Conversion

See Miqvah, origin
See Adopted children

5780.4 Conversion of a Committed Unitarian Universalist

Sh’elah
A woman whose boyfriend is a rabbi wishes to convert to Judaism. She is quite knowledgeable and is also enrolled in a formal course of study under Reform auspices. The woman is only months away from ordination as a Unitarian Universalist minister and intends to serve a UU church. She finds no conflict between her UU faith and Judaism, and notes that there are already born Jews serving as UU ministers. Should the beit din allow the conversion of this woman? (Rabbi Lisa Rubin, Director, Exploring Judaism, Central Synagogue, New York)

T’shuvah
We know that at different times and in different circumstances, rabbis have set different standards for conversion. This reflects the reality that “halachic decisions cannot be understood in terms of rabbinic law alone, but must be studied in the framework of the sociological and organizational needs of the decisor and those whom he supports.”[1] How a rabbi weighs a prospective convert’s motivation and commitment depends on the circumstances. “Given the complexity of human behavior and the near impossibility of sorting out ‘sincere’ from insincere motivations, Jewish law leaves the decision to the discretion of the rabbi, who must determine whether the candidate for conversion chooses Judaism for reasons the community would find acceptable.”[2] In the words of R. Joseph Karo, “Hakol l’fi r’ot beit din”—“It is up to the court to decide as it sees fit.”[3]

In making a decision about this woman’s suitability as a prospective giyoret, we are being asked whether Judaism and Unitarian Universalism are compatible commitments. Let us first consider what it means to be a Jew, whether by birth or by naturalization (conversion).

I. What is conversion to Judaism and what does it entail?

A. Conversion: Becoming a ben/bat b’rit
The religion of ancient Israel had no formal process of “conversion.” When the Torah refers to the ger it does not mean a “convert,” i.e., one who has accepted the religion of Israel. Rather, it means a non-Israelite who lives permanently among the Israelites—a non-citizen, who was obligated to adhere to some Israelite laws, and had the privilege of participating in some rites.[4] However, even before the Babylonian Exile, the people of Israel also engaged with the question of whether a non-Israelite could become a devoted adherent of the God of Israel, and if so, whether that made them an Israelite/Judean/Jew.[5] (Indeed, some scholars view the Book of Ruth as a post-exilic polemic against the view of Ezra-Nehemiah that the community of Israel is restricted to born Israelites.[6]) Negotiating the relationship between ethnic Jewishness and religious Jewishness was a complex process that extended over centuries.[7] In the context of first the Persian, and then the Greco-Roman, environment, our sages recognized the Torah’s ger toshav, “resident stranger,” as an increasingly obsolete category and instead reinterpreted ger to mean “proselyte,” i.e., one who wishes to join the house of Israel by committing not only to the God of Israel, but to the way of life ordained for Israel in the Sinai covenant.

Acknowledging the God of Israel as the one God who created the universe, i.e., rejecting idolatry, was not sufficient, however, to make one a Jew. Rather, to the rabbis it made one a righteous gentile, an adherent of the seven commandments of the children of Noah.[8] Becoming a ger tzedek, a “righteous proselyte,” was something entirely different. That required committing not only to the God of Israel, but also to the laws of Israel, i.e., to the Sinai covenant. To convert means becoming a party to the covenant, a ben/bat b’rit.

Our sages saw Ruth as the paradigmatic convert, and her interaction with Naomi became the paradigm of how Jews should treat prospective converts.[9] A midrashic reading of the dialogue between Ruth and Naomi[10] reinterprets it to become the model for standard conversion procedure: investigation into self-serving motives as opposed to genuine spiritual seeking; discouragement from taking on a burdensome fate; warnings about the demands of this new lifestyle; teaching the prospective convert the practicalities of living a Jewish life, but without too much burdensome and discouraging detail; ensuring that they understand the consequences of adherence or non-adherence to the mitzvot (i.e., reward and punishment in the world-to-come), and then finally formalizing their entry into the community of Israel through circumcision (for males) and immersion. All these are also detailed in a baraita that becomes the basis for all subsequent discussion of conversion. The baraita includes this provision: “If he accepts (kibbel), we circumcise him immediately….”[11]

The crucial term here is kibbel, “accept.” Prior to carrying out the formal procedures (circumcision and immersion) that effect the change in legal status, the ger/giyoret must accept the responsibilities of being a party to the covenant (ben/bat b’rit). That is what it means to be a Jew.[12] We formally affirm that inherited status of ben/bat b’rit for each newborn Jewish child, either through b’rit milah or b’rit bat; we formally extend that status to those who wish to join the house of Israel as parties to the covenant by naturalizing them through gerut, conversion. “Just as Israel entered the covenant (nichn’su lab’rit) by means of three commandments, so converts enter – by means of ritual circumcision, immersion, and [when the Temple stood,] bringing an offering.”[13]

The baraita’s language of “acceptance” is the same language the Mishnah uses to explain the significance of reciting the Sh’ma twice daily:

Rabbi Joshua ben Korḥa said: Why does [the paragraph beginning] Hear, O Israel precede [the paragraph beginning] If, then, you obey the commandments? So that one first accepts upon oneself the yoke of the kingdom of Heaven (’ol malchut shamayim), and then after that, the yoke of the commandments (’ol hamitzvot).[14]

Thus Rashi explains that the essence of conversion is entry into the covenant, expressed as “accepting the yoke of the commandments:”

“We inform them about some of the commandments”—For now, by means of immersion, they are completing the process of conversion. Therefore at the moment of fulfilling the commandment of immersion, they must accept upon themselves the yoke of the commandments.[15]

And Maimonides phrased it in this way:

Thus for all generations, if an idolator wishes to enter the covenant and to take refuge beneath the wings of the Divine Presence, and accept upon himself the yoke of Torah [emphasis added], he requires circumcision, immersion, and the making of an offering; or for a woman, immersion and an offering. For it is written (Num. 15:15): There shall be one law for you and for the resident stranger.[16]

B. What must a convert believe?
Modern readers may find it strange that the Tannaitic locus classicus on conversion does not explicitly address belief. But Jews stood out in the Greco-Roman context as the only genuine monotheists. Indeed, they were so exceptional in this regard that Roman law recognized their right not to offer sacrifices to the emperor or to other gods. Furthermore, we know that Greco-Roman synagogues attracted a considerable number of non-Jews who attended with some regularity, but did not formally join the community.[17] Anyone with a serious interest in actually becoming a Jew knew perfectly well that the Jews were monotheists and that they believed in a God who created the universe and revealed to them the laws by which they were to live. Accepting the commandments thus implicitly affirmed acceptance of the Commander.[18]

Maimonides, for whom correct belief was of paramount importance, chose to add a doctrinal component to the process of conversion: “…and we inform them of the essential principles of the religion, which are the unity of God and the prohibition of idolatry….[19] While this view was not adopted by either the Tur or the Shulchan Aruch,[20] many later authorities were troubled by the fact that the foundational halachic text, the baraita in Y’vamot, does not explicitly set a standard for belief. Since the halachah regards the formal conversion procedures (milah and t’vilah) as valid after the fact, it is possible that someone could go through the formal process of conversion without making an explicit and clear statement of what they actually believe about the meaning of those acts, or committing to living a covenantal life.[21] In theory, of course, the sages viewed this as unlikely in the extreme, since the halachah mandates that the beit din should examine a prospective convert’s motivation and reject any for whom conversion is a means to personal gain (a spouse, status, money, etc.), leaving only a sincere desire to enter the Sinai covenant. In practice, however, the issue has always been less clear cut, for how can anyone measure the sincerity of another person? Sincerely accepting the obligations of the covenant, however, is what is required. Thus, for example, R. Solomon Zalman Lipschitz (1765–1839) explained that the halachah meant only that a formal conversion was valid after the fact even if the convert was not properly taught; but “[failure to] accept the commandments obviously invalidates [the conversion], for this is the essence of conversion and the entry into the Jewish religion.”[22]

R. Mark Washofsky has summarized this matter as follows:

A candidate’s sincerity is judged by his or her demonstrated desire to practice Judaism in accordance with our beliefs and interpretations. We insist that the convert declare his or her free choice to enter the covenant between God and Israel, renounce all other faiths and religions, pledge loyalty to the Jewish people, and promise to live a Jewish life and raise his or her children as Jews. As Reform Jews, we define our range of acceptable “beliefs and interpretations” as liberally as we can;…[o]n the other hand, we are a religious community, and we therefore share in common certain ideas as to what that designation means….One who wishes to join our community but who rejects the most central elements of Jewish religion as we interpret it is not ready for conversion.[23]

II. Can a Unitarian Universalist be a ben/bat b’rit?

In the case before us, the prospective giyoret insists that there is no conflict between becoming a faithful Jew and remaining a faithful Unitarian Universalist, even becoming a Unitarian Universalist minister, because there are no conflicts between the beliefs of the two religions. We reject that contention. To put it simply: Unitarian Universalism does not require an exclusive commitment to any particular religious tradition, but Judaism does. Our tradition likens the covenant to a marriage between God and Israel—but it is not an open marriage.

Liberal Judaism affirms the value of religious pluralism in our society. Our understanding of pluralism allows us to engage in interreligious dialogue, participate in interfaith worship that is respectful to all faiths involved, and occasionally borrow non-Jewish patterns and styles of worship and adapt them to our own distinctly Jewish worship. That understanding, however, also presumes the existence of real and essential differences,  distinctions, and boundaries between religious faiths and faith communities. Judaism, therefore, is different from other faiths in its commitments and practices, and it is frequently the task of rabbis to call our people’s attention to this distinctiveness and the boundary lines that define our unique religious tradition.[24]

According to its official website, “Unitarian Universalism is a liberal religious tradition that was formed from the consolidation of two religions: Unitarianism and Universalism.”[25] A history of the religion provided there traces its roots to the pre-Nicene Christians who rejected trinitarianism and offers this conclusion: “Our history has carried us from liberal Christian views about Jesus and human nature to a rich pluralism that includes theist and atheist, agnostic and humanist, pagan, Christian, Jew, and Buddhist.”[26] The Unitarian Universalist website further states:

We have radical roots and a history as self-motivated spiritual people: we think for ourselves and recognize that life experience influences our beliefs more than anything.

We need not think alike to love alike. We are people of many beliefs and backgrounds: people with a religious background, people with none, people who believe in a God, people who don’t, and people who let the mystery be.

We are Unitarian Universalist and Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Humanist, Jewish, Muslim, Pagan, atheist and agnostic, believers in God, and more [emphasis added].[27]

And:

Our beliefs are diverse and inclusive. We have no shared creed. Our shared covenant…supports “the free and responsible search for truth and meaning.” Though Unitarianism and Universalism were both liberal Christian traditions, this responsible search has led us to embrace diverse teachings from Eastern and Western religions and philosophies….

We are united in our broad and inclusive outlook, and in our values, as expressed in our seven Principles. We are united in shared experience: our open and stirring worship services, religious education, and rites of passage; our work for social justice; our quest to include the marginalized; our expressions of love.[28]

And:

In Unitarian Universalism, you can bring your whole self: your full identity, your questioning mind, your expansive heart. By creating meaningful communities that draw from many wisdom traditions, and more, we are embodying a vision “beyond belief:” a vision of peace, love, and understanding.

We have more than one way of experiencing the world and understanding the sacred….

Explore the links below to learn how Unitarian Universalists weave these traditions and identities into who they are today.

Atheist and Agnostic / Buddhist / Christian / Earth-Centered / Hindu / Humanist / Jewish / Muslim[29]

This commitment to openness to belief is matched by a commitment to openness in praxis.

Many Unitarian Universalists and our congregations celebrate Christian holidays like Christmas, Jewish holidays like Passover, and Pagan Winter Solstice, among others. Our holiday services use the stories and traditions creatively, calling us to our deeper humanity and our commitment to the good.[30]

How compatible is this Unitarian Universalist self-understanding with Judaism?

 

  1. God
    The Torah says: I am the ETERNAL your God who brought you out of the land of Egypt, the house of bondage; you shall have no other gods besides Me.[31] But a Unitarian Universalist is free to choose to worship multiple deities or powers, including the earth, Jesus,[32] Hindu deities, and more; or no deities.[33] It may well be that as an individual, a UU feels most comfortable relating to God as articulated by Jews. But according to the UU website, UU worship is characterized by the inclusion of spiritual practices (prayers, holidays, and rituals) from all traditions. For a Jew to engage in the worship of any power in addition to God is to engage in shituf, adding other powers alongside the One God, and we are forbidden to do so.[34]
  2. Torah
    To be a ben/bat b’rit means to be committed to the primacy and exclusivity of Torah as one’s spiritual path. UUs are committed to finding meaning equally in a range of places. How can a committed Unitarian Universalist affirm the unique authority and exclusive claim of Torah in their life? As this committee has said:

    Reform Judaism is a religious movement of Jews dedicated to the covenant between God and the Jewish people. If we do not insist that the ger meet this fundamental standard and find herself ready to affirm the reality of God in Jewish religious life and experience, it would be a legitimate question whether we have any standards at all.[35]

    In the case before us, we can simply replace the word “God” with the word “Torah.” This individual may feel that her religious outlook and way of life are compatible with a Jewish outlook and way of life. But avowing a desire to commit to Torah while also maintaining a commitment to remain open to other ideas, philosophies, religions, and spiritual practices is completely illogical. The Sinai covenant requires an exclusive commitment on our part, not just an agreement to go along with it as long as it is compatible with another system of sacred meaning that holds one’s primary loyalty.

  3. Israel
    Each of us has multiple identities, and at different times and in different contexts we bond with different circles—by family, by family role, by gender, by nationality, by politics, by skin color, by leisure interest, by occupation, etc. But kol Yisrael areivim zeh bazeh—“All Israel are responsible one for the other.” We Jews are an extended family; we are each other’s community. And our collective relationship with God calls us to be an am kadosh, a holy people, of which the synagogue, the k’hilah k’doshah (holy community), is a representation in miniature. Just as we may not simultaneously be married to two people, so we may not be fully committed to two sacred paths, or two holy communities. The synagogue must be a Jew’s holy community. Yes, there are Jews who find meaning in Unitarian Universalism. But as the UU website shows, they do it by selecting elements of their Jewish heritage to fit into the UU framework.

    Many Unitarian Universalists (UUs) have a connection to Judaism. Whether we are ethnically, culturally, or spiritually Jewish, whether we’re married to a Jewish person, or simply inspired by Jewish wisdom, we have a place in Unitarian Universalism. One of the six sources we draw upon in our worship and religious education is “Jewish and Christian teachings which call us to respond to God’s love by loving our neighbors as ourselves.”
    We honor Jewish holidays with a progressive and inclusive twist. UUs with Jewish heritage hold Passover seders, celebrate Hanukkah, and mark the High Holy Days. When we worship together, Judaism comes into play in a variety of ways depending on the congregation. In the fall our Sunday services often draw on themes from Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. Our winter holiday-themed services often tell the story of Hanukkah. In the spring, we tell the stories of Moses and the Exodus, and some congregations gather around an all-ages all-faiths table to join in a celebratory Passover Seder led by Jewish UUs. Any time of year in our congregations, we may hear wisdom from the Bible, some midrash, a Hasidic tale, or a funny story from a Jewish culture.[36


    This is not, by any stretch of the imagination, living in covenantal relationship with the God of Sinai.

    We are troubled that this prospective convert cannot see any conflict between Unitarian Universalism and Judaism. Yes, both traditions reject the trinitarian doctrine that became the basis of organized Christianity; but so does Islam, and no one would claim that one can simultaneously be a faithful Jew and a faithful Muslim. To reduce Judaism to the rejection of trinitarianism is absurdly simplistic, and deeply disingenuous. We do not intend to disparage Unitarian Universalism in any way. As the Pittsburgh Platform put it, “We recognize in every religion an attempt to grasp the Infinite, and in every mode, source or book of revelation held sacred in any religious system the consciousness of the indwelling of God in man.”[37] But that does not mean that all traditions are interchangeable. To be a Jew is to follow a distinct and distinctive spiritual path. The UU path is perfectly acceptable for a UU. We cannot say, however, that it is an acceptable path for a Jew who wants to be faithful to the covenant between God and the Jewish people.

    We are in no way closing the door to interfaith activities. Nor are we engaging in a knee-jerk Jewish reaction to anything with Christian overtones, however attenuated and superficial. We are not saying that Jews should not attend, as guests, the sacred experiences of our neighbors, our friends, and, sometimes, our relatives. We value the opportunity to engage, as individuals and as congregations, with our neighbors from other religious traditions, in ways that respect the distinctiveness and maintain the integrity of all traditions present. Indeed, as the chasm grows in our society between those who live with an awareness of the transcendent and those who are insensible of it, it is not at all surprising that religious Jews will sometimes find more commonality with religious non-Jews than with non-religious Jews. But all of that is different from what we are facing here, which is the contention that one can be simultaneously a Jew and something else, that one can live wholeheartedly devoted to two paths. For faithful Jews that is beyond the pale.

 

III. Additional considerations
The would-be giyoret argues that she knows many Jewish UUs, including UU ministers, apparently implying that it would be unfair to hold her to higher standards than born Jews. It is true that born Jews can explore other paths, and that “they remain part of us as long as they do not abandon our people or join a different religion.”[38] But a Jew who indicates that they are “separating themselves from the community” (poresh min hatzibur) by adopting another religion is considered a mumar, a “changed” Jew, i.e., an apostate. The mumar does not cease to be a Jew; Jewishness—acquired through birth or through conversion—is permanent. However, the mumar ceases to be a Jew in good standing in the community, and is excluded from participation in Jewish ritual.[39] Were any beit din to convert this woman, she would immediately become a mumar, and therefore no beit din should convert her. If at any time she wishes to commit to an exclusive fidelity and enter the covenant, she would be welcome.

Furthermore, this individual is about to become a UU minister. Were a beit din to convert her, she would then constitute a role model for Jews who might be exploring Unitarian Universalism. They would learn from her that it is perfectly acceptable for a Jew to share their commitment to God and Torah with other religious frameworks, and that it is perfectly acceptable for a Jew to participate wholeheartedly in a wide variety of spiritual practices that, in their own context, teach messages that are not compatible with a Jewish covenantal commitment. At that point she would become, for them, chotei umachti et harabim—“one who transgresses and causes others to transgress.”[40]

Finally, the question alludes to the fact that this individual is in a relationship with a Jew. Although conversion for the purpose of marriage is expressly forbidden by the Talmud and the codes, nevertheless the very same halachic literature has plenty of examples of individuals whose conversions were not purely motivated by religious devotion, but who came to a genuine devotion.[41] In the modern era, the reality is that many individuals first encounter Judaism through a prospective spouse, and we are happy for it. As this committee has said:   “…[I]t is difficult to imagine a more ‘sincere’ purpose for choosing Judaism than the desire to join one’s spouse in creating a cohesive Jewish home and family.”[42] In the case before us, however, it is clear that conversion would not lead to a “cohesive Jewish home and family.”

IV. Conclusion

In 1971, a distressed rabbi inquired of R. Solomon Freehof concerning a proposed interfaith activity that was acceptable to the Christians involved, but trod on Jewish sensibilities. In supporting the rabbi’s negative response, Freehof offered commiseration: “Here, therefore, is again a case where the ecumenical mood unfairly makes us look narrow and provincial.”[43] Half a century later, those sentiments still resonate. We want to be open and welcoming to all those who sincerely want to join us. But in a time and place where many people think that religious identity is just as fluid and self-defined as gender identity, we must dissent, and insist on the uniqueness and distinctiveness of the covenant between God and Israel, and expect that those who join us will accept what that means. We therefore advise the beit din that they should not proceed with this conversion.

CCAR Responsa Committee
Joan S. Friedman, chair
Howard L. Apothaker
Daniel Bogard
Carey Brown
Lawrence A. Englander
Lisa Grushcow
Audrey R. Korotkin
Rachel S. Mikva
Amy Scheinerman
Brian Stoller
David Z. Vaisberg
Dvora E. Weisberg
Jeremy Weisblatt

 

[1] Moshe Zemer, “Ambivalence in Proselytism,” in Walter Jacob and Moshe Zemer, editors, Conversion to Judaism in Jewish Law, Studies in Progressive Halacha, vol. 3 (Pittsburgh: Freehof Institute of Progressive Halacha, 1994), 93; David Ellenson, Tradition in Transition (New York: Lanham, 1989), 92-93.
[2] Mark Washofsky, Jewish Living: A Guide to Contemporary Reform Practice (New York: UAHC Press, 2000), 210.
[3] Bet Yosef to Tur YD 268 s.v. u-mah she-katav rabeinu.
[4] See David L. Lieber, “Strangers and Gentiles,” in Encyclopaedia Judaica, 2nd ed., edited by Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik, (Detroit, MI: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007), Vol. 19, 241-242. Gale eBooks (accessed July 20, 2020). https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/CX2587519250/GVRL?u=ohlnk162&sid=GVRL &xid=ee7b53d5.
[5] See the extensive discussion of whether to render the classical Greek term Ioudeios as Jews or Judeans in English, and the implications of that decision, in Timothy Michael Law and Charles Halton, editors, Jew and Judean: A MARGINALIA Forum on Politics and Historiography in the Translation of Ancient Texts (Creative Commons, Marginalia Review of Books, 26 August 2014).
[6] Adele Reinhartz, “Ruth,” in Adele Berlin and Marc Brettler, editors, The Jewish Study Bible, 2nd edition (NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 1574.
[7] See Shaye J.D. Cohen, The Beginnings of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
[8] BT Avodah Zarah 64b; Yad, H. Melakhim 8:10.
[9] BT Y’vamot 47b; Ruth Rabbah 2:22-25, 3:5.
[10] Ruth 1:8-18.
[11] BT Y’vamot 47a-b.
[12] “Now then, if you will obey Me faithfully and keep My covenant, you shall be my treasured possession among all the peoples. Indeed, all the earth is Mine, but you shall be to Me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation (Ex. 19:5).” “Then [Moses] took the record of the covenant and read it aloud to the people. And they said: ‘All that the ETERNAL has spoken, we will do and obey!’ (Ex. 24:7)” “I make this covenant, with its sanctions, not with you alone, but with but both with those who are standing here with us this day before the ETERNAL our God and with those who are not with us here today (Deut. 30:13).”
[13] BT Gerim 2:4.
[14] M. B’rachot 2:2.
[15] BT Y’vamot 47b, Rashi s.v. u-modi’in oto mik’tzat mitzvot.
[16] Yad H. Issurei Bi’ah 13:4.
[17] See Moshe David Herr et al., “Rome,” in Encyclopaedia Judaica, 2nd ed., edited by Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik, vol. 17 (Detroit, MI: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007), 406-417. Gale eBooks (accessed July 22, 2020). https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/CX2587516895/GVRL?u=ohlnk162&sid=GVRL&xid=188ad9fb. On the presence of pagans in synagogues see, e.g., Paula Fredericksen, When Christians Were Jews: The First Generation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 190f.
[18] For a contemporary parallel, consider this: The booklet published by the US Citizenship and Immigration Service for immigrants to use in preparing for their citizenship test begins with an introduction to the US constitution, but nowhere explicitly states that the US is not a monarchy. US Citizenship and Immigration Service, Learn About the United States: Quick Civics Lessons for the Naturalization Test, revised February 2019. https://www.uscis.gov/citizenship/learners/study-test/study-materials-civics-test. Accessed 3 July 2020.
[19] Yad H. Issurei Bi’ah 14:2. His view was strenuously endorsed by the Maggid Mishneh in his comment on H. Issurei Bi’ah 14:1.
[20] Tur ShA YD 268.
[21] Yad H. Issurei Bi’ah 13:17; ShA YD 268:12. There is extensive discussion of this question in the Entsiklopedya Talmudit entry on Gerut (vol. 6, columns 431ff.).
[22] ShU”T Ḥemdat Shlomo Yoreh De’ah 29-30, cited in “Gerut,” Entsiklopedya Talmudit, vol. 6, col. 231, n. 80.
[23] Washofsky, Jewish Living, 210.
[24] Reform Responsa for the 21st Century (RR21), vol. 2, 5764.3: “May a Jew Join the Society of Friends?” https://www.ccarnet.org/ccar-responsa/nyp-no-5764-3/ .
[25] https://www.uua.org/beliefs/who-we-are/history. Accessed 17 July 2020.
[26] Mark W. Harris, Unitarian Universalist Origins: Our Historic Faith. https://www.uua.org/beliefs/who-we-are/history/faith. Accessed 17 July 2020.
[27] https://www.uua.org/beliefs/who-we-are. Accessed 17 July 2020.
[28] https://www.uua.org/beliefs/what-we-believe. Accessed 17 July 2020.
[29] https://www.uua.org/beliefs/what-we-believe/beliefs. Reformatted to save space. Accessed 17 July 2020.
[30] https://www.uua.org/beliefs/what-we-do/worship/holidays. Accessed 17 July 2020.
[31] Ex. 20:2–3.
[32] The Unitarian Universalist Christian Fellowship web page states: “Most Unitarian Universalist Christians vary in their opinions about the relationship of Jesus to God.  Some would be comfortable stating that Jesus was the Son of God; meaning that his relationship with God, while a mystery, imbued him with a special quality of being and knowing that has not been experienced since.” http://uuchristian.org/our-history-beliefs. Accessed 17 July 2020.
[33] On the difference between an atheist and an agnostic with respect to conversion, see American Reform Responsa (ARR) #65 “Gerut and the Question of Belief” regarding the conversion of a professed agnostic. It concludes: “We would not have accepted her if she denied the existence of God, but we should accept this convert with the feeling that her attachment to Judaism and the knowledge of it are sufficient to bring her into Judaism and to help her develop a commitment to this religion.  As her Jewish life continues, she may also change her views on the nature of God.” https://www.ccarnet.org/ccar-responsa/arr-209-211/.
[34] Yad H. De’ot 1:6. See Recent Reform Responsa (RRR) #10: “Jew Joining the Unitarian Church.” https://www.ccarnet.org/ccar-responsa/rrr-56-58/.
[35] Teshuvot for the Nineties (TFN) 5754.15: “Atheists, Agnostics, and Conversion to Judaism.” https://www.ccarnet.org/ccar-responsa/tfn-no-5754-15-147-152/.
[36] https://www.uua.org/beliefs/what-we-believe/beliefs/judaism. Accessed 17 July 2020.
[37] “Declaration of Principles” (1885), https://www.ccarnet.org/rabbinic-voice/platforms/article-declaration-principles/.
[38] TFN 5754.15.
[39] BT Sanhedrin 44a: “A Jew who has sinned remains a Jew.” The literature on the mumar is voluminous. R. Solomon Freehof provided a compendium of the major sources in Reform Jewish Practice and Its Rabbinic Background [vol. I] (Cincinnati: HUC Press, 1944), 140-144. See also Reform Responsa for the 21st Century (RR21), vol. 1, 5758.11: “On Patrilineal Descent, Apostasy, and Synagogue Honors,” https://www.ccarnet.org/ccar-responsa/nyp-no-5758-11/.
[40] Rashi to BT B’rachot 35b s.v. le-Yerav’am ben Nevat; and He’arot of R. Elyashiv ad loc.: “The explanation is simple: When a person commits a transgression and others see him, they will learn from him to do it.”
[41] See, e.g., the well-known story about Hillel and the proselytes, BT Shabbat 31a.
[42] TFN 5754.15.
[43] R. Solomon B. Freehof to R. Morris Kipper, Coral Gables, FL, 20 Apr 1971. “Responsa Corr Apr May Jun 71,” Freehof Papers, Rodef Shalom Congregation, Pittsburgh.

 

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

JRJ, Spring 1991, 69-73

CONVERSION AND MARRIAGE AFTER TRANSSEXUAL SURGERY

She’ela

A man who is an applicant for conversion received extensive therapy at a recognized psychiatric institution that offers a sex- change psychotherapy program. Subsequently he underwent surgery; his male genitalia were removed and a cosmetic vagina was constructed. However, this having taken place he now had a change of heart and no longer desired to be a woman. Since he had never declared himself publicly or legally as a woman, he continued his status as a man and was later married in a civil ceremony to his financee, a Jewish woman who is satisfied to live with him permanently, despite his mutilated condition. She supports his desire to become a Jew. The couple have been attending Shabbat services regularly.

Question: Should we admit the 29-year-old person to the Jewish Information Course program established jointly by the Reform congregations in our city, holding out the likelihood that in the end there would be            And if he is converted, should the rabbi sanctify the civil marriage through Kiddushinl Teshuva?

 

First of all, let us briefly look at the admissibility of sex change altogether. Since the Halacha regards the mitzvah of procreation as a chief purpose of marriage, the poskim forbade the removal of male genitalia in the androginos, the person who possesses both male and female genitalia. Even more so would they forbid the removal of genitalia from an otherwise normally-formed man who wishes to be a woman.

Exceptions were made only occasionally. Thus, Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg permitted transsexual surgery (from male to female) in the borderline case of an infant whose external genitalia were those of a female, though chromosome analysis and the presence of a testicle showed that the gender might be male.9 According to Rabbi Waldenberg, the general rule is that the “visible, external organs” determine sexual identity, and in the case of X he would therefore not have allowed the surgery.

The issue before us is, however, not the permissibility of the surgery but rather, since it has already taken place, whether Kid- dushin may now be celebrated.

There is a good deal of halachic discussion of the question whether the marriage of a transsexual is still a marriage and whether gittin is necessary or redundant. When the operation has already taken place, most follow Rabbenu Asher who says that a man whose genitalia have been removed is no longer able to con- tract a valid marriage — even though his sexual identity may not be affected and he is still considered a man.10 The prohibition of the law in Deuteronomy 23:2, as interpreted by tradition, is deemed decisive.

Are there reasons why Reform Judaism might reach a different conclusion? There might be, for it would view the biblical passage differently. It would see it as a time-bound response to a particular situation, namely the use of castrated men in society and this original purpose of the law has fallen away.

In addition. Reform also would accept the findings of modern science, which holds that external genitalia may not reflect the true identity of the individual. Rabbi Solomon B. Freehof was therefore ambivalent and suggested that the rabbi be guided by the attitude of the community: if the state issues a license to a trans- sexual it may be assumed that his/her change has the recognition of the law and therefore Kiddushin may take place. Subsequently, a CCAR Responsa Committee which dealt with the matter in some detail also allowed sex change as a permissible procedure and did not object to Kiddushin.13

Despite these precedents in our movement, we remain troubled about the matter. The sho’el notes that X received the best avail- able scientific and psychological advice before his transsexual surgery was effected. May we therefore assume that there was medical evidence that X’s chromosomes showed that he was genetically a female, or that his hormone functions made him more female than male? In some institutions that deal with per-sons such as him there is a period during which the patient receives hormonal treatment and lives for a while as a woman. Only when the results of this trial period are conclusive is the surgery performed.

Was this done in X’s case and was his preference for femaleness psychologically founded? The answer is not available to us and may not be available to the rabbi either. Still, we have to believe that no reputable institution would have proceeded with the sur- gery had there not been sufficient indications that strong female characteristics were in evidence. We would therefore consider the presumption of X’s maleness to have been seriously weakened and would advise the rabbi not to proceed with Kiddushin, should X be converted to Judaism.

Of course, even though no wedding is performed, we assume that X will be treated with all the compassion and concern that such a tormented individual desperately requires.

The question of giyur. Deuteronomy 23:2 states: “ yavo pet- sua daka ucherut shofcha bikehal Adonai,” which the JPS transla- tion renders as “No one whose testes are crushed or whose mem- ber is cut off shall be admitted into the Congregation of the Lord.” This would appear to exclude the person in question (“X”) from membership in the Jewish people, but already Isaiah (56:3 ff) mit- igated the application of this rule when he spoke of God having special regard for the saris. Subsequently, rabbinic tradition understood the intent of “lo yavo … bikehal” to be that such a man should not marry an Israelite woman, while his status as a Jew was not affected.

There is therefore no objection in principle to the conversion of a person whose genitalia are mutilated or missing altogether, even when he is a seris adam, one whose mutilation was effected by human hand and not by birth or illness ( chama). In these cases, immersion alone suffices for giyur. We see no reason to depart from this view and therefore hold that X’s desire to become a ger has to be treated on its own merits.

The question then arises whether X, with his history of identity problems, is qualified as a prospective convert. Should we not have some concern about the mental stability of a person who, having undergone this radical and irreversible operation, now desires to be a man after all?

The Rambam deals with a convert who has been admitted with- out proper examination or instruction in the mitzvot.3 But since the error has been made, he says, his conversion is deemed valid ex post facto, bedi’avad, though one should be troubled about the person until his sincerity is fully established. The Rambam oper- ates here on the principle of chazaka, and thus, once giyur has taken place the presumption is in favor of the ger.4 But before the event, lechatechila, it is different, for the fitness of the prospec-

five convert should be most carefully considered.

Rabbi Walter Jacob issued a teshuva on the question how the mental competency of a convert might be assessed, and cautioned that “we cannot accept individuals who do not meet these prereq- uisites [of mental competency] .”

In the case before us, when could it be said that X has shown that his intention to become a Jew is firm and not likely subject to reversal? As a minimum we suggest a cautionary waiting period, like the traditional cycle of three Pilgrim Festivals (which waiting period applies in other cases). Since the conversion program in the  sho’eVs city lasts for eight months, let X enter the course but

let him also be informed that, upon conclusion of the program, there would be a further time span, say a year, after which the beit din would rule on his admissibility to giyur.

While this is the majority opinion of the Committee on Respon- sa, other members disagree and would not admit X to the program at all. They would consider X as a person who has already shown his instability in a matter that fundamentally affects his physical identity. They would not wish conversion to be another stage of the person’s psychiatric meandering. The majority, as indicated, would leave the matter to the discretion of the beit din.

Should the rabbi officiate at X’s marriage? The question of admissibility to Kiddushin is different from that of admissibility to giyur. In the latter, it is not necessary to deal with a presumption of X’s maleness ( chezkatzachar) because we convert X as a human being and not as either a male or a female. But in Kid- dushin the chazaka may not be sufficient, and additional matters need to be considered.

 

 

CCAR Committee on Responsa W. Gunther Plaut, Chair Mark Washofsky, Vice Chair Judith Zabarenko Abrams Richard A. Block A. Stanley Dreyfus Walter Jacob Peter S. Knobel Dow Marmur Richard Rosenthal Louis J. Sigel Moshe Zemer Samuel E. Karff Joseph B. Glaser, Elliot L. Stevens

 

RR 82-85

Conversion and Church Membership

A man wanting to marry a Jewess is willing to go through conversion and join the Jewish congregation, but wishes nevertheless to remain a member of the Christian congregation. What should be the attitude of the Jewish congregation? (From Rabbi S. Andhil Fineberg, Mount Vernon, New York)

The very fact that such a question arises every now and then these days is an evidence of the modern mood in which sharp distinction between religious groups and traditions tends to grow vague. We Jews, for example, are now accustomed to the thought of having a Jew belong to three or four congregations, each of a different attitude in Judaism. In many cities a man will belong to an Orthodox, a Modern Orthodox, a Conservative, and a Reform congregation. This practice is deemed quite proper and often even praiseworthy.

Yet the idea would have been ludicrous a generation or two ago. The responsa of the rabbis of Hungary and Galicia discuss whether Orthodox Jews should associate with the Reformers even in charity, or even whether Orthodox should associate with what might today be called semi- modern Orthodox, the group known in Hungary for historical reasons as the “Status Quo.” These “Status Quo” organizations were strictly Orthodox, but the question arose whether one could eat of the Shechita of the Status Quo Shochet. Possibly it is to the good that the sense of denominational separation has weakened among the Jews. But should we likewise consider it praiseworthy if religious separateness ceases to be sharp between Jews and Christians? And could we contemplate, without disapproval, Jews and Christians belonging to each others’ congregations as well as to their own?

Obviously there is a difference between crossing lines that separate Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Judaism, and crossing lines that separate Judaism and Christianity. Jewish life is undergoing constant change in America. Families have roots in many types of Jewish congregations. The difference in observance is getting less, but between Jews and Christians, although social contacts may increase, the basic theological difference is unshaken. If, as we must assume, belonging to a congregation means accepting its teaching, then a Jew cannot belong to a Christian congregation. Christian congregations are trinitarian and Jewish law prohibits a Jew from adding other divine personages to God in his prayers. Likewise, Christians cannot be part of a Jewish religious community and still be Christians, because they would then have to deny the role of Jesus as Christ.

But it happens that in our present social conditions people contribute to many congregations whose doctrines they do not accept. This is due to our praiseworthy American mood of interdenominational charity. It is therefore quite conceivable that a Christian would want to make a donation to a synagogue, and this is quite in accordance with Jewish law (see Reform Jewish Practice, II, 45 ff.). He might consider his dues as merely a charitable contribution. This is, of course, a possibility, but it certainly implies a confusion of theologies.

However, since the case you mention involves the Christian’s making himself eligible to be married by a rabbi, then he means his membership in the Jewish congregation to be an evidence of conversion. Conversion is something absolute in the eyes of Jewish law. It is so absolute that the law in the Talmud (as codified in the Shulchan Aruch, Yore Deah 268 : 9) says that a proselyte is like a newborn babe. He has not even any relatives left in his former life. This is, of course, an overstatement which the law itself modifies. But it means that the division must be clean-cut. (By the way, I am certain that this is the essential meaning of the two or three statements in the Gospels when Jesus speaks to those who would join his movement. He says: “Unless ye are like little children, ye cannot enter the kingdom of heaven.” He meant: “Give up all your past and be born anew.” This was the classic Jewish concept of conversion.) The man of whom you speak cannot, therefore, either by logic or by the spirit of the law, continue his old affiliations together with the new.

Besides, the Talmudic law questions the validity of any conversion entered into merely for the purpose of marriage; it questions its sincerity. If the man involved refuses to give up Christianity, then his acceptance of Judaism cannot possibly be wholehearted or sincere and he cannot be accepted as a proselyte.

So, in spite of the general blurring of boundaries (which is part of the spirit of the age and which also has its good side), nevertheless, on the basis of both common sense and the Jewish law, which requires in conversion a clean-cut separation and unquestionable sincerity, such an arrangement as suggested is utterly unacceptable under Jewish law and tradition.

RR 87-90

Conversion Without Marriage

May we convert, without consent of parents, a fifteen year-old Christian girl who is voluntarily attending the congregation’s Sunday school? (From Rabbi Meyer Heller, San Francisco, California)

You raise a difficult and painful question. Much of whatever answer we can give depends rather on judgment than on Halacha. Theoretically, of course, any conversion is permitted, especially a conversion that has not to do with marriage. According to the Talmudic law, conversions for the purpose of marriage are specifically considered untrustworthy but, as far as that is concerned, at the Central Conference of American Rabbis, after the Report on Mixed Marriage and Intermarriage was adopted, it was decided definitely that we do not deprecate such conversions as are made for the purpose of marriage, since the desire to establish a harmonious household would help, rather than hinder, the sincerity of the conversion. But strictly speaking, such a conversion as the one you describe would be more in harmony with Talmudic law than those premarriage conversions which we make frequently.

Also, I presume we must consider this girl who is fifteen as beyond the religious age of consent or religious responsibility, which is thirteen for boys and twelve for girls. This applies to Jewish children. I presume we may assume that these maturity stages apply also to Gentiles in Jewish law. So much for the law. But from our modern point of view the situation is much more difficult. The old law was dubious as to the validity or actuality of family religions among non-Jews (pagans) in those days. Therefore they would question whether a proselyte could marry someone closely related to him by marriage in his preproselyte stage. They later prohibited it on practical grounds, but only on practical grounds. But the Gentiles in our environment are not idolaters and we respect their family status, and, especially nowadays, we must consider that this is a child of Christian parents. They may not object today to our converting their child away from their religion, but may bitterly object tomorrow, and we must be considerately cognizant of their rights as parents. The Christian family, as a family, should not be broken up in this way.

There is a wider aspect to the problem. We Jews have suffered greatly from the snatching away of Jewish children and the breaking of our family bonds by the church. We stood on firm, human, moral grounds. We cut the ground from under us if we now do the same thing.

Furthermore, while there are references, chiefly in the New Testament, that Jews once engaged in an active conversionist effort, all we can really learn from the Hellenistic period in Jewish history is that they tried to influence the pagans, but not that they tried actually to convert them. But whatever it was that occurred in those ancient days, for centuries we avoided conversion and missionizing. This was based upon our respect for the Christian religion. They were “children of Noah,” righteous, observing the seven commandments of decency, and “had their portion in the world to come.” Would that Christianity had respected and would still respect, in its canon law, the status of Judaism as we, in actual Jewish law, respect the status of Christianity. When we start converting, we are destroying a moral decency which we have maintained.

When we convert in preparation for marriage, our fellow citizens understand it. They know we hesitate even then and they know also that our motive is to establish a harmonious home. But just to convert a Christian to Judaism, as Christians try to convert Jews to Christianity, violates the type of respect which we hope will someday be given our faith by the faiths we respect.

All this is based rather on the spirit of Jewish tradition than on its actual letter. The girl in this case may attend any of our classes. (See Reform Jewish Practice, II, 72 ff. on the right of Christians to attend our religious schools.) But I urge you to discourage her strongly and, if possible, not to convert her.

RR 85-87

Converting a Married Woman

A Jewish man marries a Catholic girl in another coun try in a Catholic marriage ceremony. Later they come to the rabbi. The woman wants to be converted to Judaism and they want to be married as Jews and fledge to live as Jews. Is there any objection to the rabbi converting the wife and remarrying the couple who had been married previously by a Catholic mar riage?

There is, of course, considerable Orthodox objection to converting to Judaism any non-Jewish woman who has lived with a Jewish man in marriage or common-law marriage or civil marriage, but this objection is not always heeded, and it is certainly the attitude of the Central Conference of American Rabbis to convert women married to Jews.

As for the status of the Catholic marriage, it is clear that we consider Catholic marriage valid for Catholics, but whether it is valid for Jews is a complex question. The problem arose first with the Marranos, many of whom were married in churches and later escaped. Sometimes the woman escaped alone and the husband was killed. Is this woman a perpetual agunah, or was the church marriage not a marriage and she therefore free? There are two classic responsa on it. One is by Isaac Bar Sheshes. In his Responsum #6 he declares it is no marriage and that the woman is free to be remarried. His younger contemporary and rival in Algiers, Simon ben Zemach Duran, says (Vol. III, #47) that the church marriage is a marriage if there were valid Jewish witnesses present; otherwise it is not. In general, the weight of the authorities is that it is not a valid marriage if a Jew is involved. See the authorities quoted in Freimann, Seder Kiddushin, pp. 346 ff. For the whole discussion, see the “Report on Mixed Marriage and Intermarriage,” Central Conference of American Rabbis Yearbook, Vol. 57 (1947).

Actually, the status of a couple’s previous marriage is no concern of the rabbi. If a mixed-marriage couple comes before him with the request that the Gentile be converted, if he is convinced that they are both sincere, he certainly may convert a married woman as readily as he might a single woman even though, as mentioned above, some Orthodox authorities would oppose remarrying a woman to a man to whom she had already been married; but on this the Conference is liberal, and many Orthodox rabbis are likewise liberal. Otherwise we would not be able to remarry people who had previously been married by civil authority because the same objection would apply, since they had lived together. It is for the rabbi to satisfy himself that the pledge they make to raise their children as Jewish, to live a Jewish life, is a sincere one. If he is convinced of that, he certainly may convert and marry them. All this is understood as from our more liberal Reform point of view. This is the clear decision of the Conference; see “Report on Mixed Marriage and Intermarriage,” from which I quote:

If, however, the Christian member of the couple desires to convert, we should accept him or her, if sincere, as a candidate for proselytizing. In this regard our attitude would be consistent with that which we take in the case of a mixed civil marriage, in spite of the fact that under such circumstances traditional law would hesitate to accept the convert. Similarly, after conversion we would insist that the couple shall be remarried by a Jewish ceremony, (p. 12)

RRR 78-83

A Questionable Conversion

The rabbi is on the faculty of a Christian theological school, giving a course of lectures on Judaism. A young Christian theological student has become in creasingly interested in Judaism and is now asking for extra instruction, since he desires to be converted to Judaism and even to study for the rabbinate. The rabbi has two grounds for hesitation in this matter: first, that it would create ill will for him to convert to Judaism a student who is preparing for the Christian ministry in the school where the rabbi is a guest pro fessor and, secondly, the student himself is not quite emotionally balanced. (From Rabbi David Polish, Chicago, Illinois)

There is a basic question with regard to conversion which must be answered first, before this specific question can be adequately discussed. Is there an obligation incumbent upon the rabbi to gain a convert? Such a question would be quite unnecessary if it were a Christian minister confronted with an analogous problem. If it were a question of converting a Jew to Christianity, the Christian minister or professor (except under special circumstances) would not hesitate because it is a general duty incumbent upon all Christians to accept, in fact to seek, converts. But is that a duty with us? In other words, is it a mitzvah to seek or even to acquire gerim?

As is well known, the legal literature is full of contradictory statements with regard to the relationship of Judaism toward proselytes. Nevertheless, it is possible to find a general direction through these varied opinions. There must have been times when, owing to the outer circumstances, the accepting of proselytes brought trouble to the community from one source or another. It is evident that such times reflected themselves in the statement of the Talmud (b. Kiddushin 70b) that “gerim are worse to Israel than a wound or a scab.” Also, “Punishment will come to those who accept gerim” (b. Yevamoth 109 b ) and “Gerim hinder the coming of the Messiah” (Niddah 13 b). On the other hand, there were times when proselytes brought blessing to the community. It was such experiences which evoked the statement in the Talmud (b. Pesachim 87b) that the Jews were exiled among the nations chiefly in order that proselytes join them.

There is one fairly clear indication in the Talmud itself that they did consider the reception of proselytes to be a duty (mitzvah). In b. Yevamoth 47b, the Talmud asks, “Why, after the candidate’s consent do we circumcise him at once?” The answer given is: “Because we must never delay the carrying out of a mitzvah.”

The Tosafists also seem to have considered it a duty. (Cf. Tos. to Yevamoth 47a at the top of the page.) The opinion of the Tosafists is clearer in the comment in Gittin 88b (s.v., “E Hochi”). The problem discussed there is the fact that only ordained teachers have the right to make certain decisions. Then how can such disputes have been decided in Babylon (where ordination was not permitted)? The answer given in the Babylonian Talmud is that in everyday business matters we (the Babylonian teachers) are acting as agents for the Palestinians. To this the Tosafos says: “That is the reason we have the right to accept proselytes, even though the process requires ordained teachers [found only in Palestine].” Likewise, the Spanish Talmudist, Nissim Gerondi (“Ran,” fourteenth century): in his commentary to Alfasi (near the end of Gittin, chapter 9) he dis-cusses the same question which was discussed by Tosafists as to our right (being unordained) to decide certain disputes. He gives the same answer, namely, that we are the agents of the ordained Palestinian rabbis. Then he adds warmly: “If we may be their agents in everyday money matters, surely we may be their agents for the noble task of bringing proselytes under the wings of the Shechina!”

Shalom Kutno, in his well-known work on proselytizing (“U’ch’Torah Yeosey,” Facs, 1897) was confronted with the modern problem of Jews who had married unconverted Christians, and who demanded that their children be circumcised (see our responsum on “Circumcising Son of Gentile Wife,” p. 99). He is opposed to these demands on the ground that it does not mean genuine conversion. He is therefore embarrassed at the statement of Nissim Gerondi mentioned above, and says that Nissim referred only to those who come to Judaism out of genuine conviction. But merely to circumcise children of Gentile wives when we know that these children will not be raised as Jews is certainly not a mitzvah at all.

In spite of the opinions of the Tosafos and of Nissim Gerondi which imply that the reception of proselytes is a duty incumbent upon us, the matter was never definitely decided. Benzion Wacholder (in Historia Judaica, October, 1958) believes that the Tosafists (therefore the Franco German Jews) considered proselytizing a mitzvah, while the Spaniards did not. This distinction is certainly to be modified by the fact that it was the Spaniard Nissim Gerondi who made the warmest statement about proselytizing as a mitzvah.

Be that as it may, the status of proselytizing as a duty is still not at all clear. It would certainly not seem to be a well-established duty, for in countries where the government forbade proselytizing by Jews, the scholars immediately ceased to proselytize (cf. Moses Isserles in his gloss to Yore Deah 267 : 4). If the government had forbidden Schechita, for example, they would not have yielded so easily.

Certainly none of the lists of commandments include a commandment to seek or receive proselytes. It is not that the subject is avoided. The legal codes contain a number of items with regard to our relationship to proselytes, but not one of them declares the acquisition of proselytes to be a duty. What they do discuss is our duty to be decent to proselytes, once they have joined us. The Talmud says (b. Mezia 58 b )that you should never say to a proselyte, “Remember your past.” For example, in the listing of the negative and positive commandments in Minchas Chinuch, the positive commandment 432 says that it is a duty to love the proselyte. Then there are two negative commandments, 63 and 64, against oppressing or cheating them in any way. In other words, we must be kind and considerate to proselytes, but we are not in duty bound to seek for them. Hence, if there is any difficulty involved, if there is a question of ill will involved, there is nothing wrong, from the point of view of Jewish law, in neglecting the conversion for the sake of the welfare of the Jewish community. In fact, in many of the discussions of the laws of conversion, the respondent does not have the slightest hesitation in saying that “in this land where conversion is forbidden [as it was in certain countries] these laws do not apply.” In other words, they did not mind dispensing with proselytizing, since it was not an obligation.

There is, in addition, a further difficulty in this specific case: the emotional instability, or semi-instability of the candidate. Now, there is a large mass of law dealing with the status of the semi-insane (shota). Of course, the specific knowledge in the Talmud of the various states of mental instability was not great, and they coupled, for legal purposes, the unbalanced with the minor and the deaf-mute (cheresh, shota, vekotan). These laws deal with these classes with regard to acquisition and sale of property, and with regard to marriage and divorce. There is no specific legal discussion of the relationship of these people with proselytizing. However, the Talmud does say that we do not accept as a proselyte one who is motivated toward conversion by dreams (geray chalomos) (b. Yevamoth 24k).

Of course, it is clear from the Talmud and the Shulchan Aruch, which discuss the careful questioning to which a candidate is subjected, that they would not accept a proselyte unless he clearly understood and deeply appreciated all the elements involved in joining the community of Israel (see Yore Deah 268). Obviously, a proselyte then needed a clear mind and a balanced judgment or he could not appreciate what he needed to understand before declaring his full willingness to convert. It is clear that the law would frown upon accepting as a proselyte one whose judgment is clouded by emotional disturbance. In this case, the dictum of the Mishnah would apply (b. Kamma VIII: 4), that it is best not to have any dealings with a shota. The Mishnah means to say that if they injure you, they are not liable to pay any fine, and if you injure them,. you have to pay. You lose either way.

Since we are under no duty to convert, we may therefore hesitate whenever the good name of the community is involved; and since, clearly, conversion requires of the convert a full and deep understanding of what is involved, it is much better to avoid any conversion in this case.

RRR 87-91

Unprovable Claims to Conversion

A man aged forty-five has been married for several months. His wife is seeking an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that he misrepresented him self as a Jew at the time of the marriage. The man claims to be a Jew and has considered himself a Jew all his life. His mother was born a non-Jewess. His father, now eighty, states that his wife (the man’s mother) was converted by a Reform rabbi before their marriage. He can find no record of it. To add to the difficulty, the mother, now deceased, was buried in a non-Jewish cemetery. The son (who is now being sued for annulment) was circumcised at a Brith Mila, was Bar Mitzvah, and married by a Conservative rabbi. He was reared as a Jew and considers himself a Jew. He is contesting th e annulment on the grounds that if he does not, he will be indicating that he does not be lieve himself to be a Jew. Is the man to be considered a Jew or not, as far as Jewish law is concerned? (From Rabbi Selig Salkowitz, Reform Temple of Fair Lawn,Fair Lawn, New Jersey)

The problem is complicated. There are a number of crucial elements involved. The woman, who declares herself to be Orthodox, has evidently been instructed to contest the validity of the conversion of her husband’s mother by a Reform rabbi. If that conversion is invalid, her husband is the son of a Gentile and has misrepresented himself as a Jew. Therefore, the first important question is the validity of a Reform conversion.

It might be too much to expect a strictly Orthodox rabbi to acknowledge the validity of any Reform ceremony which varies from the norm laid down in the Shulchan Aruch. A Reform conversion certainly does not conform to that norm. The fact that we may instruct the candidate for conversion much more thoroughly in Jewish beliefs and history than any Orthodox rabbi would instruct her would be immaterial in the face of the fact that we generally omit the ceremonial requirement of sending her to the ritual bath (mikveh). It is the ritual that matters to the Orthodox rabbi and not whatever intellectual and moral preparation we may give her. While, therefore, the absence of the ritual bath prevents the Orthodox rabbi from acknowledging the validity of our conversion, the courts have no right to question it and to assume that there is only one authentic form of Judaism and that is Orthodoxy. With regard to our ceremonial disagreement with Orthodoxy, there is nothing for decent people to do but endure it, and learn somehow to achieve mutual respect. So the question of the wife’s refusal to acknowledge the authenticity of Reform conversion cannot be discussed with her. It can only be discussed in the courts, if necessary.

It is not only the Reform conversion which is here brushed aside; it is also the acceptance of the boy as a Jew by the Conservative rabbi which is here deemed irrelevant. The boy was circumcised as a Jew, was Bar Mitzvah, lived as a Jew. What objection is there, then, to considering him a Jew? It can only be that an Orthodox rabbi, rejecting the validity of the mother’s conversion, considers this boy to be a Gentile, and therefore in addition to being circumcised, he should have been sent to the mikveh. It would be on this basis only that the boy’s Jewishness could be denied. Again, it is the omission of a ceremonial which weighs more than the boy’s Jewish education, Bar Mitzvah, and his whole life as a Jew.

However, there is another question which involves a complicated problem in Jewish law. This problem revolves around the fact that the man’s father, now very old, can adduce no proofs that his wife was converted, as he claims she was. Such unprovable claims to conversion have evoked considerable discussion in the Talmud and in the Codes. The chief source of the laws involved is the Talmud in b. Yevamoth 47a, and then the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in Yore Deah 268 : 10 and 11. The various subdivisions of the problem are these: (a) a man claims to have been converted before a certain Jewish court; (b) a man claims to have been converted privately, not before a court; (c) a man was assumed to be a Jew but now he himself has raised a question and says he has been a Gentile but has been converted; (d) a man was assumed to be a Gentile but claims that he has been converted.

These various situations arouse different reactions in the minds of the legal authorities. In general, their answer is that the man claiming to have been converted, let us say privately (without the technical requirements which the court would demand), has a right to cast doubt upon his own Jewishness by raising this question, but he has no right to cast doubt upon the Jewish status of his children. That is to say, before he may now marry another Jewess he would need to take a ritual bath (assuming that he is already circumcised), but, since at the time that he makes the statement he is not surely Jewish, he is not eligible to testify in a Jewish court against his children. The children are of unquestioned Jewish status. ‘

There is some difference in the answers for each of the various categories mentioned above. But in general the tendency of the law is increasingly to accept a man’s statement if he says he has been converted. Thus Asher ben Yehiel in the “Piskey Harosh” 4 : 34, 35, sums up the law to his time when he says: if a man claims that he was converted before a certain court, he must bring proof (since a court’s actions are susceptible of proof), but all the proof that is needed is merely for people to say, “We have heard that he was converted.” Further, if a man says he was converted privately, he has to take the ritual bath before marrying a Jewess, but his sons are held to be Jewish. To Tur, Yore Deah 368, Joel Sirkes (Bach) says: “At all events, it is our custom to believe the man’s claims and even to marry him to a Jewess.” Then Joel Sirkes proceeds to explain away partially the objections of Maimonides against believing the man. Joel Sirkes’ statement is cited with approval by Sabbetai Cohen (Shach, to Shulchan Aruch, Yore Deah 368 : 10 and 11). Sirkes to the Tur also quotes the well-known legal authority Moses, of Coucy, in his “S’Mag,” who says: “This occurs every day. Strangers come (and claim to be Jews). We do not bother to investigate. We drink wine with them and eat meat from their slaughtering.” This general tendency of the law to accept the claim of a man that he is a Jew is reflected in a recent responsum by Isaac ben Aryeh Rudnik (“S’de Yitzchok,” London, 1961). The case with which he deals is that of a soldier who came to England from overseas, who claimed to be a Jew, married a Jewess; then his wife left him and lived with another man. Rabbi Rudnik decides that the marriage to the soldier who said he was a Jew is valid enough as Jewish marriage to require a Jewish divorce (get).

Of course, all this discussion involves the claimed conversion of a man. Our case here involves a woman whose conversion to Judaism is disputed. Nevertheless, the Shulchan Aruch understands that the above laws apply equally to man and woman. It cites the Talmudic law as follows (Yore Deah 268 : 10): “If a Gentile man or a Gentile woman come and say, ‘I have been converted’ . . . ,” and so forth. The spirit of the law is clear. It reveals a growing tendency to accept the claim of a person or a family to be Jewish. Furthermore, there is an overriding presumption in all such claims that families are assumed to be kosher (Jewish and legitimate) unless, of course, there is strong ground for doubt. This principle is stated in the Talmud (b. Kiddushin 76b).

Therefore, aside from Orthodox refusal to accept any conversion other than their own, a refusal which it is futile to debate, the overwhelming tendency of Jewish law in matters of unprovable claims for conversion is to accept the claim and to consider the person a Jew.

CURR 80-83

CONVERSION OF INFANTS

A Jewish couple from Colorado is adopting a Colorado infant child of a Gentile mother. The couple has moved to Massachusetts. Here the adoption cannot take place unless the social service agency involved (The Jewish Family and Child Service Agency of Denver) approves. The Jewish agency in Denver will not approve unless the child is first formally converted to Judaism. The questions, therefore, are as follows: According to Jewish law, can a Gentile child be converted unless the Gentile mother is also converted? What is the process of conversion? If a mikveh is to be used, cannot a more sanitary bathtub be used, since children are so susceptible to infection? (From Rabbi Bernard H. Bloom, Lexington, Massachusetts.)

FIRST of all, can a Gentile infant be converted without its mother being converted? The law stems from Talmud Kesubos 11 a. There it says clearly that if a Gentile mother brings a child for conversion, the Bes Din converts the child. The Talmud does not state that the mother needs to be converted too. When the law is given in the Shulchan Aruch, Yore Deah 268:7, no mention is made of a requirement that the mother be converted also. In fact, the law seems clearly stated as to avoid any such requirement.

The law adds that the child can repudiate the conversion when it grows up. This privilege of repudiation is questioned in an interesting way by Moses Sofer (Yore Deah 253; see Pische Teshuva to Yore Deah 268:7). He says that if the child’s parents are converted with him, he can never repudiate the conversion. So aside from the question as to whether he may or may not repudiate, it is clear, at all events, that the parents need not be converted with him.

Now, as to the process of conversion, the Orthodox law requires dipping in the mikveh, both for boy and girl infants. You ask whether a clean bathtub might not serve as well as the (possibly nonhygienic) mikveh. This question can make sense only on the basis of the desire to satisfy Orthodox opinion. To satisfy the Orthodox, nothing but a dipping in the regular mikveh will serve. It is true that a Jewish scholar tried to devise some sort of hygienic home tank in place of the communal mikveh, and although he wrote a book on it (“The Secret of the Jew,” Rabbi David Miller) nothing came of his suggestions. On the contrary, there is a movement in Orthodoxy in America to be stricter and stricter about the regulations of the mikveh. In fact, a recent immigrant, Rabbi Yom Tov Lippe Deutsch (Der Helmetzer) has been traveling through the country chang-ing the mikvehs in city after city, on the ground that the former Orthodox mikvehs were not kosher enough. You can be sure that no bathtub will satisfy the Orthodox. As a matter of fact, I am sure they would not be satisfied even if you arranged for the communal mikveh to be used. In fact, there has been a recent Halachic discussion raising doubt as to whether the Orthodox community should even make the mikveh available to non-Orthodox rabbis.

In general, therefore, it should be abundantly clear that no approximation of Orthodox procedures will ever satisfy the Orthodox, and sometimes the very attempt to approximate these procedures awaken indignation among them. The Bes Din of the Chief Rabbi of the British Empire has recently issued a special pamphlet denouncing the Reform Congregation in London because it (the Reform Congregation) has a Bes Din to issue bills of divorce. The Orthodox Bes Din considers this attempt to resemble Orthodoxy as a conscious deception of the community.

The most intelligent procedure, therefore, is to take for granted (which, of course, we must) that the Jewish social service authorities will not presume to raise any doubts that we Reform Jews are a legitimate form of Judaism and that our procedures are legitimately Jewish. We must never permit this to be questioned by any communal Jewish organization. In this matter of conversion of infants, we have a very definite and official Conference attitude, and it is stated in the official report on Marriage and Intermarriage, as follows:

“With regard to infants, the declaration of the parents to raise them as Jews shall be deemed as sufficient for conversion. This could apply, for example, to adopted children. This decision is in line with the traditional procedure in which, according to the Talmud, the parents bring young children (the Talmud speaks of children younger than the age of three) to be converted, and the Talmud comments that although an infant cannot give its consent, it is permissible to benefit somebody without his consent (or presence). On the same page the Talmud also speaks of a father bringing his children for conversion, and says that the children will be satisfied with the action of their father. If the parents therefore will make a declaration to the rabbi that it is their intention to raise the child as a Jew, the child may, for the sake of impressive formality, be recorded in the Cradle-Roll of the religious school and thus be considered converted.”

There may be some objection to our Conference procedure of the conversion of infants, on the grounds that a child attending our school may, nevertheless, join the religion of his mother and decide to be a Christian. However, the same objection could apply to the Orthodox procedure, since according to the law, an infant converted by mikveh, etc., has the right to repudiate later. The complication attendant upon such repudiation affects Orthodox law too. In the responsum of Moses Sofer referred to above, Yore Deah 253 discusses the question: How can we make a blessing over the immersion of this child when the child may yet some day repudiate the whole procedure? Will not that be a vain blessing? Moses Sofer says that we need not be concerned with the future contingency. This applies to our con-version too. Yet our education lasting over many years is more likely to have a permanent influence than a ceremony performed in infancy.

Therefore, in the case that you mention, the procedure should be as follows: The parents must promise to raise the child as a Jew. You record the child on the Cradle-Roll of the Congregation, and that is sufficient to fulfill our Reform procedure.

CURR 215-217

CONVERTING A GENTILE MOTHER WHOSE CHILDREN REMAIN CHRISTIAN

A Gentile woman has been married to a Jew for twentyfive years. They have three grown-up children, all three Christian. The youngest, a son now fifteen, also Christian, still lives at home. The woman, active in our Sisterhood work, now wishes to convert to Judaism. Should she be accepted for training and conversion? (From Rabbi Seymour M. Rosen, Margate City, New Jersey.)

THE reason for asking the question is that her children, especially the son who lives at home, will remain Christian. But there is a previous question frequently asked in the legal literature: May a Gentile woman married to a Jew (of course by a non-Jewish marriage ceremony) be Jewishly married to the Jew she has lived with?

The Law in general objects to such a conversion and marriage. The first objection is based upon the “insincerity” of the conversion. A conversion must not be made if there is suspicion that the purpose of it is to marry a Jew. A conversion must be out of pure conviction of the truth of Judaism, and not for any ulterior purpose, such as marriage to a Jew. That is why the Orthodox rabbinate is generally reluctant to accept proselytes these days, since it is obvious that the purpose is marriage to a Jew. Here it is clear that her marriage to the Jew is a consideration in her petition for conversion; therefore the conversion is questionable. The question of sincerity is also in the mind of the questioner, since she has no objection to her son who lives with her remaining a Christian.

But there is a second objection which applies more specifically to the case in question. The Mishna (Yevamos II, 8) says that if a man is suspected of living with a Gentile woman, he may never marry her (i.e., if she be converted) because such a marriage would confirm the suspicion.

As to these objections to her conversion, first that it is in relation to marriage and not purely out of conviction, and second that it is a case of a Jew living with a Gentile, both of these objections have been losing their force in recent decisions. For example, Jehiel Weinberg, the authority of the Berlin Orthodox Hildersheimer Seminary (and the successor to David Hoffmann) decides in almost precisely the case here in question, to permit the conversion and Jewish marriage (cf. Seridey Esh III, 50). The reasons are practical: First you cannot really say that the purpose of the conversion is in order to marry a Jew, since she feels that she is already legally married to him; and secondly it is meaningless to discuss “suspicion” since it is an open, publicly known fact that they have been living together. So as far as the two “classic” objections to this conversion, they need no longer be considered as applicable.

There remains only the last question, whether the fact that her fifteen year old son is to remain a Christian, is not a proof of insincerity on her part. As to this, it may be said that if her boy were still an infant and she, therefore, could make the decision as to his religion, it could be expected that she should raise the infant as a Jew. But a boy of fifteen must make his own decisions and she can hardly be responsible for them.

The fact that this boy and her other two children, both adults, are Christians, has no bearing on her conversion. According to Jewish law a convert is considered to be a “new born child,” i.e., (technically) no longer related to her family (Yebamoth 22a).

She may therefore be converted and remarried in a Jewish marriage. The remarriage, of course, should be a simple, private ceremony so as not to occasion any derogatory implications against the children.

✕