Wedding (Jewish)

See Marriage, with brother’s widow
See Marriage, where one is a transsexual
See Bridesmaids
See Ark, open during wedding
See also Marriage

RR 182-185

Groom Not Seeing Bride

There is a prevailing custom to forbid bride and groom seeing each other on the day of the wedding before the ceremony. Is this custom based upon Jew ish law or tradition?

In Biblical and Talmudic times the marriage ceremony was divided into two parts. The first part was called Erusin; the second, some time later (often a year) was called Nissuin. The Erusin was more than an engagement (which in later times was called Shidduchin); it was actually a legal marriage except that bride and groom were not permitted to have sexual relations with each other. Therefore it was prohibited for the espoused couple (bound by Erusin) to live together in the same house. (See Mishnah Ketuboth, chap. V, 1, 2, and Shulchan Aruch, Even Hoezer 55 : 1.) Except for the prohibition of sexual relationships, and therefore of living together in the same house, the couple were considered married and could not be parted without a “Get.” In post-Talmudic times, the Erusin (espousal) and the Nissuin (the taking home) have been combined into one ceremony with two cups of wine and two sets of blessings, as we have it today. Since the espousal (Erusin) had thus virtually disappeared as a separate status, its place was taken by a betrothal or engagement (Shidduchin), which of course has not the same legal status as a marriage as the Erusin had. It is merely an engagement. However, Isserles (to Even Hoezer 55 : 1) says that we should be concerned in keeping the engaged couple apart also (i.e., as in ancient times the espoused couple were kept apart after Erusin).

But how strictly were they to be kept apart? Marriages were arranged by marriage brokers without the couple seeing each other. But the Talmud says definitely (b. Kiddushin 41a) that a man may not marry a woman until he sees her. How, then, could this Talmudic requirement be fulfilled if they are kept too strictly apart? Samuel Feibus, of Furth (seventeenth century), in his commentary “Beth Shmuel” (to Even Hoezer 35, at the end of sec. 2), says that a dinner was given the evening before the wedding and thus the groom fulfilled the Talmudic requirement to see the bride; and it was therefore no violation of the Talmudic dictum if he did not see her before that time.

But what about the period between the engagement and such a party given the night before the wedding? How strictly was the caution of Isserles to be taken when he said, “Yesh lochush” (“we must be concerned”) about them living in the same house? Many of the stricter later authorities objected strenuously to the couple seeing each other at all or going out together during their engagement. Joshua Wildberg, in his “K’doshim Tihiyu” (Jerusalem, 1933), is very indignant at couples seeing each other during the engagement period, and he quotes whatever authorities he can find to justify this strict prohibition. He cites Phineas Horowitz, of Frankfurt (eighteenth century, in “Hamikna”), who says that after the engagement the couple should not see each other until the wedding ceremony. He also quotes Jonathan Eibeschutz (in “Kereti u’Peleti,” 195, end of sec. 6), to the same effect. Also, Isaiah Horowitz (seventeenth century, in “Sh’la,” “Gate of the Letters,” ed. Amsterdam, p. 100) says: “Now, my sons, take care that before the wedding takes place, the bride should not be seated by the groom as is customary nowadays. He even embraces and kisses her. Woe to the eyes that see such things.” So too Ganzfried in his “Kitzur Shulchan Aruch” 152 : 14. Chaim Ezekiel Medini, in “S’de Chemed” (Ma’-arches Chosen vo Challo, Letter 12, p. 25a), is shocked at the fact that the engaged are often alone and converse with each other when they should not even, he says, touch each other’s hand. Buber (Anshe Shem, p. 232) gives the text of a written promise made by grooms not to visit the home of their fiancees. (Cf. also Abrahams, Jewish Life in the Middle Ages, p. 194; Finklestein, Jewish Self Government in the Middle Ages, pp. 185-86; Responsa of Meir of Rothenburg, Lemberg, #141.)

But actually, all these puritan restrictions are based upon a carry-over from the old Erusin and refer to a desire to keep the espoused couple apart since they were legally married but might not have sexual relations. Also, they are based upon the general prohibition in the Talmud against looking on any woman or coming into close contact with any woman at all. This Talmudic law (Avo dah Zara 20) is codified in the Shulchan Aruch, Even Hoezer 21 : 1. However, all this strictness as to bride and groom has no firm legal foundation and was not generally observed. Besides, it does not justify the present custom of the bride and groom being kept from seeing each other on the wedding day before the ceremony. It was chiefly an ascetic objection to courtship after their engagement.

As for the wedding day itself, not one of the codes mentions any prohibition against bride and groom seeing each other on that day. On the contrary, there is a well-established custom in eastern Europe whereby the groom went with the rabbi to where the bride was housed with her women attendants and participated (according to one opinion, was required to participate) in the custom of covering the bride’s head and face with the veil. (See Ezekiel Landau in “Dagul Mirvovo” to Yore Deah 342; “Ta’ame Ha’minhagim,” in the Appendix, p. 14; also Hirshowitz, “Ozar Kol Minhagey Yeshurun,” pp. 29, 34.)

There is clearly, then, no objection in the law or custom to bride and groom seeing each other on their wedding day. I have discovered, however, that for them not to do so is a widespread custom among Protestants, and perhaps in that fact lies the origin of the idea among American Jewish couples.

RRR 167-170

Wedding on Saturday Before Dark

A wedding was arranged for Saturday night. As the date approached for the marriage, it became clear that it would not be quite dark at the hour when the marriage was scheduled to take place. Is it improper to officiate on Saturday night before it is quite dark? (From Rabbi Philip Bernstein, Rochester, New York)

Every now and then this question arises, and usually about a summer wedding. A summer wedding is arranged, elaborate preparations have all been made, and then the rabbi realizes that he had overlooked the fact that it is daylight saving time, and that while the Jewish calendar which he consulted gave the hour of sunset as being well before the time set for the wedding, actually the wedding is scheduled to take place an hour earlier by daylight time and it will still be light. Must it be completely dark before the marriage takes place?

The law seems definite enough that no marriage should take place on the Sabbath. In the Shulchan Aruch, Even Hoezer 63, it is stated that since the marriage is a legal kinyon (a “taking possession”), and therefore is of the nature of a contract, it is forbidden on the Sabbath (see especially 63 : 4). In the discussion of the Sabbath laws in Orah Hayyim 339 : 4, Joseph Caro states definitely that on the Sabbath we do not hold court sessions and we do not officiate at marriages.

With the law apparently so clear, the note of Isserles to the law in Orah Hayyim 339 : 4 is rather remarkable. He says that under certain circumstances “there are those who permit it.”

Who could possibly be “those who permit it” when the law seems so clear that since marriage partakes of the nature of a contract it cannot be performed on the Sabbath? The one who permits it is perhaps the greatest authority in all European Jewish law, Jacob ben Meir, the grandson of Rashi. In his “Sefer Hayashar” (Berlin, 1898, p. 101,10) he said: “I have permitted the marriage of a woman on the Sabbath to a man who had no children from a previous marriage.” Rabbenu Tarn said he permitted this marriage “b’di aoad” that is to say, after it occurred he declared it valid. B’di avad is in contrast to I’chatchillo. The latter means to take the initiative in permitting it, or to permit it if consulted before its occurrence. Then Rabbenu Tam, having said that he permitted the marriage after the event (b’di avad), continues: “Even l’ chatchillo [even when consulted beforehand], I permitted it if there was some special need to do so.”

There could hardly be a greater authority, certainly for Ashkenazic Jews, than Rabbenu Tam. In fact, Moses Isserles leaned upon this authority in a case in which he himself was involved. He was to officiate at the marriage of an orphan girl on Friday afternoon. However, disputes as to the dowry delayed the wedding. The disputes were not settled until it was completely dark. The Sabbath had well begun and the people were already returning from the synagogues to their homes. Moses Isserles did not wish to shame this orphan girl. Therefore, in spite of the fact that the Sabbath had long ago begun, he had the canopy set up and performed the marriage. Clearly, he relied upon Rabbenu Tam in this case in which he considered “there was need for it.” (Cf. Isserles’ Responsa 125.) Therefore Isserles, in the note to the Shulchan Aruch, Orah Hayyim 339 : 4, says: “While this is not the law (to marry on the Sabbath) we rely upon this permission for cases of emergency.”

It is interesting to note that there is just as strong objection to weddings on Sunday, which is nowadays the favorite wedding day among American Jews. The Shulchan Aruch, in Even Hoezer 64 : 3, says definitely that it is contrary to custom to marry on Sunday. And the “Pis-che Teshuva,” paragraph 4, is quite clear that it is wrong to marry on Sunday. See Maimonides, Yad, “Hilchos Ishus” X : 14. See also Wolf Leiter in his responsa, “Bes David,” end of responsum 80. The objection seems to be based upon the danger of violating the Sabbath in preparation for a Sunday wedding.

With regard to the Sabbath marriage late on Saturday when it is almost dark, one could say with Rabbenu Tarn that if “there is need for it,” since all the elaborate preparations have been made, the sin of officiating would not be so very great. However, officiating before it is dark would surely create antagonism, particularly from Orthodox rabbis. So it is wiser to avoid officiating before it is dark on Saturday night, simply on the legal principle that it looks bad, or creates a bad impression (mipne maris ayin).

Therefore, on the rare occasion in which, due to an error with daylight saving time, it is not quite dark when the hour set for the marriage comes, it would be wise to delay as long as is possible. Then, if it is not absolutely dark when we officiate, it is not too great a crime. Our conscience rests with Rabbenu Tam and Moses Isserles.

RRR 173-178

Wedding on the Ninth of Av

You informed me that a family had arranged for a wedding on Sunday, the 23rd of July, which is Tisha B’av, and you ask whether you should officiate or not. You were strongly inclined not to officiate, but you want to know whether there is any basis for permit ting the marriage on that day. (To Rabbi Dudley Weinberg, Milwaukee, Wisconsin)

I had already referred to this matter in Reform Jewish Practice, Vol. I, pp. 73-74, but the statement there is rather brief. It is based mainly upon the responsum of Marcus Horowitz (1884-1910), the Orthodox Rabbi of Frankfurt, in his “Matteh Levy” 32. His responsum is in answer to the Rabbi of Trier, who had heard that marriages were conducted on public fast days in Frankfurt. Horowitz denies that marriages were held on fast days in Frankfurt, and insists that there should be an absolute prohibition of marriages on all public fast days, in spite of the fact that there are some permissive statements in the law. He says that in these days of religious neglect, we ought to avoid such permissiveness. Yet the very fact that Marcus Horowitz knows and cites certain opinions in the law which would permit marriage on fast days indicates in itself that there must be considerable basis in the law for permitting such marriages. Before deciding, therefore, whether or not we should officiate at marriages on fast days, let us review the law and see what its actual status is.

Moses Isserles to the Shulchan Aruch, Orah Hayyim 5 51: 2, says that it is our custom to be strict and not to have marriages from the fast of the 17th of Tammuz up to and including the 9th of Av. Of course he means that instead of being strict from the 1st of Av through the 9th we should be strict beginning two weeks earlier, from the 17th of Tammuz. Still, he uses the word “custom” (minhag). His statement would indicate that the strictness is rather a custom than a definite law. Caro himself, speaking of the nine days from the 1st of Av to the 9th of Av, says that we do not marry or have betrothals; but, he adds, if a betrothal takes place without a feast, it is permitted even on Tisha B’av itsetf.

Going back to the beginnings of the law, we find its origin in the Mishnah, Taanis IV : 6 and 7, where the four main fast days are mentioned (Fast of Gedaliah, 10th of Tebet, 17th of Tammuz, and 9th of Av). The Mishnah ends with the statement: “When the month of Av comes, we diminish joy.” The next Mishnah speaks of what is prohibited, especially in the week in which the 9th of Av comes, namely, we do not cut the hair or bathe (i.e., all that week until after the fast). The Talmud, elaborating on the prohibitions just mentioned, says (b. Yevamoth 43a): “We do not betroth and do not marry and do not make betrothal feasts.” On which the Tosfos comments that only the feast itself is forbidden—not the betrothal.

Since the emphasis seems to be on the festive meal itself as a symbol of joy, which is prohibited, the question naturally arises whether a marriage ceremony was really prohibited in itself, or prohibited because of the feast which accompanies it. Would a marriage ceremony be prohibited if, let us say, it was a small marriage taking place in the rabbi’s study, and there were no celebrations involved? There is no question that the later law would say that a marriage, even without a feast, is joy in itself and therefore is prohibited on the fast days (cf. “Magen Abraham” to Orah Hayyim 546 : 1). Yet certainly it is strange that Maimonides (in Yad, “Hilchos Ishus” X : 14) giving all the laws of the days on which marriages are prohibited, mentions that marriages are prohibited on Friday and on Sunday (lest the Sabbath be violated to prepare the feast) and on half-holidays; but he does not mention the 9th of Av.

As a matter of fact, Marcus Horowitz, wanting to have marriages completely prohibited on the fast days, is aware that the prohibition against marriages on fast days (and therefore the 9th of Av) is not too firmly founded. He feels it necessary to explain away the statement of the Magen Abraham to Orah Hayyim 559, end of section 11, who discusses the question of whether a groom must finish his fast if his marriage takes place on a fast day. The Magen Abraham bases his discussion upon responsum 2 of Solomon Halevi (whose responsa were published in Salonika, 1652). Solomon Halevi is asked whether a father whose child is to be circumcised on a fast day should complete his fast or not, since the day of circumcision is a simcha for him. He decides, first of all, on the basis of the Tur, which says that if Tisha B’av was properly on a Saturday, but was postponed (as is the custom) to Sunday, then this postponed Tisha B’av is not so strict, and he would permit the father of a child to break his fast at the circumcision. But Solomon Halevi says that even if the fast were on the 9th of Av (and not postponed because of Saturday to the 10th) the father should not complete his fast. Then he quotes his grandfather who says: “He who marries a woman on the 9th of Av should not complete his fast even though he could have postponed the wedding to another date, which the father of the child to be circumcised cannot do with regard to the circumcision, which must occur on the eighth day.” Solomon Halevi ends this interesting responsum as follows: He believes that a bride and groom who fast on their wedding day should complete their fast, unless this Tisha B’av, when the wedding took place, is postponed (because of Saturday),to the 10th of Av. A relevant responsum of the Gaon Hai (who is quoted by Rabbenu Nissim to the Alfas, at the end of chapter 1 of Taanis) discusses what is forbidden on fast days, and specifically the prohibition to build marriage pavilions. The Gaon Hai makes a distinction between a man who was married before and has children and a man who was not married or who was married and has no children. In the latter two cases, where there are no children, the marriage is not merely a permitted happiness (simcha) but a mitzvah, and because it is a mitzvah, it is permitted to build the pavilion for the wedding, and so forth.

This statement of the Gaon Hai, permitting relaxation as to building the wedding pavilion on fast days in the case of a man who has not yet fulfilled the commandment of “increase and multiply” (i.e., who has no children), is quoted by Joseph Caro in his “Bes Joseph” to the Tur 551, and he says this might well apply, not only to the building of a marriage pavilion, but even to conducting the marriage itself. But, he adds, that the reason we do not have a marriage on fast days is because it would be unlucky (i.e., it is not really forbidden).

Joseph Caro states further that those special fast days which are called because of drought are more serious fast days than the 9th of Av and so on. Yet it is clear that marriages are permitted on the other fast days, except the 9th of Av. See the latest decisor, Yechiel Epstein, in “Aruch Ha-Schulchan,” Orah Hayyim, 550 : 2, in which, speaking of other fast days, he describes the liturgy for the Mincha service if there is a marriage on that fast day. See also Raphael Meldola, in his “Chupos Chassanim” (in Laws of Betrothal), who speaks of marriages on the fast day and is concerned only with the question as to whether or not the blessings over the wine are proper on a fast day.

In general, from the above, it is clear that while the present custom is to forbid marriages on fast days and on the 9th of Av, the custom rests primarily upon the prohibition of festivities on that day. The present law, even today, permits betrothals without festivities, and it seems clear that in earlier times marriages, too, were permitted without festivities. In fact, Marcus Horowitz says so. He warns, toward the end of the responsum (“Matteh Levy” 32), that we should not draw general conclusions from the fact that they did have weddings without festivities. Horowitz then says that nowadays, when most people neglect the fasts, it is our duty to be doubly strict and not to draw conclusions from the fact that quiet weddings were formerly conducted on fast days. The question for us is, should we draw the same conclusion which this Orthodox Rabbi of Frankfurt has drawn? The general neglect is even greater than that mentioned by Marcus Horowitz. It is more than a question of the neglect of fasting. The law prohibited all business and all washing, “even to dip the finger in water.” The whole somber mood of these fast days has vanished from our lives. Why, then, should we ignore the evidence of earlier permissiveness and conclude that it is our duty to prohibit even a quiet wedding?

The only justifiable ground is our respect for the sentiment of more observant people, whether or not their sentiment is consistent with the rest of their observances. It is on the basis of this decent regard that our new Rabbi’s Manual says: “On the grounds of historical consciousness, marriage should be avoided by Reform Rabbis on the 9th of Av, even though the Reform Synagogue does not officially recognize the day as a fast” (p. 125).

Our respect for general sentiment on the matter should certainly lead us to avoid large wedding festivities. But if a small marriage ceremony in the rabbi’s study is requested, there is, as has been said, good ground to permit it. As for the specific wedding about which you have asked me, this year the fast is a postponed fast and occurs on the 10th of Av, and as Joseph Caro said in the “Bes Joseph” to the Tur, Orah Hayyim 559: “When it is postponed, it is not quite so strict” (Lo chamir kuley hai).

RRR 178-182

A Borrowed Wedding Ring

It happens rather frequently that the groom uses a borrowed wedding ring during the marriage cere mony. Sometimes this happens simply because the best man has forgotten to bring the ring. Sometimes it happens out of sentiment—the bride wishes to use a ring that has previously been used in her family. Sometimes it happens in tradition-minded families, where there is some objection to using the ring which has been bought by the groom because it contains gems. Therefore a plain ring is borrowed and used for the ceremony and then returned. Is the use of a bor rowed ring in accordance with the spirit of Jewish legal tradition?

The Mishnah (Kidushin 1 : 1) says that a woman may be married with a penny (peruta) or the value of a penny. The Talmud, discussing the phrase, “the value of a penny,” cites various objects that the bridegroom may offer to the bride for this purpose, a date, a bundle of cotton-wool, and the answer is always, if the object has the value of a penny the marriage is valid (b. Kiddushin 13a). On an earlier page (b. Kiddushin 6b) the Talmud discusses objects which are given as a conditional gift, the condition being that the gift must be returned after a fixed time. If a man receives such a conditional gift from a friend, may he use it during the term of the gift (when the object is substantially his) to marry a woman with? While the Talmud permits the application of such a conditional present to other religious rituals, such as an esrog on Succos, it makes an exception with regard to marriage, and says that such a gift may not be used to marry a woman because women may not be married by the exchange of objects, that is, by being given an object and giving one in return. The Tosafos (ad loc.) says that this prohibition of the use of a conditional gift for marriage is only a cautionary restriction on the part of the rabbis. This statement of the Tosafos that, basically, a loan or a conditional gift could be validly used (if it were not for the cautionary prohibition of the rabbis) opens the way, as we shall see, for justifying a widespread custom in the Germanic lands of the use of a borrowed ring for weddings.

Asher ben Yehiel (thirteenth century) in his responsa (“Kelall” 35) discusses this question and asks his teachers about the use of a borrowed ring. He gives a fuller discussion of the matter in his compendium on the Talmud, Kiddushin, chapter I, section 20. He says that he has noticed the widespread custom in Germany of using a borrowed ring. Three centuries later, Moses Isserles, in his “Darke Moshe” to the Tur, Even Hoezer 28, likewise states that the use of a borrowed ring is a widespread custom. Evidently, then, the custom was well established among all the Ashkenazic Jews, both in Germany and in the eastern lands. Asher ben Yehiel (loc. cit.) goes into the question of the justification of this custom. He says that while at first it would seem that according to the Talmud (Kiddushin 6b) a marriage is not valid by the exchange of things, and since the ring will have to be returned this is like an exchange, nevertheless he justifies the custom by saying that the marriage is valid provided the groom who borrowed the ring says to the lender: “I want to use it for the purpose of marriage.” Then the lender, if he agrees of course, will determine in his mind that this should be the kind of gift or loan in which the object involved is permitted to be so used. Also, the groom should tell the bride that this is a borrowed ring, so that she will not be deceived. But how can the bride accept it when it is not a permanent gift? The answer is that the pleasure of having it for even a short time is worth to her the statutory peruta. In other words, he is not really giving her the ring; it is not his to give, although the conditions of the loan give him the right to use it for this purpose. What he is giving her is the pleasure (hana’a) of using it.

Israel Isserlein, in the fifteenth century, in his “Terumas Ha-deshen,” 2 : 10, makes reference to the opinion of Asher Ben Yehiel. The case which came before him is interesting because it gives a picture of the social life of the times. A man rented an elegant waistband to wear at a wedding dance. One of the girls among the guests wanted to borrow the fine waistband to wear during two or three dances. He said, “If you are willing to be married to me by this use of the waistband, I will lend it to you.” Isserlein, using Asher ben Yehiel’s arguments, says that if what he is giving her is the joy of the ornamentation, and if to her that is worth the peruta, the statutory penny, the marriage is valid. Asher ben Yehiel’s son, Jacob ben Asher, in his Tur (Even Hoezer 28), declares the use of the borrowed ring to be valid granting the conditions laid down by his father in his compendium on the Talmud (namely, that it be loaned for a definite time, that he tells the lender what he wants to use it for, and so forth). Moses Isserles, in his “Darke Moshe” (ad loc), doubts the full validity of such a marriage, but he accepts the fact that it has now become a widespread custom. Therefore, in the Shulchan Aruch, where Joseph Caro records this as a law, Isserles no longer repeats his doubts mentioned in the “Darke Moshe.”

Evidently this was not a well-known custom among the Sephardim (although Caro accepts it as law in his Shulchan Aruch). There is a responsum by Solomon ben Aderet, of Barcelona (number 1241 in his Responsa), but very few other references in Sephardic legal literature.

There is a recent responsum on the subject by Aaron David Burack (Pirchei Aharon, New York, 1933, p. 39 ff.). He agrees, in general, that the use of the borrowed ring is permissible, but adds a curious doubt at the end. The groom says the formula, “Behold with this ring . . . ,” and so forth. But actually he is not giving her the ring; he is giving her only the brief use of it. Hence the use of the formula is incorrect.

From our Reform point of view, we are more concerned with the spirit behind the various reasons than the actual reasons themselves. Here the whole discussion is in a field which does not have too great a weight in our religious practice. It is a discussion of the validity of a contract in the realm of civil law and monetary matters. In our Reform practice, in spite of feeling that a marriage is open to question when the ring has gems in it, since the bride may be deceived as to its value (see Reform Jewish Practice, Vol. I, pp. 91-93), we nevertheless have no hesitation in permitting the use of such a ring in marriage. Here, in the case of the borrowed ring, since the whole discussion is in the realm of conditions of loans and financial value of objects, we would nevertheless permit the use of a borrowed ring even if the law frowned on it, provided we felt that there was a strong sentiment in its favor. What does concern us in the tradition is that it became a widespread custom, at least from the twelfth century, and the majority of the rabbis and the two great Codes, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, declare it valid. We are, therefore, in no way violative of tradition in this case, of either its letter or its spirit, when we permit the use of a borrowed wedding ring at marriage ceremonies.

RRR 182-188

Breaking a Glass at Weddings

Every now and then some tradition-minded families, when making arrangements for a wedding, ask that a glass be broken at the close of the ceremony, as is the well-known custom. Should we yield to this request or not?

First it is necessary to consider the status of the ceremony of breaking a glass. Is it deemed, in Orthodox law, to be an essential part of the ceremony or not? If it is an essential part of the historic ceremony, then, of course, we should hesitate seriously before deciding to omit it. The preliminary question can be easily settled. Moses Isserles, the great sixteenth-century authority, says (Shulchan Aruch, Even Hoezer 65 : 3): “There are some places where it is the custom to break a glass after the seven blessings.” Joseph Saul Nathanson, of Lemberg, in his commentary on the Shulchan Aruch (“Teshuras Shai”), says (referring to this custom) that Eliezar ben Nathan (the great twelfth century Rhineland authority) has doubts about [the acceptability of] this custom.

It is clear, then, that the breaking of the glass at weddings is in no way to be compared with the recital of the blessings over the wine or the giving of the ring, which are essential parts of the ceremony. The breaking of the glass is merely a custom and, therefore, if we have good reasons for objecting to it we need not hesitate too much in saying so or in omitting it altogether.

My honored teacher, the late Professor Jacob Z. Lauterbach, of the Hebrew Union College, wrote a magnificent essay on the subject. It is found in the Hebrew Union College Annual, Vol. II. His essay is a complete analysis of the history and the mood of the custom. However, since the time when his essay was written there have been certain significant changes in the mood of the people and certain new opinions of Orthodox authorities. It may, therefore, be useful to restudy the question.

The bases usually stated as the source of the custom are the two incidents mentioned in the Talmud (b. Berachos 30 b -31 a ) where two rabbis (Mar, son of Rabina, and Rab Ashi) at the respective weddings of their children, noticed that the guests were hilarious and therefore broke an expensive glass vessel to shock them back to decorum. The Tosfos (eleventh century), commenting on the Talmudic passage, says: “It is from this that the custom arose to break a glass at weddings.”

Tracing the custom through the references in the medieval authorities, Dr. Lauterbach clearly shows that the custom had its true origin in popular superstition, specifically in the folk belief in demons who endanger the happiness of mortals, especially of bride and groom. This is evident from the fact that originally the glass used in the blessing, with the remainder of the wine in it, was thrown backward and smashed against the wall, evidently to scare away the demons. In some places when the glass was thus broken, the people exclaimed the verse (Psalm 124:7): “The net is broken and we have escaped” (“Taame Haminhagim,” I, pp. 1ll, 955, and Luncz, Jerusalem, I, pp. 7-8).

Dr. Lauterbach indicates that whenever the rabbis were unable to abolish a popular superstition and had to be reconciled to its continuation, they nevertheless managed to give the superstition a new interpretation so that in its meaning it would not be a flagrant violation of the rabbinic laws against demon worship, superstition, and so on. This, he indicates, was done with the demon scaring implied in the throwing of the glass at weddings. The new explanation was offered apparently for the first time in the book “Kol Bo” (laws of Tisha B’av, 62), fourteenth century, namely, that the glass is broken at weddings to remind us of the sadness which we feel at the destruction of Jerusalem, thus fulfilling the verse in Psalm 137: “I will remember Jerusalem at the time of my greatest joy.” This explanation was adopted by most of the subsequent authorities and, in fact, the custom became established among the Sephardim that when the glass was broken at the wedding, they all actually repeated the Psalm verse: “If I forget thee, O Jerusalem … at my greatest joy.”

Although this explanation was a late one, it was certainly a decent one and could be psychologically justified, and if this mood of mourning persisted in our time to express the real feeling of our people it might well be con tinued. Or, at least, we could then discuss the question of the appropriateness of the ceremony on that basis, and we would ask ourselves whether we modern people care to include in the joyous service of the wedding such sad memories. Some Orthodox people would say that we certainly should do so; for example, it has become an Orthodox custom, when a parent of bride or groom has died, to include in the joyous marriage ceremony the tearful prayer of El Mole Rachamim, with the same melody and the same text as is used at funerals. However, the sentiment of our Reform congregations is such that we do not care to interject sad thoughts into our marriage ceremony.

The fact that the ceremony of throwing the glass had its origin in the superstitious demon scaring of past folklore would not perhaps be too serious an objection nowadays, because the rabbis since the days of the “Kol Bo” have succeeded in wiping out the memory of its superstitious origin and now we can rightly say that our people have very little trace of such a superstition in this regard. A rabbi, of course, might dislike the ceremony because of its superstitious origin, but the people can no longer be accused of being superstitious when they participate in it. It would then be a matter for the rabbi to decide, whether he should not help to abolish a ceremony which has so dubious an origin. Yet even he would have to admit that the old origin hardly lives in the present thoughts of the people.

However, the ceremony did not remain in the somber (but worthy) mood to which the rabbis since the “Kol Bo” were leading it in their desire to abolish the superstitious demon fighting which was its essential meaning. The whole mood has changed and Dr. Lauterbach in his paper takes very little note of that fact. Nowadays the breaking of the glass no longer evokes sad and solemn thoughts of the destruction of Jerusalem. On the contrary, it evokes loud laughter, often applause, which mars the ceremony just as much as excessive sadness might have done. At many weddings, when the glass is smashed under the heel of the groom, people laugh delightedly and shout, “Mazel tov!” (Goodluck).

This change of mood has evoked protest on the part of certain Orthodox rabbis. These protests did not appear at the time when Dr. Lauterbach wrote his excellent paper, evidently because the Orthodox rabbis were slow or reluctant to realize what this excitement and laughter at the breaking of the glass really indicated. Certainly there is an element of boastful strength on the part of the groom. It is considered a good omen if he smashes the glass at the first attempt. The symbolism is obvious and the vulgarity can hardly be denied.

The late Hillel Posek, rabbi in Tel Aviv, in his collection “Hillel Omer” (Even Hoezer, 59), has an article on the breaking of the glass, and he begins it as follows: “In my own experience I have seen that after the breaking of the glass under the chuppah, people say ‘Mazel tov,’ and among the coarse crowd there arises laughter and hilarity and vulgar thoughts, each one according to his way.” He then says that he has tried to explain to people how wrong it is that after the breaking of the glass, which is a reminder of the destruction of the Temple, the people should shout out the congratulatory words “Mazel tov. ”

Much more serious and even heartbreaking is the comment of the late and justly honored Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Israel, Ben Zion Uziel, in his responsa, “Mishp’tey Uziel” (part II, Even Hoezer, p. 431). He writes to the Chief Rabbi of Venice, who has raised the objection (which is the same as the one which Hillel Posek had raised) that it is wrong to greet the breaking of the glass with joyous shouts of “Mazel tov, ” when instead they ought to quote the sad verse, “If I forget thee, O Jerusalem.” And now (says the Rabbi of Venice) this beautiful custom (of mourning for Jerusalem) has been turned into a ritual of boastful strength, and when the groom treads with vigor on the glass and breaks it into pieces, all the guests fill their mouths with laughter and say that it is a good sign. To which Ben Zion Uziel comments: “I also wish to express my unhappiness at this custom which in its present form is an unworthy custom. It would be better to abolish it entirely than to let it change to such an ugly form at which a decent soul recoils. Whenever I find myself at weddings and see this custom, I am greatly grieved at myself that I do not protest. We Sephardim used to say at the breaking of the glass: ‘If I forget thee, O Jerusalem,’ but now this new form of the custom has spread among us too. Oh, what harm is done by imitation and ignorance.”

This is the opinion of two Orthodox rabbis. When we consider how reluctant responsible Orthodox rabbis are to abolish any ancient custom, then it is obvious that the mood surrounding the breaking of the glass has become so unutterably vulgar that even they, at least those quoted, can no longer endure it; and the Sephardic Chief Rabbi could even wish that he were able to abolish it.

In this regard we are more fortunate than the Orthodox rabbis. The custom is already largely abolished among us and it is asked for only on relatively rare occasions. What, then, shall we do? It is possible, of course, if the rabbi himself feels attached to this custom because it is old, for him to make some spiritual interpretation of it, but even so, the moral lesson which he carefully tries to transmit is lost in the shouting and the laughter and the snickering when the glass is smashed. Many of us, however, have not particularly cared for this custom because of its superstitious demon-fearing origin. Nor were we attracted to the idea conveyed in the fourteenth-century reinterpretation, which would lead us to introduce tears in the midst of a happy wedding ritual. Certainly we are not attracted to it today, when the mood of the people has surrounded it with such thoughts as must only mar the sacredness of the marriage ceremony. If a ceremony of dubious origin becomes noble, it might in its new guise be admitted into our worship. But if even a noble ceremony has become ignoble, it should be firmly set aside.

RRR 170-172

Weddings and Other Ceremonieson Hoshana Rabba

Which nonsynagogue services, such as tombstone un veilings, funerals, weddings, and so forth, may be conducted on Hoshana Rabba? (From Rabbi Rav A. Soloff, Newark, New Jersey)

The real status of Hoshana Rabba is somewhat blurred by the fact that it has become a sort of final penitential day, the closing of the books of God’s Judgment for the year. Hence, the cantor puts on a kittel, as if it were Yom Kippur, and certain additional piutim are recited, varying according to the specific rituals.

However, in spite of these penitential accretions, the day is the fifth day of Chol Hamo-ed Succoth. Most communities omit the Sabbath psalms and all omit Nishmas (see Isserles to 664: 1). Also, after services, work is permitted. In other words, in spite of its penitential overtones, the day is Chol Hamo-ed.

Which nonsynagogue rituals may be conducted on Chol Hamo-ed? Let us begin with the least important, the ceremony for the setting of tombstones, which has absolutely no basis or status in Jewish law. It is an American development, although occasionally in Europe a sermon would be given under certain special circumstances at the setting of a tombstone. This whole custom in America of tombstone setting has been bitterly objected to by recent pious immigrants; in fact, in Hamaor, their magazine, they declare it should be absolutely abolished. I never participate in these ceremonies, but I know that since it has spread in America, it is difficult for many of our colleagues to avoid it. I mention all this merely to tell you that it has no place in Jewish law and, therefore, there is no regulation about it, and in general there is no reason why it should not be held on Chol Hamo-ed.

As for funerals, because the law is so anxious for burial to take place, whenever possible, on the day of death, funerals are actually permitted on the first day of holidays if non-Jews perform the work; and certainly on the second day of holidays Jews may perform the work involved (see Orah Hayyim 526 :1-4, and Reform Jewish Practice, Vol. I, p. 117). Therefore there is, of course, no objection to funerals on Hoshana Rabba.

With regard to weddings the situation is somewhat dif ferent, and it is a matter of discretion for the following reasons: Orthodox custom prohibits marriage on Chol Hamo-ed generally, because “one should not confuse one joy with another joy”; that is to say, we should not confuse the joy of the wedding with the joy of the Yom Tov. However, we Reformers do officiate at weddings on Chol Hamoed. Nevertheless, I would say that we should avoid weddings, if possible, on Hoshana Rabba, although it is Chol Hamo-ed. This particular Chol Hamo-ed day has in Jewish tradition many overtones of the Yom Kippur penitential mood, and while we do not observe it as such, a wedding would offend many non-Reform Jews. I call your attention to the wording in the middle of page 73 of Reform Jewish Practice, Vol. I: “In Reform congregations, where Chol Hamo-ed is not marked by any especial observances or laws, marriages are often performed.” Hoshana Rabba has this special penitential mood. I would therefore proceed as follows: If it is a small wedding in the study, I would perform it; if a large, festive wedding is planned, I would endeavor to persuade the family to pick another date. All this is merely because of maris ayin, the “look of things,” and the possible negative reaction.

MRR 116-120

SOLDIER WEARING A SWORD AT WEDDING

QUESTION:

At a recent marriage a military officer was to be married in full dress uniform, which includes the wearing of a sword. Should this be permitted? (From Vigdor W. Kavaler, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.)

ANSWER:

THERE HAS been a wide variety of customs as to what was the proper garment for the groom to wear at his wedding. The Mishnah in Sotah IX: 14 speaks of the fact that both bride and groom wore a crown, but that this custom in time of persecution was abolished. Maharil, in the fourteenth century in Mainz, describes a wedding in detail and speaks of the groom wearing ashes on his head as a mark of mourning for Jerusalem, and also wearing the sargenes (i.e., the kittel). In fact it was the custom in Eastern Europe (a custom still followed by many Orthodox people) to consider the wed ding day, if not as actually a time of mourning, as at least a time of repentance. This is based upon the Talmudic idea ( j . Bikurim 65d and Isserles, Even Ha’ezer 61:1) that for the bride and groom the wedding day is a day of repentance like the Day of Atonement. Therefore, the bride and groom fast until the wedding cere-mony and, therefore, in Eastern Europe (according to some customs) the bride wore a shroud under her wed-ding gown and the groom wore a kittel, the white, shroudlike garment of Yom Kippur. A more general custom, widely observed, was for the groom to wear a talit, a custom generally based upon the juxtaposition of the verses in Scripture (Deut. 22:12,13) where the verse: “Thou shalt put fringes upon they garments,” comes right before the verse: “If a man taketh a woman to wife.” More romantically explained, the origin of the custom of the groom’s wearing a talit derives from the fact that the bride makes him a gift of his first talit (since unmarried men do not wear the full talit), and that the four sets of eight threads in the fringes total thirtytwo, which is the numerical equivalent of the Hebrew word lev, which means “heart.” However, practically speaking, the groom’s talit was an essential part of the wedding ceremony, since before the development of the chupah (canopy) in the late Middle Ages, the custom was (and is still the custom in parts of western Germany) that the groom, during the ceremony, spreads his talit over the head of the bride, thus symbolizing their seclusion and their unity. However, most of these customs of special wear for the groom and the bride are no longer practiced among some Orthodox Jews, and certainly not among non Orthodox Jews. Therefore we can say that there is no objection to whatever type of clothes or uniform the bridegroom wears.

Although this, in general, is the case, that in those marriages which are not strictly Orthodox a soldier may be married in his uniform, nevertheless there may be a specific objection to the wearing of a sword, since the sword does seem to symbolize a mood opposite to the mood of unity and love which should prevail at a wedding. Hence the question. Besides this feeling, the very fact that this question was asked is an indication that there is some recollection of some Jewish law that may be directly involved. It is this latter question which concerns us.

The Mishnah in Berachot XI:5 says that it is forbidden to enter the Temple Mount in Jerusalem carrying one’s moneybelt and one’s walking stick. But according to the Shulchan Aruch ( Orach Chayim 151:6) it is permitted to enter our synagogue (i.e., not the ancient Temple) with staff and money belt. But Joseph Caro adds that “Some say that it is forbidden to enter a synagogue with a long knife.” In his Bet Joseph, his commentary to the Tur, he gives the source of this individual opinion. It is taken from the Orchot Chayim (Aaron of Lunel) Vol. I, “Laws of the Synagogue,” #7, where this prohibition is mentioned in the name of Meir of Rothenburg. The reason given by Meir of Rothenburg as quoted by the Orchot Chayim is that the synagogue prolongs life and the “long knife” short-ens it. But this is an individual sentiment, not a law. The Tur does not mention it at all. Since it is not a fixed law, we have no right to promulgate it. It is a principle in Jewish law that one may not prohibit that which is permitted.

Moreover, besides its not being a law, when it is mentioned it is only with regard to entering the synagogue sanctuary. In other words, if the marriage did not take place in the sanctuary itself (say, in the rabbi’s study or in a hall) even this individual objection to a “long knife” would not apply.

To sum up: The custom of special garments of mourning to be worn by bride and groom has largely lapsed among most Jews. There is, therefore, no requirement as to the type of garments to be worn. As for the full military officer’s uniform which includes a sword, there is only one chance opinion that one should not enter the synagogue with a long knife. But that is not the law and, besides, it applies only to the sanctuary itself.

An analogous question was dealt with recently by Eliezar Wildenberg of Jerusalem in Volume X (#18) of his responsa series Tsits Eliezar. The responsum, of course, reflects the tense situation which prevails at present in Israel. He was answering the question as to whether an Israeli soldier may enter the synagogue with a rifle or a revolver. He calls attention to the fact that the origin of the law prohibiting entering the synagogue with weapons is to be found in Sanhedrin 82a (bottom of the page) which cites the text from Numbers 25:7 that Phineas “went forth out of the congregation and took the spear in his hand.” From which the Talmud concludes that one may not handle a spear except outside of the congregation or the synagogue.

Wildenberg suggests that it would be better if the bullets were taken out of the rifle or revolver so that while the soldier is in the synagogue these should cease to be lethal weapons. Or he suggests that they may be covered and that, perhaps, the revolver being enclosed in the holster, is not too objectionable. He adds, how-ever, that in time of danger when these men are actively protecting the community, none of the restrictions need apply.

CORR 98-103

WEDDING WITHOUT A LICENSE

QUESTION:

Two elderly people, both on Social Security, would like to be married by Jewish law (by a Rabbi and under a a Chuppah, etc.) but without taking out a marriage license. The reason for their desiring to be married without a marriage license was to avoid reduction in the total of their Social Security. May the Rabbi officiate at this marriage? Is this mariage valid according to Jewish law? (Asked by Rabbi Allen S. Mailer, Culver City, California.)

ANSWER:

THE QUESTION raised here may very well become an important one. I have learned from a number of sources that there are many elderly people now living together without any marriage ceremony at all. The reason that they are not formally married is the same as given in the question, namely, to avoid reduction in their joint Social Security. This couple, a religious minded couple, would not live together without some marriage ceremony. There are undoubtedly other such couples, so the question will very likely come up rather often.

The specific question asked is whether this marriage (if the Rabbi does conduct it) is valid according to Jewish law. Of course it is. Jewish marriage is not dependent upon outside law, nor is it dependent upon the formalities of public ritual. Jewish legal literature is full of cases in which a young man in the presence of others gave an object of value to a young girl and said that the object was given for the purpose of marriage. If the girl accepts the object for this purpose and there are legal witnesses present, the marriage is certainly valid enough to require a get, a Jewish divorce, if it ever is to be dissolved. So considering Jewish law separately, if the groom gives an object as, for example, a ring, and pronounces the words which indicate that it is for the purpose of marriage, and there were valid (kosher) witnesses present, this marriage is valid Jewishly and would require a get to dissolve it.

But the Rabbi and the couple are also citizens of the United States and are subject to American law. So it becomes important to ask: Would this marriage be valid in the eyes of the state? Let us say, for example, that the state (as many states do) prohibits the marriage of two cousins, a marriage which is permitted in Jewish law. A Rabbi officiating at such a marriage would be conducting a valid Jewish marriage but a non-valid state marriage. Should a Rabbi officiate at such a marriage when there is such a conflict of laws?

As far as I know, there has been no discussion of this conflict in American-Jewish legal literature. It has been discussed in England by the Anglo-Jewish legal scholar, H. S. Q. Henriques, in his book, Jewish Marriage and English Law, London, 1909. In England many immigrants came from eastern Europe, where the state exercised no control over Jewish marriage, and the sole evidence that the marriage had taken place was the Jewish marriage document, the kesubah. English law accepts the kesubah as evidence. Then, also, there were some marriages conducted by Rabbis, in England, which would be invalid in English law (such as a marriage of an uncle and niece) but were valid by Jewish law. These were called in Jewish parlance a shtille chuppeh (a silent or a private marriage ceremony). Henriques does not say that such a marriage is invalid, but he says (page 5 3) : “Though valid, such marriage should not be encouraged, being in direct contradiction to the spirit of modern legislation.” He adds further that it would lead to many abuses, such as desertion, etc.

Until you raised the question, I do not remember reading anywhere in our American-Jewish literature, any question of a shtille chuppeh, that is to say, a marriage without legal license or validation.

It must now be mentioned that an important practical question, from the point of view of the Rabbi, must first be settled. Is the Rabbi violating the state law by officiating for a couple who do not have a marriage license? I have received various legal opinions on this matter. The majority opinion seems to be that it is a violation of the law so to officiate. Another opinion is that since our particular state (Pennsylvania) gives some recognition to common law marriage, a Rabbi officiating at such a marriage might not be considered culpable. But even the latter opinion (as to common law marriage) is debated on the ground that common law marriage is recognized only as a man’s acknowledgment of a present situation, but not as a prepared-for status. Therefore it would be wise for the Rabbi, before officiating at such a shtille chuppeh, to inquire from legal authorities whether or not he may be violating the law of the state.

So far the conflict between the two legal systems has been discussed from the point of view of state law; i.e., what attitude the state will take to a marriage without its permission (license). But now we must ask the other question, from the point of view of Jewish law: What is the attitude of Jewish law to a marriage conducted contrary to the laws of the state? Is there not the well known principle in Jewish law, dina d’malchusa dina, that the law of the state is valid in Jewish law?

Of course this principle applies primarily to civil matters, taxes, business law, etc., but not to ritual matters. If the state imposes a tax on the entire community, it is a valid mandate in Jewish law that the tax must be paid. But the principle does not apply to spiritual and ritual matters. If, for example, the state would prohibit the Jewish method of slaughtering animals (as has happened in certain countries) or the holding of religious services on Saturday (as might happen when Church and State are one) in such matters we do not say that the law of the state is valid in Jewish law. On the contrary, we would (as a matter of conscience) resist the law of the state in all such religious matters.

Now marriage and divorce are deemed spiritual matters in which the law of the state does not apply. Thus if a couple is divorced by civil law, they are not yet considered divorced in Jewish Orthodox law, but must also receive a Jewish divorce (get). Nevertheless, even in this case, in practice (if not in theory) Jewish law takes cognizance of civil law. In actual practice in America, a get is not granted by Jewish authorities unless the couple has first received a divorce from the state courts. But as far as I know, there has been no discussion in the United States of the interrelationship of Jewish law and state law in regard to marriage.

Although the principle of dina d’malchusa dina does not apply to such matters as marriage and divorce, there is a directly relevant way in which it does apply in the particular marriage which is the subject of this inquiry. As has been mentioned, the principle of dina d’malchusa dina applies in civil matters. In the discussion of this principle it has been frequently stated that not every fiscal law by the ruler of the state (the law was developed during the period of monarchy) was deemed valid in Jewish law. If it was an unfair tax placed only upon the Jews, or if it was some willful notion of the king, such decrees, although fiscal, were not valid in Jewish law. It was only such valid laws which applied equally to all citizens which were deemed valid in Jewish law.

Now it is evident that the Federal regulations governing Social Security are just and equal laws promulgated by authorized legal bodies, and as such, are deemed absolutely valid in Jewish law. Therefore since this marriage ceremony is being conducted without a license for the purpose of evading or contravening the just and legal regulations governing Social Security, such an arrangement must be deemed illegal, even from the Jewish point of view.

To sum up: Considered separately, as a Jewish ceremony, the marriage in question would be valid and would certainly require a Jewish divorce to dissolve it. It may, however, be an illegal action by the Rabbi who officiates, if the law of the state requires a recording and information of every marriage conducted. Furthermore, it is questionable whether such a marriage would be accepted as valid by the state. Finally, since the Social Security legislation is a civil matter, its laws are valid in Jewish law. Therefore from the Jewish point of view, the Rabbi may not assist in contravening the laws of Social Security.

NRR 182-188

WEDDING BEFORE THE OPEN ARK

QUESTION:

A couple about to be married in the synagogue asked that during the ceremony the doors of the Ark be opened. Should this request be granted? (Asked by Vigdor Kavaler, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.)

ANSWER:

NOWADAYS MANY young couples about to be married feel

very independent-minded about the wedding service. They seem to be of the opinion that since it is their

wedding, they have the right to dictate, to a considerable degree, the form of the ceremony. In these days of increased mixed marriages, rabbis are naturally inclined to be concessive to the requests of any couple that wishes to be married by a rabbi. Of course, some of these special requests are of no important consequence and can be granted readily, but some are of such a nature that they cannot be granted at all. Some couples will ask that the

rabbi officiate with a Christian minister. This will, of course, occur in mixed marriages, not when both groom

and bride are Jews. Some couples seem to wish to write the entire service themselves. Other couples insist upon having certain poetry or certain loving paragraphs that they have written to each other included in the traditional ceremony. This limited request is generally granted because it does not involve any omission of the traditional essentials of the service but is merely an addition which is of no special consequence.

But a request has come recently that during the wedding ceremony the doors of the Holy Ark be open so that the Torahs be visible. Should this request be among those which the rabbi can readily grant?

It is necessary, first of all, to make clear the Halachic status of our present custom, in all Reform and most Conservative congregations (and now in some Orthodox congregations), to have the wedding ceremony in the synagogue auditorium itself. This is an important and a controversial question. Large sections of Jewry, primarily Orthodox, consider it quite wrong to hold the ceremony indoors. I have been informed that in certain Chassidic marriages in New York, when the marriage takes place in a hired hall, the ceremony is conducted under an open skylight. The preference for marriages to take place in the open air is based upon a statement by Moses Isserles in Shulchan Aruch, Even Hoezer 61:1, in which he says, “Some say that a marriage should take place under the open sky as a good omen [simmon tov] to symbolize God’s blessing to Abraham that his descendants shall be as numerous as the stars of the heaven.” Moses Sofer, the great Hungarian authority, in his responsa (Even Hoezer 98) insists that this suggestion of Isserles be strictly followed, and he says, further, that those who do not follow it are merely imitating the Christian custom of having marriages in the church.

However, in spite of the suggestion of Isserles and the insistence of Moses Sofer, it cannot be said that it is an actual law that the marriage must take place out of doors. As a matter of fact, Maharil, the great Rhenish authority (especially in the field of our Ashkenazic minhagim), always conducted marriages within the synagogue. There was indeed a preliminary ritual outside of the synagogue in the courtyard, but the marriage itself, with the blessings, took place in the synagogue itself (Maharil, Hil. Chasuna).

An interesting modern discussion as to whether marriages may or may not take place in the synagogue is found in the responsa of the modern Orthodox authority, Moses Feinstein (Even Hoezer # 9 3) . He was asked the following question: A rabbi of an Orthodox congregation was required by the congregation to attend (if not to participate in) all the marriages of the congregation members. In this Orthodox congregation, the marriages take place in the synagogue. Therefore this rabbi asks Moses Feinstein whether, because of the statements of Isserles and Moses Sofer, he should refuse to attend the weddings in the synagogue even though, if he does refuse to attend, he may lose his position. Moses Feinstein (while he did not quote the actual practice of Maharil, who conducted marriages in the synagogue) says that Isserles’ statement is not law—it is only good advice for a good omen (simmon tov) for those who wish to follow it; and as for the prohibition against synagogue marriages by Moses Sofer, that was stated under special circumstances. Moses Sofer was fighting the custom of the Reformers, whom he accused of imitating the practices of Gentile church weddings by having the weddings in the synagogue. But actually, says Moses Feinstein, the rabbi may attend the marriages in the synagogue, and in fact, he is in duty bound to attend to see that they are conducted according to Jewish law. So it is clear that our present general custom of having the marriages in the synagogue, while contrary to the rather widespread practice of having them in the open air, is nevertheless fully in accord with Jewish legal tradition.

However, there is one significant difference between Reform marriages in the synagogue and Orthodox marriages besides, of course, the variations in ritual. The difference relevant to our discussion is the location within the synagogue where the wedding takes place.

When Maharil conducted the wedding ceremony in the synagogue in Mainz, the ceremony took place on the bimah (he calls it migdal), i.e., the reading desk and enclosure which, in all Orthodox synagogues, is in the center of the synagogue, about equidistant between the Ark and the exit doors. So today in Orthodox synagogues, when the ceremony does take place in the synagogue, it likewise takes place upon the bimah, the reading enclosure in the center of the synagogue. But in Reform congregations and in most Conservative congregations, the bimah, the center of the synagogue, has long since been omitted. The seating now is solid from the Ark to the door. Therefore, when marriages take place in a Reform or Conservative congregation, they take place on the platform right in front of and close to the Ark. Thus these marriages already are in the most sacred part of the synagogue, which is not at all inappropriate since marriage is a sacred institution and the ceremony is called Kid-dushin, “sacredness.” The Ark, too, is considered tashmishey kedusha, “the appurtenances of the holy,” so it is quite appropriate that the wedding ceremony, called Kiddushin, should take place right in front of the Ark, which is tashmishey kedusha.

Even when the Ark is closed, it must be understood that the precinct is considered sacred. If so, then why may a preacher stand with his back to the Ark during the sermon? The answer given is that when the Ark doors are closed, the Ark is considered a separate enclosure. Besides, the preacher stands there for only a limited time. It would be considered wrong, however, for people so to be seated in the synagogue that their backs are toward the closed Ark. In fact, those pious people who would spend a whole night of Yom Kippur in the synagogue are expected to be very careful that when they fall asleep, they are seated as far as possible from the Ark. It is even said that when people leave the synagogue, they should not turn their backs completely on the Ark, but rather sidle out through the door. (All the above laws and customs are described in the Encyclopedia Talmudit under the heading “Aron Ha-Kodesh.”) So it is clear that even when the Ark is closed, we must be aware and considerate of its sanctity. Nevertheless, for the brief time of the wedding ceremony, it is permissible that the rabbi or the married couple will have their backs toward the Ark, since the closed Ark is considered a separate enclosure.

But now comes the additional request—which seems to be based on the feeling that the sanctity of the closed Ark is insufficient—that the doors of the Ark be opened and the sacred scrolls be visible to all during the wedding ceremony.

This suggestion raises certain difficulties, if not in law, at least in custom. Many authorities and many communities insist that whenever the Ark is open, the congregation must stand. Therefore, during the service on Sabbath and holidays, when the Torah is taken out to be read, all communities follow the rule that people stand while the Torah is moved from the Ark to the reading desk; but some communities will stand as long as the Ark is open (see the authorities cited in Contemporary Reform Re-sponsa, pp. 37-39). Therefore, the custom has developed in some communities, for the sake of the congregation, not to keep the Ark open after the Torahs are taken out. Therefore, keeping the Ark open during a wedding ceremony might lead many to feel that the sacredness of the visible Sefer Torahs would require them to stand all through the wedding ceremony, which would certainly be a hardship for many.

Furthermore, on certain special occasions of worship, such as Yom Kippur, the Ark doors are solemnly opened. Is it wise, then, to destroy the uniqueness and the special impressiveness of those worship occasions by making the open Ark a frequent and, therefore, commonplace event?

To sum up, it cannot be said that there is a definite law against having the doors of the Ark open during a wedding ceremony, but sentiment and general good sense would be opposed to such a practice. If a couple insists on it, and if the circumstances are such that it is better to give in to their request, that may be done. But, in general, there is a danger that if it is permitted for one couple, others will deem it a privilege which they are entitled to also, and soon it would become common practice. It is this danger that must be avoided. Let the couple understand that having their ceremony on the platform right by the Holy Ark is certainly sacredness enough, and the request to open the Ark should, for the sake of the convenience of the congregation and retaining the solemnity of the special religious services, be discouraged as much as possible.

CARR 283-284

CCAR RESPONSA

Contemporary American Reform Responsa

**189. A Minyan at a Wedding**

Ceremony

QUESTION: Is a minyan required to be present at a

wedding ceremony? (P. L., Pittsburgh, PA)ANSWER: The traditional requirement

for a minyan is based upon the Talmudic interpretation (Ket. 7b) of Ruth (4.2), “He took

ten men of the elders of the city.” The Talmud felt that they were taken to act as

witnesses. Eight of these may be relatives, and two must be unrelated so that they can attest to

the value of the ring and the propriety of the ketubah. Jacob Moelln (Hilkhot

Nisuin) required two additional witnesses for the ketubah. The assembled witnesses

and relatives could later be called as witnesses in case the legality of the wedding was

questioned. Two witnesses are used for our ketubah in keeping with the

tradition. A minyan provides a more formal and public setting for the wedding (A.

Freimann, Seder Qidushin Venisuin, p. 16; P. Dykan, Dinei Nisuin Vegerushin, p.

29). Medieval authorities repeatedly felt the need for a minyan in order to prevent

misrepresentation and deception (Adret and others; see Freimann, op. cit., pp. 50 f, 102

ff, 160 f). Although every effort to have a minyan should be made, it is not essential that

a minyan be present in keeping with the old tradition that a service can also be conducted

with a lesser number, and it is certainly valid b’diavad (Sof. 10.8; Shulhan Arukh

Even Haezer 34.4). If a minyan is constituted, men and women would count equally in

keeping with our Reform traditions.February 1977

If needed, please consult Abbreviations used in CCAR Responsa.