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238. Jewish Lawyers and Terrorists

QUESTION:According to Jewish tradition, is a Jewish lawyer obliged to defend Arab terrorists who attempt to kill Jews in Israel if a Jewish lawyer is designated to defend them? Is a Jewish lawyer obliged to defend terrorists who attempt to kill people in general if a Jewish lawyer is designated to defend them? Is a Jewish lawyer obliged to defend a member of the American Nazi Party when he knows that the goal of the American Nazi Party is detrimental to the Jewish people? (Rabbi Jack Segal, Houston TX)

ANSWER: We should begin by making it clear that the current system of appointing a lawyer or the hiring of a lawyer to defend appears late in our tradition. Although a person might have engaged someone to speak for him, this was usually not an individual who made his livelihood as an attorney. A representative akin to the modern attorney was used if the individual could not appear personally due to illness or distance or if one of the parties felt inadequate to the test of presenting a case. Most cases proceeded without an attorney. The traditional Jewish court procedure saw judges engaged in interrogation and so they did much of what attorneys do in the American courts. Various responsa mentioned attorneys and dealt with problems associated with them but not with our problem (Jacob ben Judah Weil Responsa; Meir of Rothenburg Responsa; Isaac ben Sheshet Responsa #235; Moses Isserles Responsaand others).

Although there is nothing like a court appointed attorney in the traditional system of Jewish law, nevertheless, the tradition may provide some guidance for Jewish attorneys in the United States and in the State of Israel in which the courts function differently. In these systems an accused individual engages an attorney or has an attorney appointed. What is the duty of a Jewish attorney under those circumstances?

In order to answer this question, we must ask ourselves about the purpose of a trial. Our concern is justice and that was expressed by the Bible which demanded close cross examination of the witnesses (Deut 13.15) as the accused was perceived innocent till proven guilty. The accused must be present during the examination of each of the witnesses who are testifying against her/him (Yad Hil Edut 4.1). Furthermore, the defendant must be personally warned by those who saw the crime or by someone else (San 30a; Git 33b; Kid 26b and Codes). The examination must concentrate on precise facts and not wander afield (San 32b; Yad Hil Edut 18.2; 22:1 ff; Shulhan Arukh Hoshen Mishpat 15.3; Responsa Rivash #266).

There are strict rules against self incrimination and no evidence of that kind is permissible (Ex 23.1; San 9b; Yeb 25; San 6.2; 18.6 and commentaries). The defendant may plead on her/his own behalf in front of the court before the court begins its deliberations (M San 5.4), but he/she is not permitted to say anything which might prejudice the court against him (San 9.4). If the defendant is not capable of speaking for himself/herself, then a judge may do so for her/him (San 29a). If the matter involves a death sentence, then the court remains in session until the individual has been executed so that if any new evidence appears, the execution may be halted (M San 6.1; San 43a and YadHil San 13.1 ff).

This is merely a sample of judicial safeguards against injustice, it demonstrates the great care given to the defense of the accused and the efforts made on his behalf by the ancient system of courts. Lawyers or other representatives have not been involved, but the spirit of the law demands that we seek justice. We, in many modern lands, do so through an adversarial procedure.

The spirit of traditional legislation would indicate that lawyers in our system must participate in this effort to seek justice. This would apply to war criminals, terrorists or others who may be tried in the United States or in the State of Israel. Jewish attorneys should consider themselves within the framework of tradition if they are appointed to such tasks or wish to volunteer for them. No one can, of course, be forced into such a position against their will. They will help to assure that justice is done and that the accused has a reasonable opportunity to defend herself/himself within the framework of our judicial system. “Justice, Justice, shall you pursue” (Deut 16.20) or “in righteousness shall you judge your neighbor” (Lev 19.15) will continue to be our guide.

April 1989

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American Reform Responsa

50. Kosher Kitchen in Military Camps

(Vol. XXVIII, 1918, pp. 124-127)QUESTION: An Orthodox organization started an agitation to demand of the government that a kosher kitchen be provided in military camps. Is it necessary for Jewish soldiers to observe the dietary laws while in active service?ANSWER: The principle on the ground of which this question is to be treated, is the Talmudic rule “Dina demslchuta dina” (Gittin 10b, and in many other places). This principle has often been misinterpreted, as if any state law would supersede the religious law. The fallacy of such an interpretation is evident, or else the whole history of Israel from the time of Antiochus Epiphanes down to Nicholas II would be a rebellion against the Rabbinic interpretation of Judaism. The rule that obedience to the law of the state is to the Jew a religious duty, refers first of all to such laws which do not conflict with the religious duties, as tax and custom laws. Even then, the best authorities limit such duty to laws which do not discriminate against the Jews (Tosafot, Bava Kama 58a; Meir of Rothenburg, Responsa, ed. Prague, no. 134, ed. Berlin, no. 122; and Asher ben Yechiel, Nedarim 3.11, Kitsur Piskei Rosh). The clearest definition of the limitation is given by Mordecai Yafeh (1530-1612), who says: The principle of “Dina demalchuta dina” is restricted to cases in which the king derives a benefit from the law and which is needed for the welfare of the country (Lebush, Ir Shushan, sec. 369, Cracow, 1569).Application to War The application of this principle to war is given in the Rabbinic interpretation of Deut. 20:19-20, which says that the Sabbath law shall not stand in the way of any war operation (Sifrei, l.c., ed. Friedman, p. 111b). Historic facts prove that this principle was actually observed in the Jewish state. The Book of Maccabees reports that the heroes who fought for the preservation of their religion resolved that they would fight on Sabbath, if it was necessary (I Macc. 3:41). Until the end of the 18th century the Jews were not compelled to perform military duty. We have, however, individual instances during the whole period of the Middle Ages from all countries, and during the great wars of the 17th century we hear of instances in Germany as well as in Poland.l It is reasonably certain, and in the case of Worms expressly reported, that these Jewish soldiers fought on the Sabbath. Also, it is not likely that they could have observed the dietary laws under the exigencies of camp life. There is, however, the great difference that these Jewish soldiers were volunteers and therefore had the choice of violating their religion or keeping out of the army.Compulsory Service The first case in which the conflict between religious laws and military exigency was submitted to a rabbinic authority occurred, as far as I am aware, in Prague. During the siege of the city, which was the last act of the bloody drama of the Thirty Years War, the Jews had to do duty in repairing fortifications and in putting out fires caused by the bombardment (1648).2 Similar exigencies occurred in 1744, when the city was besieged by the Prussian army. The Jews again had to work on the Sabbath, and in spite of their urgent pleas they had even to work on Yom Kippur, Sept. 16, 1744, just the day before the city surrendered.3 Inasmuch as the Sabbath stands higher than the dietary laws (because the penalty for violating the dietary laws is stripes, while the penalty for breaking the Sabbath is death), and inasmuch as the Talmud places Sabbath observance so high as to say that it will wipe out the sin of idolatry (Shabbat 118b, an evidently hyperbolical, but significant expression), it is clear that the exigencies of the military service justify the breaking of the dietary laws.Direct Application to Dietary Laws Whatever higher critics may think of the chronological relations between I Samuel and Leviticus, it is clear that the report that Ahimelech gave to David the holy showbread means to convey that exigencies of military service supersede the dietary law (I Sam. 21:2-7). That this interpretation is old is clearly proven by the New Testament,4 where this incident is quoted as proof that necessity–and in this particular case, military necessity (I Sam. 21:3)–supersedes the dietary law. This is also the opinion of Rashi (Comm., l.c.) and of the Midrash (Yalkut, I. Sam, sec. 130), although Kimchi tries to explain the difficulty away by saying that the bread was not showbread, but the bread of thanksgiving offering, which lay people may eat. The question could not come before Orthodox authorities until recent times, because the first case of Jews being drafted into the army dates from 1788, when Joseph II of Austria introduced this duty by a law dated February 13. Complaints were heard by many observant Jews, but the humane emperor decided in an order of August 17, 1786, that nothing more shall be required of the Jews “als was die Not fordert.”5 In the same sense Ezekiel Landau (1713-1793), then Chief Rabbi of Prague, and one of the most celebrated rabbinical authors of the time, addressed the first contingent of Jewish soldiers and admonished them to observe the Jewish practices as far as possible.6 Moses Sofer (1762-1839), the greatest casuist of his age, condemns the practice, then extant, that the rich evade military service by bribery, so that the contingent is filled by drafting the poor. He says that no one has the right to make his fellow-Jew violate the laws, among which he mentions the dietary laws specifically as permissible under the exigencies of the military service.7Conclusion Military service is Dina Demalchuta. It is intended for the welfare of the country, and it applies to Jews and non-Jews alike. Therefore, it supersedes ceremonial law, including the dietary laws. It would be absolutely unfair to demand of the military administration to provide a kosher kitchen, which in some instances would be an impossibility, and in every case a hardship. Very observant young men, while in a camp which is in the vicinity of a large city, can easily provide themselves with kosher food, or Orthodox organizations may provide it for them, if they wish to do so, but from the strictest Orthodox viewpoint this is absolutely unnecessary.G. DeutschNotes1 A few instances will be given briefly: From Spain in the 12th century–Guedemann, Erziehungswesen I, 111; from Worms in the 13th century–ibid., 137; from Salzburg, 1382–Altmann, Geschichte der Jueden in S., pp. 103-105; from Thiengen, 1499: Guedemann, ibid., III, p. 165; from Hamburg, 1665–Jahrbuch der Jued. Lit. Ges. X, 279; from Poland, 1650-1660–Oest. Wochenschrift, 1910, no. 31-32; also from Poland in the 17th century– Resp. no. 2, Chemnitz, Der…Schwedische Krieg II, pp. 356 and 647. Settin (1648) speaks of a Jewish colonel who served in the Imperial Army.2 Milchama Beshalom, Prague, 1649, reprinted in Bikurei Ha-itim IV, pp. 103-130.3 Report of the eyewitness, Bezalel Brandeis, in Freimann, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Juden in Prag etc., p. 24 (Berlin, 1898).4 Matthew 12:5; Mark 2:26; Luke 6:4.5 Allg. Zeitg. des Judentums, 1872, pp. 981-982.6 Klein, Sollen die Juden Soldaten Werden? (Vienna, 1783); Wolf, “Die Juden im oest. Heere.” in Oester. Militaerzeitung, of which an abstract is given in Allg. Zeitg. des Judentums, 1869, p. 565; Grunwald, Die Feldzuege Napoleons, p. 7 (Vienna, 1913).7 Resp. Chatam Sofer VI, no. 29. See also: Geiger, Rabbinisches Gutachten ueber die Militaerpflichtigkeit der Juden, Breslau, 1842. Eli Rust (Pseudonym for L. Landshuth), “Die Verbindlichkeit des Zeremonialgesetzes fuer Juedische Krieger,” in Heinemann, Allg. Archiv etc. 1842, vol. II, pp. 236-238.

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12. Kippot for Women and Men

QUESTION: What is the origin of the covering the head for women and men? May women wear kippot as a sign of equality or would tradition prohibit this as imitation of masculine garb? How did the practice of wearing kippot develop? What is the Reform view? (Aaron Phillips, Cleveland OH)ANSWER: Tradition stated that any woman who wore her hair loose and uncovered was considered a virgin (Sifrei #11); if a married woman exposed her hair in this way she was considered a loose woman. A married woman either had to cut her hair very closely or had to cover it in some manner. Any married woman who left her hair uncovered provided grounds for divorce and forfeited the money and property of her dowry (M Ket 7.6; 72a). Furthermore, all women were to cover their hair during the reading of the shema (Ber 24a; Shulhan Arukh Orah Hayim 75.1 ff; Sheelat Yaavetz Vol 1 #9; Vol 2 #718). This in essence meant that women were required to cover their hair in the synagogue whether single or married; this has also been discussed in the next responsum. We can see that the wearing of a covering over the hair for married women is very old and has generally been followed by traditional Jews through the ages. Women, both married and unmarried, are required to cover their hair. As styles of hats, scarfs, and other head gear have varied according to fashion through the ages, it would be difficult to accuse women of imitating masculine garb through any head covering. We Reform Jews would object vigorously to this requirement for women which places them in an inferior position and sees them primarily in a sexual role. As Reform Judaism has stressed the equality of men and women, we would reject this path of tradition. Reform Jewish practice does not require women to cover their hair within or outside the synagogue. A number of women do, however, wish to keep their head covered during worship in the same manner as men, and do so as another symbol of the equality between men and women. Let us now inquire into the origin of this custom of head covering for men. An excellent essay on this subject has been written by Jacob Z. Lauterbach (Studies in Jewish Law, Custom, and Folklore pp 225 ff). He demonstrated that there was no Biblical or rabbinic basis for this custom. In fact the priest in the ancient temple performed their ritual with bare head (Yoma 25a), and individuals covered their head principally when they were in mourning (M K 15a, 24a) . A statement from the age of the Maccabees indicated that the pious of that period objected to a regulation of Antiochus Epiphanes which forced individuals to wear hats (II Macc 4.12); Paul registered the same custom of bareheaded worship in the Jewish communities which he visited two centuries later (I Corinth 11.4-7). In late tractate Sofrim the text specifically indicated that the shema may be recited bare headed (14.5 see also Ber 60b). In Babylonia, however, it became a sign of respect to cover one’s head in the presence of a scholar. In other words, precisely the reverse of the Biblical and modern Reform custom (Kid 33a). Various historians have assumed that this practice was later adopted by the synagogue and may have been borrowed by the Babylonian Jews from their Persian neighbors (J. Z. Lauterbach Op Cit 232). As Jewish communities of the Mediterranean were influenced by Babylonian custom during the hegemony of the Islamic empires, authorities in these areas insisted on a head covering during worship. On the other hand, communities influenced by Palestinian custom as those of France, Germany and Italy worshiped with uncovered heads (Or Zarua 2.43; Solomon Luria Responsa #72; Isserles to Tur Orah Hayim 282.3 in which he argued against the custom). This custom of covering head eventually spread and became standard in Germany and Central Europe from the thirteenth century onward although we still find some discussion of this matter later. The most radical element of the Reform movement in the nineteenth century called for the removal of all head covering during worship as this was seen as a general sign of politeness. This was intended to distinguish Reform Jews from the rest of the Jewish community and so became a symbol for this group. This practice, however, was not followed by continental European Reform Congregations with one exception; it became standard only in the United States. There has been a trend now toward wearing a head covering in some American Reform congregations and among individuals in others as a symbol of kelal yisrael. This is appropriate especially as the Reform movement is well established in the United States; it does not need an obvious symbol in order to distinguish it from the remainder of the Jewish community. The historical studies have made it clear that prayer both bareheaded and with head covering have a strong basis in Judaism so both should be permitted without argument. As women seek to express their equality with men in a wide variety of ways there is nothing wrong with their adopting a head covering for this reason. Nor would we consider this a violation of the Biblical commandment against women wearing the clothing of men (Deut 2.5). In summary then, if a woman wishes to wear a kippah or any other head covering in order to indicate a mood of worship akin to men it would be appropriate for her to do so in a Reform setting.February 1990

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227. Hebrew or Russian Names

QUESTION: A middle aged couple who recently emigrated from the Soviet Union have brought their ketubah; it is actually closer to a wedding certificate as it simply states that they have been married. It is written in simple Hebrew and signed by two Jewish witnesses. All the names are, however, Russian first names followed by ben and the Russian name of the father. All the names are written in Hebrew. Is this an adequate ketubah or should they prepare another with a different set of witnesses? They hesitate as they have been married for many years and the document is dear to them. (Boris Krokovsky, Trenton NJ)ANSWER: The couple can certainly consider themselves Jewishly married even if the document does not follow the standard form. They had a ceremony, two Jewish witnesses, and at some risk prepared a simple ketubah. This should be properly appreciated. Throughout our history we had adopted many foreign names and simply added them to our Hebrew list. In the last centuries numerous Yiddish names have entered our vocabulary and earlier Greek, Arabic, Spanish, and German names. Even some of the Biblical characters had foreign names, possibly even Moses. There is no problem with the Russian names. We wish the couple a long and happy life together in this country.October 1989

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230. Signature on a Ketubah

QUESTION: At the signing of the ketubah, the witnesses are asked to sign in Hebrew or in English. In many instances they do not remember enough Hebrew to sign their name appropriately and must, therefore, copy the writing prepared by the rabbi. Is this an appropriate way of signing the ketubah? (Betty Blum, Pittsburgh PA)ANSWER: The significance of the ketubah has changed for us. It is, of course, one of three ways of indicating that a couple has been married: (a) The most common form featured a deed witnessed by two competent individuals and handed by the groom to the bride (Kid 9a; Shulhan Arukh Even Haezer 32.1-4). This has remained the essential covenant of the modern wedding. The document is akin to the modern ketubah signed by the two witnesses. (b) In addition, it was possible to effect a marriage through the transfer of an item of value (kesef) in the presence of two competent witnesses. This remains as part of the modern wedding in the form of giving a ring with the formula “harei at mequdeshet…” (Kid 2a, b; Shulhan Arukh Even Haezer 27.1). (c) Finally, marriage can be effected through intercourse (biah) preceded by a statement indicating the wish to take this woman as wife in the presence of two witnesses who saw the couple leave for a private place (Kid 9b; Shulhan Arukh Even Haezer 33.1). The last method was, of course, severely frowned upon by the rabbis, but, bediavad, it is certainly valid. Consent was, of course, necessary (Shulhan Arukh Even Haezer 42.1). Our ketubah details the nature of the relationship and we insist that it be egalitarian; traditionally it stipulated the financial and economic considerations of the marriage. Normally in the modern ketubah such matters are omitted. Among us, therefore, the ketubah is more symbolic than legal. Our wording has become standard and does not contain special stipulations. Irrespective of these considerations the signature on the ketubah indicates that two witnesses who have signed have been present and acknowledge that the wedding has occurred. If at a later time the wedding is questioned, the signatures attest to the fact that these two people were married. Any form of signature is valid as long as it has been made by an appropriate witness and that person can subsequently attest to the fact that he/she actually signed the document. I do not know of any instance in which the signature has been questioned because it was copied out, in fact in early periods when not all individuals were literate this must have occurred regularly. It would, therefore, be permissible for the witnesses of the wedding to sign their Hebrew name through copying the letters written for them by the officiating rabbi.February 1989

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231. A Lost Ketubah

QUESTION: An elderly couple, who have moved from a house in which they lived for a long time to an apartment, have discovered that their ketubah was lost. Do they need to replace it? They have been married for more than four decades. (Stanley Rosenberg, Atlanta GA)ANSWER: The ketubah is one of three ways through which two Jews may enter a marriage; they are: (a) The most common form featured a deed witnessed by two competent individuals and handed by the groom to the bride (Kid 9a; Shulhan Arukh, Even Haezer 32.1-4). This has remained the essential covenant of the modern wedding. The document is akin to the modern ketubah signed by the two witnesses. (b) In addition, it was possible to effect a marriage through the transfer of an item of value (kesef) in the presence of two competent witnesses. This remains as part of the modern wedding in the form of giving a ring with the formula “harei at mequdeshet…” (Kid 2a, b; Shulhan Arukh Even Haezer 27.1). (c) Finally, marriage can be effected through intercourse (biah) preceded by a statement indicating the wish to take this woman as wife in the presence of two witnesses who saw the couple leave for a private place (Kid 9b; Shulhan Arukh Even Haezer 33.1). The last method was, of course, severely frowned upon by the rabbis, but, bediavad, it is certainly valid. Consent was, of course, necessary (Shulhan Arukh Even Haezer 42.1). The most important aspects of the traditional ketubah are the financial and other stipulations. We use a standardized document which emphasizes the equality of both parties. The signatures on the ketubah attest to the fact that the conditions stated in the document apply to the couple and to their marriage. If there is a conflict or the threat of a divorce, it may be necessary to review the ketubah and the conditions stipulated therein. When all goes well the ketubah may never be read again by the couple or anyone else. Among some modern couples it has become customary to create an illuminated ketubah which occupies a prominent decorative place in the home. However, in most families this document along with others is put away and forgotten. The couple in question has obviously enjoyed many years of happy marriage; they need not worry about their ketubah and should simply enjoy the years which lie ahead for them together.July 1989

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229. Error in the Ketubah Text

QUESTION: A calligraphy specialist has prepared an illuminated ketubah; the text is modified traditional, but several words have been misspelled. This was discovered a number of years after the wedding. Should the ketubah be replaced? One of the original witnesses has died? (Karen Levin, San Francisco CA)ANSWER: In contrast to a get, the spelling in a ketubah is not critical, even for the Orthodox. The ceremony was witnessed appropriately and the document attests to the wedding. That is quite sufficient especially as the ketubah represents only one of three ways through which a marriage can be validated; this matter has been discussed in several of the other responsa.June 1988

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226. Error in the Hebrew Date

QUESTION: A couple has recently reviewed their ketubah with someone who knows Hebrew well. He immediately noticed an error in the date of the wedding. The Hebrew year has been given incorrectly. They would like to have a correct ketubah, but the original witnesses to their marriage are dead. So, they do not know whether they can simply correct the one which they have, or should they have a new ketubah written with different witnesses. (Kathy Hurwitz, Charleston SC)ANSWER: Although the modern ketubah is enforceable as a legal document in some jurisdictions, it remains primarily a religious document symbolic of tradition. The nominal sum of money stipulated bears no relationship to any agreement; it is reminiscent of the ancient dowries. So the figures provided in a ketubah are not relevant. The only thing which is important are the two witnesses who must be adults Jews and not related to each other or to the bride or groom. The other data provided by the wedding document especially after a couple has been married for a considerable length of time may be significant to the family, but from a halakhic point of view are not important. This is different from a traditional get. In that divorce document the names of the parties and the city must be correct, etc., but in a ketubah if a name of a town is misspelled or the name of the bride and groom are not quite correct, the couple nevertheless are properly married. The reason for this is that marriage can occur in three different ways: (a) The most common form featured a deed witnessed by two competent individuals and handed by the groom to the bride (Kid 9a; Shulhan Arukh, Even Haezer 32.1-4). This has remained the essential covenant of the modern wedding. The document is the modern ketubah signed by two witnesses. (b) In addition, it was possible to effect a marriage through the transfer of an item of value (kesef) in the presence of two competent witnesses. This remains as part of the modern wedding in the form of presenting a ring with the formula “harei at mequdeshet…” (Kid 2a, b; Shulhan Arukh, Even Haezer 27.1). (c) Finally, marriage can be effected through intercourse (biah) preceded by a statement indicating the wish to take this woman as wife in the presence of two witnesses who saw the couple leave for a private place (Kid 9b; Shulhan Arukh, Even Haezer 33.1). The last method was severely frowned upon by the rabbis, but, bediavad, it is valid. Marriage simply through intercourse with proper intent would be akin to “common law” marriage. The ketubah, therefore, represents only one of those possibilities and in this case all the others have also clearly taken place. Even if the date is wrong, as you have stated, the couple has been married for many years. It may be historically interesting to note that they have been married thirty instead of twenty-nine years as indicated in the Hebrew dating of the document, but for halakhic purposes that is not important, especially as you indicated that children were born late in this marriage. Even on their account the Hebrew date would be irrelevant and could be shown as wrong when compared to the English date on the ketubah as well as on the secular wedding certificate. The couple may either change the document itself, add an addendum to it, or leave it as it is. Nothing needs to be done.January 1991

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232. Destroyed Ketubah*

QUESTION: The family has lost their decorative ketubah in a fire. They wish to know if it is possible to replace it and if this will have the same validity as the earlier document. The document followed the standard form and did not contain any unusual stipulations, financial or otherwise. (Frieda Blumenthal, Cleveland OH)ANSWER: We should begin by assuring the couple that the marriage remains perfectly valid even without a ketubah. The Talmud, after all, cited three ways of effecting a marriage: (a) The most common form featured a deed witnessed by two competent individuals and handed by the groom to the bride (Kid 9a; Shulhan Arukh Even Haezer 32.1-4). This has remained the essential covenant of the modern wedding. The document is akin to the modern ketubah signed by the two witnesses. (b) In addition, it was possible to effect a marriage through the transfer of an item of value (kesef) in the presence of two competent witnesses. This remains as part of the modern wedding in the form of giving a ring with the formula “harei at mekudeshet…” (Kid 2a, b; Shulhan Arukh Even Haezer 27.1). (c) Finally, marriage can be effected through intercourse (biah) preceded by a statement indicating the wish to take this woman as wife in the presence of two witnesses who saw the couple leave for a private place (Kid 9b; Shulhan Arukh Even Haezer 33.1) The last method was, of course, severely frowned upon by the rabbis, but, bediavad, it is certainly valid. We are, therefore, dealing more with the aesthetics of the wedding and the desire to have a beautiful ketubah on display rather than with the legal implications of this document. As this was a standard document, it can be drawn up again in precisely the same form as before. If it is at all possible, the same witnesses who signed the original document should sign it again. Somewhere on the document, in order to assure that there is no intent of fraud, it should note that the original document was destroyed in a fire and that this is a replacement drawn up much later than the wedding itself.February 1989

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225. Decorations on a Ketubah

QUESTION: Are there any limitations on the decorations which may be placed upon a ketubah? A couple recently had a ketubah prepared with decorations which are almost pornographic. May this document be used for the wedding ceremony? (Martin Kaplan, San Mateo CA)ANSWER: A great deal has been written about the text of the ketubah and studies have indicated that the wording has changed through the ages (Mordechai Akiva Friedman Jewish Marriage in Palestine; J. Neubauer Geschichte des biblischtalmudischen Eheschliessungsrecht; Z. W. Falk Jewish Matrimonial Law in the Middle Ages pp 35 ff). Of course, in modern times this document has become a formalized statement which reflects little about the couple. In twentieth century America the Reform and Conservative groups have developed their own ketubot to reflect the specific needs of these groups. The decorations on a ketubah especially commissioned by the couple may reflect the thoughts and wishes of the couple. We should note that illuminated marriage documents have survived from the Middle Ages onward. The earliest is from Fostat, Egypt in the eleventh century, and only fragments survived. Among the others is one from Krems, Austria (1392), Ostiano, Italy (1612) and many from Persia (Franz Landsberger Illuminated Marriage Contracts; J. Gutmann Beauty in Holiness pp 370 ff). As one looks at these illuminations and decorations, one sees that they fall into two categories. A large number contain formalized decorations of plants, Biblical themes like the symbols of the twelve tribes of Israel, or the twelve signs of the Zodiac; they were only rarely personalized. A ketubah from Rome in 1818 showed a married couple walking hand in hand while others displayed semi-nude rather formalistic angels (Ferrara, 1719, Reggio, 1774, Bosetto, 1801). The last, in one of the signs of the Zodiac, showed a nude couple (Moses Gaster The Ketubah plate 5 ff). As we have looked at the evidence from the text themselves, we must also ask about the attitude of tradition toward such documents. Although the tradition was hardly puritanical and often dealt very forthright with sex and questions relating to it (L. M. Epstein Marriage Laws in the Bible and the Talmud), it did not do so in a way which could be considered as titillating or pornographic. The wedding ceremony and the accompanying festivities are joyous, but kept within limits of decency. Tradition has done its best to encourage restraint. The sheva berakhot recites during seven days of festivities again and again added an element of prayer to the festivities of those days. Whatever the couple did privately has always been considered their business and outside the purview of regulations (L. M. Epstein Sex Laws and Customs in Judaism). The public ceremony, however, is to be conducted in a decorous fashion with everyone sober and in the presence of the minyan (Shulhan Arukh Even Haezer 34.4; A. H. Freimann Seder Qidushin Venisuin p 16) as well as two witnesses (Shulhan Arukh Even Haezer 42.5). We would therefore indicate to the couple that whatever decorations they have at home is their business, but semi-pornography can not be permitted on the ketubah. The ketubah is a formal document signed by two witnesses which may be read at the wedding ceremony (Shulhan Arukh Even Haezer and Isserles 62.9). We should note that Maharil (Minhagei Maharil 64b) in the fourteenth century did not know the custom of publicly reading the ketubah. We can not permit the use of such a ketubah for a wedding.March 1990

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