue or public institution with enough publicity, so that they may be claimed by their rightful owner.February 1991

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

CARR 5-7

CCAR RESPONSA

Contemporary American Reform Responsa

4. Professional Secrecy and an Illegal Act

QUESTION: A lawyer has discovered that a fellow attorney is providing a client with advice which will lead to an illegal act and the possibility of considerable financial loss. The lawyer asking the question has gained this information in a confidential relationship. Should he break that confidence and inform the client in question?ANSWER: It is clear that privacy and information gained as part of a professional relationship can generally not be divulged (Lev. 19.16; Yad Hil. Deot 7), yet this prohibition is not absolute. For example, if knowledge of certain medical information might change a marriage, such information should be presented (Israel Kagan, Hofetz Hayim, Hil. Rekhilut 9). The decision is based upon the principal of the “need to know.” Such facts must not be given lightly or simply to complete existing information or for any personal gain. If such information would lead to the protection of lives or prevent personal injury and financial loss, it must be divulged in accordance with the Biblical injunction of Leviticus, “You shall not stand idly by the blood of your neighbor” (Lev. 19.16). If an individual’s life is endangered, immediate action to remove that danger must be undertaken. This was also the interpretation provided for our verse by tradition (San. 73b; Yad Hil. Rotzeah 1.13 f, 15; 4.16; Hil. San. 2.4, 5, 12; Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 425.10, 426.1). Maimonides considered it necessaryto move in this direction in cases of idolatry (Yad Hil. A. Z. 5.4) and rape (Yad Hil. Naarah 3.1). This would apply, however, only if the client’s life is endangered; that is not the case here. Maimonides and some others go further through the exegesis of another verse from Leviticus (19.14), “Thou shalt not place a stumbling block before the blind.” This would include reporting someone who provides incorrect advice which might lead to criminal acts or to a considerable financial loss (Yad Hil. Rotzeah 12.4; Jakob Breish, Helkat Yaaqov III 136; Elijah of Vilna, Biur Hagra, Yoreh Deah 295.2; Joshua Falk, Peri Megadim, Orah Hayim 443.5, 444.6). We must also ask about the status of attorneys in Jewish law. Generally attorneys are not used in the traditional Jewish courts, although they have sometimes been appointed by the court (Ribash Responsa #235; Meir of Rothenburg Responsa #357). In other words, the litigants and the witnesses are present in person (M. Mak 1.9; Yad Hil. San. 21.8). Exceptions are only made when the individual involved is unavoidably absent or is too timid to defend himself (Tos. to Shev. 31a; Tur Hoshen Mishpat 123.16; also Bet Yosef). When an attorney is appointed, the fiction is created that he acts entirely on his own behalf. He, therefore, has complete power of attorney for the defendant (B. K. 70a; Yad Hil. Sheluhin Veshutafin 3.7; Shulhan Arukh Hoshen Mishpat 122-123; Arukh Hashulhan Hoshen Mishpat 124). There was, in other words, a reluctance to use attorneys, but by the late Middle Ages, they have been admitted to court, especially if the parties involved were present and their reaction could be watched. Such attorneys are paid by a fee for their services (Rif, Responsa #157; Rashba, Responsa II #393, III #141, V #287, etc.). An attorney, therefore, acts as an agent andthe laws of the agency apply to him. There is a legal presumption that an agent properly performs the duties assigned to him (Git. 64a); any agent is considered to have been appointed by a client to benefit and not to harm him (Kid. 42b). In this instance, the attorney might be considered akin to both an agent and an expert. Experts who are paid for their advice are liable if their opinion proves to be wrong (B. K. 99b ff; Simon ben Zemah of Duran, Responsa II, #174). As the lawyer in question has not been ethical and has provided improper guidance to his client, it is the duty of the attorney to inform the Bar Association or other appropriate authorities of the misconduct which he suspects. This course of action should be followed in criminal and civil procedures.December 1986

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

RR21 no. 5756.2

CCAR RESPONSA COMMITTEE

5756.2

Privacy and the Disclosure of Personal Medical Information

She’elah.

I am in my late twenties and about to be ordained as a rabbi. My father has Huntington’s Disease, a genetically transmitted condition that begins to show itself when a person reaches his or her thirties or forties. If I test positive for the disease, am I obligated to inform my congregation and the Placement Commission? Would the Placement Commission be obligated to share this information with any prospective congregation that would be interested in hiring me? Given that I fear employment discrimination should I test positive, am I obliged to be tested at all?

Teshuvah.

Huntington’s Disease is an inherited, chronic, and progressive disorder of the nervous system, the onset of which generally occurs in midlife. It is characterized by involuntary movements, cognitive decline, and emotional disturbance. Those afflicted exhibit what physicians term “movement disorder,” which may include facial twitching, unsteadiness in gait, and spasticity. The disease severely affects the patient’s speech, to the point that he or she will ultimately become unintelligible. Other manifestations include poor impulse control, depression, delusions, and even psychosis. Although some experimental treatments appear promising, no therapy currently known can halt this disease.[1]1

As the foregoing medical description makes abundantly clear, Huntington’s Disease is a debilitating condition, the symptoms of which would render it impossible for you to discharge the duties of a congregational rabbi. You are not presently diagnosed with this disease, nor have you taken the genetic test which would reveal whether you are “at risk” of contracting it.2 Still, you are rightly concerned that should you test positive, the sharing of these results would adversely affect the prospects for your employment. Your question, then, is most sensitive and difficult on religious as well as personal grounds: does Jewish tradition require you to reveal this damaging information to a congregation or to any other institution at which you are employed or with which you may be interested in contracting for your rabbinical services?

  1. Personal Integrity and the Prohibition against Deception. Judaism, as we know, places a great emphasis upon honesty in human conduct. The Torah cautions us against lying (Leviticus 19:11) and bearing false witness (Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17)3 and admonishes us to “keep far from falsehood” (Exodus 23:7).4 The rabbis teach that truth is the very seal of God, the signature of the divine;5 it follows that we, who are instructed to imitate God’s ways in our own lives,6 must comport ourselves with the highest respect for the truth.7 As Maimonides puts it: “one should not say one thing and mean another. Rather, let one’s outer expression reflect the person within, so that one speaks what is truly in one’s heart.”8 Expressed in negative language, this emphasis upon truth becomes a prohibition against the practice of deception, or geneivat da`at.9 This Hebrew term is taken from the word (geneivah) which expresses the idea of “theft”; hence, one who deliberately creates a false impression in the mind of another is guilty of an act of trespass, of quite literally “robbing the mind” of that person.10 Geneivat da`at occurs frequently in connection with deceptive business practices, which our tradition expressly forbids.11 Significantly, however, the prohibition applies even when the act of deception does not result in any monetary loss to the buyer.12

    These texts and teachings, to which more could easily be added, establish a strong prima facie case in favor of full disclosure of your personal medical history. First of all, the very act of concealing these facts suggests a transgression against the standards of personal honesty and integrity which our tradition demands from us in our everyday social conduct. In addition, this concealment would form an integral part of a business transaction, the process by which you will seek employment as a rabbi. The possibility that you may one day develop Huntington’s Disease and be rendered unable to fulfill your duties as a congregational rabbi is unquestionably a matter of great relevance to the Placement Commission and to the communities you might serve. To withhold this pertinent information from them is quite possibly an act of geneivat da`at, especially since, as you note in your she’elah, knowledge of your medical history is likely to be a critical factor in a congregation’s decision as to your employment.

    You could, of course, argue that inasmuch as you have not yet tested positively for the Huntington’s gene, you have no “pertinent” medical information to reveal. Even in the worst case, moreover, the onset of the disease is some years away. The congregation would therefore suffer no harm by offering you a contract now, since in all probability you will be able to fulfill your duties as their rabbi. These arguments fail, however, because in the final analysis they are offered in defense of deception, of geneivat da`at. Deceptive behavior is, in and of itself, the negation of integrity and a transgression against morality, quite apart from the damage it may or may not cause. And we have seen that Jewish tradition prohibits us from creating a false impression in the minds of others even when to do so causes them no financial harm.

    Then, too, the fact that you are about to become a rabbi should play a crucial role in your thinking. We do not claim that a rabbi is a “special case” when it comes to morality; surely the Torah demands the same standard of ethical behavior from all of us, rabbis and laypersons alike. Yet those who would present themselves as spiritual leaders of the Jewish community must recognize that they are expected to exemplify that standard in their personal and professional lives. For you to secure your first congregational position by withholding relevant information from your employer–that is to say, for you to begin your rabbinical career on a falsehood–would do severe damage to your own reputation should the truth later be revealed. In a wider context, it would adversely affect the standing of the rabbinate as a whole. Our ability to serve the Jewish people as rabbis rests in large part upon their perception of us as men and women of character and integrity. And that perception is called into doubt each time a rabbi is found to have violated the canons of truth and honesty in his or her dealings with the community.

  2. Jewish Tradition and the “Right to Privacy.” All of this, however, must be balanced against the concern which our tradition voices for the privacy of the individual, the right to be shielded against the prying eyes of other individuals and of the community as a whole. Although Jewish law does not formally recognize a “right to privacy”—indeed, Judaism does not speak the language of “rights” in general—it does know of certain obligations whose observance would guarantee protections which other legal systems classify under this heading.

    One of these obligations involves the prohibition against the unwarranted transgression of a person’s private domain. The Torah states explicitly that “when you make a loan of any sort to your neighbor, you must not enter his house to take his pledge. You must remain outside, while the man to whom you made the loan brings the pledge out to you” (Deuteronomy 24:10-11). This prohibition applies to the bailiff of the court (shaliach beit din) as well as to the lender.13 Mention should also be made of the concept hezek re’iyah, harm caused by the prying eyes of neighbors, which the halakhah defines as an actionable tort: “When neighbors own jointly a courtyard that is large enough to be divided, any one of them may require the others to erect a partition in the middle of it so that each one may use his portion of the courtyard without being seen by the others. We hold that damage resulting from sight (hezek re’iyah) is real damage.”14 For this reason, a neighbor who wishes to install a window in his wall that opens upon another’s property, or upon a jointly-owned courtyard can be prevented from doing so.15

    Another privacy protection is guaranteed in the medieval enactment (takanah), attributed to Rabbenu Gershom (Me’or Hagolah, “the light of the exile,” 10th-century Rhineland) forbidding one to read a letter written and sent by another person without that person’s consent.16 One who violated this takanah was subject to excommunication.17

    Especially important to our discussion are the various kinds of prohibited speech. The Torah cautions us against gossip or “talebearing” (Leviticus 19:16), which is also understood as a violation of the personal domain of the individual.18 Maimonides divides this law into three categories:19

    1. one who gossips about another person (holekh rakhil; hameragel bechavero), even if his words are true and are not meant to harm the other. “ Who is a gossiper? One who carries words from person to person, saying ‘thus said so-and-so’ or ‘this is what I heard about so-and-so’. Even if what he says is true, he is a destroyer of the world.” One who does this violates the commandment against tale-bearing (Leviticus 19:16);
    2. one who practices lashon hara, who speaks negatively about another person even if what is said is true;
    3. one who is motzi shem ra, who spreads falsehood and slander to damage another person’s reputation.

Our tradition severely condemns these sins of speech; the ancient rabbis went so far as to compare slander with leprosy.20 In recent times, R. Yisrael Meir Hakohen Kagan devoted his famous Chafetz Chayim, one of the outstanding “mussar” texts in Jewish history,21 to the sins of gossip and slander, which he declares violate the negative commandment “do not hate your brother in your heart” (Leviticus 19:17) and the positive commandment to “love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18).22 “Gossip” as a prohibited activity includes “tales carried from one person to another,” even if the information transmitted is truthful, even if it is not meant disparagingly, and even if the person who is the object of the gossip would not deny the report were he or she asked about it.23

What do we learn from these facts of Jewish law, from the prohibitions against trespassing or spying upon a neighbor’s abode, against reading another’s private correspondence, and against engaging in gossip and slander? We learn, first and foremost, that Judaism guarantees a significant range of protection to our private lives. This, to repeat, does not imply that Jewish tradition knows of such a thing as a right to privacy, for Rabbinic Judaism is not a libertarian philosophy. On the contrary: in addition to the prohibitions just described, it includes doctrines such as the duty to “rebuke your neighbor” (hokheach tokhiach et amitekha; Leviticus 19:17)24 and the assertion that “all Jews are responsible for one another,”25 teachings which express the idea that each one of us has at some point the obligation to intervene into the “private life” of a fellow Jew, to be informed as to his or her personal behavior and, if possible, to set that person back on the path of Torah and mitzvot. Nonetheless, the halakhic proscriptions of hezek re’iyah and rekhilut come to teach us that reasonable limits must be placed upon this sort of intervention. Our “right” to take an active interest in the affairs of others is to be balanced against the halakhic demand that one’s home be shielded from the gaze of neighbors and that one’s name and reputation be protected from violation by others, however well-meaning they may be. There are aspects of our existence which are and must remain off-limits to the eyes and tongues of those among whom we live, and we are therefore under no moral or religious obligation to share with them information about ourselves that they have no legitimate reason to know. This conclusion drawn from our law may not be the exact equivalent of the “right to privacy” in other legal systems. But it does express, in language too clear to permit of misunderstanding, a commitment to the proposition that all of us, created in the divine image, are possessed of a dignity which at some critical point requires that all others leave us be and let us alone.

This means, in practical terms, that our lives are not an open book. We have a duty to be truthful in our dealings with others, including our employers, but this duty must be measured against our justifiable desire, endorsed by the halakhah, to keep our private lives private. With respect to economic life, it means that our employers rightfully demand that we reveal to them information about ourselves which has a legitimate bearing upon our performance of the job for which we have contracted. They are not, however, entitled to know everything about us that they might wish to know. In the case at hand, the task you face is to determine just where to draw the line between these two conflicting obligations.

 

  1. Fixing the Balance: To Disclose or To Conceal? At what point does the demand for truth override our legitimate concern for privacy and the prohibition against gossip? We might begin our analysis with the observation that danger to life quite obviously outweighs any expectation of privacy and confidentiality. The rule that “no consideration takes precedence over the preservation of life”26 would certainly require that one who possesses information concerning a threat to the life of another must reveal that knowledge. This obligation is generally true even if one has taken an oath of confidentiality with respect to the person who is the source of that information.27 In this context, “the preservation of life” has been broadened by our tradition to include rescuing another person from various kinds of danger or unfortunate circumstances.28

    On the other hand, in cases where mortal danger is not clearly involved, the rule that we refrain from violating the dignity of others can preclude us from taking actions that would otherwise seem well intentioned. This Committee, for example, has ruled that the presence in the general population of HIV, the virus which causes AIDS, does not warrant the institution of compulsory testing for that virus unless and until it poses a significant health risk to that population. To require testing in the absence of a greater degree of danger was seen as an unjustified intrusion into the private domain of the individual.29 We have also found that lashon hara and gossip are inappropriate even when they are shared between husband and wife and are ostensibly aimed at improving the marital relationship.30 From these decisions and from their supporting argumentation we would derive the following rule-of-thumb for cases such as this: respect for privacy takes precedence over the sharing of personal information in most cases. Those who seek to acquire and to make use of information concerning other persons must meet a fairly rigorous burden of proof in order to be permitted to do so.

    In the case before us, we do not believe that either the Placement Commission or any potential employer at this time meets that burden of proof. You are obliged to share with them only that personal or family medical information which is relevant to your employment, and at present, no such information exists. You do not at this time suffer from Huntington’s Disease. That your father has the illness does not indicate with certainty that you are a carrier of the Huntington’s gene, and even if you were a carrier it is not certain that you would develop the disease.31 The ethical duty to reveal the truth to your potential employers refers specifically to truth, to matters of fact; it does not entail an obligation to reveal matters of conjecture, possibility, and “what-if”. You need not inform them that you might at some unspecified future time develop Huntington’s, for this is hardly news; at some point any person might develop a debilitating or terminal disease. You need only be able to assure them that, barring circumstances that cannot reasonably be foreseen, you are confident that no physical impairment will prevent you from fulfilling the obligations of your service during the period of your contract. The question is whether you can provide that assurance now. It seems to us that you can in all sincerity answer “yes” to this question, for even if you were to test positive for the gene it is by no means certain that you would develop the disease. Given your age, moreover, you would have good reason to believe that you were not likely to contract Huntington’s Disease during your initial term of employment.

    This implies that you have no obligation to have yourself tested for the gene, although for personal reasons you may wish to do so. Nor is there any obligation on your part to share the results of that test with the Placement Commission or with potential employers, since those results cannot predict with certainty that you will develop the disease. In addition, should the Placement Commission possess that information, it would not be entitled to share it with potential employers, since it is not clear that even a “positive” test for the gene constitutes relevant medical information. The report in that instance would amount to gossip and the spreading of an evil report, the unwarranted revelation of details that ought to remain secret.32

    On the other hand, should there arise a real and concrete indication that you may not be able to fulfill your rabbinical responsibilities–should you begin to exhibit the early signs of Huntington’s Disease–you are morally obliged to share this information with your employer. It is at that point that information concerning your medical condition ceases to be a purely private matter and becomes an issue that your employer is entitled to know.

    Ultimately, you are the only person who can decide if and when that point has arrived. You and you alone can determine whether the time has come to reveal the facts of your personal medical situation to your employer. We trust that you will make the correct decision. And we pray that God grant you health, vigor, and many long years of service as a rabbi to your people.

NOTES

  1. See J. Willis Hurst, general editor, Medicine for the Practicing Physician, Fourth Edition. (Stamford, CT, 1996), 1764-1768.
  2. Ibid. The test is administered to an individual whose parent suffered from the disease. A “positive” result on this test means that the person carries the gene which causes Huntington’s and therefore is “at risk” of developing the condition.
  3. We use the term “Jewish law” advisedly. In actuality, your relationship with a potential employer may be governed by the civil law in force within the relevant jurisdiction. You are therefore well advised to consult competent legal counsel prior to your interview.
  4. Much rabbinic commentary on this verse (see B. Shevuot 30b-31a) connects it expressly to conduct demanded of the dayan, the rabbinic judge. Hence, we might say that this verse is particularly relevant to issues involving a rabbi’s dealings with his or her community.
  5. Much rabbinic commentary on this verse (see B. Shevuot 30b-31a) connects it expressly to conduct demanded of the dayan, the rabbinic judge. Hence, we might say that this verse is particularly relevant to issues involving a rabbi’s dealings with his or her community.
  6. See B. Sotah 14a, on Deut. 13:5: how is it possible to “follow after Adonai your God”? By adopting His ways. Thus, just as God clothes the naked, so should you clothe the naked, etc. See also Rambam, Sefer Hamitzvot, pos. comm. No. 8.
  7. See B. Yoma 86a: “You shall love Adonai your God” (Deut. 6:5): act so that God’s name will be beloved because of you” make sure that your business dealings are conducted honestly”.
  8. Yad, De`ot 2:6.
  9. See Gen. 31:26 and II Sam. 15:6, where the root ganav signifies the act of deceiving others.
  10. B. Chulin 94a; Yad, De`ot 2:6. Some authorities hold that the prohibition of genevat da`at is a Toraitic one, derived from Lev.19:11, which prohibits both robbery (lo tignovu) and lying; see Chidushey Haritva to Chulin 94a. Since there is no midrashic evidence that the Rabbis read Lev. 19:11 in this way, this interpretation represents a significant expansion of the legal content of the biblical verse by post-talmudic tradition.
  11. The general prohibitory statements are found in Yad, Mekhirah 18:1 and SA CM 228:6. The texts cite numerous examples of deceptive commercial practices. One is forbidden to remove the chaff from the top of the storage-bin, for this creates a false impression that the chaff has been removed from the entire bin. Similarly, one is forbidden to paint or ornament objects for sale in such a way as to create the impression that these are newer–and hence more valuable–than they really are. See M. Bava Metzi`a 4:12; Yad, Mekhirah 18:2, 4; SA CM 228:9, 17.
  12. Sefer Mei’irat Einayim to SA CM 228, no. 7; Arukh Hashulchan, CM 228, par. 3. A transaction involving financial loss falls under the rubric of mekach ta`ut and can be annulled. See Yad, Mekhirah 15:1ff.
  13. B. Bava Metzi`a 113a-b; Yad, Malveh veLoveh 2:2; SA CM 97:6. Over time, this principle was modified in order to combat fraud on the part of the borrower. On the other hand, the principle remains in force when it is clear that the borrower is a poor person. See Menachem Elon, Cherut haperat bedarkhey gevi’at hachov bamishpat ha`ivri (Jerusalem, 1964).
  14. The citation is Maimonides (Yad, Shekhenim 2:14). See M. Bava Batra 1:1 and the Talmud ad loc.
  15. M. Bava Batra 3:7; B. Bava Batra 59b-60a; Yad, Shekhenim 5:6 and 7:1ff.; SA CM 154 and 160:1, 3.
  16. The attribution is found in Resp. R. Meir of Rothenburg (ed. Prague), no. 1022.
  17. See in general Shiltey Giborim to Alfasi, Shevu`ot, fol. 17a, end.
  18. See Rashi ad loc.: the talebearer (holekh rakhil) is a kind of spy (holekh regilah) who enters the home of another to steal private information for use in gossip.
  19. Yad, De`ot 7:1ff.
  20. See Leviticus Rabah 16, which expands the biblical word metzora (leper) to motzi shem ra (slanderer).
  21. Vilna, 1873. The book’s title is suggested by Psalms 34:13-14, in which the one who “desires life” (hechafetz chayim) is counseled to “keep your tongue from evil.” See also Lev. Rabah 16:2. In fact, the word “mussar” does not entirely do the book justice: its arrangement into sections, chapters and halakhot, much like Rambam’s Mishneh Torah, suggests that its author takes his subject with all seriousness, seeing the topic as one of law as well as social propriety.
  22. Chafetz Chayim, Introduction.
  23. Chafetz Chayim, Hilkhot Rekhilut 1:1-3.
  24. For the details of this mitzvah see B. Bava Metzi`a 31a and Yad, De`ot 6:7-9.
  25. B. Shevuot 39a-b.
  26. Ein lekha davar she`omed bifney pikuach nefesh; B. Ketubot 19a. See Yad, Yesodey Hatorah 5:1 and SA YD 157:1.
  27. See our responsum 5750.3 in Teshuvot for the Nineties (TFN), 283-288, and R. Eliezer Waldenberg, Resp. Tzitz Eliezer 13:81, part 2, for analysis of the question whether a vow that requires one to violate a mitzvah (in this case, the duty to save life) is valid under Jewish law.
  28. See Resp. Chelkat Mechokek 3:136 (Even Ha`ezer 79), who rules that a physician is obligated to reveal to a woman the fact that her fiancee suffers from cancer. And see Chafetz Chayim, Hilkhot Rekhilut 9:1ff: to reveal information that spares a person from physical or monetary damage does not violate the prohibition against gossip.
  29. TFN, no. 5750.1. This conclusion is modified by two conditions. First, its validity is very much a matter of empirical evidence: should the incidence of AIDS in the general population grow to significant proportions, compulsory testing might well be warranted. Second, an individual who has engaged in behavior that places him/her at risk of being a carrier of HIV is indeed morally obligated to be tested or to reveal the facts of his/her sexual history to potential sexual partners.
  30. Teshuvot for the Nineties, no. 5750.4, 187-190.
  31. We would add that, according to an established principle of Jewish law (safek safeka lekula; B. Kiddushin 75a and elsewhere), the presence of two elements of uncertainty in the facts of a case is held to warrant a lenient ruling:. In the present instance, “leniency” means that you would not be required to reveal this information
  32. Based upon Proverbs 25:9, the Rabbis deduced a prohibition against the revelation of secrets; see M. Sanhedrin 3:7. The discussion there centers upon courtroom procedure (see Yad, Sanhedrin 22:7), but the analogy applies well to our case: the Placement Commission functions as an administrative (and hence quasi-legal) agency, governed by formal rules, whose decisions have a concrete impact upon the lives of those who fall under its jurisdiction. The members of the Placement Commission, like the judges of a court, have no business revealing secret information.

ARR 8-21

CCAR RESPONSA

American Reform Responsa

5. Worshiping with Covered Heads

(Vol. XXXVIII, 1928, pp. 589-603)QUESTION: Where can one find the Rabbinic law prescribing that men should cover their heads when participating in Divine worship or when entering a synagogue? If there is no law to this effect, will you please tell me where and when did the custom of covering one’s head, now generally observed in Orthodox synagogues, originate among the Jews?ANSWER: There is no law in the Bible or Talmud prescribing the covering of the head for men when entering a sanctuary, when participating in the religious service, or when performing any religious ceremony. The saying in the Mishna (Berachot 9.5), “Lo yakel adam et rosho keneged sha-ar hamizrach,” does not mean “one should not bare his head in sight of the Holy of Holies,” as understood by some scholars (comp. K. Kohler, “The Origin and Function of Ceremonies in Judaism,” in CCAR Yearbook, 1907, p. 7). For one must distinguish between giluy rosh, which means “bareheadedness” and kalut rosh, which means “lightheadedness.” The latter is considered a sin. The former is no sin at all and no prohibition against it can be found in either Mishna or Talmud. It is true that among the garments prescribed for the priests (Exod. 28:4 and 40) a headgear is mentioned. This headgear was to be worn by the priests only when officiating at the altar or performing any other priestly function in the sanctuary. (This may have been intended to distinguish the priests in the Temple at Jerusalem from the priests of some heathen deity, who sit on seats in their temples “and nothing upon their heads” (Epistle of Jeremy 31; comp. note in Charles’s The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, vol. 1, p. 604, though some heathen priests, like the Roman, were also in the habit of sacrificing with covered head.) But it cannot be justifiably concluded from this that any person performing any religious ceremony must cover his head. The priests of old performed all their functions at the altar and in the Temple barefooted. Yet the conclusion was never drawn from this fact that one must be barefooted while performing any religious ceremony. And, certainly, the custom of covering one’s head when entering a synagogue has no precedent in the practice of the priests in the Temple at Jerusalem. For, the priests were not forbidden to enter the Temple bareheaded (see Jacob Reischer in his responsa Shevut Yaakov III, no. 5; Metz, 1789, 2b). Indeed, from B. Yoma 25a, it is evident that when not performing any priestly function, the priests in the Temple would go without hats. I do not know on what ground I. Scheftelowitz makes the statement that the priests, while being allowed to enter the Temple bareheaded, were not permitted to come within four yards of the altar with uncovered head (Alt-Palaestinischer Bauernglaube, Hanover, 1925, p. 154). The midrash Genesis R., XVII and Numbers R., V., to which Scheftelowitz referred, do not contain any saying that would justify such a statement. (Comp. my review of Scheftelowitz’s work in the Hebrew Union College Monthly, December, 1925, pp. 15-17.) The practice of covering the head when entering a synagogue, and when reciting prayers or performing any other religious ceremony, is not based upon any Talmudic law and cannot be supported by any express statement in the Talmud. Many express statements and implied teachings of the Talmud rather point to the contrary. This practice is merely a custom, minhag, that first appeared among the Jews in Babylon. In the course of time it spread to other countries and gradually became a generally observed custom among Orthodox Jews. Its origin probably goes back to a non-Jewish source. It furnishes another instance of how sometimes the Jews in one country, subject to the influence of their environment, would borrow a ceremony or custom from their non-Jewish neighbors and pass it on to Jews of other countries, and how in the course of time such a borrowed non-Jewish custom is interpreted by Jewish teachers as having some Jewish significance and regarded as a genuinely Jewish custom. In the following I present a brief account of the origin and the development of this supposedly Jewish custom of covering the head during religious devotion or when in a holy place. Now, as regards its origin, no such custom can be found in ancient Israel. The Jews in Palestine, in so far as Biblical and Talmudic records show, would ordinarily not wear any headgear. The covering of the head was an expression of grief or a sign of mourning, as is evident from II Samuel 15:2. When a person was in mourning he would cover his head (B., M.K. 15a and 24a), but not while the people came to comfort him and recite the comforting prayers and benedictions (comp. saying from Evel Rabbati, as cited by R. Nissim to Alfasi and quoted by N. Bruell in his Jahrbuecher, vol. 1, p. 54). Sometimes a person would cover his head as a protection from cold or excessive heat (see Midrash Lev. R. XIX.4). But this was done with a shawl or some other protective covering, not by wearing a headgear in our sense of the word. The shawl occasionally used to cover one’s head because of being a mourner or for the sake of protection from heat or cold, the sudar harosh, was not considered a regular garment or part of a man’s outfit, and hence was not subject to the law of Tsitsit prescribed for garments only (saying from Sifre, cited by R. Eshtori Haparchi in his Kaftor Vaferach, ch. 60, ed. A.M. Luncz, Jerusalem, 1897, p. 781, though not found in our editions of the Sifre). This also points to the fact that Jewish men ordinarily would not wear a hat nor otherwise cover their heads. One of the innovations forced upon the Jews by Antiochus Epiphanes, to which the pious Jews objected very much, considering it against Jewish law or practice, was that the young men were made to “wear a hat” (II Macc. 4:12, according to the authorized version, though Charles has “wear the petasus,” that is, a broad-brimmed felt hat, which, being the mark of Hermes, may have been especially objectionable). (Compare, however, A.T. Olmstead, “Wearing the Hat,” in the American Journal of Theology, January 1920, pp. 94ff). From the saying of Rabbi Meir that every day, “when at sunrise the kings of the earth put their crowns upon their heads and bow down to the sun, God gets angry” (Berachot 7a, Avoda Zara 4b), it also appears that it was the non-Jewish custom of covering one’s head when worshiping. The mishna Nedarim 3.8 takes it for granted that men go bareheaded and only women and children cover their heads. (The remark in the Gemara, B. Nedarim 30b, “Uketanim le-olam miglo,” cannot be harmonized with the plain meaning of the Mishna, unless it refers only to infants or reflects a different Babylonian custom.) According to a story found in Tractate Kalla, it was, therefore, considered impudence on the part of young boys to walk on the street, and especially to pass older people, without covering their heads. The conclusion drawn from this story in Kalla Rabbati II, “Giluy harosh azut takifa hi,” is to be understood that it is marked impudence on the part of a young boy to go bareheaded, and not, as R. Isaac Aboab (Menorat Hama-or, ch. 337, Warsaw, 1890, p. 325) seems to have understood it, that even on the part of adults it would be impudent to walk with uncovered heads. For, according to the Mishna, it was the usual thing for grown-up men to go bareheaded. And when Paul said: “Every man, praying or prophesying, having his head covered, dishonoreth his head…. For a man, indeed, ought not to have his head veiled for as much as he is the image and glory of God” (I Corinthians XI:4-7), he merely stated the Palestinian Jewish practice of his time and did not express any new or non-Jewish doctrine. It is a mistake–and one that involves reasoning in a circle–to interpret this passage in the Epistle as aiming to sever the Christian worshippers from the synagogue by distinguishing their appearance of worship from that of the Jewish worshippers, and then to assume that it was Paul’s insistence upon his followers worshiping without a hat that, in turn, caused the Jews to attach great importance to the covering of the head during religious service (W. Rosenau, Jewish Ceremonial Institutions and Customs, Baltimore, 1912, p. 49; also M. Gaster, as reported in the Jewish Chronicle of London, March 17, 1893, p. 17). In the first place, Gaster’s alleged statement that the founder of Christianity “in one of his Epistles” said, “My followers, pray bareheaded to distinguish yourselves from the Jews,” is without any justification. No such saying of Jesus is found in the New Testament or among the Agrapha of the New Testament (comp. the Jewish Chronicle, London, April 17, 1893, “Question” by “a Subscriber” to which, as far as I could see, no answer was given by Gaster). And if Gaster had in mind the saying of Paul in I Corinthians, he gave it the wrong interpretation. Paul could not have meant by his saying to put himself and his followers in opposition to Jewish custom or traditional practice, since what he recommends actually was the Jewish practice of his day (“Against Jonathan Alter,” in his Antwort auf das Sendschreiben eines Afrikanischen Rabbi, Prague, 1826, 30a,b). Secondly, had the later Jewish custom of covering the head during religious worship been the result of the Jewish reaction to the Christian practice intended as a protest against the Pauline doctrine, it is but reasonable to expect that traces of it would be found in Palestinian Jewish sources. For, during the Talmudic period, it was in Palestine, more than in any other country, that the Jews came into close contact with the Christians, and there, if anywhere, surely the teachers would have had good reason to introduce such customs as were calculated to prevent Jews from following Christian practice. But, as a matter of fact, we do not find in Palestine Jewish sources of Talmudic times the least indication of any decree or enactment by the Rabbis requiring the covering of the head during religious service or while in a synagogue. On the contrary, we find many indications and a few express statements to the effect that in Palestine men would usually go bareheaded and remain bareheaded even when entering the synagogue and reading from the Torah or reciting their prayers. Thus, R. Joshua b. Chananiah, a younger contemporary of Paul, states that the reason why a man, as a rule, goes bareheaded and a woman covers her head is because the woman is ashamed of her sin in having listened to the serpent (XVII.13; also Avot deR. Natan, Version B., pp. 148ff). The implication is that man need not be ashamed of having listened to his wife. Evidently R. Joshua b. Chananiah did not know of any custom of men covering their heads during religious service. From the Palestinian Talmud, Berachot 2.3 (4c), it appears that R. Jochanan would cover his head during the winter as a protection against the cold, but would go bareheaded during the summer. Compare the commentaries, and especially the discussion of this passage by R. Menahem de Lunsano (in the Wilna edition of the Yerushalmi, Wilna, 1922, 14a-15a). From another story in the Palestinian Talmud (M.K. III, 82c; also Gen. R. 100, 7), it is also evident that in Palestine it was the usual thing to go bareheaded. For we are told that the two sons of Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi differed in their observing the mourning for their father. On the Sabbath day during the mourning period, one of them would cover his head, as on weekdays. The other, however, would not observe this custom of mourning on the Sabbath day, and hence on the Sabbath during the mourning period he would go out bareheaded. This passage in the P. Talmud has been misunderstood by I. Scheftelowitz (op. cit., l.c.) and by A. Marmorstein in Ha-olam, December 24, 1926, no. 53, pp. 1010-1011, and in Monatschrift fuer die Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums, 1926, p. 211. They understood it to mean that even on the weekdays of the mourning period one of the sons of Rabbi would disregard the custom for mourners, and go around bareheaded. Scheftelowitz, therefore, draws the conclusion that “in some places in Palestine it was customary for every mourner to go bareheaded.” But the two sons of Rabbi lived in the same place, and Marmorstein concludes, that “the one son of Rabbi, for reasons of his own, refused to observe the mourning rites for his father” (Ha-olam, l.c., p. 1011), or “that in the time of Judah ha-Nasi it was not yet the general custom for mourners to cover their heads” (Monatschrift, l.c.). From a correct understanding of the passage, however, neither one of these conclusions can be justified. In Lev. R. 27.6 (also Pesikta deR. R. IX [Buber, 77a]) and Tanchuma, Emor 10 (Buber, 13, p. 47a), it is implied that the Jew need not trouble himself to remove his hat, if he has one on, or to stand up, if he happens to be sitting, when he is about to recite the “Shema”, but may do it even while sitting and even with his head covered. From this it is evident that not only could there be no objection to reciting the “Shema” bareheaded, but that it would ordinarily be more reverential to do so (see R. Solomon Lurya in his Responsum no. 72, and comp. Gronemann in Rahmer’s Literaturblatt, 1880, no. 42; also M. Duschak, ibid., 1881, p. 36). The Targum to the Prophets, a Palestinian work in origin if not in form (comp. W. Bacher, Jewish Encyclopedia XII, p. 61), interpreting Judges 5:9 as speaking in praise of the scholars and teachers in Israel who in times of trouble and persecution did not cease to study the Torah, expressly says that “it is fitting that these scholars and teachers sit in the synagogues with uncovered heads, teaching the people the words of the Torah and reciting praises and prayers of thanksgiving to God” (“Vekadu ya-ei lehon deyatevin bevatei keneshata bereish galei ume-alefin yat ama pitgamei oraita umevarechin umodin kedam Adonai”). And in another Palestinian work, the Tractate Soferim XIV.15 (ed. Joel Mueller, Leipzig, 1878, p. XXVI), it is expressly stated that one with uncovered head may act as the reader, leading the congregation in the recital of the “Shema”: “Mi sherosho meguleh pores al Shema” (comp. Mueller’s remark on pp. 198-199 and I. Elbogen, Der Juedische Gottesdienst, pp. 497 and 515). It is true that the Tractate Soferim in the same passage also mentions another opinion that would not allow one who is bareheaded to utter the name of God in prayer. But, as will be shown presently, this latter opinion reflects the Babylonian custom. For, in Palestine throughout the entire Talmudic period and even later, people would not hesitate entering a synagogue, reading from the Torah, and participating in the religious service with uncovered head. It was different in Babylon, though even in Babylonian Jewish sources of Talmudic times, one could not find any express regulation for covering the head during religious service. Nay, from the Babylonian Talmud it might even be proved that one is allowed to recite prayers with uncovered head. For, in B. Berachot 60b, the Talmud prescribes certain benedictions to be recited every morning before one covers his head (comp. also Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 46.1, and especially R. Elijah Gaon of Wilna in his commentary Be-urei Hagra, to Sh. Ar., O. Ch. 8.6). But there did develop in Babylon during Talmudic times, especially among very pious people, the custom of covering the head when reciting prayers or performing any religious ceremony, as well as the practice of avoiding going bareheaded. Thus, R. Huna, the son of R. Joshua, a Babylonian Amora of the fifth generation, second half of the fourth century (not Rav Huna, the disciple of Abba Areka and his successor as the head of the academy at Sura, who died about 297 C.E., see below), prides himself on the fact that he never walks four yards with uncovered head (Shabbat 118b, also Kiddushin 31a). This, however, could not have been the general practice for all scholars and for those who read the prayers, as Scheftelowitz assumes (op. cit., l.c.). For in that case Huna could not have prided himself on observing this practice. Scheftelowitz’s other statement (ibid., l.c.) that from the second century on, it became the general “custom of always keeping the head covered,” is likewise without any foundation in the sources. The covering of the head was especially considered a sign of respect which one must show to his elders or to scholars. Thus we are told (B. Kiddushin 33a) that R. Jeremiah of Difte considered it impudent on the part of a man passing him without showing him the respect of covering his head. It is evident from the context there that R. Jeremiah did not mind the man’s going without a hat, for even in Babylon it was not a generally observed custom for men to cover their heads (see Rabbinnovicz in Rahmer’s Literaturblatt XXII, 1893, no. 15, p. 58). But R. Jeremiah expected the man to show him the respect due to a scholar by not passing him without covering his head. Rabina, who happened to be with R. Jeremiah, however, sought to mitigate the man’s offense by suggesting that that man might have come from Mata Mahasya, where the people were rather on familiar terms with the rabbis and not so punctilious in the usual manner of showing respect to scholars. The covering of the head seems also to have been considered as tending to help one acquire the fear of God. Thus, the mother of R. Nachman b. Isaac, whom the astrologer had told that her son Nachman was destined to become a thief, would never allow him to go around bareheaded, evidently fearing that such conduct on his part might tend to hasten the evil destiny predicted for him by the astrologers. She would also say to her son: “Kasei reishach, ki heichi detiho alach eimta dishmaya,” “Cover your head so that the fear of Heaven may be upon you” (B. Shabbat 156b). According to J.H. Schorr (Hechalutz VII, p. 34), the practice of covering the head, and especially the idea that it is disrespectful to go without headgear, was borrowed by the Babylonian Jews from the Persians. One is also justified in surmising that there were some elements of primitive superstition connected with this practice (comp. Hastings, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, vol. VI, p. 539). But be this as it may, this much is certain, that among she Babylonian Jews already in Talmudic times the covering of the head was considered a sign of respect. It was observed especially in the presence of prominent men. It was also regarded as conducive to inculcate in one the fear of God. Pious people would be careful not to walk around with uncovered head. A prominent scholar’s outfit included also a headgear (B. Kiddushin, 8a, case of R. Kahana), though even prominent scholars would not wear a headgear before they were married (ibid., 29b, case of R. Hamnuna. According to R. Abraham ibn Yarhi in Hamanhig Tefila 43, Berlin, 1855, p. 15, it would have been regarded as presumption or haughty pride, “demechezei keyohara,” on the part of an unmarried scholar to cover his head. But for the people in general, there was no fixed rule. Some of them would cover their heads and some would go bareheaded: “Anashim, zimnin demichso reishehu vezimnin demiglo reishehu” (B. Nedarim 30b). As to how they appeared in the synagogue we have no record. Scheftelowitz’s statement that the scholars in general and those who read the prayers would always keep their heads covered (op. cit., l.c.) has no basis in the Talmudic sources. Some pious people, however, would, no doubt, cover their heads when praying. For, we are told in the Talmud (B. Berachot 51a) that R. Ashi (not Asi as in the printed editions; see Rabbinnovicz, Dikdukei Soferim, ad loc.) would cover his head when reciting the benediction after the meal. We may justly assume that he would also cover his head when reciting other benedictions and prayers. In the very early post-Talmudic times, however, we find that the Babylonian Jews considered it already forbidden to utter the name of God in prayer with uncovered head. (This is the opinion of “yesh omerim,” “Some say,” in Tractate Soferim, which, as already suggested above, represent Babylonian authorities.) In the Chilufei Minhagim (published by Joel Mueller in Hashachar VII), it is stated that one of the differences in custom and ritual between the Palestinian and Babylonian .Jews was that among the former the priests would recite their benedictions bareheaded, while among the latter, the priests were not permitted to recite their benedictions with uncovered head: “Benei Bavel oserim sheyevarechu hakohanim leYisra-el verosham parua; be-Erets Yisra-el mevarechim kohanim leYisra-el verosham parua.” This is the correct reading (comp. Mueller’s discussion there, no. 44). This, by the way, also implies that even in Babylon it was not absolutely forbidden to enter the synagogue and participate in the religious service with uncovered head. Had this been the case, the special mention of a law prohibiting the priests from pronouncing their blessings bareheaded would have been gratuitous. There was, accordingly, a difference in custom between Palestine and Babylon regarding wearing hats. In the former, the people would not cover their heads while praying or when in the synagogue, and in general would be bareheaded; in the latter, however, it was the custom of pious people to cover their heads. This custom, however, had not been brought to Babylon from Palestine by Abba Areka, as Marmorstein assumes (Ha-olam, 1926, p. 1010, and Revue des Etudes Juives, 1928, pp. 66-69). The custom could not have been imported from Palestine where it did not exist. And we have no indication in the Talmud that Abba Areka ever observed it. The Geonim do mention among the ten practices of extreme piety (asara milei dechasiduta) observed by Rav, the practice not to walk four yards with uncovered head (see responsa of the Geonim, Sha-arei Teshuva, no. 178, Leipzig, 1858, p. 18, and Sefer Ha-ora of Rashi, ed. Buber, Lemberg, 1905, p. 4). They also add that his disciple R. Huna followed this practice. But the Talmud reports this practice only of R. Huna, the son of R. Joshua, who lived one century after R. Huna (the disciple of Rav), and nowhere does the Talmud say that Rav himself observed this custom. Marmorstein’s arguments for his theory that the Palestinians would cover their heads and the Babylonians would go bareheaded (ibid., l.c., also Ha-olam, 1926, no. 8, pp. 159ff) are not at all convincing. The contradiction which he finds between B., M.K. 24a and B., Berachot 60b, can be explained without recourse to his theory (comp. also A.S. Hirschberg, Ha-olam, November 1926, no. 47, pp. 889-890). Like the two centers in Asia–Palestine and Babylon–the European countries in the Middle Ages (at least up to the 13th century) were also divided as regards the propriety of covering the head during prayer or not covering it. Spain followed Babylon, while France and Germany followed Palestine. The Spanish rabbinical authorities require the covering of the head during prayer and in general consider it praiseworthy to avoid going bareheaded. Thus, Maimonides declares that one should not recite his prayers with uncovered head (Yad, Hil. Tefila IV.5) and he also says that it is the proper thing for a scholar not to go bareheaded (ibid., De-ot V.6). The Zohar in Va-etchanan (Lublin, 1872, p. 520) likewise says that one must cover his head (“Uva-ei lechafaya reisheh”) when praying. R. Abraham ibn Yarhi in Hamanhig, Tefila, 43 (Berlin, 1855, p. 15), states that it is a custom to pray with covered head, and he recommends this custom as well as the general practice of covering the head; but he expressly characterizes them as the custom and practice of the Jews in Spain. (This plainly contradicts the statement of David ben Yehuda Chasid as quoted by A. Marmorstein in Monatschrift fuer die Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums, 1927, p. 41). R. Jeroham b. Meshullam, in his Toledot Adam VeChava I, Nativ 16 (Kopys, 1808, p. 118b), requires the covering of the head when reciting benedictions. Judah Asheri, in his responsa Zichron Yehuda, no. 2 (Berlin, 1846, 4a) recommends the covering of the head when studying the Torah, but would not insist upon it in hot weather, when one feels uncomfortable to have his head covered. And Joseph Caro, in Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 91.3, merely mentions that some authorities forbid the uttering of the name of God in prayer with uncovered heads, and also that some authorities would even prevent people from entering the synagogue with uncovered head, but he himself does not decide the question. He recommends, however, as a pious practice (midat chasidut), not to go around bareheaded (ibid., 2.6, according to R. Abraham Abali Gumbiner in his commentary Magen Avraham to 91.3; comp. also Tur, O. Ch. 2 and the discussion of Isserles in Darchei Mosheh and especially of R. Joel Sirkes in Bayit Chadash, ad loc.). In France and Germany, however–following the Palestinian custom–there was no objection to praying or reading from the Torah with uncovered head. Thus R. Isaac b. Moses (Or Zarua) of Vienna (1200-1270) expressly reports that it was the custom of the French rabbis to pray with uncovered heads: “Minhag raboteinu shebeTsarefat schemevarechin berosh meguleh” (Or Zarua 2.43, Zitomir, 1862, p. 20), though he does not favor it. Likewise, R. Meir of Rothenburg (1215-1293) is quoted by his disciple R. Shimshon b. Zadok in Tashbaz 547 (Warsaw, 1875, p. 93) as having said that it was not forbidden to go around bareheaded. He is said to have explained the conduct of R. Huna the son of R. Joshua (reported in Kiddushin 31a and Shabbat 118b) as having been an exceptional case of extreme piety which the average man need not follow. Compare also Kol Bo, Tefila, XI (Lemberg, 1860, 8a). Beginning, however, with the 13th century, the Babylonian-Spanish custom began to penetrate into France and Germany. We accordingly find Ashkenazic authorities of the thirteenth century and of the following centuries favoring the Spanish custom and recommending or requiring that one should cover his head when praying or reading from the Torah (cf. R. Isaac of Vienna, in Or Zarua, l.c., and R. Moses Isserles in Darchei Mosheh to Tur, Orach Chayim 282.3, arguing against the French custom, and in Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 282.3, forbidding one to read the Torah bareheaded, and many others). But even as late as the 16th century it was in German-Polish countries not generally considered as forbidden to read the Torah or to pray bareheaded. R. Solomon Lurya, one of the greatest rabbinical authorities of his time (1510-1573), in his responsum no. 72, referring to the above, expressly says: “Ein ani yodea isur levarech belo kisui harosh” (“I do not know of any prohibition against praying with uncovered head”). (Comp. also Joseph Solomon Delmedigo in his Matsref Lechochma, Odessa, 1864, p. 76.) In the 17th century, R. David Halevi of Lemberg (1586-1667), in his commentary Turei Zahav, to Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 8.3, advanced the argument that praying with uncovered head be forbidden on the ground that, since it is a custom generally practiced by non-Jews, it should be regarded as Chukat Hagoy. This argument, however, is fallacious. For, according to the definition given by R. Moses Isserles in Sh. A., Yoreh De-a 178.1 (comp. also Tosafot to Avoda Zara iia, s.v. “ve-i chuka”), only such non-Jewish practices as are observed by the non-Jew because of some foolish superstition (leshem shetut) or because they express or symbolize some of his peculiar religious beliefs are to be regarded as Chukat Hagoy, which the Jew is forbidden to imitate. But practices which the non-Jew observes for the sake of comfort and convenience or because they are expressions of politeness and good manners, not involving any particular doctrine, cannot be classed as Chukat Hagoyim, and the Jew need have no scruples in practicing them as the non-Jew does (comp. A. Chorin in Igeret Elasaf, Prague, 1826, pp. 23-24). And, indeed, many great rabbinical authorities of the 17th and 18th centuries utterly disregarded this argument on the ground of the law against Chukat Hagoy and declared that there is no prohibition against praying with uncovered head. Thus, R. Hezekiah Silva (1659-1698) in his commentary Peri Chadash to Sh. A., Orach Chayim 93.1, says: “The opinion of those who permit the utterance of the name of God in prayer with uncovered head seems to be reasonable and valid” (“Mistabera keman dematir lehotsi azkara berosh maguleh”). And R. Jacob Reischer (died 1733) in his responsa Shevut Ya-akov III, referring to the above says: “Veisur giluy harosh ein lo ikar umakom barur baShas.” And the famous Gaon of Wilna in his commentary Be-urei Hagra to Sh. A., Orach Chayim 8.6, expressly says: “According to Jewish law it is permitted to enter a synagogue and to pray without covering one’s head” (“Demidina afilu lehitpalel velikanes leveit hakeneset, hakol mutar”). And after some discussion in which he cites many proofs for his statement, he closes with the following words: “There is no prohibition whatever against praying with uncovered head, but as a matter of propriety it would seem to be good manners to cover one’s head when standing in the presence of great men, and also during the religious service” (“Kelala demilta, ein isur kelal berosh meguleh le-olam, rak lifnei hagedolim vechen beet hatefila”). In the 19th century, as a reaction to the first attempts of modern Reform, which suggested the removal of the hat by the worshippers in the synagogue (see Igeret El-asaf by A. Chorin, Prague, 1826, pp. 17-24 and 29b-31b), the strict Orthodox rabbinical authorities became more emphatic in their insistence upon the requirement of covering the head when entering a synagogue and when praying or performing any religious ceremony (comp. Chayim Chizkiya Medini in his Sede Chemed, vol. II, Ma-arechet Beit Hakeneset, Warsaw, 1896, pp. 159160, where most of the authorities are quoted). But none of these authorities succeeded in proving that there is in Jewish law or tradition an express prohibition against praying with uncovered head. (Recently it has been argued that the custom of covering the head during prayer is against the Halacha; see Kahan in Revue des Etudes Juives, vol. LXXXIV, 1927, pp. 176-178.) Neither do the reasons for the custom of covering the head in the synagogue and the arguments for retaining it, advanced by modern Orthodox authorities, have any validity. Thus, to mention but a few of them: Gaster, as reported in the Jewish Chronicle, referring to the above, said that one of the reasons why the Jews covered their heads when praying was because the Roman slaves used to go bareheaded. The Jews did not wish to appear as slaves, hence they covered their heads when praying. But according to Rava (B. Shabbat 10a), it is the proper attitude when reciting the prayers to appear like a slave: “Ke-avda kamei mareh.” An anonymous writer in Orient-Literaturblatt VII, p. 388, arguing in favor of retaining the custom of covering the head in the synagogue, although ordinarily it is a sign of respect to remove the hat, gives two reasons for it. The first one is that we need not be so formal with God as to show him the ordinary outward signs of respect, for only man looketh on the outward appearance, but the Lord looketh on the heart: “Dem alten Gotte des Judentums sollen keine Komplimente gemacht werden, er soll ueberhaupt nicht auf aeussere Erscheinung sehen sondern in den Herzen lesen.” But according to this argument, God would not mind if we came to him without a hat but with a pure heart. His second reason is that the covering of the head while in the synagogue shows that the worshippers are like one family and feel themselves at home in the synagogue without any need of observing the social convention of removing the hat while there. But by such an argument one might excuse any lack of decorum in the synagogue. Compare further G. Deutsch, Jewish Encyclopedia II, pp. 530ff, s.v. “Bareheadedness”; and “The Covering of the Head,” in The Jewish Chronicle of London, October 10, 1919, p. 15). In summing up the discussion, I would say that from the point of view of Jewish law or ritual there can be no objection to either covering or uncovering the head in the synagogue, or when praying or reading the Torah. The custom of praying bareheaded or with covered head is not at all a question of law. It is merely a matter of social propriety and decorum. As such it cannot, and need not, be the same in all countries and certainly not remain the same for all times. For it depends on the ideas of the people as to what is the proper attire for worshippers in the temples or what is the proper thing to wear or not to wear at solemn occasions and at public worship. These ideas are, of course, in turn subject to change in different times and in different places. Hence, in countries where the covering of the head is a sign of showing respect and reverence, it certainly would be improper to appear before God in the house of prayer with uncovered head. And even in countries where it is generally regarded more respectful to remove the hat, if there be congregations who still feel like their grandfathers and consider it disrespectful to pray with uncovered heads, they are within their right if they retain the custom of their fathers. We can have no quarrel with them and should rather respect their custom. In visiting them in their synagogues or when participating in some religious service at their homes, we should do as they do. For their motive and their intentions are good, and they observe these practices out of a feeling of respect and a sense of propriety, misguided as they may appear on this point to the occidental and modern mind. On the other hand, no one should find any fault with those people who, living in countries where it is considered to be disrespectful to keep the hat on while visiting in other people’s homes or in the presence of elders and superiors, deem it proper to show their respect for the synagogue by removing the hat upon entering it. These people also observe the practice with the best intentions and with a respectful spirit. They are not prompted by the desire to imitate non-Jewish practice. Their motive, rather, is to show their respect for the synagogue and to express their spirit of reverence by praying with uncovered head. And although in the last century this question of “hat on or hat off” was the subject of heated disputes between the Conservative and Liberal groups of Jewry, we should know better now and be more tolerant and more liberal towards one another. We should realize that this matter is but a detail of custom and should not cause arguments between Orthodox and Reform. It is a detail that is not worth fighting about. It should not separate Jew from Jew and not be made the cause of breaking up Jewish groups or dividing Jewish congregations.Jacob Z. Lauterbach

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

CARR 22-23

CCAR RESPONSA

Contemporary American Reform Responsa

15. Inert Pigment as a Permanent

Cosmetic

QUESTION: An eye surgeon has asked whether there would

be anything in Jewish law against the procedure of inserting an inert pigment into the superficial

dermis at the base of the eyelash. Its purpose is cosmetic in nature and has been requested by

many individuals. Some have physical handicaps which make the application of normal

cosmetics difficult or are allergic to a normal cosmetic. Others have requested it as a

convenience. The procedure has also been suggested to accompany a variety of

surgical procedures used to correct defects or following serious accidents which lead to the loss

of eye lashes. Appropriate tests to assure no allergic reaction will, of course, be made in each

instance. As Judaism is opposed to tattooing, is it permissible to use this procedure on Jewish or

non-Jewish patients? (Rabbi R. Agler, Boca Raton, FL)ANSWER: The Biblical text

of the Book of Leviticus (19.28) states, “you shall not make gashes in your flesh for the dead or

incise any marks on yourself. I am the Lord.” This passage has been interpreted by the

Talmud to deal primarily with incisions made at a time of mourning for the dead (Mak.

20b). However, the next Mishnah prohibits any “incised imprint”; an offender was to be

flogged. There was some discussion in the Talmud whether such an “imprint” refers only

to incisions of the name of God or of idolatrous deities. One authority, Rabbi Malkiah, even

prohibited the covering of a wound with burnt wooden ashes as it might appear like an “imprint”

(Mak. 21a). This prohibition against tattooing included the permanent marking of slaves to avoid

their flight (Git. 86a). Curiously, the writing of the Divine name on top of the skin, and covering it

to avoid erasure during a bath, was permitted (Shab. 120b). In each of these instances in which

tattooing is prohibited, it is done so on the basis of being an idolatrous practice or marring the

human body. Eye makeup and facial makeup is mentioned in the Bible (Jer.

4.30); it was a practice followed by women of doubtful morality, such as Jezebel (II Kings 9.30),

and was condemned by the prophets (Ez. 23.40; Jer. 4.30). In the Mishnaic period, eye makeup

was accepted although sometimes still frowned upon (Tosefta Sotah 3.3; Shab. 95a; M.

B. K. 1.7; B. K. 117a; Ber. 18b, etc.) There was some discussion about which eye makeup might

be provocative (Shab. 11b; 80a). Cosmetics are prohibited during the period of mourning (Ket.

4b). These traditional sources make it clear that there would be nothing wrong with

any temporary application of a cosmetic. They would prohibit its application in a permanent way

as marring the human body. When the procedure is used as a surgical procedure to

restore the eye after an accident, or to correct some other deficiency, it is permissible as any

other surgical procedure. It would also be appropriate for use with handicapped individuals. It

would, however, violate the spirit of tradition to use this procedure in a broad, general

manner.January 1985

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

CARR 124-125

 

CCAR RESPONSA

 

Contemporary American Reform Responsa

 

76. Pierced Ears

QUESTION: The custom

of piercing the earlobe in order to insert an ear ring has again become widespread. What does

Jewish tradition have to say about this? Is it permissible according to tradition? (V. Kavaler,

Pittsburgh, PA)

ANSWER: The piercing of the earlobe is one of the few surgical

procedures mentioned in the Bible, however, in a totally different connection. If a Hebrew

slave, who was to serve for six years and be freed in the seventh year, declared that he loved his

master, and his wife and children did not wish to be freed, then “he shall be brought to the door

or the doorpost and his master shall pierce his ear with an awl; and he shall then remain his

slave for life, ” (Ex. 21. 6; Tosefta B. K. 7.5). Pierced ears in Biblical times, therefore,

clearly indicated lifelong slavery and were a permanent form of branding the individual. It was

considered appropriate to pierce the cartilage so that the wound site would never close again,

although there was some controversy about this (Bekh. 37a; Kid. 21b).

In our

instance, however, we are not dealing with permanent marks on the ear, but rather with a way of

holding decorative items of female ornamentation. Piercing for this purpose was known in

Talmudic times (M. Shab. 6.6). For that matter, not only were ornaments worn in the ear

during the Talmudic period, but also as signs of various trades and professions. So, a writer

would carry a quill, a carpenter a little piece of wood, and a money changer, a coin, while other

professions carried other items (Tos. Shab. 1.8; Shab. 11b; J. Shab. 3b). It is clear,

therefore, that such a surgical procedure was permitted in Talmudic times, nor was it prohibited

later, although during frequent periods it was not fashionable.

Generally this matter is

related to the Talmudic willingness to encourage women to beautify themselves. For example,

spices are frequently mentioned, and a dealer in spices could visit women in the women’s

quarter, although such visits were prohibited to anyone else (B.K. 82a; B. B. 22a). Furthermore,

women could continue to beautify themselves even during the semi-holiday period (Shulhan

Arukh Orah Hayim 346.5) and a husband had to provide the means for such beautification

(Ket. 64b). Many other references along these lines could also be provided.

We may,

therefore, conclude that piercing one’s ears for the sake of beautification would be permissible to

Jewish women according to tradition.

September 1983

 

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.