Apostate

See also “Messianic Jew/s”
See Marriage
See Qaddish

CuRR 181-183

RRR 127-131

RRR 120-127

Status of Apostates (Children and Adults)

The Committee has received during the past year a number of questions which involve Jewish converts to Christianity, and some questions with regard to the reversion to non-Jewish faith on the part of converts to Judaism. A question arose about the status in Juda ism of Christian children, adopted, converted to Juda ism, and then, because of physical or mental defects, the adoption is cancelled and the child returned to the agency. What is the status of such a child? The questions involving apostasy have come up generally in the following circumstance: A child is of an immi grant family in which there is a Gentile father and a Jewish mother, the family having been converted to Christianity in Germany. Now the young girl from this mixed family wants to marry a Jew. May she be married to a Jew without conversion? Analogous to it is the question of a child of a Jewish mother adopted and raised by a Christian family as a Christian. Can this child be married to a Jew without conversion? Does the fact that this child was not raised by her Jewish mother make a difference? As for a Christian child adopted, converted to Judaism, and then, be cause of physical or mental defects, returned to the agency, is this child to be deemed to have remained a Jew? May he or she, for example, when grown up, be married to a Jew, without further question as to reconversion?

These are all practical questions, and therefore it is important not only that we analyze the attitude of Jewish law in the past to these individuals, but also arrive at a practical conclusion for ourselves as to how we should deal with the problems mentioned above.

At the outset, it is to be noted that these problems are not new. To some degree they are dealt with in the Talmud, but they come to more complete discussion in the many responsa dealing with the Marranos, who for cen-turies kept on escaping from Spain and Portugal and appearing in Jewish communities elsewhere. Decision had to be made as to the status of these fugitives. Should they now be converted to Judaism? Or was the conversion unnecessary on the ground that they still were Jews? The question came up likewise in Ashkenazic Jewry due to the waves of compulsory conversion in the wake of the Crusades and later persecutions. It would be well, therefore, to trace the law in its general principles from the beginning.

The Talmud, in Yevamoth 45b, says that a child born of a Gentile father and a Jewish mother is “kosher.” To which Rashi comments, “Since his mother is Jewish, he is counted as one of our brothers.” The Talmud in Kiddushin 68b, in discussing the verse in Deuteronomy 7 : 4: ” … he will wean your son away from following Me,” indicates that “he” means the Gentile father of the son, who will mislead the son away, and so forth. Therefore, the Talmud says, this indicates that “your son” born of an Israelite woman is truly your son, but a son born of a Gentile woman is her son. The principle is so embodied in the Codes: in the Tur, Even Hoezer 4, it is written that the son of any Gentile man and a Jewish woman is “kosher” to marry a Jew; so it is also in the Shulchan Aruch, Even Hoezer 4 : 5 and 19. There is some question whether a child of such a mixed marriage may marry a priest, but most authorities agree that she may do so.

Therefore, there is no question that the child of a Jewish mother is fully a Jew and may be married to a Jew. Now, theoretically speaking, if this daughter of a mixed marriage also marries a Gentile, her child is a child of a Jewish mother and is also Jewish. For how many generations would this Jewish status endure? While, of course, this is a theoretical question, it is interesting to note that Solomon, the son of Simon Duran, of Algiers, says (“Rashbash” 89) that it applies “ad sof ho ‘olom, ” forever. The statement of Duran is as follows: “One whose mother is Jewish, even for many generations, even if the father is Gentile, the child is Jewish, even to the end of the world, ad sof ho ‘olom. ”

But such a person has been raised as a Christian—either, as in the case concerning which the Committee was specifically asked, the child was herself converted to Christianity; or, as in the case of the Marranos, the child was raised in a Christian environment from the very beginning. Granted that the child is Jewish by birth, must it not be in some formal way restored to its Jewish status—by a ceremony akin to conversion? This is discussed in the law and most of the discussion goes back to the Talmud in Bechoros 31a and Avodah Zara la. Here the discussion is specifically with regard to the Am Haaretz, meaning in the Talmudic sense one who is not to be trusted to observe the laws of purity and to give tithes and heave offering properly. What should be the relationship between these non observers (Am Ha’aretz) and the Chaverim (those who are careful to keep all the laws mentioned)? The Talmud says that the Am Ha’aretz, before he can be accepted as trustworthy, must make a formal promise of Chaverus, i.e., to be one of the Chaverim who are careful to observe the law.

The same term is used in the discussion of apostates who want to return. Repentant apostates are asked to take upon themselves the promise of Chaverus, i.e., to obey Jewish law. As to whether any formal ceremony other than such a promise is to be required of them, there is a general agreement that the ritual bath is not really required by strict law (m’d’oraiso), but some would require the ritual bath as a rabbinical caution (m’d’rabbanan). Thus it is decided by Moses Isserles in Yore Deah 268 : 12. However, it is noteworthy that in the discussion in the Talmud, in Bechoroth, Rabbi Simon and Rabbi Joshua, speaking of the nonobservant and whether we should accept their repentance, say that under all circumstances we should accept them because of the verse in Jeremiah (3 : 22), “Return, ye recreant children”; and the Talmud says that the law is according to this pair of lenient authorities. The status of the nonobservant Jew, and that of the proselyte are brought together in the Tosefta (Demai II). In the discussion on the Shulchan Aruch passage mentioned above, Elijah of Vilna quotes this lenient discussion in the Talmud as applying also to apostates who revert to Judaism. In general, the Talmud is lenient also with regard to children of Jewish birth who, unaware of their Jewish origin, are raised among non-Jews (Tinok hanishbah bayn hanochrim). See the discussion in Shabbas 68 b ), especially with regard to their being excused since in their ignorance they violated the Sabbath.

The general mood of the law with regard to all those who seek to return was to make as little fuss as possible and to interpose no hindrances. The rest of the statement of Solomon Duran as to these reverts is as follows: “The requirements of conversion do not apply to them at all. When they wish to return to Judaism, we do not have to tell them about the various commandments (as we do to Gentile converts) for they already stand sworn as part of Israel from Mount Sinai and they do not need the ritual bath for conversion.” That this is not merely a chance liberal statement is evidenced by the fact that it is quoted by Joseph Caro in his “Bes Joseph” (Bedek Ha Bayis) at the end of Yore Deah 268, where the question is discussed. It is noteworthy, too, that Rabbenu Gershom, the Light of the Exile, speaking in the Rhineland, also says in a similar case (in fact, with regard to a priest) that we should be as lenient as possible and refrain carefully from reminding them of their former state lest we discourage thereby the apostates from returning in repentance (“Vitry,” pp. 96-97).

It is clear from this that no ritual of conversion should be required of a child of a Jewish mother. To do so would indeed violate the law and imply that they are not Jews, which would be errpneous. However, the decision of Is series that they avow Divre Chaverus could well be accepted by us as a cautionary action. We should ask the person involved to promise to maintain a Jewish home. This, at the most, is all that is necessary.

Now as to the other and somewhat related question: What about a child born of a Gentile mother who, in infancy, is adopted into a Jewish family, converted to Judaism, and then, after conversion, is returned to the adoption agency because of some physical or mental defect? Is this child, because of the original conversion in infancy, to be deemed permanently a Jew? This may become a practical question if, when the child grows up, he or she wants to marry a Jew.

In general, the law concerning an infant who is converted is different from that governing an adult who is converted to Judaism. An adult accepts Judaism of his own free will after a careful explanation is made to him of all the circumstances involved in becoming a Jew. But an infant is converted without knowing what is involved. The Talmud says (Ketuboth 11a) that an infant may be converted by the authority of the Beth Din, not, of course, on the ground of the child’s intelligent acceptance of the conditions involved, which is impossible, but because becoming a Jew was deemed to be an advantage, and we may do a favor to a person even without his consent. Therefore, with regard to an adult convert, he cannot completely discard the allegiance which he had accepted. He simply becomes a sinful Jew and he may still enter into Jewish marriage, just as an apostate Jew may (see Tosefta, Demai I I : 5; Yore Deah 268 : 12).

This convert to Judaism who reverts to his former faith is, of course, not deemed a Jew in the full sense of the word. Just as in the case of a born Jew who apostatizes, he is, for example, not to be relied upon with regard to various mitzvos. The wine in his possession is Gentile wine, and his bread is Gentile bread. But with regard to marriage, he has the same right as an apostate Jew. The only exception with regard to apostates in the marriage relationship concerns the levirate marriage and Chalitza. If, for example, a man dies and has no children, and his brother is an apostate, some few authorities ease the requirement that the widow obtain Chalitza from this apostate. But otherwise the apostate, whether born Jewish or having been converted as an adult, retains his Jewish status in marriage relationships (cf. Ezekiel Landau, “Nodah b’Yehudah” II, Even Hoezer 150).

Thus, the adult convert, like a Jew by birth, possesses what international lawyers call an “indelible allegiance,” at least with regard to marriage and divorce. However, a child who has been converted without his own intelligent consent, but merely on the theory that a favor has been done him, is given the permission to renounce the conversion when he grows up. So says Rabbi Joseph in the dis-cussion in the Talmud (Ketuboth 1 1a). This is embodied as law by Asher ben Yehiel in his Compendium on the Talmud. He adds, however, that if the convert, when he is full-grown, is known to observe Jewish law, this observance is deemed to mean consent; and then he can no longer renounce his allegiance. So it is in the Shulchan Aruch, Yore Deah 268 : 7 and 8. The child in question, therefore, has the right to determine whether his conversion in infancy remains valid or not. If he chooses to live a Jewish life as he grows up, he is a Jew; if not, his conversion is void.

To sum up: Those who are born of Jewish mothers and those who are converted to Judaism as adults have an indelible allegiance to Judaism with regard to marriage laws. The only real exception to this is the circumstance in which a woman is free from the need of Chalitza if her husband’s brother is an apostate.

(Originally published in Central Conference of American Rabbis Yearbook, Vol. LXX, 1960.)

RR 127-131

Burial of an Apostate

A Jewish family in Los Angeles asked an undertaking establishment to arrange for the burial of their close relative who had just died in a Catholic institution in San Francisco. The nuns in charge delivered the body at the request of the family, but informed the family that the man had been converted to Catholicism and had received extreme unction. The question is this: Is a Jewish institution, or are Jews in general, in duty bound, according to Jewish law and tradition, to pro vide burial for an apostate from Judaism? The family also asks that the body be put in shrouds (tachrichim).

(From Louis J. Freehof, San Francisco, California)

The origin of the law is to be found in the post-Talmudic treatise Evel Rabatti (Semachos, chapter 2). The discussion there includes suicides, criminals executed by the court, people under ban, apostates, and so forth. The general injunction given with regard to all these sinners is that we do not tear the garments for them (Keriah) and we do not engage in any burial activity with them (Eyn Misaskin). This law, namely, the general injunction that we have no concern with, or burial responsibility for, such people, is repeated almost verbatim in all subsequent legal discussion and in the Codes.

Yet, although this formal prohibition is stated and repeated, it is noticeable that there has been continual limitation of the scope of the prohibition. Sometimes the limitations have to do with one of the types of people involved (the suicide, or the man under ban, or the apostate, and so forth). Sometimes the limitation concerns one or the other elements of the general prohibition, such as the formal periods of mourning, or standing in line at the cemetery to console the mourners, or providing shrouds, and so forth. In general, not much distinction is made between these sinners, and what applies to one applies to the other. One can say that the prohibition against formal mourning for this group is the one which is most fully observed. This is due to the general principle that whenever questions have to be settled as to mourning (i.e., how long it should endure, and so forth) the rule is to make the lenient decision; that is to say, whenever in doubt, the decision is to mourn less or not mourn at all. Therefore, this part of the general prohibition (namely, the mourning ritual) usually remains firm through all the discussions of the law. Yet, even in this case, permission is occasionally given to participate in regular mourning. See, for example, the responsum of Moses Sofer, “Chasam Sofer,” Yore Deah 326, where he says with regard to a certain honored family concerning whom the inquiry was made (when a member of the family committed suicide) that he certainly would permit such a fam ily to save itself from gossip and shame, which would come if they conspicuously kept from mourning for the deceased suicide.

Moses Sofer’s decision to permit mourning in the case of a suicide was based upon his concern for the honor of a family. This motivation explains much of the development of the law in this case. The original source of the law in Evel Rabatti summarizes what is permitted and what is not permitted in regard to this group of sinners, by saying that whatever is for the honor of the dead we do not do (since they do not deserve any honor from us), but that whatever is for the honor of the living we do observe. Based on this distinction, every element in the ritual of burying and mourning has been, and must be, separately evaluated. Whatever is for the honor of the dead we do not do, and what is for the honor of the living we do observe. Thus, almost no authority except, perhaps, Ezekiel Katzenellenbogen, of Altona (“Knesses Yecheskel” 37), would say that we give a hesped (eulogy), since the hesped is clearly for the honor of the dead.

Therefore, the question as to whether we are in duty bound to bury these sinners, or to provide tachrichim or not, depends upon the prior question, whether burial and tachrichim are for the honor of the dead or for the honor of the living. This very question is the subject of an elaborate debate in the Talmud (b. Sanhedrin 47c ff.). This debate is evaluated by Abraham de Boton (“Lechem Mishna” to Maimonides, Yad, “Hilchos Avel” I : 10). He bases his judgment on the Tosfos which he cites, namely, that although burial does involve the honor of the dead (and therefore one would think we are not in duty bound to provide this honor for these sinners), nevertheless some disgrace is always involved for the living if the body of the sinner is not properly buried. The fact that the honor of the living is always involved is cited by Abraham de Boton as the explanation of a crucial decision in this matter by Solomon ben Aderet, Rabbi of Barcelona, thirteenth century. (See his responsum 763.) Solomon ben Aderet (Rashbo) says that when Evel Rabatti states that we do not do anything for these sinners (eyn misaskin), this does not mean that we are free from our responsibility for burying them and providing shrouds. Although Solomon ben Aderet is one of the greatest authorities, his opinion would not stand up against the earlier authority of Evel Rabatti if he stood alone. But his opinion is cited by Joseph Caro; see “Bes Joseph” to the Tur, Yore Deah 334, where he quoted this responsum and also another by Rashbo to the same effect. Caro quotes them without the slightest disagreement. So, too, in the Shulchan Aruch, Yore Deah 333 : 3 (the discussion here is specifically about an excommunicated man), Schach (Sabbetai Cohen) cites the opinion of the Rashbo, and states that it has been quoted by Joseph Caro (“Bes Joseph”) and he accepts it as the rule. So the Be’er Hetev (ad loc.) cites it as a rule that the Evel Rabatti does not mean at all that we should refrain from providing burial and tachrichim for these sinners. It is noteworthy that the great Rabbi of Egypt of the sixteenth century, David ben Zimri, said in his commentary to the Yad, “Avel” I :10: “It seems that we must bury them, but not alongside of the righteous.” A full responsum on the question is found in the Responsa of Bezalel Shaffran, rabbi in Rumania, responsum 131. He is asked a question from Yassy about the burial of an apostate. The questioner says they have a minhag in Yassy not to bury such persons in the Jewish cemetery. Shaffran denies that the minhag is valid. He quotes all the authorities, Maimonides, Rosh, Rif, who emphasize that we do not mourn for apostates but imply that We do bury them, and he also quotes Solomon ben Aderet, who specifically says that we do bury them. He also quotes Joel Sirkes (Bach) to Yore Deah 362, who con eludes that we do bury but do not give tachrichim. He then tells that Or Zerua (II, 422 : 3) takes the opposite point of view, that we do not bury them, but he calls attention to Joseph Saul Nathanson’s commentary, “Yad Shoul” to Yore Deah 345, which says that Or Zerua’s statement that we do not bury applies only to the specific case of a shochet who supplies Jews with trefe meat. Finally, he leaves the matter unsettled.

In a footnote, the son of Bezalel Shaffran, Enoch Shaffran, Rabbi of Bucharest, says the matter is decided, and that we do bury them; and he quotes Moses Sofer, Yore Deah 341, who says that we do, and then adds that it is the custom to bury them with tachrichim.

An interesting older responsum on the question of burial of a sinner is found in the Responsa of Jacob l’Ves Levi, 49 (rabbi in Turkey, seventeenth century). This responsum concerned a woman who threw in her lot with her excommunicated son, and violated all the laws of the community and the faith. (By the way, this woman is identified by Perles as the mother of Uriel Acosta [Monatsschrift, vol. XXVI, 1877].) He decides, on the basis of all the opinions cited above (going back to the fundamental decision of Solomon ben Aderet) that it is our duty to bury her. He adds, of course, that if the rabbinical court wishes to make a special example of her and not bury her, they have the right to do so; but that is only under special circumstances of community tension when the safety of the community is involved, when it is permitted even to deprive a sinner of the right to have his son circumcised, or the right of the son to study in the communal school. See Responsa of Nachmanides, 244. Except for these emergency rights of the rabbinate, the general rule is clear: All the sinners listed in Evel Rabatti, including apostates, should be buried by the Jewish community (or their relatives), and also, if desired, shrouds (tachrichim) should be provided

MRR 169-175

OUR ATTITUDE TO APOSTATES

QUESTION:

In these days of ecumenical mood, religious groups are rethinking their attitude towards each other. Should we not, therefore, also rethink our attitude to those Jews who have abandoned Judaism for Christianity? (From Rabbi Abraham Shinedling, Albuquerque, New Mexico.)

ANSWER:

THE BIBLICAL attitude to apostates (to idolatry) is stern and even harsh; they are to be put to death (Deuteronomy 13:13-19). This is the same attitude which the Church had to its heretics. Post-Biblical law also says that a provoking heretic (mumar Lehach’is) “must be brought down and not brought up again from the pit,” i.e., must not be rescued from danger (AvodahZarah 26b). Thus the attitudes of both religions to heretics seem to be the same. Yet in actuality they differed drastically from each other. While the pages of history are red with the blood of heretics to Christianity, there is no record in all of Jewish history, beginning with Scripture, of any such violence done to one who aban-doned Judaism and the Jewish community. In addition to this negative self-restraint, Jewish legal literature is replete with law revealing a positive attitude of con-tinued kinship with apostates.

The rule “Even though he has sinned, he is still a Jew” (Sanhedrin 44a) applies also to the apostate. This reveals itself in laws that touch the most intimate side of life. The apostate’s marriage is still a valid marriage. If his wife is to be divorced, he is eligible, in spite of his change of faith, to give a Jewish get. In fact a get must be obtained from him if his wife is to be divorced. If he is the surviving brother of a childless man who has died, the widow cannot be freed unless the apostate gives her chalitsah (although there is some disagreement on this question in the law). When his father dies, he is entitled to inherit the estate (although there is some disagreement in the law about that also). In other words, in all intimate family relations, he is still considered a part of the Jewish community, with the basic rights and duties of a Jew. He has sinned, but he is still a brother. This insistence that he is still part of our life, of course, created great difficulties in the obtaining of a get or a chalitzah from one who wants to have nothing to do with Jewish life. Nevertheless, in spite of these difficulties, Judaism has persisted in holding to this kinship.

It is with the background of these attitudes that the present relationship of Jews and Judaism towards apostates must be considered. But first of all it is necessary to understand, more precisely, the mood and the motivation of presentday apostates in the United States. In our long history we have had a wide spectrum of different relationships with apostates. Sometimes, and perhaps most times, our apostates became our bitterest enemies and persecutors, such as Abner of Burgos in Spain, Nicholas Donin in France, and Pfefferkorn in Germany. Sometimes they remained our friends and helpers, such as Paulus Cassel in Germany and Chwolson in Russia. Most of the time they became neither friends nor enemies, but just dropped out of Jewish life; and sometimes, especially when the apostasy was forced upon them, they returned to Jewish life. Some writers say that as many as 10 percent returned to Jewish life. Whether the figure is correct or not, there must certainly have been a fair number of such reverts, be-cause laws have developed in our legal literature governing their return. Cf. Yoreh Deah 158:2 (end). To the hostile apostates the Talmudic term can be applied mumar lehach’is, (provocative apostates). To the nondestructive type of apostate the Talmudic term can be applied, mumar leteavon (apostates for ther own benefit). To which of these types of apostate do most of those belong whom we meet nowadays in the United States? Of course, there are a large number of them whom we never meet, Jewish men and women in a large city who marry Christians and convert for that purpose. They disappear into the Christian community and the Jewish community has no knowledge of their existence. There is no personal contact with these people; they simply disappear from our life. We need not develop an attitude to people we never meet, except perhaps our general attitude of selfaccusation that our Jewish education has not succeeded in instilling a greater loyalty to our tradition. But there are some who keep in contact with their Jewish family and to a considerable extent, in social contact with their Jewish friends. Also, in a small city, where everyone is known to everyone else, even those who might wish to disappear from Jewish life cannot quite achieve it. They meet their former coreligionists frequently. It is in relation to these two classes of people to which we must consider our attitude, as individuals and as a social and communal body.

There are of course, among them some apostates whom we may well consider analogous to the hostile apostates who persecuted Jews and Judaism in the past. These are the ex-Jewish professional missionaries whose aim is to lure Jewish adults and children from their ancestral faith. These are conscious enemies of Judaism and with them we can have no other relation ship than to do our best to resist their depredations.

But these active ex-Jewish subverters of Judaism are comparatively few in number. The overwhelming majority of apostates intend no harm to Jews and Judaism. In fact, they feel no longer concerned with it; they are concerned only with themselves. They leave Judaism either in order to facilitate their marriage to a Chris-tian or to further their social, professional or business standing. They are clearly mumar leteavon, apostates for their own benefit, and with regard to them Jewish law is comparatively speaking lenient. For example, we may not lend them money on interest, for to that extent, they are still Jews (cf. Isserles to Yoreh Deah 159:2). Of course, we cannot have any respect for them because they have abandoned our embattled Jewish community for the sake of their own ease or wishes.

It is not logical to equate the mood of a Christian who becomes a Jew with the mood of a Jew who becomes a Christian. Even though marriage may be the main motive in a conversion, the person who is being converted cannot help being aware of other moods involved. A Christian who converts out of love for a Jew is well aware that he or she is now entering into a some-what disadvantaged minority. In fact it is our duty so to inform the candidate for conversion (Yoreh Deah 268:2). Whereas a Jew converting to Christianity out of love for a Christian cannot help but be aware that he may thus be bettering his situation as to career or business. In joining Judaism there is a touch of the unconsciously heroic, while in leaving Judaism there is an element of desertion. If, for example, an apostate would donate candles for use in the synagogue, we do not kindle them in the synagogue. Yet donated candles would be acceptable if given by a Gentile (cf. Orach Chayim 154:11, Isserles and Magen Avraham; also Is-serles to Yoreh Deah 254:2).

We therefore cannot respect the Jewish apostate. Yet although we do not respect him, it is nevertheless clear from the general mood of Jewish law that we do not cast him off. He has cast himself off, but we do not exclude him entirely. He still has bonds with Jewish family life, according to Jewish law. A child may say Kaddish for an apostate father (cf. Recent Reform Re-sponsa, p. 134 ff.) A Kohan who has apostasized and returns is considered to have his sanctity completely returned to him and he may bless the people in the congregation in the services. (See the letter of Rabbenu Gershom in Vitry, p. 96.) Besides, it well may be that he or his children may return to Judaism. We frequently these days have occasion to marry a Jew with a child of a family which had converted to Christianity and we do not require reconversion.

If, of course, apostasy would increase greatly, as it did once or twice in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, then the apostate would be a constant danger to us and our attitude might then be justifiably sterner. Unless that occurs, then as to these apostates who are not concerned with us and mean us no harm, we do not and cannot respect them but, in accordance with the spirit of Jewish tradition, we do not reject them entirely. The door is always open for their return.

NRR 189-192

APOSTATE WEDDING ATTENDANTS

QUESTION:

The sister of the bride has converted to Christianity. Now this convert wishes to stand under the chuppah as an attendant at her sister’s wedding. Should this be permitted? (Asked by Rabbi David Polish, Chicago, Illinois.)

ANSWER:

IT IS NECESSARY, first, to consider the actual status in Jewish law of the apostate from Judaism. Then, after considering the legal status of the apostate, we must come to a conclusion suitable to our present circumstances as to the rights of this apostate in the wedding ceremony of her sister.

In Deuteronomy 22:1-3, Scripture speaks of strayed cattle and other lost objects. It declares it to be the duty of everyone to protect these strayed or lost objects until the owner can search them out and recover them. In verse 3, Scripture says:” Thus shall you do with regard to all things lost by thy brother.” R. Jochanan, in Avoda Zara 26b, says, “I take the Scriptural word ‘brother’ to include the apostate.” Also, the phrase in Sanhedrin 44a, “Although he has sinned, he is still an Israelite,” applies as a general principle to the apostate. Note that Pachad Yitzchok (s.v. Mumar) applies this phrase a number of times to the apostate. Of course the law makes a distinction between a hostile apostate (mumar l’hachis) and an apostate merely out of supposed self-benefit or self-gratification (mumar l’teovone). These two different groups are met, of course, with different attitudes, but legally they are Jews, poshey Yisroel, sinful Jews, but still Jews.

These general maxims which include the apostate in the Jewish fold are exemplified and emphasized by the fact that certain vital Jewish functions, if performed by an apostate, are fully valid. This rule applies especially in matters of family life. If a woman’s husband has become an apostate, her marriage cannot be dissolved unless her apostate-husband gives her a get. In this divorce document the apostate may not use his new Gentile name but must use his old Jewish name, since it is still his name (Even Hoezer 129:5). If a man dies childless, his wife must get chalitza before she can marry again. She must get the chalitza from her husband’s brother even if the brother is now an apostate (Even Hoezer 157:4). (There are some variations of this law, but they do not directly concern us here.) This unbroken kinship with the apostate is to be seen also in the laws of inheritance. An apostate is entitled to inherit his father’s estate; and if he is the first-born, he still has the additional rights of a first-born (Choshen Mishpot 283:2).

Now if an apostate can validly perform and participate in these vital legal situations, there certainly can be no legal objection to an apostate being an attendant at a wedding. The wedding attendant is not an indispensable functionary. A Jewish wedding is legal if the husband proposes to the wife and gives her an object of value, and she accepts it in the presence of witnesses. Here the apostate sister is not necessary as a witness. There are other witnesses present, and so there can be no legal objection to her participating in the wedding.

This is the purely legal situation. But in all relationships with an apostate, there is, of course, some natural human reaction. We have suffered so cruelly through the centuries from the slanders and machinations of apostates that their very presence becomes hard for a Jew who knows Jewish history to endure. Of course, those bitter enemies of ours were mumar l’hachis. While it is reasonable to assume that this girl has no hostile intention at all, but has converted out of convenience, she is a mumar l’teovone. Nevertheless, to the extent that we are guided by our Jewish feelings, any sort of mumar is objectionable.

Thus it is that although the law gives a mumar virtually every legal right, the law still expresses caution in dealing with them. For example, in the laws of shechitah (Yore Deah 2:2, 4), as a general rule the apostate’s shechitah is kosher, but he must be carefully examined and watched. In the laws of inheritance, while the apostate may legally inherit, the rabbis under certain circumstances have stopped the transfer of property from a Jew to an apostate (see Choshen Mishpot 283:2). In other words, we judge the special circumstances before we decide whether or not we permit an apostate to exercise his privileges in Judaism, although it is legal for him to do so.

Thus in this case, the rabbi by tradition has leeway to go by his personal judgment. He must consider the communal and also the family situation. If having the apostate sister stand under the chuppah next to the bride at the marriage will be taken by many in the community as a condoning of apostasy and may, therefore, tend to increase such occurrences, then the rabbi has the right l ‘ migdor milso, to make “a fence of protection” and forbid the apostate’s participation. If, however, there is no danger of misunderstanding, then we must remember the legal status of the apostate in general. Nevertheless it would be wise not to have her there if it is a very small wedding. If there are more people present who are considered the legal witnesses, and if there is no danger of her presence being taken as condoning apostasy, then there can be no legal objection to her presence. Furthermore, one must also consider the family situation. If the parents of the bride are eager to have their daughter present, and if the bride herself is eager to have her sister, then forbidding her to participate could easily do more harm than good, especially since, after all, there is no real legal objection to her presence.

TRR 64-65

CIRCUMCISING CHILD OF AN APOSTATE MOTHER

QUESTION:

The Jewish wife in a mixed marriage has given birth to a baby boy. They want the child circumcised. However, the situation is complicated by the fact that the mother has converted to Christianity. Should this child be circumcised? (Asked by Rabbi Michael B. Berk, San Jose, California.)

ANSWER:

Since the mother was born Jewish and the child follows the status of the mother, the only question involved is the fact that the mother has converted to Christianity. Nevertheless, in the eyes of Jewish law, she is still Jewish and her child is Jewish, and there is no reason why there should not be a bent milah.

Now as to the question of the wife having converted to Christianity. The easiest way to deal with the relevance of this statement is to consider the status of an apostate in Jewish law The specific question then becomes this: Has the woman’s conversion to Christianity abolished her status as a Jewess in the eyes of Jewish law?

The answer to this question is negative. If a Jew converts to Christianity, he is considered a sinner, of course, but as the Talmud (Sanhedrin 44a) says: “Although a sinner, he is still an Israelite.” This is more than a social statement. It is a legal principle. A woman married to an apostate must receive a get from him and he can validly give it. In other words, he has legal status as a Jew. This applies to her also. Regardless of her conversion, the child should have a berit milah. Certainly her apostasy does not change the status of the infant.

CARR 105-107

CCAR RESPONSA

Contemporary American Reform Responsa

65. Drifting Apostate

QUESTION: A young

woman has moved through Christianity to Bahai and then to Judaism. After what appeared to be a sincere conversion, along with active synagogue participation, she and her twelve-year-old daughter suddenly disappeared upon reconciliation with an ex-husband. She subsequently moved into “neo-paganism” and Unitarianism. Now she has returned and once more seeks membership in the congregation. The time elapsed since her disappearance from the community is approximately nine months. The woman appears to be a spiritual “drifter.” Should she be accepted as an active haverut? How should the child be treated? (Rabbi D. Zucker, Springfield, MO)

ANSWER: It is quite clear that a proselyte who has become an

apostate remains, nevertheless, a Jew. In modern times we can not deny the right of an individual to join another religion, but for our purposes, that individual, nevertheless, remains a part of the Jewish people (see “An Apostate Proselyte,” W. Jacob, American Reform Responsa, #71). Now we must ask what should be done to readmit this individual as we are unsure of her stability.

Most of the traditional material which deals with apostates is

irrelevant for this situation as it treats apostasy under duress. Here the act was entirely voluntary and may reflect the instability of the young mother. When apostates under duress reappeared in a Jewish community (principally Marranos), they were generally welcomed and made part of the community with as little fuss as possible.

It has been felt that one should not

embarrass such unfortunate individuals and make it easy for them to return to the Jewish community. So Rabenu Gershom, who lived in the Rhineland in the eleventh century, felt that one should simply admit such individuals and not in any way remind them of their previous apostasy (Mahzor Vitry, pp. 96 ff). Solomon ben Simon Duran (Responsa #89) also felt that no ritual bath or any other act was required. These thoughts were incorporated by Joseph Caro in his Bet Josef (to TurYoreh Deah 268).

However, in

instances where the apostasy was not under duress, and where the apostate may have caused considerable trouble to the community, then a process akin to conversion was demanded (Hai Gaon in Aderet, Responsa, Vol. 4, #292; Rashi to Kid. 68b and Lev. 24.10). At the very least, a ritual immersion in the miqveh was demanded (Moses Isserles to Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 268.12) as well as a promise to become an observant Jew before three witnesses (Joseph Ibn Habib to Alfasi Yeb. Chap. 4). Examples of this more demanding point of view may be found in Zimmel’s Die Marranen in der rabbinischen Literatur.

In this instance, as the woman seems unstable, it should be impressed

upon her that conversion to Judaism is serious and that a return from the status of apostasy is not easy, so a declaration along with perhaps immersion in a miqveh are in order. As presumably the daughter followed her mother into neo-paganism and Unitarianism, the same requirements should be applied to her.

July 1986

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

RR21 no. 5758.11

CCAR RESPONSA

On Patrilineal Descent, Apostasy, and Synagogue Honors

5758.11

She’elah

This query concerns a young man whose Jewish father and fundamentalist Baptist mother are members of my congregation. The young man, who is now college age, grew up attending our religious school on Saturday mornings and his mother’s church on Sundays. He observed his bar mitzvah in our synagogue, on condition that he not be baptized for a minimum of two years following the ceremony. He continued to attend religious school classes, exceeding our synagogue’s “post-Bar Mitzvah” requirement, and he and his family continue to attend Shabbat services every week. However, the young man eventually chose to be baptized as a Christian some time after his seventeenth birthday. He is now attending a seminary with the intention of becoming a Christian minister.

The father of this young man, who is an active worker for and major donor to our congregation, customarily reads the haftarah at our Yom Kippur minchah service (“maftir Yonah”). This is an honor which we bestow upon the person judged the synagogue’s “star supporter or worker;” hence, the father has read this haftarah for some years. And since the father has no knowledge of Hebrew, his son has for several years recited the benedictions preceding and following the reading. Now that the son has chosen to become a Christian, a congregant has objected to his continued participation in the service. On the other hand, our ritual policy which deals with the participation of non-Jews in our public services does not seem to apply here. The policy states that non-Jews are not permitted publicly to recite benedictions containing the formulae asher kideshanu bemitzvotav (“Who has sanctified us through the mitzvot”) or asher bachar banu (“Who has chosen us”). Since the haftarah benedictions do not contain these formulae, it is not clear to me that we can deny the son the right to participate in this honor without making it clear to his father that this decision is aimed specifically at him.

Should we permit the son, who at any rate is very respectful of his Jewish heritage, to recite the haftarah benedictions?

Teshuvah

Under no circumstances should this young man be permitted to recite the haftarah benedictions. He is not a Jew, and as such he is precluded from participating in the ritual reading of the Torah, of which the haftarah is an inseparable element.

This she’elah raises the issue of how a synagogue determines its rules governing the participation of non-Jews in its worship services. The present congregation has such a policy, and our sho’el suggests that this policy does not clearly apply to the haftarah benedictions. We disagree with this suggestion, for two reasons. First, we would point out that the benediction recited prior to the haftarah reading does contain the words asher bachar…uveyisrael amo, “God, who has chosen…Israel His people,” thereby expressing the very same theological doctrine which according to the policy ought to disqualify a Gentile from participating in this element of the service. Second, even if this doctrine were missing from the text of the benediction, the she’elah proposes that we read the congregation’s rule in such a literal and formalistic way as to render it meaningless.[1] The point of the policy, it seems to us, is not that Gentiles are prohibited from reciting certain “magic words” and combinations of syllables but that it is inappropriate for Gentiles to lead rituals and to read prayers which express the concept of the peoplehood of Israel, the idea that we Jews are a particular community, distinct from all other communities in its unique understanding of how to worship God and to realize the ideal of holiness in our lives. “Chosenness” and “commandment/sanctification” are, to be sure, prominent verbal embodiments of this concept, but a great deal of our liturgy is devoted to the rehearsal of our identity as a particular people “chosen” for the task of sanctifying ourselves and the world through the performance of mitzvot. By that token, there are many parts of the service which a Gentile, who by definition is not a member of this particular people, should not lead for us, even though they do not contain the precise formulae designated explicitly by the congregation’s ritual policy.

In several recent responsa, we identify the concept of community as the proper standard by which to distinguish those elements of our service that Gentiles may not lead or perform from those which they may.[2] Non-Jews may not recite those rubrics of the liturgy, such as the Shema its benedictions and the tefilah, which our tradition defines as chiyuv (obligations), for it is in the recitation of these elements that we constitute ourselves as a particular community and identify ourselves as participants in the ongoing historical experience of the people of Israel. Another way to put this is that a Gentile may not serve as a sheliach tzibur, a leader of congregational prayer, for that person must, as a representative of the people, be of the people, a member of the community. Similarly, a Gentile should not recite on behalf of the community benedictions whose wording expresses the idea that “we, the people of Israel, do this in response to God’s mitzvot.” And a Gentile may not participate in any of the rituals surrounding the reading of the Torah, since this act, which requires a minyan of Jews, is one of the central liturgical means by which the community affirms its existence as a covenant people. Since the haftarah, the “supplement” to the Torah reading, is an integral part of that reading,[3] it is clear that this young man, who is a non-Jew and not a member of the religious community of Israel, may not recite it or its accompanying benedictions.

Patrilineal Descent and Jewish Status.

We have described this young man as a “Gentile” and on that basis find him ineligible to recite the haftarah benedictions. By this, we do not mean that he is a Jew who has converted to another religion; such a person is regarded as an “apostate Jew,” a subject we shall take up later in this responsum.[4] We mean rather that this young man never was a Jew in the first place. To say this is to declare that he never qualified for Jewish status under the terms of the CCAR’s Resolution on Patrilineal Descent, adopted in 1983. The text of that resolution states:[5]

The Central Conference of American Rabbis declares that the child of one Jewish parent is under the presumption of Jewish descent.

This presumption of Jewish status of the offspring of any mixed marriage is to be established through appropriate and timely public and formal acts of identification with the Jewish faith and people. The performance of these mitzvot serves to commit those who participate in them, both parent and child, to Jewish life.

The resolution goes on to enumerate some of those public and formal acts which might serve to confirm what it terms the child’s “positive and exclusive Jewish identity.” Among these are religious study and participation in a ceremony of Bar or Bat Mitzvah.

One might possibly assume that this young man qualifies as a Jew under the resolution, since he has attended religious school and observed his Bar Mitzvah in the synagogue. This assumption, however, is erroneous. The point of the Resolution on Patrilineal Descent, as it has been interpreted by this Committee and through the accumulated practice of Reform congregations, is that Jewish status is not automatically conferred upon the child of one Jewish and one non-Jewish parent. The child’s Jewishness is a “presumption” which must be established through a pattern of behavior which testifies to the desire of the parent(s) to raise the child exclusively as a Jew. Therefore, the “public and formal acts” of which the resolution speaks can confirm a child’s Jewishness only to the extent that they offer proof that such is indeed the intention of the parent(s).These actions must serve as “meaningful acts of identification” with the Jewish faith and people.[6] As we have written:[7]

These acts of Jewish identification, though “public” and “formal,” are more than mere public formalities. To be “meaningful,” they must offer evidence that the child in fact identifies as a Jew and that the parents are willing and able to transmit a sense of Jewishness to their son or daughter. If they offer no such evidence, then they become meaningless, mere words and empty ceremony that tell us nothing of the depth of a child’s identification or of the parents’ capacity or sincerity in fulfilling their promise to raise the child as a Jew.

In that responsum, we found that a child raised in a “dual-religion” household, one in which Judaism and another religion are actively practiced, does not qualify for Jewish status under the Resolution on Patrilineal Descent, because regardless of the “public and formal acts” they may perform, such a family is incapable of transmitting an “exclusive Jewish identity” to the child. A household in which two religions have a legitimate claim to equal status is not a Jewish household. In such a household, it is as easy to say that the child enjoys a presumption to Gentile status as to a Jewish one. And in such a case, the child’s Jewishness can be established only through conversion.

The case before us is markedly similar. This young man, whose father is an active member of the synagogue and whose mother is a committed Christian, grew up in a dual-religion household. He was intentionally raised in both Judaism and Christianity. The “timely and formal” acts of Jewish identification, such as religious school and Bar Mitzvah, are nullified by his attendance at church, and his choice of Christianity is proof that he never developed an “exclusive Jewish identity.” We would conclude that, although under our 1983 resolution this young man enjoyed a presumption of Jewish status, this presumption was never established. He is, in our eyes, a non-Jew, and he can become a Jew only through the process of conversion.[8]

Judaism as an Exclusive Commitment and a Public Matter

. This conclusion proceeds from Reform Judaism’s categorical rejection of the notion that a child can be raised simultaneously as a Jew and as a member of another religious community. In this regard, we would point out that there is no such thing as a “half-Jew”; one is either a Jew or one is not. That a child receives a Jewish education along with a Christian one does not change this reality. That he “is very respectful of his Jewish heritage,” while admirable, is irrelevant for the purposes of this she’elah. For our community to consider him a Jew, a member of the religious community of Israel, he or his parents must make an exclusive commitment to Judaism, a commitment requiring that he renounce his attachment to any other faith. And as a means of avoiding the confusions and difficulties of which this she’elah is a remarkable example, a mixed-religion family ought to make such a decision for their child as soon as possible in that child’s life.

With this in mind, we find it puzzling in the extreme that the congregation permitted this young man to observe his becoming a bar mitzvah in the synagogue. Our Committee has held that such ceremonies of religious identification as berit milah and bar/bat mitzvah are inappropriate for children who are being raised in two religious traditions.[9] The latter ceremony symbolizes a young person’s acceptance of the mitzvot, the religious responsibilities incumbent upon an adult member of the Jewish community. One of these, obviously, is the responsibility to be a Jew, to identify with this people and with its religious experience and expression. This young man, who was simultaneously attending church services and considering whether to “be” a Jew or a Christian, was most assuredly unready to declare his acceptance of those responsibilities. We are confused, as well, at the “condition” imposed upon him at the time of his Bar Mitzvah ceremony. A promise not to be baptized for two years hardly inspires confidence that we are dealing here with an identified Jew. On the contrary: the fact that such a promise had to be made indicates that he was at the time actively exploring the possibility that he would commit himself to Christianity. This sense of doubt, this lack of exclusive commitment to a Jewish religious identification renders the bar mitzvah ceremony an empty ritual, a contradiction in terms. As we have written elsewhere, “the (bar mitzvah) celebration is a confirmatory act, not a trial run…its observance under present circumstances would be a denial of its essence.”[10]

We take this opportunity to stress a point of critical importance concerning these issues: the definition of Jewishness and the setting of criteria by which an individual’s Jewish status is determined is an emphatically public matter. It is for the community, and not for the individual or the individual’s family, to answer the question “who is a Jew?”, for we are the Jewish people, a collective which bears a common historical identity. In order to maintain its common existence, this people must possess and exercise the right to draw its own parameters and to declare its standards for membership. An individual may regard himself or herself to be a Jew; his or her family may concur. And this sense of identification may be significant for that person and family. But for our purposes, in deciding how we shall set the rules and ritual policies that govern our communal religious life, this person is not a Jew unless and until we, the community of Israel, can accept him or her as one of us.[11]

The Apostate and the Synagogue.

Even were this young man considered a Jew under the doctrine of patrilineal descent, his decision to become a Christian would define him as an apostate. While it is true that mainstream halakhah holds that one cannot successfully convert “out” of the Jewish people,[12] an apostate is nonetheless regarded as having separated him- or herself from the community and therefore ineligible to participate actively in its ritual and public life. On that basis, while we would encourage this young man to attend synagogue, we would certainly not permit him to ascend the bimah or to perform any of the public rituals of our worship services. In a previous teshuvah dealing with a Jew who converted to Episcopalianism and graduated from a Christian theological seminary, we wrote:[13] “we would be sending the most confusing signals to our community if we permitted apostates to assume prominent roles in our synagogues and thereby blur the distinction between those who proudly declare their Jewishness and those who abandon our faith.” That conclusion applies without question to the present case.

Conclusion.

Because he was raised simultaneously in two faiths and because he has declared his attachment to Christianity, the young man who is the subject of this she’elah does not qualify for Jewish status under the CCAR Resolution on Patrilineal Descent. He is therefore not a Jew, and he should not be permitted to recite the haftarah benedictions or to lead any of the elements rubrics of our liturgy whose recitation and performance are restricted to Jews.[14]

One final note. We have approached this question as a matter of standards of religious practice. At the same time, we surely recognize its personal and emotional side. We do not know the father of this young man, yet we know that his must surely have been a most difficult experience. We are unable to agree with his desire that his son continue to recite the haftarah benedictions, for we do not believe that we obtain lasting religious benefit when we abandon the most basic standards of practice and observance that distinguish us as a people. Yet we are also forbidden to ignore the sense of pain and anger, of rejection and loss which quite likely lie behind that request. This is, therefore, a situation that calls not only for judgment but for compassion, for the exercise of midat harachamim alongside midat hadin. It is a situation that clearly demands the utmost in pastoral skill and sensitivity. We are confident that the rabbi of the congregation possesses these in sufficient measure to respond fully to the human needs of its members. We can but offer the rabbi our encouragement and our wishes for success.

NOTES

We doubt whether even this congregation applies its policy so literally. For example, the benediction following the Torah reading does not contain the word bachar in any of its forms, yet no suggestion is made by the congregation that a Gentile for this reason is permitted to recite the blessing after the reading but not the one before it. We think this is because the congregation does not really interpret its rule in such a formalistic sense as implied by the she’elah, especially when such an interpretation would lead to an obviously absurd result.

See Teshuvot for the Nineties (TFN), no. 5754.5, and the other responsa cited therein, especially American Reform Responsa (ARR), no. 6. See as well our teshuvah 5758.2.

See M. Megilah 4:1 and Yad, Tefilah 12:2. The haftarah is never read when the Torah is not read; hence, it, too, requires a minyan (M. Megilah 4:3; Yad, Tefilah 8:4) and is like the Torah reading an essentially communal ritual.

The Jew who renounces Judaism for another religion is regarded as yisrael mumar, an apostate Jew; see below in the text.

The text can be found in American Reform Responsa (ARR), 550.

Ma`agele Tzedek: Rabbi’s Manual

(CCAR, 1988), 227.

Teshuvot for the Nineties (TFN)

, no. 5755.17, at 254-255.

Our Reform responsa tradition has consistently ruled that the presumption of Jewish status under the doctrine of patrilineal descent does not apply in cases where the parents have chosen to raise their child in more than one religious tradition. See Contemporary American Reform Responsa (CARR), no. 61; Questions and Reform Jewish Answers (QRJA), nos. 88, 109, and 110.

On berit milah, see QRJA, nos. 108 and 109; on bar mitzvah, see CARR, no. 61 and TFN, no. 5754.3, 263-264.

, no. 5754.3, at 264.

This point is not altered in any way by the disagreements between Reform Judaism and other Jews over such matters as patrilineal (better: “one-parent”) descent. We may dispute the details of the definition of Jewishness, but we have never disputed that this definition is a public matter, to be set by the community. The Resolution on Patrilineal Descent is just such a communal standard: adopted by the Conference and interpreted by the Conference and its constituent bodies. Reform Judaism has never suggested that an individual is Jewish merely on the grounds that he or she “feels” Jewish or regards him- or herself as such.

“A Jew, even though he sins, remains a Jew”; BT Sanhedrin 44a, according to the interpretation advanced in Teshuvot Rashi, no. 173.

, no.5753.13; the citation is at p. 83. We add there that “were we to honor an apostate who, to boot, is a scholar of theology, the community would be confronted with a man who was born and raised a Jew, but determined after much study that Judaism is inferior to another religion. We must be careful to avoid conveying any message which may weaken the Jewish community.” See that responsum for texts and sources on the status of the apostate in Jewish law and tradition.

We should add, parenthetically, that although the she’elah takes note of this young man’s ability to pronounce the blessings in Hebrew, the haftarah benedictions may be recited in the vernacular: M. Sotah 7:1; BT Sotah 32a, and Tosafot ad loc., s.v. keri’at shema utefilah; BT Berakhot 40b; Yad, Berakhot 1:6 and Kesef Mishnah ad loc.; SA OC 185:1. To be sure, the tradition prefers that the berakhot be recited in Hebrew; see both the Mishnah Berurah and the Arukh Hashulchan to OC 185:1. And while the words of both of these late-19th and early-20th century authorities are influenced by their anti-Reform zealotry, we Reform Jews for good reasons of our own have come to encourage the use of the Hebrew language in our synagogue and home rituals. Still, in the absence of any absolute requirement that the haftarah benedictions be recited in Hebrew, there can be no practical justification (let alone a religious one) for permitting this young man to recite them.

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

TFN no.5753.13 81-85

CCAR RESPONSA

Apostate in the Synagogue

5753.13

She’elah

A man, born and raised a Jew, has converted to Christianity and joined the Episcopal Church. Having earned a theological degree, he now teaches Comparative Religion at a local private school and has been “very helpful in the ecumenical dialogue between Christians and Jews.” Should he be allowed to speak in a Reform synagogue? If permitted to speak, may he do so from the bimah? If he is permitted to speak from the bimah, should he be permitted to deliver a homily during Sabbath or Holiday worship? May he lead the congregation in prayer or be offered an aliyah? (Rabbi Harry Rothstein, Amenia, NY)

Teshuvah

It must be made clear that regardless of how genial this man is, regardless of his academic credentials or how honest his intentions, because he has forsaken Judaism and converted to another religion we must consider him an apostate. The issue of how we are to interact with apostates has been thoroughly covered in traditional halakhic literature, as well as in our Reform responsa.¹

Central to our she’elah is the question: Why would we even consider permitting an apostate to enter our synagogues, let alone teach or lead us in worship?

Jewish tradition has always been sensitive to the different circumstances under which a person would abandon his or her affiliation with the Jewish community. Not all apostates are lumped together. There are essential differences between one who is forced to convert during a period of religious persecution (anoos)² and one whose apostasy is a matter of religious conviction and public rejection of Judaism (mumar l’hakh’is or meshummad).³

Nonetheless, we always hope that even those who are apostates of their own volition will at some time return to the fold. For ours is not simply a religion, we Jews are also a family. We can change our name, looks and religion, but we cannot erase the familial link with the Jewish people. An oft cited passage in the Talmud reads:

Rabbi Abba the son of Zavda said, Even though [an Israelite] has sinned, he is still called `Israel.’ Rabbi Abba said, there is a popular saying: A myrtle, though it stands among reeds, is still a myrtle, and so it is called.⁴

Indeed, our insistence that an apostate is still Jewish often led to grave consequences.⁵ To solve some of those problems, there was an attempt by Gaonic authorities to rule that the apostate had forsaken the Jewish people and, therefore, had forfeited his or her claim for certain benefits and rights within the Jewish community.⁶ But their attempts were rejected by Rashi and other leading halakhic authorities.⁷ Rashi takes the above-quoted statement from the Talmud and extends it to include apostates:

The meshummad is a Jew in every way, as it is said: “even though an Israelite has sinned …”, meaning that even though he has sinned [or in this case, apostatized], he is a Jew.”⁸

If then a meshummad, the willful and even provocative apostate, is still considered Jewish, are there any restrictions to his or her participation in the Jewish community? The question is an ancient one, and the answer is: yes, there are restrictions.⁹

Far from welcoming the apostate to participate in the service, the early Jewish liturgy included a Birkat haMinim, which explicitly cursed those Jews who abandoned their people.¹⁰ Some authorities have even rejected or restricted commmunal contributions by apostates.¹¹ The Rabbinic decrees and ordinances against the willful apostates are founded on the Torah, which established the severest of punishments against those who left the faith and people of Israel.¹²

Thus we have, on the one hand, the classic teaching that a Jew is always a Jew. On the other hand, tradition effectively shunned complete apostates, denying them an active role in the Jewish community. Israel of Bruna, a 15th century German Rabbi, made an attempt to resolve the conflict by teaching that even though the apostate is an Israelite, he is not a Jew, meaning that “Israelite” is the designation of one’s lineage, while “Jew” refers to one’s relationship with the Jewish community.¹³ (The idea seems to parallel Reform Judaism’s recent insistence that from either mother or needs to be supported by “appropriate and timely acts of identification with the Jewish faith and people.”¹⁴)

The modern state of Israel has also ruled that an apostate, though Jewish by lineage, is not permitted to be registered as a “Jew” under the “Law of Return.”¹⁵ The Jewish community has thus been remarkably consistent in excluding apostates from active participation, all the while affirming the ancestral lineage and holding out hope for them to return. The Reform movement has similarly remained firm on the issue of the apostate Jew.¹⁶

In our case, we therefore conclude that this man, who has earned a theological degree and is an active member of the Episcopal church, has willfully converted and is thus an apostate, a meshummad. He is thereby is excluded from actively participating in Jewish worship. We would be sending the most confusing signals to our comunity if we permitted apostates to assume prominent roles in our synagogues and thereby blur the distinction between those who proudly declare their Jewishness and those who abandon our faith.

Consequently, this apostate should not be given the honor of ascending the bimah, nor should he be given the distinction of addressing the congregation before, during or after a worship service.¹⁷ Were we to honor an apostate who, to boot, is a scholar of theology, the community would be confronted with a man who was born and raised a Jew, but determined after much study that Judaism is inferior to another religion. We must be careful to avoid conveying any message which may weaken the Jewish community.

However, we would not keep him from attending the service, because we always hold out hope that he will repent and rejoin our fold.¹⁸

Notes

There are several Reform responsa that deal with apostasy: Solomon B. Freehof, “Status of Apostates and Burial of an Apostate,” Recent Reform Responsa #26, pp.120-127 and #27, pp. 127-131; “Our Attitude to Apostates,” Modern Reform Responsa #30, pp. 169-175. Also see Walter Jacob, “Status of a `Completed Jew in the Jewish Community,” Contemporary American Reform Responsa #68, pp. 109-112. Coercion is not, of course, limited to threats of violence. Coercion can also include the combined pressures of economic welfare and professional security. See, for example, Asher Siev’s article on the strange path of an apostate Jew in Sefer zikaron lish’mue’l kalman mirsky (Jerusalem, 1970). The mumar l’hakh’is, literally, the “provoking apostate,” is the most troublesome of those who forsake our faith. Rambam identifies this kind of willful apostate as one “who repudiates the Oral Law as a matter of personal conviction and through his reasoned opinion.” (Yad, Hilkhot Mamrim, 3:3). History has shown that it is the provoking or willful apostate who, all too often, acts in a way which denigrates Judaism and is most detrimental to the Jewish people. For evidence of the murders and oppression wrought by former co-religionists, see The Jewish Encyclopedia, 2:14-17; Yitzhak Baer, A History of the Jews in Christian Spain, Philadelphia, 1966, vol. 1, pp. 328-354) and vol. 2 (pp. 141-150, 341ff). BT. Sanhedrin 44a. Jacob Katz details some of the “grave consequences” (in Exclusiveness and Tolerance, pp. 70-71), such as the cases of apostates who did not grant their wives a Jewish divorce. If they would no longer be considered Jewish, their marriages could simply be annulled. But by insisting that every apostate was still Jewish, a get was necessary for a true divorce. Without it, the woman could not remarry in the traditional community. Katz (ibid, pp. 70-71) cites Otzar HaGeonim, VII, pp. 34-37, concerning their ruling that a widow did not have to submit to the ceremony of chalitzah with her apostate brother-in-law. In another case, some of the Geonim (Otzar HaGeonim, IX, pp. 28-35) and Rabbenu Gershom (Teshuvot Rabbenu Gershom # 58) ruled that an apostate was no longer eligible to inherit from his Jewish relatives’ estate. Teshuvot Rashi #173. “It was in this connexion that Rashi quoted the maxim `although he has sinned he remains a Jew,’ which has, since then, become a standard ruling in connexion with the definition of the status of the apostate. In its original talmudic context this sentence appears in an aggadic setting only, and not in relation to apostasy. By using it in this striking manner, Rashi ensured the almost uncontested adoption of his definition. Behind this clear-cut statement lies an emphasis on the unchangeable character of the Jew, an emphasis that would contest any possible justification for obliterating Judaism by baptism” (Katz, ibid, p. 71). Teshuvot Rashi # 173. See for example: BT. Chullin 4b-5b; Sifra 2.2 (Finkelstein ed., vol. II, pp. 20-21); Lev. R. 2.9; Yad, Hilkhot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot, 3.4; SA, YD, 53.4 and OC 215.2. Tosefta, Berakhot III.25; see also Gedalia Alon, The Jews in Their Land, ed. Gershon Levi (Harvard Univ. Press, 1989), pp. 288 ff. 11 Rabbi Yaakov Weil, She’elot uTeshuvot: Dinim v’halakhot #57; R. Moshe Schick, Teshuvot Maharam Schick, Yoreh De’ah, #231, cited by R. Solomon B. Freehof, The Responsa Literature (New York: Ktav, 1973), p. 134. Deuteronomy 13:13-19. She’elot uTeshuvot Mahari miBruna, #35; see R. Maurice Lamm in Jewish Tradition and the Nontraditional Jew, ed. J.J. Schachter, Northvale, NJ, 1992, pp. 169-170. Resolution of the C.C.A.R., see its Yearbook XCIII (1983), p.160, and the interpretation of the decision inRabbi’s Manual (1988), pp.225-227 (W. Gunther Plaut) and the detailed discussion in Contemporary American Reform Responsa, #38, pp. 61-68 (Walter Jacob). The ruling, which is known as the “Brother Daniel case,” was made by the Israeli Supreme Court: 72/62, PD 16:2428-55. Cf. Encyclopaedia Judaica, sub “Apostate.” See the Reform responsa on apostasy listed in the first footnote above. In the words of R. Walter Jacob, Contemporary American Reform Responsa # 68, “such individuals should not be accorded membership in the congregation or treated in any way which makes them appear as if they were affiliated with the Jewish community … We certainly do not want these individuals to speak for Judaism in any public forum.” This follows the CCAR’s Responsa Committee’s 1983 teshuvah, “Status of a `Completed Jew’ in the Jewish Community,” Contemporary American Reform Responsa #68. Thus, for the Committee, even “Messianic Jews” or the “Jews for Jesus” (who, because of their proclivity for proselytization, must certainly be classified as mumarim lehakhis (“provoking apostates”), are not to be excluded from attending services or classes “for we always hold the hope that they will return to Judaism and disassociate themselves from Christianity.”

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.