Circumcision

See B’rit milah

5780.3

5780.3

B’rit Milah During COVID-19 Pandemic

 

Note: This responsa deals with the ritual aspects of b’rit milah. A doctor should always be consulted in regard to the medical aspects of b’rit milah.

Question
What should be the proper procedure regarding b’rit milah during the COVID-19 pandemic?
(submitted by Rabbi Julie Pelc Adler, Director, Brit Milah Program of Reform Judaism)

Response
In the midst of the current pandemic, it is understandable that parents and mohalim/ot are confused and frightened.  We will examine the issues here carefully, one by one.

1. The importance of b’rit milah

In emphasizing the importance of b’rit milah the Talmud equates it to all the other mitzvot and, indeed, credits it with preserving the very existence of the world.[1]  In Christian lands it was an unmistakable, permanent marker of Jewishness; in Muslim lands, it marked Jewish male children.  Its complex psychological significance in a classically male-centered Jewish spirituality cannot be overstated.[2]  It is true that the first generations of Reformers were deeply ambivalent about it; Kaufmann Kohler, for example, called it “a barbarous cruelty,” and recommended its abolition.[3]  It is quite likely that most Reform Jews would have ceased to practice circumcision had it not been for the view that gained currency in the early 20th century, that circumcision conveyed hygienic and health benefits.[4]  Before World War II, lengthy post-partum hospital stays for middle- and upper-class women and their infants made it easy to arrange a hospital circumcision, with or without ritual. In the postwar era, however, shortened hospital stays led to numerous inquiries about the acceptability of circumcision before the eighth day, or the reality of Jews simply ignoring b’rit milah in favor of medical circumcision. While Responsa Committee chair Israel Bettan authored a strenuous objection to that widespread practice in 1954,[5] Solomon Freehof was far more accommodating in 1960.[6]  All Reform responsa since then, however, have followed R. Bettan in insisting on the importance of milah on the eighth day as a religious rite.[7]  As a movement we have encouraged Reform Jews to choose b’rit milah on the eighth day, and have facilitated this by training Reform mohalim/ot.

2. Circumstances for delaying b’rit milah

We are forbidden to endanger ourselves. As Maimonides writes: “The Sages prohibited many things because they are life-threatening.  And anyone who ignores their words, and says, ‘I can go ahead and endanger myself; what business is it of anyone else what I do to myself?’ or ‘I pay no attention to that’ – they are to flog him for rebelliousness.”[8]  We are obligated to preserve ourselves from danger (and, as parents, we are responsible for preserving our children from danger). There is, therefore, unanimous agreement among all halakhic authorities that we delay b’rit milah if the infant is not healthy enough to undergo it.[9]
By contrast, there is far less consideration of whether b’rit milah might risk the well-being of an otherwise healthy infant.[10]  However, there is a faint thread running through the halakha that is worth examining in detail.  It begins with this Talmudic passage:

Rav Pappa said:  Therefore, on a cloudy day or on a day when a south wind is blowing, we do not circumcise [an infant], nor do we draw blood.  But nowadays, when people are accustomed to ignore [these strictures, we rely on the assurance that] Adonai preserves the simple (Ps. 116:6) [and we proceed on the assumption that no harm will follow].[11]

This statement was never codified in the later halakha, but the Nimukei Yosef cites it approvingly:

The Ritba wrote in the name of his teacher [with reference to this passage]:  From here we learn that whoever does not wish to circumcise on a cloudy day has permission to do so, and is acting with clear justification in not relying on Adonai preserves the simple.  And similarly it is appropriate not to circumcise on Shabbat if it is cloudy.[12]

The discussion of this issue by the Arukh Ha-Shulḥan makes abundantly clear that the underlying concern is whether conditions are such that performing the rite could endanger the infant:

…But Rabbenu Yeruham wrote that neither a cloudy day nor a south wind delays the b’rit milah, because Adonai preserves the simple. However, the strain of a journey—meaning that the infant is ill from the strain of having made a journey, does postpone the b’rit, until he is well. Another authority wrote that anything other than some illness in the infant himself—such as having to go on a journey—does not delay the b’rit, just as we do not delay it for the sake of blowing winds.

Obviously, we do not delay the b’rit for the purpose of going on a journey, but rather we carry it out.  But it seems to me that it is obviously forbidden to take the infant on a long journey until he has recovered from the circumcision, lest he be endangered. However, it may be permissible to take him in a wagon, since in that case he is placed in one spot and appropriately covered with blankets and pillows. Also, one can see, when they have brought him on a journey by wagon, whether any weakness appears in him. This requires examination by experts in the body and face of the infant.  Indeed, we have never heard what the Nimukei Yosef wrote, that on cloudy days it is permitted to delay the b’rit. In fact, it is because Adonai preserves the simple that we are lenient on optional matters such as drawing blood on the eve of Shabbat…and thus all the more so with regard to an important commandment such as circumcision. And the proof of this is that not a single one of the authorities saw fit to mention this. So we learn that we do not use its guidance in fulfilling our obligation. Thus has the custom spread, and there is no changing it.[13]

It is quite obvious that the original authority, Rav Pappa, was expressing a genuine medical concern, based on his best knowledge. As subsequent generations’ medical knowledge changed, however, they dismissed these concerns as nonsense—but did not replace them with their own medical concerns. This may reflect the tacit trend toward stringency evident in the halakha over time, as seen in other practices such as the discontinuation of hafka’at kiddushinas a way of preventing agunot, or the Ashkenazic invention of “glatt kosher.”
Fortunately, we are under no obligation to adhere to the codified halakha when a minority viewpoint has clear merit.  And as we have stated before, we rely on medical expertise:  “As rabbis, we are not competent to render judgments in scientific controversies. Still, we do not hesitate to adopt ‘the overwhelming view’ as our standard of guidance in this and all other issues where science is the determining factor.”[14]
It is clear to us that b’rit milah may be delayed when performing the rite would endanger an otherwise healthy infant.

3. Does performing b’rit milah at this time endanger the infant?

The reality in North America is that parents can take many steps to minimize the chances of infection, but under current circumstances it is virtually impossible to eliminate all possibility of infection. Asymptomatic individuals are not being tested; the incubation period can be lengthy; and the virus is extremely contagious.  In many areas, by the time the infant reaches his eighth day, it is already highly probable that he has already been exposed to someone who is carrying the virus, unless he was born at home under conditions of strict isolation, and the medical practitioner(s) who delivered the baby were known to have tested negative for the virus. In other areas, it appears that this will be the case before too long.
As of this writing, there is not enough science available to stand as definitive research on COVID-19 in infants. Anecdotal evidence continues to mount, however, indicating that infants do not appear to be seriously affected. Infant deaths from the virus are so rare that individual cases are being reported as news.  It appears that in each case there were underlying health complications.[15]  It seems counterintuitive, and understandably goes against parents’ instinctive reactions, but so far the evidence is that babies, including newborns, are far less susceptible to COVID-19 than are older adults, unless the infants have some other health problem. It appears that the adults who would be present at a b’rit milah could be at greater risk than the infant himself.
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that this virus will disappear soon. Experts are saying that it will continue to circulate until there is a vaccine to treat it, with some saying that we will, therefore, require social distancing for 12-18 months.[16]  After that much time has elapsed, circumcision will be much more difficult and will carry its own set of risks.
Medical literature regards “newborn” circumcision as routine, requiring only local anesthesia, up to about age six weeks.[17]  Beyond six weeks, or when the baby grows larger than twelve pounds, it may be advisable to wait until he is six months old and perform the procedure under general anesthesia. There is a small indication that bleeding is a more likely complication for an older baby. Furthermore, as the baby ages, the foreskin is thicker and less pliable, so it is more difficult from a technical point of view to perform the circumcision using the more traditional Mogen clamp.
It would appear, then, that there is no absolute guarantee of safety for the infant; but he is no more at risk in a b’rit milah performed on the eighth day, even during the pandemic, than he will be at any time in his first year of life. That assumes, of course, that the b’rit milah is carried out in a way that does not add needless risk. It should be in the home, and there should be no one present other than the parents and the mohel/et. All standard procedures to minimize transmission should be followed, including wearing masks and gloves. It would be advisable to reduce danger to the parents by not having the rite performed by a mohel/et who has been working in a hospital or clinic where COVID-19 patients are being treated.
Some parents will, doubtless, consider a medical circumcision immediately after birth, followed by hatafat dam b’rit at home. We would point out that the most significant risk factor for the virus is the number of people to whom one is exposed at close range. A hospital procedure will bring the infant into contact with at least as many adults as will a b’rit milah performed at home.

Conclusions

  1. B’rit milah on the eighth day is a mitzvah that we as Reform Jews take extremely seriously.
  2. We take seriously the obligation of sh’mirat ha-guf, preserving our well-being, and we therefore recognize danger to an otherwise healthy infant as a valid reason for postponing a b’rit milah.
  3. In keeping with our commitment to taking into account the best scientific and medical advice, given what we know about COVID-19, its transmission, and the danger it poses to infants, we do not find that performing the b’rit milah on the eighth day, with appropriate precautions, poses a more significant risk to the infant than delaying it until the pandemic has passed.

As we wrote recently, the COVID-19 pandemic constitutes a genuine emergency situation (sha’at had’ḥak).  “In an emergency situation a bet din is responsible for taking action for the welfare of the community, and may issue a temporary ruling (hora’at sha’ah) to prevent the kahal from going astray.”[18]  People can “go astray” in all sorts of ways, including by allowing self-preservation and concern for our families to turn into irrational fear and panic. We pray that this pandemic will pass, and that as many lives as possible will be spared, and that people’s livelihoods will not be destroyed; but in the meantime we will—we must—continue to live our lives.

Joan S. Friedman, chair
Howard L. Apothaker
Daniel Bogard
Carey Brown
Lawrence A. Englander
Lisa Grushcow
Audrey R. Korotkin
Rachel S. Mikva
Amy Scheinerman
Brian Stoller
David Z. Vaisberg
Jeremy Weisblatt
Dvora E. Weisberg

 

 

[1] Nedarim 32a.

[2] See Lawrence A. Hoffman, Covenant of Blood: Circumcision and Gender in Judaism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), and Shaye J.D. Cohen, Why Aren’t Jewish Women Circumcised? Gender and Covenant in Judaism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

[3] “Authentic Report of the Proceedings of the Rabbinical Conference Held at Pittsburg, Nov. 16, 17, 18, 1885,” in Walter Jacob, ed., The Changing World of Reform Judaism:  The Pittsburgh Platform in Retrospect (Pittsburgh:  Rodef Shalom Congregation, 1985), 101.

[4] See David Gollaher, “From Ritual to Science: The Medical Transformation of Circumcision in America,” Journal of Social History vol. 28, no. 1 (Autumn 1994): 5-36.

[5] ARR #55, “Circumcision on a Day Other Than the Eighth Day of Birth.”

[6] RR #21, “Circumcision Before Eighth Day.”

[7] ARR #56, “Circumcision Prior to the Eighth Day” (1977); CARR #28, “Berit Milah” (1978); CARR #100, “The Pressured Mohel” (1988).

[8] Yad, H. Rotze’aḥ 11:5. See also Isserles’ gloss to ShA YD 116:5.

[9] Yad, H. Milah 1:16-17; ShA YD 262:2, 263:1.

[10] This question did arise in connection with metzitzah b’feh. The majority opinion is that metzitzah is a hygienic matter, not an integral element of the mitzvah, and therefore any technique that makes it safer is permitted. Isaac Klein, A Guide to Jewish Religious Practice (NY: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1979), 424.

[11] Yev. 72a.

[12] Nimukei Yosef, Yevamot 24a, s.v. ve-ha-id’na.

[13] Arukh Ha-Shulḥan YD 263:4-5.

[14] RR21, vol. 2, 5759.10, “Compulsory Immunization.”

[15] For example, see this news story: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/29/coronavirus-illinois-governor-announces-rare-death-of-baby, accessed 10 April 2020.

[16] See, e.g., https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/federal-government-18-month-plan-life-return-normal/story?id=70046439, accessed 10 April 2020.

[17] For the research that provided the information in this paragraph I thank Dr. Bryan Hecht, M.D., Division Director of Reproductive Endocrinology, Obstetrics and Gynecology, MetroHealth, Cleveland, board certified in Obstetrics and Gynecology and Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility, and a certified Reform mohel.

[18] Yad H. Mamrim 2:4, cited in 5780.2, “Virtual Minyan in Time of COVID-19 Emergency.”

5769.6

5769.6

Circumcision of a Transgender Female

 

She’elah.

I have worked with a woman in her late twenties this past year to prepare her for conversion and found her to be an excellent candidate. Late in the process, but before the conversion ceremony, she revealed to me that her sex assignment at birth was male and that she had been living a life of gender ambiguity from childhood. About two years before I met her, she chose to live exclusively as a woman. She sought and received legal status as a woman from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, a process which requires certification of mental health by suitable professionals. She has begun and continues female hormone therapy. She has not had sex reassignment surgery and such surgery may or may not be part of her future. She has uncircumcised male genitalia.

I considered whether I would ask her to undergo milat gerim (circumcision for proselytes) as part of her conversion process.  I concluded that I would not require milah in her case because her entire involvement with the synagogue, her very identity within the Jewish community, has been as a woman. I accept her gender as female and, of course, milah is not required of women.

I have several questions for the Committee. What standards should Reform rabbis and congregations apply to accepting the gender assignment of members of our communities and those who wish to attach themselves to our communities? To the extent that we regard a requirement of milah and hatafat dam berit to be under the purview of rabbinic authority, should we require them of transgender women with male genitalia? What is the attitude of Jewish law, as understood in a Reform context, toward transgender people in general? In the past, the mental health of transgender people has been regarded as suspect by society in general and, on at least one occasion, by the Responsa Committee.[1] Have changes in medical understanding of gender identity and the social acceptance of transgender people affected the ways in which we apply Jewish law? (Rabbi Jeffrey Goldwasser, North Adams, MA)

 

Teshuvah.

We want to divide your query into two separate questions. The first of these concerns our general attitude toward the issue of “transgender” and of the position of transgender people in our community. The second deals with the more specific issue that you resolved in this case: should a Reform rabbi who normally requires circumcision for male converts[2] insist upon that requirement when the candidate is a transgender female?

  1. On Transgender. “Transgender,” as defined by the American Psychological Association, “is an umbrella term used to describe people whose gender identity (sense of themselves as male or female) or gender expression differs from that usually associated with their birth sex.”[3] Our attitude concerning transgender has undergone a significant change during the last several decades. Our general approach to the subject, however, has remained constant: we have turned to science, in particular to the mental health professions, to learn about a phenomenon that, to say the least, has been imperfectly understood. There was a time, not so long ago, when most scientists held that transgender people suffered from a mental or psychological illness. To this day, the authoritative fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) defines “a strong and persistent identification with the opposite gender” as Gender Identity Disorder (GID), which like all other disorders involves a specific etiology, set of symptoms, and course of treatment.[4] This theme has not entirely disappeared from the public discourse over transgender. As you note, at least some units of government continue to require “certification of mental health by suitable professionals” before persons can be legally accepted as belonging to a gender opposite from their birth sex. Previous Reform responsa on the subject reflected this broad scientific consensus. In recent years, GID has become the focal point of a growing controversy, with many mental health professionals arguing that a difference between a person’s gender identity and his or her birth sex does not in and of itself constitute a “disorder.”[5] As of this writing, the DSM is undergoing a revision, and it is quite possible that “Gender Identity Disorder” will either disappear entirely or be substantially redefined in its next (fifth) edition.

Whatever the outcome of that controversy, its very existence affords us the opportunity to rethink the “general approach” described above. What we now know about transgender persuades us that we should consider it not as a scientific or bioethical issue[6] but as a personal and communal one. Our stance is not to be determined by the findings of mental health professionals but by our understanding of our religious duty as Jews. In other words, the question we should ask is not whether transgender is a “disorder” but rather how does Torah teach us to respond to transgender persons as human beings and as members of the Jewish people?

When we search for guidance in our texts, we find something of a parallel to the transgender person: the androgynos, the individual who (as the Greek term suggests) displays both male and female physical characteristics. We read in Mishnah Bikurim 4:1 that the androgynos is classified in some respects as a male, in some respects as a female, in some respects as both, and in some respects as neither. The rest of that chapter[7] works out the details that give life to these general statements, charting the ritual and legal status of the androgynos and defining that person’s role and duties under the halakhah. The Rabbis, it seems, were aware that not every individual falls clearly within the established gender boundaries, and the category of androgynos served as a special designation encompassing those who straddle the lines. To put this another way, although the traditional Jewish world view presumes the existence of two genders and assigns many religious and ritual responsibilities accordingly, the Sages found a place for this person, who otherwise would not fit within their conceptual world. To us, the great message of these texts is the duty of inclusion: like the Rabbis, we, too, are obligated to find a place within our midst for the outsider, the Jew who does not seem to fit within the established boundaries and social categories upon which our communities are normally based.

On the other hand, the parallel is not absolute; the androgynos is not “transgender.” The Rabbis had no concept of “gender,” understood as a personal sense of identity separate and apart from birth sex. In Rabbinic thought, a person’s sex assignment is that person’s gender; it is an empirical fact, established by the physical signs (the genitalia) that ordinarily associate us as either male or female. The problem is that, because the androgynos displays both male and female genitalia, his/her sex assignment – for the Rabbis, the same thing as “gender” – cannot be determined through empirical observation. And the Rabbis must find a way to make that determination, since one’s gender establishes many of one’s obligations under traditional Jewish law. Hence the debates in the halakhic literature over the nature of the androgynos: is this person a male, a half-male/half-female, or a separate gender that is neither male nor female?[8] The predominant view is that the androgynos is a case of safek, of factual doubt: perhaps male, perhaps female,[9] so that his/her ritual and legal status is set accordingly.[10] By contrast, the individual of whom you speak in your she’elah is in the eyes of Talmudic law unquestionably male and would bear all the responsibilities of a male under the traditional halakhic system.

 

For Reform Jews, committed to the principle of gender equality, this debate holds little practical significance. We differ from the Rabbis and from contemporary Orthodox Judaism in that, in our communities, men and women perform the same ritual roles. We therefore have no need as a community to determine the “correct” gender of any individual or to question any person’s expressed gender identity. We accept the person as that individual presents him- or herself, as male, female, or transgender. The person of whom you speak has chosen “to live exclusively as a woman.” That choice, which determines her gender identity, is enough for us, we accept her accordingly. Upon her conversion she will be “a Jew in all respects”;[11] our concern, quite simply, is to welcome her into the midst of the community of Israel.

 

  1. Circumcision for a Transgender Female Jew by Choice. The fact that we accept this person as a woman, however, does not necessarily answer our second question. You waived the requirement of milat gerim in this case on the grounds that “milah is not required of women.” That decision assumes that gender identity, the person’s subjective sense of self, is the determining factor in this question. In our view, however, the objective fact of birth sex is the more compelling consideration. While the Biblical sources of this mitzvah (Genesis 17:10-11 and Leviticus 12:2-3) make it clear that only a male (zakhar) is to be circumcised, they describe the essence of that ritual as the removal of the foreskin (basar orlato). This individual, who possesses a foreskin, is therefore a member of that group of people who are subject to this ritual. Let us be clear: we accept this individual as a female because she presents herself as such and because we understand today – as few could possibly have imagined until very recently in human history – that one’s gender identity is not automatically determined by one’s birth sex. But the objective reality of her birth sex (which, as we have seen, is a very different thing from “gender identity”) does make her one of those who according to our tradition are to carry ot berit, the sign of the covenant of Abraham and of Sinai.[12] Had she undergone sex reassignment surgery prior to her conversion – in other words, had she altered that objective reality through surgical means to bring her sex in line with her gender identity – circumcision would obviously not have been required of her.[13] In the absence of that surgery, we are persuaded that the better response is to urge milah in cases such as this.

 

The above reflects our deep devotion to the mitzvah of circumcision[14] as a powerful act of Jewish identity that links our modern-day community to the earliest generations of our people. There is no reason in principle to exclude a person from the opportunity to participate in this mitzvah simply because she is transgender. We should recall that the Rabbis, in their efforts to determine the status of the androgynos, included that individual in the community of those who are to be circumcised.[15] We Reform Jews are at our best when we, too, practice the policy of inclusion, and we should remember that as we work to find a place for transgender people within our own religious community.[16]

 

NOTES

  1. Teshuvot for the Nineties, no. 5750.8, pp. 191-196, http://data.ccarnet.org/cgi-  bin/respdisp.pl?file=8&year=5750
  2. The Central Conference of American Rabbis (CCAR) has held since 1893 that the traditional conversion rites are non-obligatory. See CCAR Yearbook 3 (1893), p. 36, reprinted in  American Reform Responsa (ARR), no. 68, http://data.ccarnet.org/cgi-bin/respdisp.pl?file=68&year=arr. This resolution has never been repealed by the CCAR, but it has been modified by Divrei Giyur (see below in this note) and by a number of Reform responsa. See our responsum no. 5756.13, http://data.ccarnet.org/cgi-bin/respdisp.pl?file=13&year=5756 , particularly at notes 35-36, for references to these responsa. 5756.13 also offers a detailed critique of the scholarship adduced in support of the 1893 resolution. Meanwhile, over the past several decades the stance of our movement toward those rites has become much more positive. Today, many Reform rabbis require milat gerim, circumcision for adult male converts. See Divrei Giyur: Guidelines for Rabbis Working with Prospective Gerim, adopted by the Central Conference of American Rabbis, June, 2001, section 8b; http://www.ccarnet.org/Articles/index.cfm?id=215&pge_prg_id=3818&pge_id=1637 (accessed January 26, 2010).
  3. American Psychological Association, Answers to Your Questions About Transgender Individuals and Gender Identity, http://www.apa.org/topics/sexuality/transgender.pdf (accessed January 15, 2010).
  4. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (Washington: American Psychiatric Association, 2000), code 302.85; http://allpsych.com/disorders/sexual/genderidentity.html (accessed January 15, 2010). This diagnosis continues to be accepted by such governmental agencies as the S. national Institutes of Health; see http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001527.htm (accessed January 15, 2010).
  5. See the American Psychological Association’s Answers to Your Questions (note 2, above): “This diagnosis is highly controversial among some mental health professionals and transgender people. Some contend that the diagnosis inappropriately pathologizes gender variance and should be eliminated.” A psychological condition, in this view, is to be characterized as a disorder “only if it causes distress or disability.” On the efforts to insure that the next edition of the DSM omits GID, see Lois Wingerson, “Gender identity Disorder: Has Accepted Practice Caused Harm?” Psychiatric Times, May 19, 2009, http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/display/article/10168/1415037?verify=0 (accessed January 18, 2009).
  6. As an example, see our responsum no. 5757.2: “In Vitro Fertilization and the Status of the Embryo” (http://data.ccarnet.org/cgi-bin/respdisp.pl?file=2&year=5757 ): “given our positive attitude as liberal Jews toward modernity in general, it is surely appropriate to rely upon the findings of modern science, rather than upon tenuous analogies from traditional sources, in order to render what we must consider to be scientific judgments” (italics in original). In this case, the attitude we take toward transgender people is based upon an ethical rather than a “scientific” judgment.
  7. Scholars doubt that the fourth chapter of Bikurim formed part of the original Mishnah. While present in some manuscripts and printed editions, it is missing from others. Its contents appear to have been taken from Tosefta Bikurim 2:3-7. See Yaakov N. Epstein, Mavo lenusach hamishnah (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1948), 976, and Chanokh Albeck’s comments in his edition of the Mishnah (Tel Aviv-Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik-Devir, 1957), vol. 1, 307.
  8. This latter is the opinion of R. Yose in Tosefta Bikurim 2:7: “the androgynos is in a unique category (beriyah le`atzmo).”
  9. This is the position of Maimonides (Yad, Milah 3:6; Ishut 2:24; Nezirut 2:11; Chagigah 2:1, and elsewhere) and the Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 331:5 (see Mishnah Berurah ad loc., note 18). Other authorities hold that the androgynos is half-male and half-female, and some describe him/her as a third gender, neither male nor female. See Encyclopedia Talmudit, 2:54ff.
  10. For example, the androgynos observes all positive ritual commandments that, because they are dependent upon the time of day or of the year, are traditionally incumbent upon men and not upon women. The androgynos observes them because he/she is possibly a male and therefore commanded to do so. By the same token, the androgynos does not recite the benediction over the performance of these mitzvot, because he/she is possibly a female and therefore not commanded to observe these mitzvot. Yad, Avodah Zarah 12:4 and Tzitzit 3:9. See at note 15, below.
  11. Taval ve`alah harei hu keyisra’el lekhol devarav; Yevamot 47b.
  12. See Keritot 9a: our male ancestors, the Rabbis taught, were required to undergo circumcision and immersion, while the women were required to undergo immersion, prior to the giving of the Torah. Today’s proselyte reenacts their experience when he or she enters the covenant.
  13. A male proselyte whose penis has been severed requires only immersion (tevilah) in order to convert to Judaism; Tosafot, Yevamot 47b, v. derabbi yose; Shulchan Arukh Yoreh De`ah 268:
  14. On berit milah as a mitzvah in Reform Judaism, see Simeon J. Maslin, Gates of Mitzvah (New York: CCAR, 1979), p. 14. On our evolving position with respect to milat gerim, see the sources in notes 10 and 11, above.
  15. That the androgynos is circumcised is declared in Yad, Milah 1:7 and Shulchan Arukh Yoreh De`ah 262:3, on the basis of the sugya in Shabbat 135a. The authorities are in dispute as to whether the traditional berakhah (benediction) should be recited over that act. Rambam (Yad, Milah 3:6, in a ruling adopted by Shulchan Arukh Yoreh De`ah 265:3) holds that no benediction is recited because the androgynos is not unquestionably male (eino zakhar vada’i). R. Avraham ben David of Posquierres objects: the circumcision of an androgynos is a matter of uncertainty over an element of Torah law, and in all such cases of doubt we rule stringently (B. Beitzah 3b). Thus, a berakhah should be required (Hasagat Haravad, Milah 3:6).
  16. We recognize, of course, that in any particular case the mara de’atra, the community rabbinical authority who supervises the conversion process, may judge the prospect of circumcision to be exceptionally difficult or stressful to a transgender female conversion candidate. We would support the rabbi’s decision not to demand circumcision of such a candidate as a proper application of the CCAR’s 1893 resolution on conversion rites (see note 2). We will not attempt to devise a precise formula to define the term “exceptionally difficult.” That is and must remain a matter left to the judgment of the mara de’atra, just as it is left to him or her to evaluate the motivations and sincerity of the prospective convert. In the latter case, says R. Yosef Karo, the decision must be left to the discretion of the authorities in charge (hakol lefi re’ut einei beit din; Beit Yosef to Tur, Yoreh De`ah 268). The same is true here.
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