Rabbi/s

See Mixed marriage; Reform rabbis
See Marriage, of two

RRR 215-216

Rabbi’s Contribution to a Building Fund

The congregation is collecting funds for a new build ing. The rabbi wishes to contribute to that fund. Some members feel that it is not proper that he should do so. What is the Jewish traditional attitude to a rabbi contributing to the needs of the congregation? (From Rabbi Sanford E. Rosen, San Mateo, California)

The question of a rabbi’s participation in bearing the expenses of a congregation or a community has received a great deal of discussion in Jewish legal literature. In fact, the subject goes back to the Talmud and even to the Bible. In Ezra (7 :24) it is stated (after enumerating taxes and imposts) that no tax or impost of any kind should be required of priests, Levites, and other Temple servants. The Talmud (b. Baba Bathra 8c top), when a tax was placed upon the rabbis, rebukes the one who imposed the tax by saying: “You have violated the Torah, the prophets, and the holy writings.” There are also some Agadic statements to the effect that certain people (Abraham and King Asa) were punished because they imposed a tax upon the scholars (see b. Nedarim 32a and Sotah 10a).

In the Middle Ages this feeling that it is wrong to impose taxes upon the rabbis grew firmer and more definite. Taxation imposed upon the Jewish communities by the government had to be prorated in various ways among its members, sometimes according to a man’s possessions, and sometimes equally upon all (as a poll tax). It was followed, as a definite policy, that the man who devotes his time to the study of the Torah, to teaching it, and to answering the religious questions of the community, should be free from all such taxes. All this is codified in the Shulchan Aruch (Yore Deah 243 : 2),-where the law is given that the rabbi “whose livelihood is the Torah,” Toroso umnoso, shall be freed from all taxes placed upon the community. The law goes on to explain that if, of course, the rabbi is a well-to-do man and has a business of his own, that business should participate in the tax burden. But if he has only a small subsistence business, for the purpose of being somewhat independent of the gifts of the members of the community, then such a small business should not be taxed. In other words, if the Torah is his main concern and occupation, he should be free from all taxes and imposts.

This unbroken tradition is applicable to the question which is asked here. First of all, the rabbi should be free from all regular dues and assessments. Whether he should contribute to the building fund or not depends upon how the fund is being gathered. If it is being gathered pro rata or as a fixed-sum assessment upon the members, this is an impost which should not be placed upon him. But if it is a freewill offering which a man can make or not make, as he wishes, then if the rabbi wishes or is able to contribute, there can be no objection on the part of Jewish law or Jewish tradition to his doing so.

TRR 127-131

MALPRACTICE SUITS AGAINST RABBIS

QUESTION:

The Church Mutual Insurance Company founded by Lutheran ministers in 1897 has recently begun to sell malpractice insurance to ministers. This is an innovation and is based upon reports that there have been suits for malpractice when the minister gave wrong advice in counselling. However, a careful study of the situation revealed that at the very most, there were only two such suits in the country. So it has been charged that the whole situation must have been blown up in order to sell insurance. However, nowadays when people are, as one person interviewed described it, “sue crazy,” and when malpractice suits have already greatly multiplied against doctors, lawyers and accountants, this type of suit against ministers may indeed increase. Therefore the question now asked is: To what extent, on the basis of Jewish tradition, is a rabbi to be held liable for harm coming from wrong advice that he had given. The question is still theoretical and, it is hoped, may never become practical, but it is worth preliminary investigation from the point of view of tradition. (Asked by Rabbi Lawrence J. Goldmark, La Mirada, California.)

ANSWER:

In one of the suits the minister’s lawyer said that the suit is an anti-constitutional interference with the separation of church and state. This may well be argued on the ground that while lawyers and doctors may not practice unless they are licensed by the state, ministers are not licensed by the state, but are licensed by their denomination. The only authorization which the state gives to the minister is that if he is already accepted by the church as a minister, the state then gives him the right to officiate at marriage, for the laws governing marriage are state laws. Yet even in the case of marriage, in which the state has authority over the work of the minister, is it at all conceivable that the minister could justly be sued for malpractice when a marriage at which he had officiated turns into a tragic mismatch? When one sees what a flood of suits could start in this all-too-frequent situation, it is clear that the courts cannot permit such suits. However, in all other activities of the minister except marriage, the state has no authority. Nevertheless the minister does a great deal of counselling and in this activity, he often overlaps the work of the psychiatrist who is a professional, licensed by the state and subject in a suit to punishment by the state. Therefore when the minister in his counselling does psychiatric work, it is there that there would be the chief ground for possible malpractice suits.

Therefore our specific question here is: To what extent does Jewish tradition hold a rabbi liable for harm resulting from his counsel? Actually there is some sort of liability, due to the historic function of the rabbi as judge. If a rabbi is part of a court (a Bet Din) in the case of some financial dispute and gives a wrong decision, then, if this decision cannot be reversed when the harm due to the mistake has already been done, there are circumstances in which the judge (i.e., the rabbi) must make up for the damage from his own property (Hoshen Mishpat 25). Therefore we would say that if some Jewish businessman would bring a case before a Bet Din of rabbis and a wrong decision was given, there are indeed, in Jewish law, certain circumstances under which the rabbi is liable to make restitution. But, even so, the businessman would not need to institute a malpractice suit in the civil courts, since Jewish law under which the case was heard already provides for the restitution.

But actually this situation is rare. Few people bring their business disputes nowadays to a Bet Din and if they do, then, considering the long and detailed development of Jewish law, there is almost no likelihood of such liability being incurred by the rabbi judge due to a wrong decision.

The only potential cases in which a modern malpractice suit is likely to occur is in the field of family or personal counselling. We must therefore ask: Is such counselling an inherent function of the rabbi? It must be understood at the outset that personal and family counselling are indeed an essential part of the work of the Christian ministry. At the very beginning of the Christian ministry Jesus said to disciples: “Feed my sheep” (John 21:16). Since that beginning, the guidance of each individual Christian was a central responsibility of the pastor, whose very title means “the shepherd.” The church has a name for this individual counselling. It is an historic name for an historic function, cura animarum (the healing of the spirit). In the Lutheran Church the term used is Seelensorge. The Latin and the German terms could be translated into the Greek as “Psychiatry.” The “healing of souls” is the essential task of the Christian minister. So if a Christian minister errs in his counselling, one could well argue (in a suit) that he has made a professional error, as a doctor who gives the wrong medicine has made a professional error.

This personal guidance has never been an essential part of the rabbi’s task. He was, as mentioned above, the judge, but primarily he was the teacher. People would of course come to him for advice, as they would to any other person whom they respected as intelligent. But giving the advice was not an essential or required part of his profession. He is a teacher, not a pastor, a shepherd of the flock.

Of course in recent years counselling as a practice has developed among our rabbis. This is understandable. Partly it is due to the influence of the Christian environment and partially because in these confused and troubled times people increasingly come to him for advice. But unlike the Christian minister, the rabbi is not required by his profession to give advice in every situation. He may, if it seems proper to him, refuse to interfere. For it must be understood that to the extent that rabbis follow the practice of Christian clergy and give psychiatric advice, they run the risk of such suits if such malpractice suits will indeed multiply.

This at least we can say in defense of the rabbi in such a suit. We share the Christian defense of the separation of church and state, but we also have the additional defense that such counselling is not a required part of the rabbinical profession and, therefore, such mistakes cannot be ascribed to professional failure. It is not malpractice on our part, because counselling is not the required practice of the rabbinical profession. It is simply advice given by one person to another.

What we can learn from the threat of such suits for which this clerical insurance company is now selling insurance, is that we should be careful in our counselling not to infringe upon the work of a psychiatrist, and always to remember that while we do practice counselling when necessary, this counselling is not an essential part of the traditional function of the rabbinate, and that we will not be neglectful of our rabbinical duty if in certain cases we say: “This situation is not one in which I can be of help.”

NARR 356-357

CCAR RESPONSA

New American Reform Responsa

224. Officiating in a Civil Capacity

QUESTION: May a rabbi officiate in a civil capacity in a wedding involving two Catholics? What is our Reform response to such a request? (Peter Schweitzer, New York NY)ANSWER: There is nothing in the tradition which deals with a situation even remotely akin to this. The procedure used by Jewish military chaplains in the wartime emergency of giving last rites to Catholics was limited to that emergency. In this instance, although it may be legally possible for a rabbi to perform a civil marriage of two Catholics, it would be wrong to do so because of marit ayin. As most rabbis do not marry a Jew to a non-Jew, this kind of participation would be bizarre. A rabbi should not conduct such a ceremony for it appears as if he/she is willing to marry anyone without religious considerations. A rabbi should be involved only in qidushin and not in the marriages of other religions or civil marriages. It would be difficult because of our orientation to avoid some religious overtones in such a wedding ceremony and that would be inappropriate. The rabbi may, of course, give a toast or something akin to that at the festivities following the wedding. That would clearly indicate to everyone that the rabbi is present as a friend and not participating in the actual marriage ceremony. We should not engage in a civil marriage.October 1990

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

CARR 202-204

CCAR RESPONSA

Contemporary American Reform Responsa

138. Rabbi’s Responsibility to the

Unaffiliated

QUESTION: What is the rabbi’s responsibility toward the

unaffiliated? What is the financial responsibility of a Jew to his religious community? Does a Jew

have the right to demand religious services from the community even if he refuses to pay

membership fees? (Rabbi B. Cohn, New York, NY)ANSWER: The financial

responsibility of the adult Jew toward religious institutions was first mentioned in the discussion

of the half shekel (Ex. 30:11 ff), which was demanded of every male above the age of

twenty as an atonement. Rich and poor were to provide the same sum. According to some

modern Biblical interpreters, this was intended less as a financial contribution and more as a way

of taking census. Although the gifts, sacrifices and tithes were regularly contributed to the

Temple, the sources did not indicate any mechanism for their collection. Actually, we learn far

more from them about the distribution among priests, Levites and the poor. We, of

course, know that the Diaspora Jewish community continued to provide funds for the Temple

until its destruction and that the Roman Emperor Vespasian, after 70 C.E., sought to devote

those funds to the Temple of Jupiter Capitolina in Rome, causing considerable misery to the

Diaspora. The measure, however, eventually lapsed. We do not know what regular contributions

were demanded of all Jews who worshiped at the Temple in ancient times. In the

Middle Ages, it was clear that the community could compel (kofin) its members to

contribute for the sake of charity (Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 256.5). Even the poor were

to give according to their means (Yoreh Deah 248.1). In matters of communal support and

charity, therefore, the pressure of the community was exerted. All this becomes even

clearer when we look at direct support for synagogues. The Shulhan Arukh indicated that

members of the community could force each other to contribute to the building of the synagogue,

the purchase of Torah scrolls, etc. (Orah Hayim, 150.1 kofin zeh et zeh),

and if this was not effective, various forms of excommunication could be, and were, used. The

obligation of individuals toward the community went considerably further. For example if a

community consisted of only ten adult males, and one of them wished to absent himself during

the High Holidays, then the community could force him to attend their services or to obtain a

substitute in order to complete the minyan (Shulhan Arukh Orah Hayim 55.20). In

some places they could force each other to engage two, or even more individuals to complete a

minyan not only for the High Holidays, but for the regular synagogue services. Traditional

sources have set ample precedent for obtaining proper support for religious institutions and using

communal force when necessary. In our age, herem, niduii and other lighter

forms of punishment have lost their meaning; it would only be appropriate to use those means

which are at our disposal, i.e., the restriction of services in life cycle events from the individuals

in question. There is, of course, no doubt that those who withhold their support are still

considered Jews. It is clear throughout the tradition that even apostate Jews were considered to

be Jews in most ways and could be buried by rabbis in the Jewish cemetery at a distance from

others (Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 34.1, 151.12, 367.1), for even sinners were still

considered Israelites (San. 44a). Those under the ban could be buried but with a stone on the

coffin; furthermore, there was no shiva for them. Individuals who had deeply offended the

community, or had been disloyal, were denied services by the Hevra Qadisha in

eighteenth century Germany. This could extend to no visiting or care while ill, nor would their

bodies be prepared for a funeral (Marcus, Communal Sick-Care, p. 129). Here, however,

we are not dealing with the status of the Jew, rather with the survival of the Jewish religious

institutions. Perhaps most analogous is a nineteenth century Galician question brought

to Joseph Saul Nathanson of Lemberg, (Sheol Umeshiv, Vol. 3, part A, #58). He was

asked by a rabbi in a small community whether the ban on private home services, which then

existed in that community, should remain in force. In the discussion Nathanson shows that the

ban was originally pronounced as regular services in the synagogue were in danger of lapsing

due to the home services– something which he felt was not restricted to the small community of

the questioner, but also represented a danger in Lemberg. Even on the Sabbath and holidays,

synagogue attendance had diminished. This, in turn, would lead to a shrinking of the income of

the synagogue and its inability to support a cantor, the rabbis and teachers. He concluded that it

was clearly the responsibility of the rabbinic authorities to control communal life in such a way

that the synagogue would be strengthened. Certainly, such a step to which Nathanson

agreed was more stringent than the decision on our part to conduct no private services for

unaffiliated individuals. After all, his decision dealt with regular daily religious services, not with a

wedding, funeral or brit, which occur but seldom. A similar kind of restriction

was imposed on special services at home by the London Jewish community in the eighteenth

century; someone who was ill was permitted to hold High Holiday services at home only if he

paid the community one guinea and turned the proceeds of the sale of religious honors over to

the community (Taqonot, London, 1791, in J. Marcus, Communal Sick-Care, p.

10). It would seem clear that the tradition indicates that we can, and should, do

everything possible to strengthen synagogue affiliation in our time and to assure the proper

support for our religious institutions. Unaffiliated individuals have no right to demand religious

services. April 1975

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

NARR 379-381

CCAR RESPONSA

New American Reform Responsa

235. Suing the Rabbi

QUESTION: A rabbi who does a considerable amount of counselling has asked whether it is necessary to purchase malpractice insurance. What, according to tradition, is the range of liability? (Walter Rosenthal, Trenton NJ)ANSWER: We are going to look at this matter with the understanding that the rabbi in question is not a licensed therapist, and so would do counselling as part of ordinary congregational responsibility and not in the special capacity of a therapist. Such cases would be akin to the responsibility of a physician which has been discussed previously (W. Jacob Contemporary American Reform Responsa #75). This entire area has been treated thoroughly in American secular legal literature; it is the general desire of the courts to remain out of this area, as it is very difficult for them to establish the parameters of training and appropriate religious conduct for so many religious groups and sects (Funston, “Made out of Whole Cloth – A Constitutional Analysis of the Clergy Malpractice Concept” California Western Law Review Vol 10 pp 507 ff; McMenamin The Jurist Vol 45 pp 275 ff etc). We are not concerned with the judicial function of the rabbi and possible errors which might take place in the exercise of that function (Shulhan Arukh Hoshen Mishpat 25 and commentaries), but rather with the general area of responsibility through counselling. The rabbi would be liable if there was gross neglect, for then he/she would be violating the Biblical statement “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind” (Lev 19.14). However, the later Talmudic development of the law of torts is rather confused; we have two concepts, garmi which includes those actions directly responsible for damage, and gerama matters in which the action is indirect (Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol 6; Ramban Dina Degarmi; Shulhan Arukh Hoshen Mishpat 386). The general rule which we may abstract from the many cases cited in the literature is as follows: If the individual in question is an expert and the advice which is followed is based upon his expertise, then he would be liable. As for example, a coin appraiser has been shown a coin and has declared it as good, but subsequently it was discovered to be bad coinage. If he has been paid for his advice, then he is liable. If he has not been paid, then he is not liable. On the other hand, if he is not an absolute expert, but the individual who came stated that he was relying on this person’s opinion alone, then he is also liable (Yad Hil Shirut.5). We can see from this that the matters which are involved are: (a) The expert status; (b) the exchange of money for the advice and evaluation; (c) the agreement between the individuals that this person is the only one to be asked for advice. In the case of counselling ordinarily done by rabbis, there is no exchange of funds. The rabbi makes no pretense to being an expert in the field. In addition to that, a rabbi would and should not permit himself/herself to be placed in a position of being the only person consulted, particularly in a difficult matter. It is our common practice to refer difficult matters onward and even in other counselling situations to provide only tentative advice. Furthermore, following the rabbinic advice is entirely voluntary. This is not like a business transaction in which the paths are much clearer, but involve a great many areas: (a) Theological issues raised; (b) to what extent was the party being counseled completely forthcoming; (c) was there an opportunity to see other parties or to gather additional information about this matter; (d) the party seeking counselling remains completely independent and may accept or reject the advice. From a traditional point of view, therefore, there is little or no ground for a suit to be brought against a rabbi as the counselling situation leaves so many areas open.January 1991

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

RR21 no. 5758.1

CCAR RESPONSA

The Reform Rabbi’s Obligations Toward the UAHC

5758.1

She’elah

During the past year, there has been significant controversy concerning how the Union of American Hebrew Congregations (UAHC or the Union) shall raise its monies. Are Reform rabbis ethically obligated to support the Maintenance of Union Membership (MUM) program of the UAHC? Is the rabbi of a Reform synagogue ethically obliged to take a leadership role in his or her congregation to urge its leaders to fulfill their financial obligations toward the UAHC? (Rabbi James Simon, Worcester, MA)

Teshuvah

This question poses a special challenge to the members of this Committee. We are all Reform rabbis. The vast majority of us are ordinees of the Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion (HUC-JIR), the North American yeshivah of the Reform movement which derives a large portion of its budget from the MUM dues collected by the UAHC. The chair of this Committee, moreover, is a faculty member at HUC-JIR. We therefore owe our rabbinical educations and our livelihoods in no small measure to the UAHC and to the funding it raises for our rabbinical school. At the same time, many of us are rabbis of synagogues affiliated with the UAHC, congregations whose fiscal health is never a sure thing and which struggle to balance their own budgets. Since MUM dues make up a significant proportion of a Reform congregation’s annual appropriations, the synagogue’s members and leadership, including its rabbinical leadership, understandably question the value that this particular expenditure offers to their institution. None of us, in other words, qualifies as a purely “objective” observer in this matter.

Yet as rabbis we cannot evade this question, despite our clear professional or financial stake in the answer we give to it. This she’elah, at its core, asks that we think about the nature of our religious community, to define its structure and circumference. It requires that we explain with some precision our understanding of Reform Judaism as a “movement,” as an institutional phenomenon whose existence and fiscal health depends upon the contributions of its members. In addition, it demands that we consider our proper role as rabbis, as teachers and scholars who work within the context of our particular Jewish community. These issues are not new ones, inventions of our own time. They have been the subject of Jewish communal discussion for many centuries. More than that: they have been the subject of rabbinical analysis, of debates and decisions carried on by rabbis in the language of sacred text, recorded in the halakhic literature of codes, commentaries and responsa. The record of Jewish tradition, that is to say, teaches us that this question is not the exclusive province of the “laity”. We therefore consider it our duty to take up this she’elah, even though we cannot claim some sort of dispassionate objectivity as to its teshuvah.

We should note at the outset one important point. As of this writing, much of the controversy surrounding MUM contributions (a controversy which may well have produced this she’elah) concerns the precise level of a congregation’s membership dues to the UAHC and the financial basis upon which these dues are calculated. Our sho’el does not ask us to consider these problems, and at any rate, they lie outside the boundaries of our competence as rabbis. Our task, instead, is to discuss the broader parameters of this issue: how does our understanding of Jewish tradition inform our perception of the obligations of Reform synagogues and rabbis toward the institutions of the wider Reform movement?

1. The UAHC As Our Community. In 1986, this Committee issued a responsum which concluded that the member congregations of the UAHC “are obligated to support this national organization at the level set by duly elected representative delegates.”[1] The teshuvah justifies this conclusion, in part, by citing as precedents a number of historical examples of financial contributions made by Jews to regional, national, or world-wide bodies. These include the half-shekel donated to the Temple in Jerusalem and the communal structures established in medieval Europe to collect taxes on behalf of the general government. These “precedents”, of course, do not correspond to our own communal situation. The Temple was an institution quite different from any other in Jewish history, and the medieval governments, unlike our own, considered us an alien element within the state, in which we did not exercise the rights of citizenship. The duties we owed to these institutions were imposed upon us by “superior” authority, either by the Torah itself[2] or by the government exercising its inherent powers;[3] we had no choice but to meet them. The UAHC by contrast is a democratic organization controlled by its members, who accept their financial obligations toward it voluntarily. The past, in these cases, may not offer us much in the way of useful guidance.

The 1986 responsum, however, does cite a third historical example which speaks more directly to our contemporary circumstances: the takanot hakahal, legislative enactments made by a community for the maintenance of its vital institutions and the governance of its public affairs. These ordinances defined the very nature of the kahal, the “community,” as a political institution, determined its constitutional structure and regulated a wide array of activities such as taxation, commercial transactions, enforcement of community mores, marital law, and many others. Given the wide and frequent use of this legislative power, it is somewhat ironic that the classical talmudic literature, the source of Jewish law, says relatively little about it. Simply put, it is not certain that talmudic halakhah, which speaks of the legislative power of kings and rabbinical courts, recognizes the authority of the “community” to adopt laws and to enforce them upon recalcitrant citizens. Halakhic scholars have therefore struggled to find a theory which would justify the takanot hakahal according to the basic premises of Jewish law. Some argue that these enactments are but a logical extension of the ancient right of the “townspeople” (beney ha`ir) to make rules concerning the control of wages and prices, the requirement to build a synagogue, the collection and appropriation of tzedakah monies and other matters.[4] Others assert that the community is the legal equivalent of the beit din, especially the ancient Sanhedrin, the rabbinical court which under talmudic theory does enjoy the power to enforce its decrees upon the people.[5] Still others locate the source of the community’s legislative power in valid and long-standing local custom (minhag hamedinah), in itself a valid “source” of Jewish law.[6] Finally, there are those who hold that the community by its very nature is endowed with the power to make its own determinations in matters of legitimate public concern, even if those determinations run afoul of some technical requirements of the halakhah.[7]

Whichever of these theories may be the “correct” one, they are united in their assumption that the kahal exists as a legitimate corporate entity and that it possesses the powers necessary to the successful function of such an entity. To put it differently: once the Jews have defined themselves as a community rather than merely a collection of individuals, they have created thereby a mechanism by which this political body can chart its common course and enforce the decisions that it has the right to make. And this serves, ultimately, as the basic argument in support of our 1986 decision on the responsibility of member congregations to support the UAHC. The Union, that is to say, is our community. In establishing the Union and in ratifying its By-Laws, our Reform congregations have indicated that they define themselves in large part as affiliates of an international community of progressive Jewish congregations.[8] Under Jewish law this community, like all others, is endowed with the power of “taxation,” which means the power to set membership dues in accordance with the procedures described in its By-Laws and regulations. As members of such a community, congregations are obligated to pay those dues.

The Reform rabbi is therefore equally obligated to call upon congregations to support the Union by meeting their agreed-upon financial obligations toward it. This is true of all Reform rabbis, but perhaps especially the case for those who serve UAHC member congregations. These obligations, remember, are not only accepted freely by the congregation when it joined the Union; they carry the full sanction of centuries of Jewish tradition. As the teacher of that tradition, the congregation’s rabbi must assume a “leadership role” in advocating the fulfillment of its legitimate responsibilities toward the larger community of which it is a part.

2. The Reform Rabbi and “Kevod Harav”. The principle of kevod harav, the duty to render honor and respect to one’s teacher, serves as an additional argument in favor of the Reform rabbi’s moral obligation to support the UAHC. We discuss this principle in a teshuvah concerning the question of “private ordination,” of whether a rabbi ordained at HUC-JIR may ordain as a rabbi any person who has not been approved for ordination by the College-Institute.[9] We decide that question in the negative: a rabbinic graduate of HUC-JIR may not participate in such an ordination, in large part because the concept of kevod harav means that in an important sense we rabbis remain subject to the authority of the rabbis who ordain us. “To act otherwise is detrimental to the kavod (honor) of one’s teacher and, by extension, of the rabbinate as an institution.” This limitation, to be sure, does not mean that we are prohibited from disagreeing with our teachers on matters of Torah and theology; both Jewish tradition at its best[10] and our own Reform Jewish tradition proclaim our individual intellectual freedom in these matters. On the other hand,

…we feel just as surely a sense of obligation to render honor to our rabbis, those who instilled Torah in us and prepared us for the momentous task of transmitting it to our people. We, too, recognize the principle of kevod harav. And this principle, if it means anything at all…implies that we have a duty to promote the welfare of the College-Institute in any way that we can. It demands at the very least that we avoid taking actions which would undermine the centrality and integrity of the College-Institute as the agency by which North American Reform Jewry has chosen to train its rabbinic leadership… Our semikhah, whatever powers it confers, cannot entitle us to undermine the school which granted it to us.

The duty of rabbis “to promote the welfare of the College-Institute in any way that we can” would certainly imply that we are required to speak out in support of the MUM program. Our seminary draws a significant percentage of its budget from the proceeds of that program, which are divided equally between the UAHC and HUC-JIR. When a member synagogue fails to meet its financial obligations to the Union, the College-Institute suffers thereby. Ordinees of HUC-JIR should not remain silent; they should indeed assume “a leadership role” on behalf of the Union and, through that means, on behalf of the school which taught them Torah.

Conclusion

. We therefore respond to this she’elah in the affirmative. Reform rabbis are ethically obligated to support the Maintenance of Union Membership program. This is because our movement defines and understands itself as an international community made up of member congregations, and like all Jewish communities ours has the right to set membership fees and dues through its authorized procedures. Rabbis ordained at HUC-JIR must also support the MUM program because, as rabbis, they owe a special debt of obligation to the school which ordained them, a school which receives a great deal of its funding from congregations who pay their share of Union dues.

We repeat that this teshuvah in no way deals with the proper level of MUM dues, a question which cannot be answered by way of text and tradition but which must be settled by the congregations themselves, speaking through their duly-elected representatives to the Union. With regard to the more fundamental issue, however, our understanding of our tradition and of our nature as a community leaves us in no doubt whatsoever: Reform congregations are obligated to support the Union which they have created, and Reform rabbis, as the teachers of Torah they claim to be, must assume a leadership role in assuring that their synagogues fulfill that obligation.

NOTES

 

  • Contemporary American Reform Responsa

(CARR), no. 139.

  • Exodus 30:11ff.
  • The principle indicated here is dina demalkhuta dina, “the law of the state is the law.” For a detailed discussion, see our responsum 5757.1.
  • R. Chananiah bar R. Yehudah Gaon, in the collection of geonic responsa known as Sha`arey Tzedek 4:4(16). The rabbinic sources concerning the beney ha`ir include M. Megilah 3:1, Tosefta Bava Metzi`a 11:23, BT Bava Batra 8b, and BT Megilah 27a. R. Chananiah also applies to the community the rule hefker beit din hefker, derived from Ezra 10:8, according to which the court is empowered to confiscate the property of all citizens who disobey its decrees; see BT Gitin 36b. A similar line is adopted by Rabbenu Gershom ben Yehudah, the “Light of the Exile,” Responsa, no. 67, and by R. Yitzchak b. Sheshet (14th cent.), Resp. Rivash, no. 399.
  • This is notably the case with R. Shelomo b. Adret (Rashba; d. 1310) of Barcelona, the source of much of the halakhic theory concerning takanot hakahal. See his Responsa 5:126: “the relationship of the majority of the city to the minority is that of the Great Sanhedrin (beit din hagadol) to the Jewish people in ancient times: their decrees are binding, and the one who transgresses them is to be punished.” See as well Resp. Rashba 1:729, 3:411 and 417 and others. This theory, however, is not universally accepted. R. Ya`akov Tam, in particular, rejects the analogy of the community council to the rabbinical court; accordingly, he rules that the majority of the community may not enforce its will upon those who dissent. See Sefer HaMordekhai, Bava Batra 1:480.
  • Resp. R. Meir of Rothenburg

, no. 106 (Prague ed.) and 371 (Lvov ed.). This may be the strongest theoretical argument, in that it accommodates R. Tam’s objections to the beit din analogy (see note 5) by injecting a note of pragmatism. See Resp. Chatam Sofer, Choshen Mishpat, no. 116: the minhag is to follow the majority decision in all community matters, for “were we to wait until unanimity is achieved, no public business would ever be concluded.”

  • R. Chaim Ya’ir Bachrach (Germany, 17th cent.), Resp. Chavat Ya’ir, no. 57.
  • The process of ratification is important here, since it means that this community was created in the form of an explicit agreement among its members, who imposed its authority upon themselves. The outlines of such a democratic theory already exist in Jewish law, which speaks of the “ratification” of the Torah by the Israelite people (Ex. 24:7) and of a subsequent “re-acceptance” during the days of Esther and Mordekhai (see BT Shabbat 88a on Ex. 19:17 and Esther 9:27; the rabbis were concerned over the seemingly coercive elements of the Mount Sinai narrative). See as well Maimonides’ Introduction to the Mishneh Torah, which explains the legal authority of the Babylonian Talmud in terms of its “acceptance” by the Jewish people (hiskimu…kol yisrael). This is not to say that this theory fully corresponds to the notion of representative democracy as it operates in modern political culture. We mean to suggest rather that some of the opposition to the authority of the community, particularly that of Rabbenu Tam (see note 5), can be allayed when we remember that our own communities are based explicitly upon “popular acceptance” of the governing rules, which are not imposed by a body which claims the powers of a beit din to enforce its decrees against the will of the people.
  • Teshuvot for the Nineties

, no. 5753.4, particularly at pp. 136-138. See the accompanying notes to that teshuvah for source material.

  • For example, R. Ya`akov Emden (18th cent.), Resp. She’elat Ya`avetz 1:5: “on matters of halakhic judgment, it is not sufficient to say that the student is entitled to argue in favor of his own opinion against that of his teacher; rather, he is obligated to do so. He should not remain silent due to the honor of his teacher (kevod rabo), for the honor of the Torah takes precedence (kevod torah adif).”

 

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

ARR 474-477

CCAR RESPONSA

American Reform Responsa

151. Non-Jewish Clergy Participating in a Jewish Wedding with a Rabbi

(Vol. LXXXVII, 1977, pp. 100-102)QUESTION: May non-Jewish clergymen participate in a Jewish wedding ceremony together with a rabbi?ANSWER: We are here concerned not with a class of mixed marriage, but with the participation of non-Jewish clergy in the ceremony of two Jews. This question involves the general status of Christians in Jewish law, as well as their capacity in any Jewish service. It is clear that the Talmud, already having begun to consider pagans of its day differently from the more ancient heathen, did so also with Christians. The precise attitude toward Gentiles during the five centuries of Talmudic times depended upon specific circumstances. Thus, Simeon ben Yohai could be uncomfortably negative: “The best of the Gentiles should be killed in time of war” (Yer., Kid. 66c, with full reading in Tosafot to A.Z. 26b; Soferim 15.10). On the other hand, it was possible for Meir and Judah Hanasi to have warm, friendly relationships with Gentiles (B.K. 38a) or for R. Chiya bar Abba to say in the name of R. Johanan that Gentiles outside of the Land of Israel are not idolaters, that they merely continue to follow the customs of their fathers (Chulin 13b). By the Middle Ages, Christians were no longer classified as idolaters (Meir of Rothenburg, Resp. #386). Rabbi Isaac of Dampierre placed Christians in the category of Noahides and not of pagans (Tosafot to San. 63b and Bech. 2b). Menachem Meiri (1249-1306) went further by stating that Christians and Moslems who lived by the discipline of their religions should be regarded as Jews in matters of social and economic relationships (Beit Habechira to Avoda Zara 20a). Maimonides stated that a Christian or a Muslim should be considered as a Ger Toshav (Yad, Hil. Melachim 8.11 and Hil. Teshuva 3.5; Hil. Edut 11.10, etc.). This point of view became normative, and Christians, as well as Muslims, were considered to be in the same category as the Gerei Toshav. This was the point of view accepted by Caro in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De-a 148.12; also Tur, Yoreh De-a 148). It was expressed most forcefully by Moshe Rifkes, author of the Be-er Hagola to the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 425, at the end of the column). The statement is remarkable because the author himself was an exile (from Wilna to Amsterdam) who had fled from anti-Jewish riots. He says: “The sages made reference only to the idolaters of their day, who did not believe in the exodus or the creation of the world, but these people among whom we are scattered believe in the creation of the world and hold with the essentials of religion, and their whole intention is to the Creator of heaven and earth. So it is not only not prohibited to deliver them, but it is our duty to pray for their welfare,” etc. The status of the Gentile in the general application of Jewish law had, therefore, changed, and thus positive opinion of Gentiles was re-emphasized at the beginning of the modern era by Emden, Bacharach, Ashkenazi, and other Orthodox authorities (see A. Shohet, “The German Jew: His Integration Within the Non-Jewish Environment in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century,” Zion, vol. 21, 1956, pp. 229ff), as well as Mendelssohn (“Schreiben an Lavater,” Schriften, 1843, vol. 3, pp. 39ff) Since the Christian has been equated in the legal tradition with the Ger Toshav, we must inquire about the latter’s status. In economic and social matters a Ger Toshav is considered equal to a Jew, but he has no status in connection with the ritual obligation of the Jew. A Ger Toshav would not be considered part of a Minyan, or part of the quota for Mezuman, or suitable for leading Jewish worship service (Orach Chayim 199.4). Similar considerations would prevail in the case of a wedding. The officiating individual (Mesader Kiddushin) must be Jewish. Nothing would prevent a non-Jewish clergyman or friend from participating in the less essential parts of the service as a social, non-religious gesture. He might add a prayer (without trinitarian references), give a homily, or be included in the wedding party. This would be considered appropriate and within the bounds of Jewish tradition. Rabbis, whose regular officiation at weddings is attested at least since the 14th century (Abrahams, Jewish Life in the Middle Ages, p. 216), should read the major portion of the service. The wedding liturgy could also be so arranged that the non-Jewish clergyman’s participation would not interrupt the Jewish service, and, therefore, no one would have the impression that the Gentile participated in the actual ritual. Jews who have been married by a Christian minister (with a civil license) alone would, of course, be considered civilly married, but the marriage could not be considered Kiddushin. In passing, we may note that the question of the status of a marriage of two Jews or Marranos by Christian clergy arose following the legislation in Spain, when Jews married in this manner fled to neighboring lands where they could once again live openly as Jews. These marriages, performed by Catholic priests, were not considered valid Jewish marriages (Isaac bar Sheshet, Responsa #6 and 7). This decision may have been partly prompted by the fact that often only one partner survived the attempt to escape; if the marriage was invalid, then no proof of death was necessary, and no inheritance problems, etc arose. The only exceptions to this rule were those marriages conducted under the Inquisition which had been preceded by a Jewish ritual held privately at home before ten witnesses; in that case the marriage was considered Jewish, since the Catholic ritual was conducted only for the sake of the authorities (Duran, vol. 3, #47; for more on this see, A. Freimann, Seder Kiddushin Venisu-in). These decisions cast no aspersion upon marriages performed by Christians between two Christians, which were, of course, considered appropriate and valid (Isaac bar Sheshet, #6; Maimonides, Yad, Isurei Bi-a 14.19). We may, therefore, summarize: At a Jewish wedding it would be improper for a Christian minister to co-officiate with a rabbi on equal terms. The essential portion of the wedding ceremony must be performed by the rabbi; the minister may, however, participate through a greeting, a homily, etc., in such a fashion as to preclude any inference that he or she is performing or validating a Jewish rite. A minister may be a member of a wedding party.Walter Jacob, ChairmanSolomon B. Freehof, Honorary ChairmanStephen M. PassamaneckW. Gunther PlautHarry A. RothHerman E. Schaalman

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

CARR 250-252

CCAR RESPONSA

Contemporary American Reform Responsa

167. A Rabbi at a Christian Ordination

Service

QUESTION: Should a rabbi participate in the service of

ordination of a student as a Christian minister? Would it be possible for him to participate in one

of the three following ways – attending the ordination; reading a Biblical selection; invoking the

priestly blessing on the candidate? (Rabbi J. Stein, Indianapolis, IN)ANSWER: This

question involves the Jewish attitude towards Christians and Christianity. Since Medieval times

Christianity and Islam were viewed as monotheistic religions. Therefore, none of the strictures

which the Bible and Talmud place upon idolatry are relevant for

Christianity. The Talmud began to consider pagans of its day differently from

the ancient heathen; it treated Christians similarly. The precise attitude toward Gentiles during

the five centuries of Talmudic times depended upon specific circumstances. Thus, Simeon ben

Yohai could be uncomfortably negative (J. Kid. 66c, with full reading in Tosfot to A. Z.

26b; Soferim 15.10). On the other hand, it was possible for Meir and Judah Hanasi to have warm

friendly relationships with Gentiles (B. K. 38a). We comfort their dead, visit their sick, help their

poor, etc. (Git. 29b; Tur Hoshen Mishpat 266). R. Hiya bar Abba said in the name of R.

Johanan that Gentiles outside the land of Israel were not idolaters. They merely continued to

follow the customs of their fathers (Hul. 13b). By the Middle Ages, Christians were

generally no longer classified as idolaters (Meir of Rothenburg, Responsa #386). Rabbi

Isaac of Dampierre placed Christians in the category of Noachides and not of pagans (Tosfot

to San. 73b and Bek. 2b). Menachem Meiri (1249-1306) went further by stating that

Christians and Moslems who live by the discipline of their religion should be regarded as Jews in

social and economic relationships (Bet Habehirah to A. Z. 20a). Maimonides stated that

Christians or Muslims should be considered as gerei toshav. They would assist in the

preparation for the Messianic era (Yad Melakhim 8.11 and Teshuvah 3.5; Edut. 11.10,

etc.). At other times he considered Christianity as a form of idol worship (Yad Hil. Avodat

Kokhavim 9.4; Hil. Akum 10.2; Hil. Maakhalot Asurot), although he, too, had some positive

thoughts about Christianity (Yad Hil . Melakhim 11.4). Of course Maimonides dealt with

Christianity in the abstract in contrast to the other authorities who lived in a Christian world. A

French Tosafist of the same period expressed positive views akin to Meiri, and so we see that

they were not restricted to Sephardic Jewry (Bekh. 2b). This point of view became normative,

and Christians as well as Muslims were considered in the same category as the gerei

toshav. This point of view was accepted by Caro in the Shulhan Arukh (Yoreh Deah

148.12; also Tur Yoreh Deah 148) and most forcefully by Mosheh Rifkes, author of the

Beer Hagolah to the Shulhan Arukh (Hoshen Mishpat, 425 at the end). The

statement is remarkable because the author himself had fled Vilna to Amsterdam from anti-

Jewish riots. He stated: “The sages made reference only to the idolaters of their day who did not

believe in the creation of the world, the Exodus, God’s marvelous deeds, or the divinely given

law. But these people, among whom we are scattered, believe in all these essentials of religion.

So, it is our duty to pray for their welfare, and that of their kingdom, etc.” The status of the

Gentile in the general application of Jewish law had, therefore, changed and this positive opinion

of Gentiles was reemphasized at the beginning of the modern era by Emden, Bacharach,

Ashkenazi and other Orthodox authorities (See A. Shohet, “The German Jew, His Integration

Within Their Non-Jewish Environment in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century,” Zion,

Vol. 21, 1956, pp. 229 ff) as well as Mendelssohn (“Schreiben an Lavater,” Schriften,

1843, Vol. 3, pp. 39 ff). The classification of Christians as gerei toshav

had theological implications and important economic consequences. For example, wine made by

a Gentile was permitted to be handled by Ashkenazic Jews. Although it could not be consumed

by Jews, they could trade in it (Tosfot to San. 63b; Isserles to Shulhan Arukh

Yoreh Deah 123.1). Sephardic Jews did not follow this practice and had no pressing need to do

so, as they were not involved in extensive wine growing and lived among Moslems, whose

consumption of wine was limited (Maimonides, Responsa II, #448; Tur Yoreh

Deah 124). Despite these friendly views, all of the traditional authorities made it quite

clear that major distinctions continue to exist between Judaism and Christianity. Maimonides felt

that we should restrict our relationships with Christians (Yad Hil. Akum 10.2) and also

prohibited Jews from dealing in Christian wine (Yad Maakhalot Asurot 17). He and all the

other medieval authorities thought that both Christianity and Islam had strange concepts

(shituf) which impinged on the absolute unity of God (Isserles to Shulhan Arukh

Orah Hayim 156; Maimonides, Peer Hador 50, etc.). In secular relationships Christians

could be treated as b’nei noah, but in religious matters, distinctions were to

remain. The factors outlined above have provided a Jewish basis for good Jewish-

Christian relationships in the last centuries. They have enabled us to participate in many joint

social and charitable programs. Reform Jewish thought goes one step further and permits

participation in interfaith services which remain neutral and are non-Christological. They would

also permit us to participate in a strictly Christian service when it is clear that our participation is

limited to matters which are not offensive to us. This means that it would be possible to read a

Biblical portion at an ordinary service or a service of installation for a minister in a new

congregation, or at any other service as a gesture of friendship. This emphasizes our common

bonds. Additional participation at a service of ordination would be inappropriate, as

such a service is by its very nature very specifically Christian. Such services usually emphasize

creed and the loyalty of the minister to that creed. This emphasis on shituf would be

inappropriate for us. In our age of extensive friendship, it is important that ties be continued and

fostered, yet distinctions should not be blurred.December 1980

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

CARR 3-4

CCAR RESPONSA

Contemporary American Reform Responsa

2. The Disabled Rabbi

QUESTION: May a rabbi who is temporarily disabled through a broken arm or leg continue to conduct services, preach, etc.?ANSWER: We must differentiate between rabbinic functions in which the rabbi acts for a congregation as sheliah tzibur and teacher in contrast to his role as a judge. There are several kinds of situations in which he could not act as a judge because of the specific Biblical stipulations, at least according to the tradition. This would be true in capital cases in which, under some circumstances, the judge would be involved in the execution (Deut. 17.7; J. San. 8; 26b, Num. 5.11 ff; Shulhan Arukh Even Haezer 159.1; Hoshen Mishpat 7.2). As far as we are concerned, there is no likelihood of being involved in these kinds of cases, so there would be no problem with a physical disability and a rabbi’s judicial function. Much more important for us is the rabbi’s function as a leader of the congregation and its religious services. The traditional statements connected with these duties are inevitably based upon those of the priests who officiated in the ancient temple. The main statement in Leviticus 21.19, which deals with shever regel or shevel yad, is not as clear as it at first glance appears to be. It seems to exclude priests with a broken arm or leg from publicly officiating at the sanctuary, but this may very well have referred only to fractures which did not heal properly and, therefore, present a visible deformity to those watching the procedure (Bech. 45a). In any case, the lengthy Talmud discussions make it clear that a patient with a mum only excluded from certain tasks at the sanctuary. Fractures of human limbs are rarely discussed in traditional literature. The Biblical text and the various rabbinic sources state that those who limp or have a deformity of the leg are not fit to serve as priests (Lev. 21.18; Sifra Emor II, III, p. 95b; Bekh. 7.6; Tosefta Bekh 5.9; Yad Hil. Biyat Hamiqdash 8.13). Here we are dealing with defects of a permanent nature and visible to the worshiper. These cautions have been carried into the synagogue, so a priest with a visible defect on his hands or feet may not recite the priestly blessing at a service as this may distract the people who may look at these disfigurements rather than think of the sacred words (M. Meg. 4.7; Tosefta Meg. 4.29; Meg. 24b). The regulations against defects extend to any deformities of the fingers (Yoma 2.1, 23a) . An exception was made if everyone in the village is a dyer, and so all share the same visible defects; in that instance no one would notice (Meg. 24b; Mordecai; Yam Shel Shelomo Hul.; Shulhan Arukh Orah Hayim 53.8 with some disagreements). A visible deformity, such as discoloration of the face, etc., would disqualify a person from serving as sheliah tzibur (Ettlinger, Binyan Zion #5). These references also deal with permanent disabilities. If, however, such disabilities do not distract the congregation, then there is no obstacle to blessing the congregation or leading it in prayer (Shulhan Arukh Orah Hayim 128.30). We might also note that tradition has no prohibition against the use of canes or crutches when they enable a person to walk to synagogue, even though they must be carried on shabbat (Shulhan Arukh Orah Hayim 301.17, 51, 346.13, 622.1). If the defect is not visible, then there is no problem (Yad Hil. Tefilah 8.12). If the injury causes fainting or similar seizures and are frequent, then the individual should not lead the congregation in service; if infrequent, he remains capable of leading them in a service (Moses Sofer Responsa Yoreh Deah #7). We can see from the sources that temporary disabilities do not disqualify as long as they do not distract the congregation. Certainly a congregation would soon become accustomed to a rabbi appearing in a sling, on crutches or with a cane, especially as it would only be for a short period of time. If this is not so, then someone should be designated to conduct services for the period of temporary disability and permit the congregation to worship undisturbed.April 1983

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

RR21 no. 5759.3

CCAR RESPONSA COMMITTEE
5759.3
Who Is a Rabbi?

 

She’elah.

A new congregation has been formed in my city, founded by a woman who has attended the International Institute for Secular Humanistic Judaism (IISHJ), the rabbinical school of the Society for Humanistic Judaism. She serves as the congregation’s rabbi, even though she has yet to be ordained by that school. She has been licensed by the state to perform weddings, and also does conversions. Should we accept these conversions as valid, even though they were supervised by someone other than an ordained rabbi? In general, what is our position with respect to individuals who have received private ordination or who claim to possess ordination from seminaries, schools or yeshivot with which we are unfamiliar? Do we recognize them as rabbis? Do we accept them as colleagues in our communities?

Teshuvah.

  1. Conversions Supervised by a Layperson. Your first question has been addressed quite clearly by the Central Conference of American Rabbis (CCAR). We hold that, while “a rabbinical beit din is desirable for giyur,” conversion should at any rate take place in the presence of a rabbi and no fewer than two lay leaders of the community.[1] We base this position upon considerations of both a halakhic and a practical nature.

    Our tradition teaches that conversion must take place in the presence of a beit din, a court of Jewish law.[2] The Rabbis derive this requirement through a midrash,[3] the interpretation of biblical verses in which the Hebrew root sh-p-t (“judgment”) appears in connection with the word ger, or “proselyte.”[4] The precise make-up of this court is a matter of dispute in the literature; some contend that the Torah itself requires that a beit din consist of no fewer than three judges,[5] while others believe that one judge is sufficient and that the requirement of three judges in cases other than penal law is a rabbinic stringency.[6] Both views agree, however, that the judges must be knowledgeable of the law and qualified for their task. Although the codified halakhah declares that any three individuals, including those with no special legal training,[7] may constitute a beit din, it justifies this provision on the assumption that among a gathering of three persons “it is impossible that there should not be one who knows something of the law.”[8] It follows that the rule will change should this assumption prove inaccurate: “if there is not one among these three judges who has studied the law, they are disqualified from serving as a court.”[9]

    In particular, the beit din which oversees a conversion must be composed of knowledgeable Jews.[10] Conversion, we stress, is much more than the stated desire to become a Jew. Choosing Judaism is a complex and demanding intellectual and emotional procedure. It involves, first of all, the study of Torah and Jewish practice (hoda`at hamitzvot), a curriculum which is taught at least in part by the members of the court.[11] Our tradition also requires that we “examine” the prospective Jew-by-choice, to determine whether his or her decision to become a Jew is sincere, well thought out, and motivated for reasons we find acceptable.[12] The journey by which one enters into the Jewish people, the veritable creation of a brand new identity – indeed, “the proselyte is like a new-born child”[13] – should therefore be supervised by a specialist who possesses the Judaic education and counseling skills necessary for this important task. We would add, moreover, that issues of personal status are among the most sensitive that face our community. It is deeply in our interest that we as a people be able to agree, to the greatest extent possible, upon “who is a Jew”, arriving at a consensus as to the standards by which we determine the Jewish identity of those who claim to possess it. “Conversions” performed by those who are unqualified to do so endanger this vital but fragile consensus, for they are likely to create a class of Jews whose very Jewishness will be suspect in the eyes of many. It is for these reasons, to insure the quality and the validity of conversion procedures, that our Conference along with the rest of the organized Jewish community insists that the supervision of conversion be a rabbinic prerogative.

    In principle (l’khatchilah), therefore, conversion should not be supervised by a layperson. We deal here, however, with a situation of “after the fact” (b’di`avad), with conversion ceremonies that have already taken place, with individuals who perhaps have been accepted as Jews-by-choice in your community. And in such a case, the halakhic tradition permits us to acknowledge the conversions, for although it ought to take place in the presence of a knowledgeable beit din, a conversion ritual administered by three unlearned judges (hedyotot) is nonetheless valid.[14] Let us be clear: we are under no obligation to recognize the validity of any “conversion” merely because a ritual bearing that name was performed by a group of three persons claiming to be a beit din. We are entitled to withhold our recognition of the conversion, for example, when we have serious doubts as to the legitimacy of the “court” or the fitness of its members to serve as “judges.”[15] Yet such objections do not apply here. Although we have our religious differences with Humanistic Judaism,[16] we have no reason to doubt the Jewishness or the Judaic sincerity of those who practice it. Similarly, we have every reason to believe that the individuals who have converted with this person demonstrate a genuine desire to live a Jewish life as it is understood by their community. They have made a carefully considered and public decision to take their place in the covenant of Israel, joining their fate to that of the Jewish people. For our part, we do not want to erect barriers to their entry. On the contrary: as Reform Jews, whose movement has distinguished itself by its encouragement of those who wish to choose Judaism, we ought to welcome them actively into our midst.

    Thus, our advice is two-fold. We urge you to advocate in your community that conversions to Judaism be supervised and guided solely by ordained rabbis. Such a standard reflects honor to the Torah and the seriousness with which we take the conversion procedure. It will also forestall difficulties by helping to ensure that the validity of conversions is accepted by most of the Jewish population. Yet to reject the individuals already converted by this person would serve no purpose save to embarrass them, sowing the seeds of bitterness and divisiveness within the community. Out of concern for Jewish unity and communal peace, and in recognition of their evident sincerity, you should rather accept them as full-fledged members of the Jewish people.

  1. Rabbis with “Suspect Ordination.” How we are to evaluate the rabbinical credentials of those who have received private ordination? What of those who have graduated from rabbinical schools with which we are unfamiliar or which we regard as inferior in quality? Do we accept these individuals as our colleagues, as rabbis in our communities?

    We might begin by considering the nature of the ordination by which we bestow the title “rabbi.” As we know that institution today, “ordination” is but the symbolic representation of the ancient s’mikhah described in the Talmudic sources.[17] Ancient ordination, according to halakhic theory, formed a new link in the chain of s’mikhah from teacher to student that stretched back all the way to Moses. The musmakh, or ordained judge, was therefore the legal successor to the seventy elders who stood with Moses on Sinai, and he was entitled to exercise the full range of legislative, judicial, and executive power pertaining to that exalted station. Among these was the power to enforce his decisions upon litigants even against their will, that is, if they had not agreed in advance to accept him as their judge. The musmakhim who constituted the High Court (beit din hagadol) could issue ordinances (takanot) that were binding upon all Jews everywhere. This s’mikhah was never practiced outside of the land of Israel; the Babylonian amoraim (sages of the Talmudic period) did not possess it, unless they received s’mikhah in the land of Israel. At best, the Babylonian “rabbis” (for without s’mikhah they did not take that title but were rather called rav) could regard themselves as “agents” of the rabbis of Eretz Yisrael, who commissioned them to exercise legal authority (sh’luchotayhu avdinan, “we perform their agency”)[18] within carefully circumscribed boundaries. Today’s rabbis, too, function as the agents of the rabbis of old. Although we do not wield the full legal power which they enjoyed–“today, we are all lay judges (hedyotot); we do not exercise the Toraitic power of jurisdiction”[19] – tradition suggests that they have empowered us to act in their name on matters that occur frequently in the legal life of our community or that are important enough to demand a response from contemporary authorities.[20] The “s’mikhah” that we practice today does not confer this ancient grant of jurisdiction upon the recipient. It is merely an attestation by a teacher that the recipient, his student, “has attained the requisite knowledge to rule on matters of Jewish law (higi`a l’hora’ah) and does so with the permission (r’shut) of the rabbi who has ordained him.”[21] Thus, our ordination does not endow its recipient with the authority to issue rulings that our people must accept. It is merely an expression of a teacher’s opinion that the student is capable of serving as a rabbi for a community which wishes to engage him or her. And nowhere do the sources tell us that a person must be ordained in order to perform rabbinical tasks. Rather, all rabbinical power today flows from the willingness of a community to abide by the rabbi’s rulings.[22]

    If this is the case, then no seminary, yeshivah or other institution owns a monopoly over the power to ordain. Any rabbi today is entitled to ordain any student who in the rabbi’s opinion has attained that level of knowledge which qualifies him or her to function as a rabbi. And the community, which has the final say as to who shall perform that function in its midst, is under no obligation to engage the services of an ordained person as its rabbi. From all this, one could argue that there is no substantive, objective content to the title “rabbi.” A “rabbi” is rather anyone who claims to possess some sort of ordination from a teacher. It would follow that we must recognize all such “rabbis” as legitimate possessors of that title.

    Yet though this is true according to the theory of Jewish law, our practice – that is, the way in which we live our law – has moved in the opposite direction. We emphatically do not believe that any and every person who is called “rabbi” or who serves some congregation in that capacity necessarily deserves the title. To us, rather, a “rabbi” is someone who is qualified for that distinction. It is therefore the widespread minhag among our communities, liberal and otherwise, to require that our rabbis receive the “customary ordination” before we engage their services.[23] Like our medieval ancestors, we utilize ordination as a criterion to measure one’s qualifications for the rabbinate, to determine that one meets and hopefully exceeds the minimum requirements of knowledge and expertise that we would set for our rabbinical leaders. If ordination is to serve as such a standard, it must surely be something more than an expression of some rabbi’s opinion or a signature on a piece of paper. Ordination must rather attest that its recipient has successfully completed an extended and rigorous program of Torah study and professional training which prepares one to exercise the rabbinical function in our communities.

    How do we define this program? Every Jewish community since the Middle Ages has developed its own answer to that question. In our community, that is, in the Reform Jewish community of North America, it is customary to require that those who wish to serve as rabbis graduate from rabbinical schools, seminaries and yeshivot whose curricula in our estimation clearly reach the necessary and desirable standards of educational excellence. We use the phrase “in our estimation” advisedly. We know that it is difficult to define “standards of educational excellence” to the satisfaction of all. Indeed, our rabbinical curricula have always been the subject of much debate among practitioners and educators. We acknowledge that our seminaries are not perfect, that a seminary ordination is no ironclad guarantee that its bearer will be a brilliant scholar and an inspiring religious leader. We believe, however, that as a general rule, the education provided by these schools, with the scholarly resources at their command, is a better preparation for the rabbinate than that afforded by lowly-regarded institutions or by individual rabbis who bestow “private ordination.”

    We also assert the right and the duty to act upon this belief. Every profession is entitled to define its own carefully considered educational standards. Those standards will inevitably be the subject of controversy, but at the end of the day it is the responsibility of the members of the profession to decide upon them and to enforce them. To deny us the right to set the standards we would demand for rabbinical education merely because they are controversial is to conclude that there are no standards, that there is no substance to the word “rabbi,” and that a rabbi is legitimately and properly anyone who chooses to assume that title. We do not believe this. The people whom we serve do not believe this. To draw such a conclusion would be absurd, and to act upon it would have destructive consequences for both the rabbinate and Jewish life. The best path, the one we must surely take, is to insist that our rabbis meet educational standards that, in our eyes, do honor to the title they carry.

    As a way of distinguishing between those who meet these standards and those who do not, the various rabbinical associations have developed sets of criteria to determine an individual’s fitness to join the rabbinical fellowship. The CCAR’s Admissions Guidelines[24] serve as a good example. The Guidelines specify that all applicants for membership to our Conference must have earned the degree of Bachelor of Arts (or its equivalent) from a recognized institution of higher learning, and the Master’s degree in Jewish Studies (or its equivalent). Rabbinic graduates of Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion and of the Leo Baeck College of London are eligible for CCAR membership without interview or examination, provided that they apply within four years after ordination. Rabbinic graduates of other “approved seminaries” may be admitted to the CCAR following a process of interview or examination (which may include academic examination). Graduates of seminaries and yeshivot not on the “approved” list can be admitted following an investigation of the quality of those schools and of their courses of study. This is a crucial point: we do not claim that only the graduates of “approved seminaries” are worthy of admission to the Conference. Others may join as well, provided that they can prove that their rabbinical education meets standards of excellence similar to those of the recognized schools. On the other hand, a private ordination will not be accepted, for the ordination of students by individual rabbis whose programs of study are not supervised by any responsible authority endangers the maintenance of any and all standards of educational excellence.[25] It should go without saying–but, in the interests of clarity we shall say it nonetheless–that students or graduates of “rabbinical” schools affiliated with the various messianic Jewish movements are apostates; they are not rabbis, and our community must not grant them that distinction.

    The rabbis of your community can certainly develop some admissions criteria of their own, patterned after those of the CCAR and the other rabbinical associations. These associations will certainly assist you as you seek information concerning the programs of study at rabbinical schools with which you are not familiar.

To summarize: not everyone who may be called “rabbi” is necessarily deserving of that distinction. Your community is under no obligation to recognize the rabbinical credentials of those individuals who have received “ordination” privately or from lowly-regarded institutions. The rabbis in your city are similarly under no obligation to accept these persons as colleagues and as members of your local rabbinical association. You should, of course, act towards them with grace, cordiality and tact, with all due concern for communal unity, in the spirit of a tradition that calls upon us to follow “the paths of peace.” Yet the ultimate message is clear: if we as rabbis truly care about the quality and the reputation of our calling, it is our duty to advocate that membership in the rabbinate be restricted to those who clearly meet the proper educational standards.

NOTES

  1. Rabbi’s Manual (New York: CCAR, 1988), 232.
  2. B. Y’vamot 46b and Kiddushin 62b; Yad, Isurey Bi’ah 13:6-7 and 14:6; SA YD 268:3.
  3. The text says “verses” because the Talmud does not specify which verse is the subject of the midrash. According to Rashi (Y’vamot 46b, s.v. mishpat k’tiv beh), the verse in question is Numbers 15:16, and “judgment (mishpat) does not occur with less than three judges”; on the other hand, in Kiddushin 62b, he points to Leviticus 24:22. Tosafot (Y’vamot 46b, s.v. mishpat) offers Deuteronomy 1:16, following a baraita on Y’vamot 47a.
  4. The identification with the biblical term ger with the proselyte is found in the rabbinic literature. In the Bible itself, the ger is not a “convert to Judaism” but rather a “resident alien,” a non-Israelite permitted to dwell in the land and who, though remaining a non-citizen, enjoys certain privileges. For sources and discussion, see our responsum 5756.13.
  5. M. Sanhedrin 1:1; Rava, B. Sanhedrin 3a. The number three is derived by way of midrash on three appearances of the word elohim (“judges”) in Exodus 22; see the baraita near the top of B. Sanhedrin 3b. Rava holds that this requirement applies to all matters of monetary law (mamonot) as well as to matters involving fines (k’nasot).
  6. Rav Acha b. deRav Ika, B. Sanhedrin 3a.
  7. The term used here is hedyotot, which can be translated either as “persons ignorant of the law” or “persons who are not ordained judges (musmakhim).” In this case, the Talmudic text (B. Sanhedrin 3a) makes it clear that we are speaking of the former.
  8. SA HM 3:1. This reasoning is used in the Talmud (B. Sanhedrin 3a) to support the position of Rav Acha: that is, although the Torah permits one person to judge a case, the Rabbis impose the requirement of three so that at least one of them will be gamir, i.e., one who is familiar with the law at least on a basic level (see Rashi, Sanhedrin 3a, s.v. d’gamir: “one who has heard some of the laws from sages and judges”).
  9. Tosafot, Sanhedrin 3a, s.v. ‘i efshar; Hilkhot HaRosh, Sanhedrin 1:1; SA HM 3:1.
  10. The noted nineteenth-century Galician authority and scholar R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes writes in his chidushim to Shabbat 46b that a conversion beit din must be composed of scholars (talmidey chakhamim). The opposite view, however, is taken in Resp. Binyamin Ze’ev (16th-century Greece), 1:72.
  11. B. Y’vamot 47b (according to Rabbi Yochanan’s emendation of the baraita at the top of the page): “three scholars (talmidey chakhamim) stand by him (at the moment of ritual immersion), informing him of some of the lighter and weightier commandments.”
  12. On the requirement of “examination,” see Yad, Isurey Bi’ah 13:14 and SA YD 268:12. The question of motives is discussed in B. Y’vamot 24b. One who wishes to convert for the “wrong” reasons (marriage; hope for financial gain or political power, etc.) Should not, in theory, be accepted, although once accepted is a valid proselyte. And in all cases, the determination of “proper” and “improper” motivation or readiness for conversion is a matter left to the judgment of the beit din (Tosafot, Y’vamot 24b, s.v. lo; Beit Yosef YD 268, end; Siftey Kohen, YD 268, no. 23. That a decision to convert must be “well-thought-out” implies that the Jew-by-choice be made aware of the obligations which Judaism imposes and of the difficulties and even dangers that have historically been the lot of the people of Israel; see B. Y’vamot 47a-b.
  13. B. Y’vamot 22a and parallels.
  14. Yad, Isurey Bi’ah 13:14-17; SA YD 268:12. Maimonides does require that in the case of a ger who converts before a panel of hedyotot who do not properly examine his motivations, we “watch him until his sincerity is proven.” This does not mean that the ger is not a Jew (see Magid Mishneh and Kesef Mishneh to 13:17), but rather that we may not allow him to marry a Jew until we are certain of his proper intent.
  15. For example, if one of the members of the panel were a non-Jew or an apostate.
  16. See Teshuvot for the Nineties (TFN), no. 5751.4, pp. 9-16, https://www.ccarnet.org/ccar-responsa/tfn-no-5751-4-9-15/
  17. For sources and discussion, see our responsum “Private Ordination,” TFN, no. 5753.4, pp. 133-139, https://www.ccarnet.org/ccar-responsa/tfn-no-5753-4-133-140/. Yad, Sanhedrin ch. 4, along with Tur, SA, and Arukh Hashulchan, HM 1, offer useful summaries of the rules and definitions of rabbinic status in ancient times and in our own day.
  18. See B. Gitin 88b, on the coercion of divorce from recalcitrant husbands.
  19. Tur, HM 1.
  20. Today’s judges, who do not possess s’mikhah, are empowered to adjudicate matters which are “frequent” (i.e., normal occurrence in social life, such as torts, contracts, inheritance, etc.) and which involve monetary loss; SA, HM 1:1. Conversion itself is an interesting case. If the Torah requires three judges to preside over giyur, it might be thought that these judges (shoftim) should be ordained according to the biblical standard. This would mean that conversion, in the absence of such judges, could not take place today. Yet conversions manifestly do take place. Therefore, halakhists have developed the theory that the ordained judges of old have also commissioned us to act as their agents in matters of conversion, on the grounds that “we should not bar the door to proselytes”; Tosafot, Y’vamot 46b-47a, s.v. mishpat.
  21. Isserles, YD 242:14, based upon a responsum by R. Yitzchak b. Sheshet (14th-century Spain/North Africa), Resp. Rivash, no. 271.
  22. We should note that this “willingness” is not an arbitrary matter. In the traditional understanding, a “good” Jewish community certainly wants to live its life in accordance with Torah. While anyone, in theory, can study Torah and apply its provisions to his or her own life, the complexity of the halakhah has led to the long-established minhag to turn to sages and scholars for the reliable interpretation of Jewish law. Rabbis, as these sages and scholars, are therefore indispensable to traditional Jewish life. The point we make here is that no individual “rabbi” can through the power of ordination force any individual or community to abide by his particular interpretations and rulings. Rather, by engaging or recognizing the individual as “their” rabbi, Jews traditionally stipulate their willingness to accept his rulings. Power, in other words, flows from the community to the rabbi and not, as it did in the days of ancient s’mikhah, from the ordaining institution to the rabbi.
  23. See Arukh Hashulchan HM 1:14: no one should preside over weddings, divorces, or chalitzah rituals unless he has received “the customary ordination.”
  24. On file with the CCAR.
  25. See as well TFN, no. 5753.4 (note 17, above), at 137-138: private ordination, which offers a shortcut to s’mikhah which bypasses the rigors and requirements of a seminary curriculum, is surely destructive of our efforts to support the rabbinical schools that meet the standards of educational excellence upon which we insist.

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

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