B'rit Milah
LXIV(1954) 78-79
XCVII (1987) 184-85
XCVIII (1988) 158-159
CARR 165-168
XCIX(1989) 243-244
RR 165-168
Kaddish and Yahrzeit for a Child
A child died at the age of four. After the funeral the father asked whether he should observe mourning for the child, say Kaddish and keep the Yahrzeit.
Whether the regular mourning customs should be observed for a child has been widely discussed in the legal literature, but as yet the law is far from clear. There is a wide variety of opinions and even a divergence in the basic principles involved.
What is sure is the status of very young infants with regard to mourning. If an infant dies before it is thirty days old, it is considered equivalent to a stillbirth (Nefel). Therefore no regular funeral rites need be observed (cf. “Magan Abraham,” Orah Hayyim 526, n. 20).
A child who dies when older than thirty days must have the usual burial rites, but how much mourning should be observed is widely debated in the law. Basically, it is seriously questioned whether a father has any duty at all to say Kaddish for his son. The essential duty of saying Kaddish devolves upon a son for his father. All relatives other than sons who recite Kaddish do so not out of legal duty, but only by custom (see Isserles’ full note on the question of Kaddish at the end of Yore Deah 376). This opinion is based upon the statement in the Talmud (b. Sanhedrin 104a) to the effect that a son can bring merit (and deliverance) to a father, but a father cannot “save” a son (i.e., in the judgment after death). Furthermore, according to the tradition, no one is subject to judgment after death before the age of twenty. If, then, Kaddish is for the sake of redeeming the departed, it is not even necessary if the departed had not reached the age of twenty! (See the question in Ezekiel Landau’s “Nodah b’Yehudah” II, Orah Hayyim #8.) However, Landau in his answer doubts the validity of the argument that a person who dies before twenty does not need to have Kaddish said for him; for if the argument were valid, then the orphan children of a young father who dies before he is twenty would not need to say Kaddish for him, which, of course, is not so. Nevertheless, most of the opinions agree that anyone under twenty does not need Kaddish said in his behalf. (Cf. Joseph Schwartz, “Vayitzbor Yosef,” #21.)
But there are strong psychological reasons involved in the saying of Kaddish and the keeping of Yahrzeit. These psychological reasons go beyond the legalistic denials of a father’s duty to say Kaddish for a son and the notions about a person under twenty not needing the redemptive effect of Kaddish. There is a strong emotional need in a parent to say Kaddish for a son. Therefore, in spite of the law, the custom arose for a father to say Kaddish. However, this is recognized as being only a custom. Therefore, in the numerous disputes between a number of mourners in a synagogue as to who has the right to recite Kaddish (and, for example, the orphan’s right to recite the Haftara or to lead the Saturday evening services), it is always stated that orphans have the right to protest the privilege given to a father, since his Kaddish is not required by law. (Cf. Jacob Reischer, Shevus Ya’acov, II, Yore Deah 93, and Beth Lechem Yehuda, Z’vi H. Azriel, of Vilna [eighteenth century], to Yore Deah 376.)
However, all this indicates that the custom has been firmly established for a father to say Kaddish for his son. But how old must the deceased child be for the father to say Kaddish? Since this is merely custom, not law, it is not surprising that the customs vary.Chaim Cheskia Medini (“S’de Chemed,” Avelus 151) cites (with disapproval) the custom not to say Kaddish for a child who died unmarried. Nissim Ashkenazi (“Ma’aseh Avraham,” #59) says that the custom in Smyrna is not to say Kaddish unless the child was Bar Mitzvah (except, of course, the Kaddish at the grave). Isserles says that it should be said only if the child was twelve months old (Yore Deah 344 : 4). Medini says (loc. cit.) that Kaddish should be said if the child had reached the age of understanding and intelligence.
Clearly, the state of law and custom allows the parents to make their own decision. If the child was to them an intelligent personality, or if they feel the need to say Kaddish and keep the Yahrzeit, then, although it is not strictly required of them, they may certainly do so.
RR 105-111
Who May Circumcise?
The question is frequently asked whether a physician may perform the operation of circumcision for the ritual purpose of inducting a child into the covenant of Abraham. Must it necessarily he a mohel? May a physician circumcise? If he may, must he necessarily he a Jewish physician?
Although many parents nowadays do not hesitate to have a physician circumcise the child, there is frequently disagreement among members of the family as to whether it would not be more proper from the religious point of view to have a mohel perform the operation. Since the physician who circumcises is generally the obstetrician, the question is often still more complicated if he happens to be a Gentile.
The law as to who may circumcise is discussed in the Shulchan Aruch (Yore Deah 264 : 1). There Isserles in his note, quoting from the “Or Zaruah,” says: “A man should seek around to find the best and most pious mohel and godfather” (the term “Baal Bris” here does not mean the father of the child but the godfather, the Sandek). Isserles plainly recommends that one should look for an able and pious man to perform the circumcision. It is not only the mohel who should be a pious man, but so should all who take an important part in the ceremony. This is quite understandable, since this is a Jewish religious ceremony and those who participate are expected to be worthy of their role in it.
The question is, however, whether the piety of the circumciser is an indispensable requirement. Strictly Orthodox Jews certainly believe so. For example, the honorary president of the Agudas Harabonim, Rabbi Eliezer Silver (quoted in “Taharas Yom Tov,” by Yom Tov L. Deutsch, Vol. VIII; see Hamaor for Elul, 1957) says as follows:
I have forbidden physicians, most of whom are not observant Jews, to circumcise; but have only permitted skilled mohelim who are religious to approach the fulfillment of this commandment, I have never consented to be a godfather [Sandek] if the mohel is a physician, even if he were a Sabbath observer and a religious man. Thank God, in my city and in my area they listen to me and they do not permit any physician to perform the circumcision; even the physicians themselves, when they have a son, call on a mohel in this area to perform the circumcision. If a physician who is not observant has circumcised a child, I have commanded that the extra drop of blood of the covenant [Dam Beris] be taken from the child by a pious mohel.
It is clear from the above that Orthodox Jews have a strong preference for a mohel who is Orthodox. But the question is whether piety is a definite requirement of the law or whether it is merely a preference of the completely Orthodox, as would be implied by the language of Isserles when he says one ought to seek for a pious mohel and godfather (Yesh la’chazor).
First, it should be clear that a mohel is not a regular or official Jewish religious functionary, as is, for example, a rabbi, who has to have ordination (Semicha), or a shochet, who has to have official authorization (Kabbala). As a matter of fact, circumcision was a mitzvah which the father himself often performed, or the mitzvah could be given to anyone whom the father wished to honor. The mohel as such has no special status. If, then, a Jewish physician has skill in performing the operation, why should he not be permitted to circumcise?
This question hinges on the question of the physician’s orthodoxy. Of course, if the physician is a pious Orthodox Jew, then there cannot possibly be any objection in the law to his circumcising (since the mohel has no official special status as a functionary). Although an Orthodox rabbi might discourage a family from employing an Orthodox physician (as above), it would be only because the rabbi would want to discourage the use of other physicians who might not be so pious. But aside from such cautionary strictness, there cannot be any serious or basic objections on the part of the most Orthodox families to an Orthodox Jewish physician.
But inasmuch as many physicians are not observantly Orthodox, the question then is, May a non-Orthodox Jewish physician circumcise? In general, from our Reform point of view, we who are ourselves not Orthodox in many of our ceremonial observances can hardly make any objection to a Jewish physician who is no more observant than we ourselves. But we are concerned here with what traditional law (not mere traditional sentiment or preference) would say as to the validity of such a physician circumcising. The Shulchan Aruch, in the section mentioned, discusses who may circumcise and who may not. It says: A woman may circumcise, a minor may circumcise, and even an uncircumcised Jew, if he is uncircumcised because his brothers died as a result of circumcision. Isserles adds the following restriction: A mumar (a violator of the law), if he is a mumar against the entire Torah, or if he is a mumar (a disbeliever) as to the rite of circumcision itself, is to be considered to be like an idolater in this matter (and may not circumcise).
But Rabbi Akiba Eger limits this restriction against the violator of the law. He bases the limitation upon the statement of Chaim Chizkiya De Silva in “Mayim Chaim” #3 (at the end of the book). The restriction is based upon the well-known legal distinction between a violator who violates impudently to provoke the pious, that is, a willful violator (L’hachis) and a violator who merely violates the law out of convenience (L’teovon). It is only the willful violator who, according to the law, may not circumcise. But one who merely does not obey the law because it is diffi-cult for him to do so, or because he is not trained to do so, could hardly be declared ineligible because of his careless nonobservance. The Shulchan Aruch itself is very careful to limit its prohibition against nonobservers by saying that it is only nonobservers of the entire Torah or those who disbelieve in circumcision itself. Of course, those who today would seek to exclude any physician at all would then say that every violator of the Sabbath is considered technically a violator of the entire Torah. Even so, a physician who is involved in saving life certainly is excused for his violation of the Sabbath, since when people are in danger because of sickness, not only may the Sabbath be violated, but it must be violated.
However, the mood of the law would require of us some distinction between Jewish physicians. A Jewish physician who is an avowed atheist or an open mocker of religion should certainly not be permitted to perform a ceremony that is religious in its nature; but a Jewish physician who is merely nonobservant, either because of his profession or because of his training, cannot even, from the point of view of Jewish law, be deemed ineligible to perform the circumcision. A full discussion of the question whether a non-observant Jewish physician (Epikoros) may validly circumcise is given by David Hoffmann, “Melamed L’ho-il,” Yore Deah 80. He first mentions Isserles’ decision to Yore Deah 264, that a mumar is like a complete pagan and that therefore his circumcision is not valid (and an extra drop of blood must be taken to symbolize the covenant). But Hoffmann gives the various opinions against this decision of Isserles, such as Akiba Eger in his notes to Yore Deah and his Responsum #264. (Hoffmann quotes it from “Berith Horishonim.”) Even Chaim Sofer (in “Machenay Chaim” II, 20), who agrees with Isserles, nevertheless says that if no one but a Sabbath violator were available, he would use him.
The more difficult question is that of the Gentile obstetrician circumcising the Jewish child. On the face of it, he certainly may not do so, although his eligibility cannot be too lightly dismissed. It is true that the Shulchan Aruch says that an idolater may not circumcise. Yet we certainly do not consider a Gentile physician an idolater. The status of a Christian in Jewish law is not that of a pagan but of a “son of Noah” (ben Noach). Even without this important distinction, it is not clear even in the case of the ancient pagan that he was forbidden to circumcise. The whole discussion as to a pagan circumcising goes back to the Tosefta in the discussion of the laws of paganism (Avodah Zara III, 12). There we find a discussion between Rabbi Meir and the sages. Rabbi Meir says that an Akum may not circumcise because he is suspected of wanting to destroy the life of the child. Therefore, the rabbis say, he may not be allowed to circumcise if he performs the operation alone, but if others are standing by, he may circumcise the Jewish child. This discussion is carried over in the Talmud in a lengthy debate (in b. Avodah Zara 26b and especially in b. Menachos 42a). This debate in the Talmud is discussed by Joseph Caro in his commentary, “Kesef Mishnah,” to Maimonides (Yad Milah 2 : 1). Jehiel M. Epstein in the “Aruch Ha-Shulchan,” evaluating Joseph Caro’s analysis, says that Caro understands then that the outcome of the Talmudic debate is that a Gentile may circumcise. Maimonides (in Yad Milah 2 : 1) says at first that a Gentile should not circumcise, then adds that if a Gentile does circumcise, no further operation is necessary. In other words, it is not necessary to take a formal “drop of blood of the covenant.” And that, too, is why Joseph Caro himself (in the Shulchan Aruch, Yore Deah 264 : 1) says that a Gentile should not circumcise, but that if he has circumcised, it is not necessary to recircumcise.
Israel of Kremsier (fourteenth century, in his “Hagahos Asheri” to the Rosh, b. Avodah Zara 27a) says that all the prohibitions against using Gentile physicians apply only if the healing is done by an amateur or without pay, but if it is done by a professional and for pay, then it is absolutely permitted to use him; and there is no danger in his being used. Inasmuch as the whole objection of Rabbi Meir was based upon the danger of willful hurting of the Jewish child, and since the danger does not apply to a professional, who will not harm his profession (see Asheri, ad loc), the law is clear, that a Gentile may circumcise.
But, of course, if circumstances are such that a Gentile doctor is to do the circumcision, then certainly the family should be present, not, of course, for the reason mentioned in the Tosefta (to watch and protect), but to indicate that what the Gentile physician has done is merely the surgical operation, and that the religious ceremony (naming the child and admitting it into the covenant of Abraham) must be performed by the parent or his representative. We accept the actual circumcision as merely an operation, but consider the prayers as the essential part of initiating the child into the covenant.
Insofar as the operation itself is to be considered religious, it is, of course, preferable to have a Jewish physician. Certainly a skilled mohel is acceptable beyond question, but he is not indispensable. A Jewish physician may circumcise and perform the entire ritual, including reciting the prayers. A Gentile physician may circumcise, but the family should be present to conduct the religious service.
RR 90-96
Circumcision Before Eighth Day
In a number of hospitals the custom has been estab lished that mothers and their babies are sent home on the fifth or sixth day after the baby’s birth. This situa tion affects the time and place of circumcision. Shall the child be circumcised at home on the eighth day, or shall we yield to the physicians preference to cir cumcise the child while it is yet in the hospital and therefore earlier than the eighth day?
Before going into the halachic side of the question, inquiry was made as to the actualities of the present situation with regard to hospital practice in this matter. Through the kindness of the administrative head of a well-known hospital, inquiries were instituted of obstetricians and from famous lying-in hospitals. From these inquiries it is evi dent that the shortened period of hospitalization is likely to continue and will undoubtedly affect the actual practice of circumcision.
It seems that as a national average the length of stay of the mother in the hospital is now four to five days, some hospitals permitting the mother to stay six to seven days. Many physicians agree that while it is valuable for the mother to become ambulatory a day or two after childbirth, it still would be best if she stayed at the hospital for about ten days. Nevertheless, the average stay is now four to five days. The chief reason for this is the crowded condition of the hospitals and perhaps also the fact that many hospital insurance plans for lying-in cases allow free hospitalization for only that length of time. Both these factors result in the fact that a mother leaves the hospital two or three days before the eighth day, on which a male child should be circumcised.
In general, doctors prefer to circumcise the child in the hospital rather than at home, or, if a mohel is used, to have him do the circumcision in the hospital under aseptic conditions. But nowadays the child cannot be circumcised in the hospital on the eighth day unless the mother takes it back to the hospital. Orthodox Jews will undoubtedly return to the earlier custom of circumcising the child at home on the eighth day (Milo Bizmano). This, of course, may be a step backward from the medical point of view, because sanitary conditions in the home cannot be as carefully watched as they have been in recent years in the hospital whenever the mohel circumcises. But for the sake of Milo Bizmano, which is an important enough mitzvah to set aside the laws of Sabbath work, Orthodox circumcisions will undoubtedly be moved back to the home.
What are our young parents likely to decide on their own accord? It is unlikely that they will decide for the sake of Milo Bizmano to have the child circumcised at home. They will undoubtedly prefer to have him circumcised by the obstetrician in the hospital, as is now a widespread custom. What shall we do about this most probable preference of the members of our congregations, which, because of the present conditions outlined above, will mean that most of the circumcisions will be before the eighth day?
Also in this regard, before answering the question from the halachic point of view the medical point of view was considered. There is no doubt that if there is a choice to be made between circumcision at home and circumcision in the hospital, physicians will overwhelmingly prefer hospital conditions. Moreover, is there any medical advantage in having the child circumcised before the eighth day? It seems that there is considerable medical opinion that it would be better to wait until the eighth day, as is required by Jewish law, because certain blood conditions that might make it desirable to postpone circumcision do not become clearly evident until the eighth day. Thus, if we wait until the eighth day, these dangerous conditions can be recognized and the circumcision postponed, as it should be.
Thus, common sense would require that we should not readily yield to the present new circumstances, but when a male child is born should endeavor to get the mother’s stay lengthened to eight or nine days to allow the child some time of healing. Under many circumstances in certain hospitals this will be possible. Whenever it is possible, both for the sake of the mother and because of tradition, we should endeavor to get the stay lengthened to nine days, and have the circumcision on the traditional eighth day.
However, in the increasing majority of cases where this is becoming impossible, what shall we do? As to having a surgeon operate instead of a mohel, there is no real objection in the law if he is a Jewish surgeon, and there is considerable opinion that even a Christian surgeon is also permissible. This matter of using a surgeon rather than a mohel is discussed later, in Responsum #24. The chief question that here concerns us is the validity of circumcision before the eighth day (Toch Sh’mono).
In general, the halachic point of view is that it is not valid to have it earlier, for if it were possible to do so, why violate the Sabbath? However, there is considerable opinion that tends to accept the validity of circumcision before the eighth day. Thus, Asher ben Yehiel (to b. Sabbath, chap. 19) discusses whether a child who is circumcised before the eighth day needs on the eighth day the taking of the drop of blood of the covenant (Hatofas Dam Bris), as is done when the child is born circumcised, or when a Gentile who has already been circumcised is converted. He decides that a child circumcised earlier than the eighth day does not need the drop of blood taken, thus indicating that such early circumcision is to be deemed valid. Nathaniel Weil (in Korban Nesanel, ad loc.) also defends this viewpoint, refuting Sabbathai Cohen (Shach) and defending Isserles on this question, and ends by saying: “The law is, that it is not necessary to take the drop of blood [on the eighth day] of the child who is circumcised earlier than the eighth day.”
Isserles on this question seems to hold two contradictory opinions. In Yore Deah 262 : 1, he simply says that if the child is circumcised earlier than the eighth day, the duty of circumcision has been accomplished. But in 264 : 1, discussing the question of who may circumcise (Jew or Gentile or woman, etc.), he says that when a child needs to be circumcised earlier than the eighth day because of danger, a Jew or a Gentile may do the circumcising, since this (earlier circumcision) is not really the mitzvah of circumcision. But Moses Rifkes says (in “B’er Hagola”) that this latter statement (“that it is not the fulfillment of the commandment”) refers merely to the question of whether or not a Jew be required to do the circumcising, and that this early circumcision is actually (as Isserles stated earlier in 262 : 1) a fulfillment of the commandment. Aryeh Lev, of Metz (in “Sha’agas Aryeh” #52) discusses the question of a child who at the command of a doctor was circum-cised before the eighth day. He sides with Sabbathai Cohen that this is not the fulfillment of the commandment, yet the question itself and his discussion of it indicate that such early circumcision was a fairly frequent practice. It is clear that there is a considerable weight of authority that gives legal status to the pre-eighth-day circumcision at the command of a doctor, and in the present case it is clear that the doctors so desire it.
It often happens in the law, when certain liberal opinions are noted but are not followed, that these liberal opinions are nevertheless regarded as important “to rely upon in time of need.” That is to say, if circumstances arise when it is necessary to make a permissive decision, these liberal opinions will become useful. It is in this way that we must regard those opinions which concede the legality of circumcision before the eighth day. They are contrary to general Jewish practice. But in case this hos pital practice of sending mothers home early becomes permanent, and in case the parents insist upon the circumcision being performed in the hospital before the mother goes home, then we may have to face the fact.
Yet there is no need to surrender too soon. As long as possible, we must insist upon the importance of the traditional eighth day. For the present we should resist the tendency to convert the fifth day into the regular circumcision day.
It therefore would be advisable for a rabbi not to participate in the fifth-day circumcision. The father, however, is indispensable at the circumcision. The duty to circumcise is in the first instance incumbent on the father himself, and the mohel is only his agent (Sheliach); therefore the father must stand at the side of the mohel to indicate that the mohel is only acting as his agent. Besides, tradition assigns one of the blessings to be recited by the father. Therefore let the father and some other relatives be present at this early circumcision and let the father name his child, as is provided for in the Union Home Prayerbook.
Since we will thus give the early circumcision partial, but not complete, religious sanction, it would be advisable that the father be called up to the Torah a week or so afterward, and the child named in the presence of the congregation, as we already do with girl children.
In conclusion, it is clear that we are facing a situation which is at present beyond our power to change basically. Where we can modify it, we should. Whenever possible, we should urge that the mother be permitted to stay beyond the eighth day so that the circumcision can occur at the proper time in the hospital, or perhaps the parents may be willing to return to the hospital on the eighth day.
Where that is impossible, the father should be present at the early circumcision, and within a week or so the child should be formally named by the rabbi in the presence of the congregation, or on the eighth day at a regular circumcision-naming ceremony.
RR 96-99
Circumcision of Dead Child
An infant boy died a day after his birth. The rabbi in structed the family that no mourning is required for any child under thirty days of life. This the family accepted, but the grandmother of the infant was told by a friend that it is necessary for the dead child to be circumcised. The young couple, disturbed at this suggestion, wanted to know what to do, and to what extent this custom is an established one in Orthodox law, and to what extent it should be followed by a family belonging to a Reform congregation.
The circumcision of a dead infant at the graveside is mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch (Yore Deah 263 : 5). The statement reads as follows: “A child who dies before it reaches the age of eight days is circumcised with a stone or a reed and we do not recite the blessing over the circumcision; but we give him a name that he may receive mercy from Heaven and revive at the resurrection of the dead.”
This seems like a definite statement of law. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that no blessing is to be recited over this circumcision, which in itself indicates that this is not a mandatory circumcision. Furthermore, Isserles in his gloss to this passage warns that this circumcision should not be done on the second day of the holidays for this reason: Any Jew who lives longer than thirty days may be buried by Jews on the second day of the holidays. It is highly questionable in the law whether a child who lived less than thirty days is required to be buried, that is, whether burial is a mitzvah with regard to him. There fore the second day of the holidays should not be violated because of such a dubious case. The statement in the Shulchan Aruch comes from the Tur (same reference), where Asher ben Yehiel quotes “a Gaon” who says if a child dies before the age of eight days, we have the custom to circumcise him at the grave. Asher ben Yehiel, the father of the author of the Tur, in his compendium to the Talmud (to Moed Katan, chap. 3, end of sec. 88), quotes the Gaon as Rav Nachshon; and so he is quoted by name in other sources. It is he, therefore, who records this as a custom, and it is probably due to his statement that it has found its way into the literature.
How much status does this custom have in the law? To what extent is it a firmly established custom that has the force of law? In the first place, it is noteworthy that Meir Ha-Kohen (Hagahos Maimonioth) to Yad Hil. Milah (chap. 1) says: “As for the custom to remove the child’s foreskin, this is not a custom firmly founded in the law and, therefore, we do not do so on the second day of holidays.” In fact, Maimonides does not mention the custom at all.
A more directly negative opinion of this custom is given in a responsum of Rashi, who definitely opposes it. The responsum is given in Or Zaruah Hil. Milah #104. The author of Or Zaruah, Isaac of Vienna, says that Rashi received an inquiry from some scholars in the city of Rome, asking whether a child who dies before its eighth day should be circumcised at the grave. Rashi answers: “I know that it is the custom of our women to do so, but this is not a mitzvah.” He gives the following reason for its not being a mitzvah: “It is a principle of Talmudic law that the dead are no longer obligated to fulfill the Commandments” (Mays Chofshi Min Ha-Mitzvos, b. Shabbas 30a). The mitzvah of circumcision is not incumbent until the eighth day of life. The child being dead by the time the mitzvah would be incumbent upon him, there is no mitzvah to circumcise.
After this legal argument Rashi moves on to a more homiletic argument, based on the Midrash. Bereshis Rabba (48 : 8), on the text, “And Abraham was seated at the door of his tent,” says that in the future our father Abraham shall be sitting at the door of Gehenna in order to keep out of it all who are circumcised. But if circumcised men come who have sinned so much that they should enter Gehenna, Father Abraham takes the foreskins from the uncircumcised children and places them upon these sinners, so that thus being made uncircumcised, they enter Gehenna. Now, Rashi argues, if all infants were circumcised at the grave, how could Abraham use their foreskins for the purpose described? Evidently, he says, this circumcision of infants is not to be done. Then Isaac of Vienna contin ues: “And my teacher Simcha gave a similar responsum, namely, that even on weekdays [i.e., to say nothing of holidays] it is not a well-grounded custom to circumcise stillborn children, and this is clear from the account in the Midrash.”
Later development of the question goes into detailed discussion as to whether in case this circumcision has been neglected and the child buried uncircumcised, the grave should be reopened for that purpose (see Kenesses Ezekiel #44), and also whether if the child was bom circumcised, a drop of blood of the covenant should be taken (Vayitzbor Yosef #26).
It is clear that there is only one source for the custom, namely, the Gaon Nachshon, who suggests that this is done for the benefit of the child. The statement of the Gaon makes it clear that this is only a custom, not a law. And the Midrash leads, as it did with Rashi, to the conclusion that the custom should not be followed. The leading halachist of the Spanish school, Maimonides, does not even mention it, and Rashi of the Franco-German school definitely opposes it.
I suggest, therefore, that the rabbi do nothing to encourage this sad and heartbreaking custom.