Synagogue

CORR 13-17

SELLING SYNAGOGUE TO BLACK MUSLIMS

QUESTION:

Two synagogues in San Francisco have merged and, therefore, one of the buildings is not needed and is available for sale. The building is situated in a Black area and an offer has been received for it from Muhammad’s Mosque, a Black Muslim organization. Some of the members of the congregation object to the sale since the Black Muslims have frequently expressed themselves anti-Semitically. Is there any Halachic principle involved in selling the building to such an organization? (Asked by Rabbi Herbert Morris, San Francisco, California.)

ANSWER:

FIRST OF ALL, there arises the question whether a congregation really has, according to Jewish law, the full right ever to sell a synagogue building, since such a sale would be destroying or at least diminishing the sanctity of a synagogue. This basic question has received much discussion in the law and has resulted in considerable restrictions and limitations in the possible sale of a synagogue building. The discussion is found in the first place in the Mishnah, Megilla, Chapter 3, and then in the Talmud, Megilla, page 27 ff. Then the law finds its way into the codes and is discussed in the Tur and in the Shulchan Aruch in Orah Hayyim 153.

At the outset the Halacha makes a distinction between synagogues in villages and synagogues in large cities. The synagogues in small cities may when necessary be sold without much legal difficulty. But it is not so easy to permit the sale of a synagogue in a large city. The reason for the distinction is this: No synagogue can be sold without the consent of the members. In a village all who have contributed (or their heirs) are present and therefore have the right to agree to sell it. In the large cities to which many strangers come and where presumably many non-residents, visiting but not living in the city, have contributed to the building, these non-residents are deemed, as it were, part-owners of the synagogue and one can no longer know who they are to get their consent to sell. In a sense a synagogue in a large city belongs to world Jewry and so cannot be sold since consent cannot be obtained.

However a decision permitting the sale of a large urban synagogue was made in the sixteenth century by Joshua Hoeschel ben Joseph (1578-1648) Rabbi in Cracow (P’ne Jehoshua, I, 4). He said that in a large city where there are many synagogues, each synagogue really belongs to its own group of members, who can exclude non-members if they wish. Therefore each separate synagogue, even in a large city, is equivalent to a small-city synagogue and may be sold. It is on this basis that nowadays synagogues in large cities, when no longer needed, are sold. So this permissive line is followed through the law and, for example, in our day the great authority (head of the Agudas ha-Rabbonim) Moses Feinstein, in his Igros Moshe, Orah Hayyim 50, permits the sale of a large urban synagogue, especially when worship no longer takes place within its walls. Therefore there is no question that the Talmudic prohibition no longer applies and a congregation in a large city may sell its synagogue (cf. previous responsum).

There is an additional reason indicated in the pioneer sixteenth-century decision permitting the sale of the building. The synagogue in the city of Grodno about which Joshua Hoeschel wrote his decision was in ruins. A ruined synagogue is deemed to retain its original sanctity and must be protected. The members of the congregation had built a fence around the ruined synagogue to protect it from intruders who befouled it, but the fence was not adequate to save the ruins from being further defiled. Therefore Joshua Hoeschel said that since its sanctity was being destroyed by intruders, this was an additional reason why this large urban synagogue, despite the Talmud’s negative opinion, could be sold.

There is no question that the synagogue building under present discussion which is now in a neglected neighborhood would undoubtedly be invaded, looted and generally defiled, and for that reason should certainly be sold to a tenant who would occupy and use it. But the second question involved here is perhaps the more grievous one. To whom may a synagogue be sold? This is really the question which is now being asked. A similar question was raised in the Mishnah and the Talmud and carried over into the codes. No synagogue may be sold for an unworthy purpose as, for example, a tannery (because of its evil smell), a bathhouse, etc. But even this is not a insurmountable obstacle, at least with regard to a small-town synagogue. If both the officers and the entire membership agree, they may sell it for an unspecified purpose. Nevertheless, there is obviously a hesitation about selling a synagogue for an unworthy purpose, since even in a small town it would require virtually unanimous consent of the entire community.

There is another indication that no sale should be made which is unworthy of the synagogue’s sanctity. This example has no direct connection with the selling of a synagogue but with the building of a synagogue. It is permissible for a Jew to have a house built by the type of contract with a Gentile builder called “Kablonus,” by which no time limit is established and the Gentile works on his own time, as it were. In that case, the building process may go on even on the Sabbath since it is not being done on that sacred day at the express command of the Jew. This Sabbath work is permissible for the building of a private house but is not permissible for the building of a synagogue because even the appearance of working on the Sabbath violates the sense of sanctity with regard to a synagogue.

Such feelings against selling the synagogue for an unworthy purpose or the violating of special religious sensitivity stand in the way of the sale of this syna gogue to the Black Muslims who often are anti-Semitic.

Nevertheless, this synagogue should be sold and must be sold or its sanctity will be destroyed anyhow by intruders. Furthermore, it would be a distinct disservice to the Jewish community if the risk were taken of intensifying the anti-Semitic feelings of the Black Muslims by refusing outright to sell the building to them.

Perhaps the best solution would be somewhat in the line of the minority suggestion made by Rabbi Judah in the Mishnah (M. Megillah, III, 2) that while a synagogue may not be sold directly for an unworthy purpose (tannery, bathhouse, etc.) it may be sold to be used as a courtyard and then the purchaser can do with it as he wishes once it is sold. Therefore what should be done is this: The building should not be sold to the Black Muslims. It should be sold to some other purchaser. If he wishes to sell it to them, the building is no longer sacred and it is his property. But even so, there should be, as the Talmud suggests, virtually unanimous consent of the officers and members of the congregation.

CORR 127-130

STATUETTES IN THE SYNAGOGUE

QUESTION:

Two small statues of marble, one of Moses and one of David (almost naked) have been offered to a Conservative synagogue. Should they be accepted and permanently displayed in the lobby of this synagogue? (Asked by J. R. Kohn, Tampa, Florida.)

ANSWER:

IN GENERAL the commandment, “Thou shalt not make any graven images,” would seem to prohibit any sort of statuary. However, this general prohibition of representing actual objects in art is immediately delimited by the laws in the Talmud, Avoda Zara 43b and Rosh Hashonah 24b. There the prohibition is confined to such objects which were in the image of the Divine chariot or entourage as described by Ezekiel. Hence, lions, oxen, eagles and humans were the images which were actually prohibited. In fact, figures of humans were specifically and additionally prohibited. However, even in the cases of the prohibition of these images, the Talmud and the later codes (see especially Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Yore Deah 141 passim) prohibit only three-dimensional objects but not flat objects such as painting and embroidery, and certainly not sunken objects such as intaglio. In the Middle Ages, however, there was some prohibition by certain Franco-German authorities even to decorations of birds and flowers (even though these were not among the specific objects in the image of the Divine entourage and also were not three-dimensional). The reason given by Rabbi Eliakim, who ordered the removal of such decorations from the synagogue in Cologne (11 th century) was that they would distract the worshiper. This concern that the worshiper would be distracted was evoked in the discussion of the lions, often three-dimensional, that were found in certain synagogues as decorations of the Ark. However, even in such a case the lion images were defended if they were not above the Ark where all the worshipers could see them, but down lower where they would not be seen and would not distract the worshipers.

Clearly these statues will not be in the main synagogue where worshipers might be distracted, but in the lobby where no worship takes place. So there would be no objection.

Now the question is: Is it proper, even if it does not distract worshipers, to have a statue altogether in a synagogue? To this it must be noted that it is an actual fact that in one of the most ancient synagogues in Babylon there was a bust of the monarch. This synagogue is discussed in the Talmud in Megilla 29a, Avoda Zara 43b, and in the letter of the Gaon Sherira (10th century) edition Lewin, p. 72. This synagogue which was called Shev V’Yashiv (a name whose meaning is debated) had a most honored origin. The Talmud says it was founded by the exiled King Jehoiachin himself, and he used sacred soil and stones from the Temple in Jerusalem for its foundation; and indeed when the question was asked where does the Shekinah, which follows Israel in its exile, come to rest in Babylon, the answer which the Talmud gives is that the Shekinah rests in this ancient synagogue, Shev V’Yashiv. Furthermore, we are told that the greatest of the early Babylonian Rabbis, Rav and Samuel, worshiped there. Evidently they had no objection at all to the presence of a statue of the emperor in the sanctuary. But the question (by implication) is asked in the Talmud: Should not such a bust or statue be prohibited on the ground that some misguided person might worship it? And the answer that the Talmud gives is that perhaps such a suspicion might arise if the statue were in private premises, but in a public place such as the synagogue, where all the people are together, we need have no such suspicion. So a historic synagogue founded by a king of Judea where the Shekinah reposed and where the great rabbis worshiped without demur, had a statue; and since it was in public, there was no suspicion that it would lead to idolatry.

So if a statue of a heathen king was permitted in this most sacred of ancient synagogues, then certainly it would be permitted to have a statue of the Jewish King David and of the great leader, Moses. The only possible objection would be that the statue of David is virtually naked. It is very likely Michelangelo’s David, which is almost entirely naked. I would think that this then becomes a matter of taste; although, even here, it must be stated that in a public place (as, for example, a bathhouse) where many people are together, the matter of nakedness is not a matter of too strict a concern (see Shulchan Aruch, Even Hoezer 21:5, the note of Isserles). However, if the nakedness would offend the majority of the congregation, even if the statue is in the lobby and not in the synagogue proper and is of a Jewish king, it should not be displayed.

If the statue of Moses is a copy of Michelangelo’s Moses, it has two horn-like projections from the head of Moses. This is based upon the ancient understanding of the verse (Exodus 34:29) that when Moses came down from Mount Sinai his face shone with rays of light, and the Hebrew verse is “Koran or ponov,” in which the word “koran” which means “rays of light” was taken to mean the same as “keran” which means “horns.” But there is no objection to this representation of Moses. Many Hebrew books with elaborate title pages depicted Moses in the same way.

In short, the answer is as follows: There is no basic objection to statues, especially in the lobby where they do not distract from actual worship. There may be a sense of impropriety in the nakedness of the David statue; that must be decided as a matter of taste. There is no objection to the statute of Moses.

RRT 145-147

SYNAGOGUE FROM FUNERAL PARLOR

QUESTION:

Is there any objection in Jewish law to converting a building which was a funeral parlor into a synagogue? (Asked by Rabbi Sidney Wolf, Corpus Christi, Texas.)

ANSWER:

IT MIGHT MAKE some difference, if only minor, if the funeral parlor were a Gentile one, not a Jewish one. In Jewish law, one might possibly entertain a more serious objection if the funeral parlor were Jewish than if it were non-Jewish. This may seem strange; one would imagine the reverse, but the fact is this:

If the objection is based upon tuma, the ritual uncleanliness of the dead, then the fact is, as far as a Kohen is concerned, that Jewish bodies are unclean for him by “enclosure.” That is to say, a Kohen may not go into a house that contains a dead body. But Gentile bodies are not unclean by enclosure, only by contact. In other words, a Kohen can go into a morgue which contains only Christian bodies, but not into one that contains Jewish bodies.

But all this assumes the actual presence of bodies in the building. Such a question as to whether a syna gogue may be built or a building be used as a synagogue where there are actually bodies present has arisen in England and created a whole series of responsa.

An old church was bought and converted into a synagogue. It was discovered that in the basement of the church, going back to the days when England was still a Catholic country, the bodies of monks and others were buried in what we would call the basement. And the question arose as to whether a shul, a synagogue, may be in a building in which all these ancient bodies are underneath it. There were varied opinions because in that particular case, the bodies or their bones were still there.

But the case that you are asking about is one in which there are no longer any bodies, Jewish or Gentile, on the premises. So your question amounts to this: Is the fact that once there were bodies in the building a reason for not permitting the use of the building?

This question can be answered definitely by analogy. The law gives us a clear analogy in the case of a building used for idolatry. The question is put in this way: If idols were present and were worshiped in a building (or a room), may it be used later as a synagogue? This question, before we mention the answer, could arise in modern times and, in fact, is a modern question. The reason for it being a live question is this: While the Christian religion is not considered to be idolatrous in Jewish law, nevertheless, certain objects, such as the crucifix, would be deemed idolatrous objects. Therefore the modern form of the question is this: Suppose a room or a large enclosure contained crucifixes and was used in Christian worship, can such a room be used as a synagogue after the crucifixes are removed? The answer to this question is generally yes, because it is only the objects which are dedicated to the non Jewish worship, but not the room or the house itself. Therefore when the objects are removed, the house or the room may be used for Jewish worship. Of course, if the building is actually dedicated, that might be another question.

Therefore, we may say that since the question of ritual uncleanliness of bodies is much less important than idolatry, if a room may be used after an idolatrous object is removed from it, then all the more is it permissible, if the bodies are removed from the building, for the building to be used as a synagogue.

NRR 56-57

THE SIGNS OF THE ZODIAC ON SYNAGOGUE WINDOWS

QUESTION:

Is it proper to have the twelve signs of the zodiac on the stained-glass windows of our temple? The status of the twelve symbols in Jewish tradition is somewhat vague, and so there could be arguments for or against their use. What we need, therefore, is the preponderance of attitude or opinion on whether to use them or not. (Asked by Rabbi Albert A. Michels, Sun City, Arizona.)

ANSWER:

FIRST OF all, the argument against their use: One motive for putting the signs of the zodiac on the windows might be for the purpose (even incidentally for the purpose) of holding the interest of those people nowadays who believe in astrology. If this is the motive, then it is absolutely against Jewish tradition. The objection to astrology stems from the verse in Jeremiah 10:2: “Thus saith the Lord: Learn not the way of the nations, and be not dismayed at the signs of heaven; for the nations are dismayed at them.” On this verse the Talmud in Shabbat 156a says: No constellation governs the life of Israel (eyn mazol l’ Yis-roel). In other words, all the astrology which was so elaborately developed by the Babylonians is forbidden to us.

However, if the intention and the effect is not to encourage the belief in astrology, then much can be said in favor of having the signs of the zodiac on the windows. The signs of the zodiac are taken to represent the twelve tribes of Israel. Furthermore, each of the signs is given a religious significance in the Midrashic literature. Thus Aries the lamb is the pure sacrifice of Isaac, etc. (see the article “Zodiac” in the Jewish Encyclopedia and in the new Encyclopaedia Judaica).

There is also a more direct reason for permitting the use of these signs on the windows. In the older Halachah, most of the objection against decorations on synagogue walls and in prayerbooks was based upon the fear that they would distract the people from their prayers (see the reference in Modern Reform Responsa, pp. 185 ff.). But the signs of the zodiac were actually printed in all the holiday prayerbooks for the rain and dew prayers on Succos and Passover. If, therefore, the signs of the zodiac were printed in the prayerbook for the people to look at when they pray, then surely it was deemed even praiseworthy to have them.

Our answer, therefore, must be on balance. If you believe that the effect of the pictures of the signs of the zodiac will encourage interest in astrology, then it is wrong to have them. But if there is no such concern or danger, then there is plenty of tradition in favor of having them.

TRR 13-15

TEMPLE DEDICATION QUESTIONS

QUESTION:

Should there be separate dedication exercises for the various donations of parts of the building? Should a donor be permitted on a memorial plaque in the Temple to have a picture of his late father? (Asked by Rabbi Elliot M. Strom, Newton, Pennsylvania.)

ANSWER:

There is very little firm and definite law in the tradition as to the dedication of a new synagogue. Most of what is available on the matter has been recorded in Contemporary Reform Responsa, pp. 9 ff. However there is enough in the tradition to give a more or less general answer to the questions asked here.

One or many dedication services. There is only one principle upon which to decide this question and that is the concept frequently invoked of tirhat hatzibur, “burdening the congregation.” The phrase is used when too many additional elements are inserted in the service. It is not deemed wise to weary the worshipers. Some of the authorities who express concern for “over” burdening the congregation in the reading, for example, of lengthy memorial lists, are recorded in Modem Reform Responsa, p. 27. Following this general concern, it would be wrong to have, let us say, ten or fifteen separate dedication services. The people would weary of them and the experience would have a negative effect on the devotions of the congregation. Perhaps an acceptable compromise can be adopted as follows: that all the donations to the main sanctuary should be united into one impressive dedication, with all donors properly honored. Then, a second dedication service should be held for the donors to the Chapel, School, Library, etc., and, again, all these donors honored. Thus all donors will be honored, as they should be, without tirhat hatzibur, burdening the congregation.

A memorial plaque with a photograph of the parent honored. As with the general practice of dedication, there is no direct law governing the plaques in the synagogue, except the general one applying to all additions and decorations in the synagogue, namely, that they should not be where they will distract the attention of the worshipers. Of course if these plaques are not where the worshipers would be looking at them during prayer, this objection would not apply to them.

However, certain attitudes of tradition can govern these plaques when we consider that many of them are memorial plaques in honor of deceased parents, etc. Thus they may be judged in the light of what has been decided with regard to the memorials in the cemetery, the tombstones, etc. As to these memorials in the cemetery, many congregations had a committee to see to it that there was a general equality and none should be overwhelmingly more impressive than others, since in that regard, the scholars say that “we are equal partners,” i.e., that there should be democracy.

Therefore, on this basis alone, no one plaque should be more outstandingly noticeable than the others. But more specifically in this case, it may be stated that the custom of having such photographs on tombstones, a custom frequently followed in certain Orthodox cemeteries, has been deprecated by the scholars, although not forbidden outright. For example, the great Hungarian authority Maharam Shick (Responsa Yoreh Deah 170) expressly forbids such photographs (cf. the last paragraph of the responsum). See the long footnote in Greenwald’s Kol 13o, p. 380, note 1.

For these reasons, this suggestion of a photograph on the memorial tablet should be discouraged. Besides, others may want the same privilege.

To sum up: The dedications should not overburden the congregation. They should be organized into two impressive dedications. As for the picture on one memorial plaque, it should be discouraged for the reasons mentioned above.

TRR 8-10

MEMBERSHIP OF UNMARRIED COUPLE

QUESTION:

A Jewish couple, living together in sexual relationship, has applied to the congregation for membership as a family. May the congregation accept them as such? (Asked by Rabbi Seymour Prystowsky, Lafayette Hill, Pennsylvania.)

ANSWER:

This question involves, first of all, the relationship of Jewish law to non-Jewish law. The principle of diva d’malkhuta is that non-Jewish law is given validity by Jewish law when the non-Jewish law is just and applies to all citizens equally. If, for example, a non-Jewish law was an oppressive decree announced by some medieval monarch against the Jews specifically, it could be evaded without incurring a sin in Jewish law See the full discussion on the matter in Contemporary Reform Responsa, p. 102.

Now it is obvious that the state laws involving adultery are not specifically directed to any race or religion but equally to all citizens of the respective states. Therefore Jews are religiously obligated to obey the state law by the principle of diva d’malkhuta. For us to admit as a family two people who are living in a relationship which is illegitimate in state law, would be a violation of state law in their case, a law which we are Jewishly in duty bound to obey.

Let us, then, consider what is the relationship of the civil law to this couple living together without marriage. If either one of the couple is already married to someone else, then their living together constitutes an adulterous relationship which is certainly a violation of the law of the state. Or if the couple is too closely related by blood, although not in a marriage bond with someone else, this would constitute an incestuous relationship, also forbidden by general law. But if either of the couple is not bound to another person and not too closely related to each other, then, in most states, their living together in sexual relationship constitutes no violation of the law.

However, we must now consider the specific status of Jewish law with regard to this couple. Of course, when there already exists a marriage bond of either of the couple to someone else, or when they are too closely related by blood, then, of course, their relationship is absolutely a flagrant violation of Jewish law and these two people cannot possibly be acknowledged by the congregation as being a family. But what is the Jewish status of a couple living together who are not related by marriage to another or by blood to each other? Is this relationship, which is not illegal in general law, legal or illegal in Jewish law?

Maimonides (Yad Hil. Ishut 1:4) bases his decision on the verse in Deuteronomy 23:18 which declares: “There must be no harlotry among the daughters of Israel,” and he says that if a man lives with a woman without the regular ritual of marriage, without, therefore, also a ketubah to protect her rights should he sends her away or die, then such an arrangement is a violation of the Biblical law against harlotry. This decision is cited in the listing of commandments in Minhat Hinukh, Commandment 570. The Shulhan Arukh (Even Haezer 26:1) itself is still more clear as to this prohibition : “A woman is not considered a wife unless by way of regular marriage (qiddushin) but if they have sexual relationship without marriage, it has no status at all (eino klum); furthermore (continues the Shulhan Arukh) if he has sexual relationship with her even meaning it to be marriage, she cannot be counted as his wife. On the contrary, we should compel them to part.” Therefore, whatever may be the status of such a relationship in the laws of the various states, it is considered a sinful one in Jewish law, and so we have no right to give it any status by admitting these people to a family membership in the congregation.

Furthermore, if such a couple would be admitted, the congregation may very well receive applications from other couples whose relationship (one or the other being married already) is flagrantly adulterous. Shall we then start a new investigation of all such couples, especially since all of them are in violation of Jewish law? It is far better not to open this “Pandora’s box” and yield to the rather brazen demand that this union, illegal in Jewish law, shall be acknowledged as a legal family by the synagogue.

NARR 80-82

CCAR RESPONSA

New American Reform Responsa

50. Portrait in a Synagogue

QUESTION: Is it permissible to hang a large picture of the Four Chaplains in the vestibule of a synagogue? The oil painting depicts the chaplains who bravely sank with the Dorchester, in the Atlantic in World War II. (Wilham R. Guaroscio, Monongahela PA)ANSWER: The prohibition against works of art in the synagogue is based upon the Decalogue statement “You shall not make unto yourself a graven image” (Ex 20.4; Deut 5.8). When the Talmud discussed these prohibitions it principally dealt with human figures, as well as those described by Ezekiel’s vision along with the sun, moon and stars (A Z 43b; R H 24b). In the later codes the prohibition was further restricted to encompass only those objects which were three dimensional in nature; this excluded embroidery as well as wall paintings (Tur and Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 141). Yet a statement in the Talmud described a bust of a monarch in a synagogue (Meg 29a; A Z 43b; Sherira Gaon Sheeltot (ed) Lewin p 72). Although Rav and Samuel attended this synagogue they did not object to the bust. Eventually the codes indicated that there would be an objection only to a complete figure but not to a bust (Tur and Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 141). Interestingly enough the further development of the prohibition against pictures and images was not connected with idolatry or the danger of idolatry, which was the concern of the second commandment, but simply with the possibility of distracting the worshipper from appropriate devotion in the synagogue or concentrating on the text of a decorated book (Tos to Yoma 54a; Sefer Hassidim #1625; Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 141; Meir Katzenellenbogen Avqat Rahel #65). These discussions stand in contrast to the decorations found in synagogues both ancient and modern. The synagogue at Dura Europa in Syria as well as various others in Israel have demonstrated that two dimensional figures were frequently used. Furthermore, the many volumes by E. Goodenough (Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period) show us a large number of pictorial images of plants, animals, as well as human figures on sarcophagi, ritual objects, coins and in synagogues. Josephus, Philo and other Hellenistic authors expressed themselves on the subject as well (Joseph Gutmann ‘The Second Commandment and the Image in Judaism” Beauty and Holiness pp 1 ff). Abstract designs, in place of portraits or figures, were used in synagogues in Islamic lands as Muslims permitted no figures in their decorations. Other cultures influenced us in different directions so the ketubot of the Renaissance often showed human figures (Abraham Hiya De Boton Lehem Rav #15). De Boton felt that although we should not encourage decorations; it was not necessary to destroy the ketubah (Franz Landsberger “Illuminated Marriage Contracts” Beauty and Holiness, (ed) J. Gutmann pp 383 f). Although marriage contracts did not find a permanent place in the synagogue, the ceremony at which they were read took place in the courtyard of the synagogue or in the synagogue itself. In modern times Orthodox synagogues frequently restrict their window or other decorations to abstract designs. However, they continue to use lions and other figures on the Torah ark parokhet and Torah covers in two and three dimensional forms (Dov Baer Menkes Anaf Etz Avot #4; J. Greenwald Zikhron Yehudah Orah Hayim #63). Conservative and Reform synagogues use figures in their windows as the Tree of Life (Pittsburgh) where a window portrays Isaac Mayer Wise, the founder of Reform Judaism, in this Conservative synagogue, and Rodef Shalom with many figures. There is no religious problem about hanging a picture of the Four Chaplains in the foyer of the synagogue. Questions about the artistic merit of the picture as well as other local considerations should be taken into account.December 1987

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

NARR 95-97

CCAR RESPONSA

New American Reform Responsa

59. Renting a Portion of the Synagogue to a University

QUESTION: May a synagogue rent a portion of its building for university classes? The classes will be held both during the week and on shabbat. Is that rental appropriate as it involves a secular use of the building on shabbat? Does it make a difference that there are separate entrances for congregants coming to worship and for students coming to study? (Rabbi Robert T. Gan, Los Angeles CA)ANSWER: Synagogues through the ages have been located in many different sites sometimes, especially since the Emancipation, in a completely secular environment. So, for example, the Orthodox synagogue in Springfield, Missouri was in an office building which also housed a movie theater, and the normal secular activities continued around the synagogue on shabbat as well as the holidays. Elsewhere, rooms rented by a congregation for religious school or adult activities during certain days were rented by others for secular purposes at different times. In your instance, of course, we are dealing with a synagogue which owns the property and may rent to others. The fact that the rental is to a university for the purposes of study would make no difference to the traditional authorities such as Ezekiel Landau or Moses Sofer and many of their disciples who long opposed secular studies (A. Altman Moses Mendelssohn p 397; Ezekiel Landau Derushei Hazelah 53a pp; Moses Sofer Responsa #197). We, of course, do not share these feelings about the university and secular learning, and are joined by other Orthodox authorities such as David Hoffmann (Melamed Lehoil) and Samson Raphael Hirsch. We must ask whether any particular feelings of holiness are attached to the synagogue building outside of the synagogue itself such as the social hall and other rooms. Such areas of the synagogue do not possess a special sanctified status. We would not hesitate to use the facilities of the synagogue for entirely secular purposes such as a social dance (S. B. Freehof Recent Reform Responsa #45; W. Jacob (ed) American Reform Responsa #166 ff). There are few restrictions on the use of a synagogue building. All of the instances discussed have dealt with congregational or communal uses and were subject to restrictions on shabbat and holidays. No normal activities would continue during these sacred days especially during the hours of services. We can only claim that university classes are inappropriate on shabbat under the rubric marit ayin. The appearance to the congregation and the general community of such a rental would be wrong. It would seem to violate the shabbat and secularize the synagogue building. Although technically such a rental arrangement would be alright, we should not neglect marit ayin and such sentiments unless the economic circumstances are extreme and this is the only way in which the synagogue can continue. The facilities should not be rented to a university if it is going to use them on shabbat and the holidays.December 1990

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

ARR 76-78

CCAR RESPONSA

American Reform Responsa

28. Sale of a Synagogue

(Vol. XXIX, 1919, p. 85)

QUESTION: An Orthodox congregation has a synagogue in the downtown district of the city. A considerable number of its members–representing the wealthiest element–moved from the neighborhood to a more desirable part of the town, and–finding it impossible to attend the old synagogue on account of the great distance–propose to sell it and to use the proceeds for the erection of another synagogue in their new neighborhood. The members who remained in the old neighborhood object to the sale. The attorney representing the advocates of the sale wishes to obtain information on the Jewish law in the case.

ANSWER: The constitutional law of the congregation is chiefly defined by local practice, and the legal authorities often differ on these questions.

Shulchan Aruch, the authoritative law book (Orach Chayim 153.7) says: A synagogue may be sold by the seven trustees (the usual number) of the congregation in a convention of the members, which can only mean that the latter have but a consulting vote.

All financial affairs of the congregation, such as assessment and expenditures, are arranged through a vote in which the membership, paying more than half of the taxes, decides (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 163.3).

Solomon Ibn Adret (Responsa,no. 1091) declares that a majority of the membership, regardless of the tax payment, is decisive.

Asher ben Jehiel (Responsa,no. 7.3) is for decision on the ground of tax payment.

The usual practice of the congregation is that both factors are to be taken into consideration, e.g., if a congregation has 100 members, a vote of 51 is necessary, provided these 51 pay more than 50 percent of the congregational taxes. Mendel Krochmal (Responsa,no. 1-2) declares that in personal questions (such as the election of a paid official), the majority of the taxpayers is always necessary, so that in a case which is submitted to him, where, of a membership of fifty, five men pay more than half of the congregational assessment, their veto cannot prevent the election of a congregational official.

Conclusion: If a majority of members, whose dues represent more than half of the income of the congregation raised by assessment, decide upon the sale of the synagogue, their action is legal. This is the rigorous view, but authors of considerable authority declare that a vote of the trustees is sufficient, as long as the membership is ratified.

G. Deutsch

NOTE:

Since every congregation has a constitution and bylaws, such should be checked before any property is sold. However, whether or not the constitution and by laws make provision for the sale of property, it is wise to consult an attorney. Furthermore, legal counsel may be essential because many states have laws requiring the courts to approve the sale of any property owned by a religious institution.

Responsa Committee (1980)

See also:

S.B. Freehof, “Selling Synagogue to Black Muslims,” Contemporary Reform Responsa, pp. 13ff.

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.

NARR 63-65

CCAR RESPONSA

New American Reform Responsa

40. Unusual Synagogue Support

QUESTION: Our synagogue is located in a resort area. This means that we have a large congregation during three or four months of winter, a somewhat smaller congregation during another six weeks in fall and spring, and a very small congregation the rest of the year. Many of the individuals who worship with us and come to synagogue programs make no financial contribution, while others provide a nominal gift. Most retain their membership in northern cities. As almost none of these individuals are with us for the High Holidays, they feel little responsibility to the congregation although they turn to it for worship as well as attention during times of illness or bereavement. We have, therefore, asked for contributions at each service and passed a basket around the synagogue. We have also instituted a practice of seeking a donation when a name is read for Yahrzeit or when a person is invited to the Torah. Some have vigorously objected to these efforts. How does tradition view them? (Patricia Rosenthal, Miami Fl)ANSWER: It is the duty of individuals who settle permanently or temporarily in a community to support it. This mitzvah has been established in our tradition. The financial obligation of adult Jews toward religious institutions was first mentioned in the discussion of the ancient half sheqel (Ex. 30.11 ff). All men above the age of twenty were obligated to give it, both rich and poor. Later the Diaspora Jewish community provided regular maintenance for the Temple in Jerusalem. When the Temple was destroyed, the Romans sought to divert this financial obligation to the royal treasury, which caused considerable misery. That measure eventually lapsed. During the Middle Ages a community could force its members through taxation to help maintain the necessary religious institutions (Shulhan Arukh Yoreh Deah 256.5; Orah Hayim 150.1). Actually, measures went considerably further and a community which had only ten males could force them all to be present for the High Holidays, so that the community could conduct proper congregational services. Anyone unable to be present had to obtain an appropriate substitute for the minyan (Shulhan Arukh Orah Hayim 55.20; Solomon ben Aderet Responsa V #222; Isaac bar Sheshet Responsa I #518 and #531). A community could force an unwilling minority within it to contribute to a synagogue (Yad Hil Tefilah 1.1; Tur Orah Hayim 10.50). When members sought to escape their obligation it was, in the past, possible to place them under the ban (J. Wiesner Der Bann). Torah honors and other honors were not accorded to them. When the Reform movement reorganized the synagogue services, it sought to remove financial considerations from all portions of it along with much else. The custom of seeking gifts for Torah honors was also eliminated. We should be very hesitant about reestablishing this custom as it commercialized the central portion of a service. If the honors are distributed on another day before the service then this objection would be removed. Some should always be given to individuals who have made non-financial contributions to the synagogue. The other matters which you have suggested are somewhat different. The passing of the basket, of course, is taken from the Christian churches around us which regularly have a collection during their service. I can understand people’s hesitation and discomfort with this practice (huqat goyim). Perhaps it can be done in a somewhat different way by having envelopes available at each seat or giving them to individuals as they come to the service. Something along these lines should be attempted to avoid the overtones of huqat goyim. The reading of Yahrzeit names can be limited to those who have made prior arrangements with the Temple office; the contribution can be explained at that time. As people are concerned about Yahrzeit, this would probably generate a reasonable income. In addition, it should be possible to educate the individuals of this holiday community who regularly use the services of the Temple that they have an obligation to support it for themselves and the broader community.April 1989

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.